Frederick Lee Jackson v. Michael Barnes et al
Filing
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ORDER ACCEPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS by Judge Ronald S.W. Lew. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that (1) Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED as to Michael Barnes' liability; (2) Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED as to Patricia M. Murphy's and Ventura County Sheriff's Department's liability; (3) Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED as to Patricia M. Murphy's liability; and (4) Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED as to Michael Barnes' and the Ventura County Sheriff's Department's liability. (es)
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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FREDERICK LEE JACKSON,
Plaintiff,
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Case No. CV 04-08017 RSWL (RAO)
v.
MICHAEL BARNES, et al.,
Defendants.
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ORDER ACCEPTING FINDINGS,
CONCLUSIONS, AND
RECOMMENDATIONS OF
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE
JUDGE
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Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636, the Court has reviewed the Third Amended
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Complaint, all of the records and files herein, and the Magistrate Judge’s Report
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and Recommendation, dated February 4, 2016. Further, the Court has engaged in a
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de novo review of those portions of the Report to which the Parties have objected.
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The Court accepts and adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of
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the Magistrate Judge.
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On September 27, 2004, Plaintiff Frederick Lee Jackson filed the instant
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action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff filed his Third Amended Complaint on
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May 12, 2015, asserting claims against Defendants Michael Barnes, Patricia
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Murphy, and the Ventura County Sheriff’s Department.
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Defendants moved for summary judgment on all claims in the Third Amended
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Complaint.
Both Plaintiff and
On February 4, 2016, the Magistrate Judge issued a Report and
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Recommendation, recommending that the Court grant, in part, and deny, in part, the
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Parties’ cross-summary judgment motions. Both Plaintiff and Defendants have
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filed Objections to the Report.
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Defendants object to the Report’s finding that Plaintiff was taken into
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custody for purposes of Miranda. (Defs.’ Objs. at 2.) Defendants argue that the
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circumstances in this case closely resemble the circumstances found in Howes v.
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Fields, --- U.S. ----, 132 S. Ct. 1181, 182 L. Ed. 2d 17 (2012). (See id. at 2-5.) In
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Howes, two sheriff’s deputies questioned a Michigan jail inmate about allegations
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of sexual conduct with a minor occurring before his incarceration. 132 S. Ct. at
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1185. A deputy led the inmate down one floor of the facility and through a locked
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door to a conference room in another section of the facility. Id. at 1185-86. The
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deputies told the inmate that he was free to leave and return to his jail cell at the
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beginning of and during the interview. Id. at 1186. The deputies were armed, but
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the inmate was not restrained. Id. The conference-room door was open at times
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and closed at times during the interview. Id. The inmate was questioned between
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five and seven hours and was at no time given Miranda warnings. Id.
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About halfway through the interview, the inmate “became agitated and began
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to yell” after being confronted with allegations of abuse. Howes, 132 S. Ct. at
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1186. One of the deputies, using an expletive, told the inmate to sit and said that
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“‘if [he] didn’t want to cooperate, [he] could leave.” Id. The inmate told the
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deputies “several times during the interview that he no longer wanted to talk” to
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them, but he did not ask to return to his cell. Id. The inmate ultimately confessed.
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After the interview, the inmate waited 20 minutes for an officer to be summoned to
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take him back to his jail cell. Id.
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The United States Supreme Court found that the inmate was not in custody
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for purposes of Miranda. Howes, 132 S. Ct. at 1192-93. The Court indicated that,
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in assessing the question of custody, a court must consider all of the circumstances
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surrounding the interrogation to determine whether a reasonable person would not
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have felt free to end the interrogation and leave. Id. at 1189. The Court stated that
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“[w]hen a prisoner is questioned, the determination of custody should focus on all
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of the features of the interrogation … includ[ing] the language that is used in
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summoning the prisoner to the interview and the manner in which the interrogation
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is conducted.” Id. at 1192.
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Defendants attempt to draw favorable comparisons with Howes, arguing that
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Plaintiff was subjected to even fewer restraints and therefore could not have been in
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custody for purposes of Miranda. (See Defs.’ Objs. at 3-5.) Defendants contend
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that the undisputed facts show Plaintiff was a sophisticated criminal, Defendant
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Barnes interviewed Plaintiff for less than five minutes, Barnes was unarmed during
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the interview, Plaintiff voluntarily ended the interview by standing up and telling
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the guards outside that he wanted to leave, and the conditions of the interview room
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were no harsher than Plaintiff’s usual environment. (See id.) In reaching their
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conclusion, however, Defendants err by taking a narrow view of the circumstances
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surrounding Plaintiff’s interview.
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The Court agrees with the Report that a comprehensive analysis that takes
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into consideration all of the circumstances surrounding Plaintiff’s interview leads to
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the conclusion that Plaintiff was in Miranda custody. See Howes, 132 S. Ct. at
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1192 (“the determination of custody should focus on all of the features of the
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interrogation …”) (emphasis added). For instance, Plaintiff was not told he was
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free to terminate the interview at any time.
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untruthful in his past interviews.
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confronted Plaintiff with evidence of guilt. Further, Barnes persisted in asking
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Plaintiff for his story – eight times, specifically – within an approximately four-
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minute timespan, despite Plaintiff refusing each time. Not only are these coercive
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aspects absent in Howes, they also outweigh the other circumstances suggesting
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Plaintiff was not in Miranda custody.
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///
Plaintiff was accused of being
Barnes insisted Plaintiff tell the truth and
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Defendants claim that the Report’s emphasis on the fact that Plaintiff was not
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informed he was free to leave undermines the totality of the circumstances test,
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citing to Howes, 132 S. Ct. at 1194, in support. (Defs.’ Objs. at 7.) But the Howes
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Court, in considering the totality of the circumstances, weighed this factor heavily.
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See, e.g., 132 S. Ct. at 1194 (“Taking into account all of the circumstances of the
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questioning – including especially the undisputed fact that respondent was told he
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was free to end the questioning and to return to his cell – we hold that respondent
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was not in custody within the meaning of Miranda.”) (emphasis added); see also id.
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at 1195 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (“Critical to the Court’s
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judgment is “the undisputed fact that [Fields] was told that he was free to end the
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questioning and to return to his cell.”). The Report’s consideration that Barnes did
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not inform Plaintiff he was free to leave, combined with the other coercive factors
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found in Plaintiff’s interview, does not render the Report’s custodial finding
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improper. See United States v. Thomas, Case No. 12-CR-0128-MJD-JJK, 2012 WL
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6812536, at *6, 7 (D. Minn. Dec. 19, 2012) (comparing Howes and finding
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custodial interrogation where, inter alia, defendant was not advised she was free to
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leave), R&R adopted, 2013 WL 101930 (D. Minn. Jan. 8, 2013).
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Defendants also object to the Report’s finding that Barnes is not entitled to
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qualified immunity, arguing that the specific context of this case had not been
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considered before 1993 so as to put a reasonable officer on notice that Barnes’
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conduct was unlawful. (Defs.’ Objs. at 6-8.) The argument is untenable because it
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rests on an unwarrantedly narrow view of the circumstances surrounding Plaintiff’s
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interview, glossing over the coercive aspects of the interview. (See id. at 6-7
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(claiming the context at issue here for determining qualified immunity is “where a
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prisoner already in custody is questioned for a matter of minutes by a single
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unarmed officer without any restriction on the inmate’s movement beyond that
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inherent in a prison setting”)); cf. Mullenix v. Luna, --- U.S. ----, 136 S. Ct. 305,
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308, 193 L. Ed. 2d 255 (2015) (determining whether the law placed a state actor on
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reasonable notice that his conduct would violate the Constitution must be
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determined “in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general
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proposition.”) (emphasis added).
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Defendants urge this Court to disregard the coercive aspects of the interview
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in determining qualified immunity because they are “secondary features” not
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typically considered by other courts and do not establish “beyond debate” that a
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reasonable officer would know Barnes’ conduct was unlawful. (Id. at 7-8.) The
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arguments lack foundation and merit. At the time of Plaintiff’s interview, the law
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was clearly established that, at a minimum, a person is in custody for purposes of
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Miranda when there is a “formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the
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degree associated with a formal arrest.” See California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121,
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1125, 103 S. Ct. 3517, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1275 (1983). And in applying the law, courts
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had found Miranda custody in cases decided before 1993 where a suspect was not
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advised he or she may voluntarily terminate the interview and was free to leave, and
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was confronted with psychological pressure and/or evidence of guilt. See, e.g.,
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United States v. Beraun-Panez, 812 F.2d 578, 580-81 (9th Cir. 1987) (finding
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custody where, inter alia, suspect was not informed he was free to leave, was
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repeatedly accused of lying, confronted with false or misleading witness statements,
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and told to tell the truth); United States v. Wauneka, 770 F.2d 1434, 1438-39 (9th
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Cir. 1985) (finding custody where, inter alia, suspect was not offered an
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opportunity to leave the interview room prior to his confession, the questioning
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turned accusatory, and the suspect was told to tell the truth).
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Finally, Defendants claim in their Objections that summary judgment should
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be entered for Defendant Ventura County Sheriff’s Department because Plaintiff
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failed to present any evidence supporting the department’s liability under a Monell
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theory. (Defs.’ Objs. at 8.) Because Defendants did not raise the issue of Monell
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liability in their motion for summary judgment, the Court declines to consider the
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argument as improper. See Greenhow v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 863 F.2d
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633, 638-39 (9th Cir. 1988) (district court properly ruled that issues raised for the
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first time in objections to magistrate judge’s report had been waived), overruled on
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other grounds by United States v. Hardesty, 977 F.2d 1347, 1348 (9th Cir. 1992).
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Plaintiff objects to the Report’s conclusion that summary judgment should be
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entered for Defendant Patricia M. Murphy. (See generally Pl.’s Objs.) Plaintiff
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disagrees with the Report’s statement that he needs to prove Murphy’s participation
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in the deprivation of his constitutional rights, arguing that he only needs to show
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Murphy entered into an agreement or “meeting of the minds” with Barnes to
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unlawfully elicit a confession from Plaintiff. (See id. at 1-2 (citing Gilbrook v. City
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of Westminster, 177 F.3d 839, 856-57 (9th Cir. 1999).) However, a defendant is
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liable under § 1983 only if his or her conduct “subjects, or causes to be subjected”
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the alleged deprivation of a constitutional right. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 370-
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71, 96 S. Ct. 598, 46 L. Ed. 2d 561 (1976); see also Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693
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F.3d 896, 915-16 (9th Cir. 2012). To prove then a civil conspiracy in violation of
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§ 1983, a plaintiff must have sufficient evidence showing that the defendant
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participated in the conspiracy. See Lacey, 693 F.3d at 916; Gilbrook, 177 F.3d at
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856-57.
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evidence demonstrating Murphy’s participation in a conspiracy, within the lens
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framed by Plaintiff – that Murphy directed Barnes to elicit a unlawful confession
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from Plaintiff and knew about Barnes’ past practice of withholding Miranda
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warnings. (See Third Amended Complaint, ¶¶ D(1), (9), (15)); cf. Robichaud
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v. Ronan, 351 F.2d 533, 537 (9th Cir. 1965) (holding that prosecutors who
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allegedly directed police to coerce confession from suspect, were not immunized
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from responsibility for the unlawful acts).
The Report correctly reviewed whether Plaintiff adduced sufficient
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Plaintiff further claims in his Objections that the Report improperly weighed
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the evidence in finding summary judgment for Murphy. (See Pl.’s Objs. at 2-5.)
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The Court’s function in evaluating a summary judgment motion “is not to weigh
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the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is
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a genuine issue for trial.” Tolan v. Cotton, --- U.S. ----, 134 S. Ct. 1861, 1866, 188
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L. Ed. 2d 895 (2014). “The evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed, and all
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justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Id. at 1863. The exception
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though is that the nonmovant may not create a genuine issue of material fact
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through speculation or unjustifiable inferences. See Nelson v. Pima Cmty. Coll., 83
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F.3d 1075, 1081-82 (9th Cir. 1996) (“[M]ere allegation and speculation do not
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create a factual dispute for purposes of summary judgment.”); In re Coordinated
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Pretrial Proceedings, 906 F.2d 432, 441 (9th Cir. 1990) (at summary judgment
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stage, a court may refuse to adopt unreasonable inferences from circumstantial
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evidence), cert. denied, Chevron Corp. v. Arizona, 500 U.S. 959, 111 S. Ct. 2274,
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114 L. Ed. 2d 725 (1991).
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The Court finds that the Report did not weigh the evidence in considering the
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cross-motions for summary judgment, but rather appropriately reviewed the
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materiality of the facts proffered to determine if they “might affect the outcome of
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the suit under the governing law.” George v. Morris, 736 F.3d 829, 834 (9th Cir.
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2013) (citing Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 312-13, 116 S. Ct. 834, 133 L. Ed.
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2d 773 (1996) and Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S. Ct.
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2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986)). And as the Report thoroughly explains, Plaintiff
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fails to set forth evidence reasonably supporting the inference that Murphy
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participated in a conspiracy to unlawfully elicit a confession. For example, Plaintiff
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argues in his Objections that Murphy’s declaration stating she was knowledgeable
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about the events with the prosecution demonstrates she was fully aware Barnes
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would unlawfully elicit a confession from Plaintiff. (See Pl.’s Objs. at 4-5.) The
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Court disagrees with the inference Plaintiff draws from this evidence because
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Plaintiff offers only speculation as to the existence of a causal link between
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Murphy’s knowledge of the events concerning the prosecution and her participation
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in the alleged conspiracy. In short, Plaintiff’s proffered evidence fails to raise a
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genuine triable issue of fact that Murphy directed Barnes to elicit an unlawful
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confession from Plaintiff or knew about Barnes’ past practice of withholding
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Miranda warnings.
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IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that (1) Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary
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Judgment is GRANTED as to Michael Barnes’ liability; (2) Plaintiff’s Motion for
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Summary Judgment is DENIED as to Patricia M. Murphy’s and Ventura County
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Sheriff’s Department’s liability; (3) Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is
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GRANTED as to Patricia M. Murphy’s liability; and (4) Defendants’ Motion for
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Summary Judgment is DENIED as to Michael Barnes’ and the Ventura County
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Sheriff’s Department’s liability.
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DATED: 4/13/2016
s/ RONALD S.W. LEW
RONALD S.W. LEW
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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