Alvaro Quezada v. Al K Scribner

Filing 106

ORDER re Respondent Al K. Scribner's ("Respondent") Motion for Review of United States Magistrate Judge's Partial Denial of Respondent's Motion to Depart From Mandate came on for regular calendar before the Court 98 by Judg e Ronald S.W. Lew. The Court finds that the Magistrate Judge was not clearly erroneous in deciding that the Superior Court made a ruling solely on procedural grounds and that Pinholster does not apply. As such, the Court OVERRULES Respondent's objections to the Magistrate Judge's order and AFFIRMS the Magistrate Judge's order. (lom)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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10 Alvaro Quezada,

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On October 4, 2011, Respondent Al K. Scribner’s

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Petitioner,
v.

13 Al K. Scribner,
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Respondent.

CV 04-07532-RSWL(MLGx)
ORDER re: Respondent’s
Motion for Review of
United States Magistrate
Judge’s Partial Denial
of Respondent’s Motion
to Depart From Mandate
[98]

17 (“Respondent”) Motion for Review of United States
18 Magistrate Judge’s Partial Denial of Respondent’s
19 Motion to Depart From Mandate came on for regular
20 calendar before the Court [98].

The Court having

21 reviewed all papers submitted pertaining to this Motion
22 and having considered all arguments presented to the
23 Court NOW FINDS AND RULES AS FOLLOWS:
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The Court hereby OVERRULES Respondent’s Motion and

25 AFFIRMS the Magistrate Judge’s order.
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27 ///
28 ///
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I. BACKGROUND
This Action stems from a Writ of Habeas Corpus

3 filed by Petitioner Alvaro Quezada (“Petitioner”) on
4 September 10, 2004 [1].

This Court originally denied

5 Petitioner’s Writ of Habeas Corpus on November 21,
6 2007.

However, on August 18, 2010, the Ninth Circuit

7 remanded Petitioner’s Writ back to this Court and
8 issued a mandate for an evidentiary hearing regarding
9 the admissibility of new evidence pertaining to
10 Petitioner’s Brady violation claim [65].

In response,

11 Respondent filed a Motion with Magistrate Judge Marc L.
12 Goldman to stop the hearing and depart from the Ninth
13 Circuit’s Mandate pursuant to Supreme Court precedent
14 [92].1

Magistrate Judge Goldman, however, issued an

15 Order partially denying Respondent’s Motion, finding
16 that Pinholster does not apply to Petitioner’s Brady
17 violation claim because the Superior Court did not
18 reject the Brady violation claim on the merits [97].2
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Cullen v. Pinholster, ---- U.S. ----, 131 S. Ct.
21 1388 (Apr. 4, 2011) and Walker v. Martin, ---- U.S. ---, 131 S. Ct. 1120 (Feb. 23, 2011).
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The Supreme Court in Cullen v. Pinholster held
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that a federal court’s review of a state court’s habeas
24 corpus decision is “limited to the record that was
before the state court that adjudicated the claim on
25 the merits.” 131 S. Ct. at 1398. The Pinholster Court
26 explicitly noted that its holding only applied to
habeas corpus claims that “fall within the scope of §
27 2254(d),” meaning claims adjudicated on the merits of
28 the federal claim in state court proceedings. Id. at
1400-01.
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1 On September 2, 2011, Respondent filed this present
2 Motion for Review of the Magistrate’s Partial Denial of
3 Respondent’s Motion to Depart from Mandate [98].
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II. LEGAL STANDARD

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“When a pretrial matter not dispositive of a

6 party’s claim or defense is referred to a magistrate
7 judge” and the magistrate judge issues an order stating
8 the decision, a party may object to the magistrate
9 judge’s order by filing a motion for the district judge
10 to overrule the magistrate judge.
11 72(a).

Fed. R. Civ. Pro.

In reviewing the order from the magistrate

12 judge, “[t]he district judge in the case must consider
13 timely objections and modify or set aside any part of
14 the order that is clearly erroneous or contrary to
15 law.”
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Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 72(a).

To conclude that a magistrate judge is “clearly

17 erroneous, the district court must arrive at a
18 ‘definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
19 committed.’” Folb v. Motion Picture Indus. Pension &
20 Health Plans, 16 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1168 (C.D. Cal.
21 1998)(quoting Federal Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp. v.
22 Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co., 130 F.R.D. 507
23 (D.D.C. 1990)).
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III. DISCUSSION
The Court finds that the Magistrate Judge did not

26 clearly err in concluding that the Superior Court
27 disposed of Petitioner’s Brady violation claim solely
28 on procedural grounds.
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Upon review, the Court finds that the language of

2 the Superior Court’s decision is in accordance with the
3 Magistrate Judge’s ruling that the Superior Court did
4 not rule on the merits.

More specifically, the

5 Superior Court was explicit in rejecting Petitioner’s
6 Brady violation claim as untimely and hence
7 procedurally barred.

At the beginning of its ruling,

8 the Superior Court stated in pertinent part that:
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Petitioner contends that he has met a
timeliness exception by virtue of recent
discovery of new evidence. . . . As discussed
subsequently, [Petitioner] fails to
demonstrate the ‘constitutional magnitude'
necessary to be granted an exception.
This petition is not timely."

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14 Resp. Mot. at Ex. B. at 22 (emphasis added).
15 The Court finds that this excerpt makes it clear that
16 the Superior Court denied Petitioner’s Brady habeas
17 claim as untimely and not within the “constitutional
18 magnitude” exception to timeliness.3
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Respondent argues that the Superior Court’s

20 decision should be viewed as containing two alternate
21 rulings, one on procedural grounds and one on the
22 merits.

To support its argument, Respondent highlights

23 various passages that allegedly indicate that the
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The constitutional magnitude exception requires
26 that the “error of constitutional magnitude led to a
trial that was so fundamentally unfair that absent the
27 error no reasonable judge or jury would have convicted
28 the petitioner.” In re Robbins, 18 Cal. 4th 770, 780
(1998).
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1 Superior Court made a ruling on the merits.

When read

2 in isolation, the passages highlighted by Respondent
3 may be misinterpreted as an analysis on the merits
4 given that the standard for proof for the
5 “constitutional magnitude” exception to timeliness is
6 similar to a discussion of the merits of a habeas
7 claim.4

The Court finds, however, that when read in the

8 context of the Superior Court’s decision as a whole,
9 these passages can only be interpreted to be a
10 discussion of the “constitutional magnitude” exception
11 to timeliness.

More specifically, all these passages

12 follow the Superior Court’s explicit statement that the
13 “constitutional magnitude” exception will be “discussed
14 subsequently.”
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Resp. Mot. at Ex. B. at 22

In sum, the Court finds that the language of the

16 Superior Court’s decision supports the Magistrate
17 Judge’s ruling.
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To prove an error of constitutional magnitude
22 occurred, “the petitioner would have to persuade the
court that had the excluded evidence been presented, he
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would have been acquitted or convicted of a lesser
24 offense. As is required when newly discovered evidence
is the basis for a habeas corpus petition, the evidence
25 must be such that it would ‘undermine the entire
26 prosecution case and point unerringly to innocence or
reduced culpability.’” Clark, 5 Cal.4th at 797, n.32
27 (quoting People v. Gonzalez, 51 Cal.3d 1179, 1246
28 (1990)).
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IV. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the Court finds that the Magistrate

3 Judge was not clearly erroneous in deciding that the
4 Superior Court made a ruling solely on procedural
5 grounds and that Pinholster does not apply.

As such,

6 the Court OVERRULES Respondent’s objections to the
7 Magistrate Judge’s order and AFFIRMS the Magistrate
8 Judge’s order.
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11 DATED: October 13, 2011
12 IT IS SO ORDERED.
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HONORABLE RONALD S.W. LEW
Senior, U.S. District Court Judge

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