Woodard v. Griffin et al

Filing 16

ORDER GRANTING 14 MOTION to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim filed by Bollen, Carl, Arnold, Griffin, Henery. This case is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Signed by Honorable P. K. Holmes, III on March 7, 2018. (mjm)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
HOT SPRINGS DIVISION
BART WAYNE WOODARD
v.

PLAINTIFF
Civil No. 6:17-06126

CORRECTIONAL OFFICER GRIFFIN,
SERGEANT HENERY, LIEUTENANT
CARL, CAPTAIN KING, MAJOR
ARNOLD, and MAJOR BOLLEN

DEFENDANTS
ORDER

The instant matter is a civil rights action filed by the Plaintiff, Bart Woodard, pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff proceeds pro se and in forma pauperis. (ECF No. 1, 9). He is currently
incarcerated in the Arkansas Department of Correction, Ouachita River Unit, and alleges that his
constitutional rights were violated when the staff failed to protect him from assault by an inmate.
Before the Court is the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. (ECF No. 14). The Defendants
assert that Plaintiff’s Complaint should be dismissed because he failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies before filing suit. The Plaintiff has not responded to the motion.
The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) in 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) provides: “[n]o action
shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other
Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such
administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.”

Exhaustion is mandatory. Porter v.

Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524-25 (2002). In Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007), the Supreme Court
concluded that “to properly exhaust administrative remedies prisoners must complete the
administrative review process in accordance with the applicable procedural rules.” Id. at 218
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The Court stated that the “level of detail necessary
in a grievance to comply with the grievance procedures will vary from system to system and claim

to claim, but it is the prison’s requirements, and not the PLRA, that define the boundaries of proper
exhaustion.” Id.
“[F]ailure to exhaust available administrative remedies is an affirmative defense, not a
matter of subject matter jurisdiction.” Lenz v. Wade, 490 F.3d 991, 993 n. 2 (8th Cir. 2007).
However, dismissal for failure to exhaust can occur prior to the summary judgment stage if the
complaint makes it clear that the plaintiff failed to exhaust.
Here, the Plaintiff’s Complaint states that he did not present the facts relating to his
complaint in the written prisoner grievance procedure. The Plaintiff further states that he was in
fear of retaliation because his complaint involved an ADC staff member and an inmate Marshall
who was recently transferred to another unit. (ECF No. 1). Plaintiff’s subjective fears do not
excuse exhaustion. The Eighth Circuit has stated “[t]he statute’s requirements are clear: If
administrative remedies are available, the prisoner must exhaust them.” Chelette v. Harris, 229
F.3d 684, 688 (8th Cir. 2000). See also Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 85 (2006) (“[e]xhaustion
is mandatory”).
Accordingly, the instant motion (ECF No. 14) should be, and hereby is, GRANTED, and
this action is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 7th day of March, 2018.
/s/P. K. Holmes, III
P.K. HOLMES, III
CHIEF U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE

2