S A Thomas v. Leroy Baca et al

Filing 870

ORDER Decertifying Damage Class 825 , 841 , 842 by Judge Dean D. Pregerson. For the reasons stated above, Defendants Motion to Decertify Damages Class is GRANTED. (See Order for Details). (sch)

1
2

O

3
4
5
6
7
8

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

10
11

S.A. THOMAS,

12
13
14
15
16
17

Plaintiff,
v.
LEROY BACA, MICHAEL
ANTONOVICH, YVONNE BURKE,
DEANE DANA, DON KNABE,
GLORIA MOLINA, ZEV
YAROSLAVSKY,
Defendants.
___________________________

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV 04-08448 DDP (SHx)

ORDER DECERTIFYING DAMAGES CLASS

[Dkt. Nos. 825, 841, 842]

18
19

Presently before the court is Defendant’s Motion to

20

Decertify Damages Class Action. Having considered the

21

submissions of the parties and heard oral argument, the court

22

grants the motion and adopts the following order.1

23

I. Background

24

On May 17, 2005, this court, pursuant to Federal Rule of

25
26
27
28

1

Plaintiffs were unprepared to answer several of the court’s
questions regarding decertification at the motion hearing. Solely
in the interest of resolving this issue on the merits, Plaintiffs’
“Ex Parte Application for Order that the Court Consider on the
Pending Motion for Reconsideration Of Class Certification, The
Substantive Short Memorandum That Addresses Points Raised by Oral
Argument, by Analogy to F.R. App. P. Rule 28(j)” is granted.

1

Civil Procedure 23(b)(3), certified a damages class of individuals

2

who, while in the custody of the Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department

3

(“LASD”), were required to sleep on the floor of an LASD facility

4

with or without bedding. (Docket No. 98 at 12, 15.) The court

5

refers to such individuals as “floor sleepers.”

6

moves to decertify the damages class.

7

II. Legal Standard

Defendant now

8

An order regarding class certification is subject to

9

alteration or amendment prior to final judgment. Fed. R. Civ.

10

P. 23(c)(1)(c).

Such an order is, therefore, inherently

11

tentative.

12

n.11 (1978).

13

certification order in light of subsequent developments in the

14

litigation.

15

147, 160 (1982). The court may decertify a class at any time.

16

Rodriguez v. West Publishing Corp., 563 F.3d 948, 966 (9th Cir.

17

2009).

18

III. Discussion

Coopers and Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 469
Thus, this court is free to modify the

Gen. Tel. Co. of Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S.

19

This court’s 2005 certification order was based, in part,

20

on the conclusion that a class action would be superior to any

21

alternative, and that the difficulties managing the proposed

22

class were not likely to be significant. (May 15 Order at 12.)

23

Subsequent developments in the litigation, however, indicate

24

that this is not the case, and that Defendant’s concerns about

25

the manageability of the class and superiority of a class action

26

are justified.

27
28

As an initial matter, the court notes that Plaintiffs have
not yet submitted a trial plan of any kind. See In Re Paxil
2

1

Litigation, 212 F.R.D. 539, 548 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (denying class

2

certification for lack of a workable trial plan); Lee v. ITT

3

Corp., 275 F.R.D. 318, 324 (W.D. Wash. 2011) (same).

4

theory of damages has been difficult to ascertain.

5

represented to the court that they were waiving all claims for pain

6

and suffering (Transcript at 17:6-10) and expressed a desire to

7

explain in writing how they would present evidence of damages for

8

the constitutional violation alone. (Tr. at 18:5-12.)

9

Plaintiffs’

Plaintiffs

Plaintiffs correctly state that a Plaintiff may recover on a

10

Section 1983 claim without a showing of actual damages.

11

Reyes, 5 F.3d 412, 416 (9th Cir. 1993), citing Floyd v. Laws, 929

12

F.2d 1390, 1401 n.9, 1402 (9th Cir. 1991).

13

actual damages, however, a Plaintiff may recover only nominal

14

damages.

15

Parte App. At 5:28.)

16

they sought damages only for the constitutional violation of forced

17

floor sleeping.

18

acknowledge, however, they cannot recover damages based solely on

19

the abstract value of a constitutional right.

20

Schl. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 308 (1986); (Ex Parte. App.

21

at 5.)

22

Plaintiffs now assert that they are seeking damages for pain and

23

suffering.

24

the instant motion appears to suggest that trial of this case,

25

which Plaintiffs now acknowledge would require evidence of pain and

26

suffering, would be manageable because “no individualized class

27

member damages are sought” and “a standard per diem damages award

28

will be sought.” (Opp. at 12.)

Id.

Wilks v.

Absent a showing of

Plaintiffs here do not seek nominal damages. (Ex
Instead, Plaintiffs previously indicated that

(Tr. at 18:5-12.)

As Plaintiff now appears to

See Memphis Comm.

Accordingly, and contrary to their earlier representation,

(Ex Parte. App. at 5.)

Plaintiffs’ opposition to

Plaintiffs propose that
3

1

“compensatory damages can be determined by arriving at a dollar

2

value for a night of unconstitutional floor-sleeping, which can

3

then be multiplied by the number of nights an inmate slept on the

4

floor.” (Opp. at 24.)2

5

Plaintiffs’ suggestion rests on the mistaken assumption that

6

each class member suffered a “standard” injury.

7

case. Though all floor sleepers suffered from the same

8

constitutional violation, the damages at stake likely vary greatly.

9

For example, a class member who slept on the floor of a clean cell,

This is not the

10

with bedding, is unlikely to be entitled to the same physical,

11

mental, and emotional damages as one who slept without bedding on a

12

wet, unsanitary floor at the mercy of vermin. Given the wide array

13

of variables related to damages, the standardized, per diem

14

approach Plaintiffs suggest would be inappropriate.

15

This case bears similarities to Pierce v. County of Orange,

16

526 F.3d 1190 (9th Cir. 2008). In Pierce, the district court

17

initially certified a class of approximately 180,000 pre-trial

18

detainees who alleged certain constitutional violations and

19

violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act. Pierce, 526

20

F.3d at 1198, 1200. The district court later decertified the

21

damages class due to the difficulty in ascertaining class

22

membership and the highly individualized issues of damages

23

proof. Id. at 1200.

24
25
26
27
28

2

Plaintiffs suggested this approach before acknowledging that
damages for the value of a constitutional right alone are not
recoverable. In that context, and in the absence of any subsequent
trial management suggestions from Plaintiffs, the court understands
Plaintiffs to be suggesting that a dollar value be found for one
night’s worth of pain and suffering resulting from unconstitutional
floor sleeping.
4

1

Though the injuries at issue in this case all stem from the

2

violation of the same constitutional right, the other manageability

3

factors at issue in Pierce are even more problematic here. As noted

4

in Pierce, membership in a class comprised of county jail detainees

5

is “highly fluid and indefinite.” Pierce, 526 F.3d at 1200.

6

the parties estimate that up to 200,000 people per year cycle

7

through Los Angeles County jails. Plaintiffs have suggested that

8

the plaintiff class here may include “only” one million people, and

9

at various times throughout these proceedings have indicated that

10

the class may exceed two million.

11

Here,

3

Contrary to Plaintiffs’ assertion that Defendant possesses

12

records of class membership, that does not appear to be the case.

13

Prior to this court’s ruling on the unconstitutionality of forced

14

floor sleeping, Defendant was not required to, and did not,

15

maintain records of instances of floor sleeping. Pursuant to this

16

court’s order, Defendant did subsequently keep records of instances

17

of floor sleeping during certain periods.

18

only indicate the number of floor sleepers on a given night, and

19

not the identities of those floor sleepers.

20

cannot aid in the identification of class members.

21

notification to every individual who cycled through the Los Angeles

22

County jail system during the class period, Plaintiffs have not

23

suggested any method of identifying or notifying members of the

24

class who actually slept on the floor.

Those records, however,

The records therefore
Short of mailed

25
26
27
28

3

Plaintiffs’ estimate is apparently premised on the
assumption that every jail inmate was required to sleep on the
floor.
5

1

The difficulty in identifying and notifying class members, a

2

subset of a highly fluid population, also creates a significant

3

likelihood that the verdict in this case would dwarf verified

4

claims.

5

wildly, and have reached up to $600 million.

6

provided any viable suggestion as to how a large excess,

7

potentially reaching into the hundreds of millions of dollars,

8

could be disbursed.

9

court should “solve an enormous problem that the [Los Angeles

Plaintiffs’ estimates of the potential verdict have varied
Plaintiffs have not

Plaintiffs suggest, for example, that the

10

County] Board of Supervisors never will address” by applying the cy

11

pres doctrine to fund new construction of Los Angeles County jail

12

facilities.

13

such an invitation, however, would give rise to serious separation

14

of powers concerns.

15

(Plaintiffs’ Ex Parte App. at 7:18-24.)

To accept

In summary, it does not appear to the court that there is any

16

feasible way to reliably identify or notify members of the class.

17

Even if class membership were ascertainable, the existence of

18

highly individualized questions of proof as to damages would render

19

a class action unmanageable.

20

presented with any viable method of distributing any damage award

21

excess, which would likely constitute the vast majority of the

22

total award.

23

decertified.4

24

///

Furthermore, the court has not been

Under these circumstances, the damages class must be

25
26
27
28

4

The court’s conclusion is based on factors specific to the
circumstances of this case. Nothing in this order should be read
to suggest that a damages class action arising out of jail
conditions is inherently unmanageable, inferior, or otherwise
untenable.
6

1
2
3

IV. Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, Defendant’s Motion to
Decertify Damages Class is GRANTED.

4
5

IT IS SO ORDERED.

6
7
8

Dated: March 22, 2012
DEAN D. PREGERSON
United States District Judge

9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
7