Sublime v. Sublime Remembered
Filing
149
MINUTES (IN CHAMBERS) by Judge Christina A. Snyder RE: Plaintiff's Application for an Order Finding Defendant in Contempt 122 . The Court hereby GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART plaintiffs' request to find defendant in contempt. Additionally, the Court hereby ORDERS defendant to pay the sum of $500 to the clerk of court by 8/26/2013. Court Reporter: Not Present. (gk)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No.
CV 06-6059 CAS (FMOx)
Title
SUBLIME, ET AL. V. SUBLIME REMEMBERED, ET AL.
Present: The Honorable
Date
July 22, 2013
CHRISTINA A. SNYDER
Catherine Jeang
Deputy Clerk
Not Present
Court Reporter / Recorder
N/A
Tape No.
Attorneys Present for Plaintiffs:
Attorneys Present for Defendants
Not Present
Not Present
Proceedings:
I.
(In Chambers:) PLAINTIFF’S APPLICATION FOR AN ORDER
FINDING DEFENDANT IN CONTEMPT (Docket #122, filed
March 8, 2013)
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs Sublime and Floyd Gaugh IV filed this case in this Court on September
22, 2006. Sublime is a well-known popular music group, and Floyd Gaugh IV is a
former member of Sublime. Plaintiffs brought this case seeking to enforce intellectual
property rights related to Sublime and its music. Defendant Mike Houlihan is a musician,
and a former member of the Sublime tribute band Sublime Remembered; defendant
Tawnee Houlihan is Mike Houlihan’s wife and former manager.
This case was eventually settled in July 2010, when defendants agreed to
permanently cease and desist selling, offering for sale, or promoting goods or services
related to Sublime or a Sublime cover band. The Court issued a permanent injunction on
July 19, 2010, which sets out several terms enforcing the parties’ settlement agreement
(“the injunction”). Dkt. #117.
Plaintiffs now claim that in February 2013, they discovered that Mike Houlihan
(“defendant”) was acting in violation of the injunction. On March 8, 2013, plaintiffs filed
an application requesting that the Court issue an order to show cause regarding why
defendant should not be found in contempt of court for violating the injunction. On April
15, 2013, the Court issued an order to show cause, requesting that defendant explain why
he should not be found in contempt due to his alleged violations of the following four
terms of the injunction:
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No.
CV 06-6059 CAS (FMOx)
Date
July 22, 2013
Title
SUBLIME, ET AL. V. SUBLIME REMEMBERED, ET AL.
A.
Cease and desist selling, offering for sale, advertising and promoting goods
and services related to Sublime, Bradley Nowell, Floyd “Bud” Gaugh IV or
Eric Wilson, their music or creative endeavors, specifically including, but
without limitation, any and all activities related to a Sublime tribute band or
Sublime cover band.
B.
Refrain from performing in public or in private for more than ten
people music compositions written in whole or in part by Sublime . . . or
contributing to, encouraging or authorizing the same.
H.
Take down all existing, and refrain from creating any new websites
related to any musical group comprised of one or more of the Houlihan
Parties that has performed the music of Sublime, Bradley Nowell,
Floyd “Bud” Gaugh IV or Eric Wilson.
I.
Take down or cause to be taken down all videos posted . . . on the
Internet and refrain [from] posting any new videos on YouTube.com,
VidiLife.com or any other website that (a) feature performances of any
of the Defendants performing music compositions written in whole or
in part by Sublime [or its members] or (b) reference or mention, Q-Ball,
Sublime Remembered, The LBC or any other Sublime tribute band or
Sublime cover band comprised in whole or in part of any Houlihan
Party.
Specifically, plaintiffs allege that defendant violated these terms by performing the music
of Sublime at several concert venues, at times after the injunction had issued, with his
band Long Beach Rehab. Plaintiffs learned of these performances through videos posted
on the website youtube.com. Additionally, plaintiffs allege that defendant violated the
injunction by maintaining a website related to a music group that has performed the
music of Sublime, and by failing to take down videos posted on the Internet depicting
defendant performing the music of Sublime. Finally, plaintiffs allege that in February
2013, defendant used the names “Sublime” and “Bradley Nowell” to promote a concert in
Malibu, California.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No.
CV 06-6059 CAS (FMOx)
Title
SUBLIME, ET AL. V. SUBLIME REMEMBERED, ET AL.
II.
Date
July 22, 2013
LEGAL STANDARD
“Civil contempt . . . consists of a party’s disobedience to a specific and definite
court order by failure to take all reasonable steps within the party’s power to comply.” In
re Dual-Deck Video Cassette Recorder Antitrust Litigation, 10 F.3d 693, 695 (9th Cir.
1993). To find a party in civil contempt for violating a court order, the moving party
must establish: “(1) that [defendant] violated the court order, (2) beyond substantial
compliance, (3) not based on a good faith and reasonable interpretation of the order.” Id.
The defendant’s conduct “need not be willful” to violate a consent judgment. Id.
Additionally, the moving party must carry its burden of establishing a violation of the
order by clear and convincing evidence; a preponderance of the evidence is insufficient.
Id.
III.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiffs claim that the injunction was violated in four distinct ways, and the Court
considers each in turn.
A.
Promotion and Marketing
Plaintiffs claim that defendant impermissibly used the names “Sublime” and
“Bradley Nowell” to promote a concert at the Malibu Inn in February 2013 (“the
February concert”). A promotional flyer for the concert contains the phrase “paying
tribute to Bradley,” which is a reference to Sublime’s lead singer Bradley Nowell, and
listed the name “Long Beach Rehab” alongside the band “Sublime LBC.” Dkt. #122 Ex.
B. Plaintiffs’ counsel learned of the performance before it occurred, however, and took
steps to ensure that the performance did not took place.
Defendant explains that Matt Myers (“Myers”), who is a former member of Long
Beach Rehab and also a member of the band Sublime LBC Tribute, handled the
marketing and promotion of the Malibu Inn concert on behalf of defendant. Dkt. #132,
Third Houlihan Decl. ¶ 10. According to defendant, in the months prior to the February
concert, Myers had been living with defendant and promoting the band Long Beach
Rehab. Dkt. #130, Second Houlihan Declaration ¶¶ 5 – 6. At the same time, Myers was
promoting and performing with the band Sublime LBC, and began booking Long Beach
Rehab and Sublime LBC at the same shows. Dkt. #130, Second Houlihan Declaration ¶
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No.
CV 06-6059 CAS (FMOx)
Date
July 22, 2013
Title
SUBLIME, ET AL. V. SUBLIME REMEMBERED, ET AL.
8. Following this practice, Myers booked the February show featuring both bands. Dkt.
#130, Second Houlihan Declaration ¶ 9.
Defendant explains that he did not believe Myers’ activities came within the scope
of the injunction. Dkt. #130, Second Houlihan Decl. ¶ 10. Defendant believed it was
acceptable for his band Long Beach Rehab to perform at a concert that also featured a
Sublime tribute band such as Sublime LBC as long as defendant did not perform with the
tribute band. Id.
The Court finds that defendant did not violate the injunction in connection with the
promotion and booking of the February concert because the injunction did not squarely
prohibit defendant’s conduct. “To ensure fair notice to the defendant, the decree
underlying contempt must be sufficiently clear to allow the party to whom it is addressed
to ascertain precisely what it can and cannot do.” Chao v. Gotham Registry, Inc., 514
F.3d 280, 292 (2d. Cir. 2008). “[A] person should not be held in contempt if his action
appears to be based on a good faith and reasonable interpretation of the court’s order.” In
re Dual Deck Video Cassette Recorder Antitrust Litigation, 10 F.3d at 695. (“The proper
measure of clarity . . . is not whether the decree is clear in some general sense, but
whether it unambiguously proscribes the challenged conduct.”). Consequently, as long as
defendant had a good faith, reasonable belief that his conduct did not violate the
injunction, he should not be held in contempt.
The portion of the injunction purportedly violated during the promotion and
booking of the February concert states that defendant must “[c]ease and desist . . . any
and all activities related to a Sublime tribute band or Sublime cover band.” Given the
broad scope of this injunction, it is reasonable to believe that activities with only a
tenuous relationship to a Sublime tribute band do not come within the its scope. For
example, it appears that attending a Sublime tribute band concert as an audience member
is not barred by the injunction, nor is listening to recordings by such a band, even though
both activities are, in some remote sense, “activities related to a Sublime tribute band.” It
was therefore reasonable for defendant to believe that the injunction did not prevent him
from performing at the same concert as a Sublime tribute band, as long as he did not
perform as a member of that band or promote that band’s performance. This
interpretation is reasonable, in part, because the injunction focuses on defendant’s
participation in a Sublime tribute band or his performance of Sublime’s music, and does
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No.
CV 06-6059 CAS (FMOx)
Date
July 22, 2013
Title
SUBLIME, ET AL. V. SUBLIME REMEMBERED, ET AL.
not explicitly concern itself with defendant being in physical proximity to performances
of Sublime’s music or a Sublime tribute band.
Therefore, the Court finds that defendant should not be held in contempt due to his
involvement with the February concert, because he acted on the basis of a good faith,
reasonable belief that his conduct did not violate the injunction.
B.
Performance of Sublime’s Music
Plaintiffs claim that defendant has performed Sublime’s music several times since
the injunction was entered. Plaintiffs’ evidence consists of videos posted on
youtube.com, which purportedly show defendant performing the songs “Ball and Chain,”
“Let’s Go Get Stoned,” “April 29 1992,” “Santeria,” and “Pawn Shop.” The performance
of “Ball and Chain” purportedly occurred in Jacinto, California on June 12, 2011; the
performance of “Let’s Go Get Stoned” and “Santeria” purportedly occurred in Seattle,
Washington in February 2011; the performance of “April 29 1992” purportedly occurred
in Enumclaw, Washington on January 8, 2013; and the performance of “Pawn Shop”
purportedly occurred in Sacramento, California on May 31, 2013.
Defendant does not deny that the videos referenced by plaintiffs depicts him
performing “Ball and Chain,” but argues that the performance occurred in 2009, prior to
the issuance of the injunction. Additionally, defendant claims that the alleged
performances of “April 29 1992” and “Let’s Go Get Stoned” did not occur. Third
Houlihan Declaration ¶¶ 26 – 27. Regarding the performance of “Pawn Shop,” defendant
admits that the performance depicted in the video took place, but contends that he was
actually performing a song entitled “War Deh Round a John Shop.” Finally, defendant
does not dispute that he participated in the performance of “Santeria” depicted in
plaintiffs’ submissions.
Regarding the performances of songs other than “Pawn Shop” and “Santeria,” the
Court finds that plaintiffs have not met their burden of proving a violation of the
injunction through clear and convincing evidence. In re Dual-Deck Video Cassette
Recorder Antitrust Litigation, 10 F.3d at 695. Plaintiffs’ evidence consists solely of
videos posted on youtube.com. In order to admit a video posted on youtube.com under
the Federal Rules of Evidence, the proponent of the video “must produce evidence
sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the proponent claims it is.” Fed. R.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No.
CV 06-6059 CAS (FMOx)
Date
July 22, 2013
Title
SUBLIME, ET AL. V. SUBLIME REMEMBERED, ET AL.
Evid. 901, Orr v. Bank of America, 285 F.3d 764, 774 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Authentication is
a condition precedent to admissibility . . .”). Therefore, to admit the youtube.com videos,
plaintiffs must introduce evidence sufficient to support a finding that these videos depict
performances that occurred at the times and places claimed by plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs have failed to offer any evidence authenticating the youtube.com videos
purportedly depicting post-injunction performances of “Ball and Chain,” “Let’s Go Get
Stoned,” and “April 29 1992.” The videos clearly depict defendant performing with a
band, but there is no evidence regarding when or where the videos were created. While
statements posted on youtube.com by the users who uploaded the videos claim that the
performances occurred at particular times and places, these statements are inadmissible
hearsay if introduced to authenticate the videos. United States v. Jackson, 208 F.3d 633,
637 (7th Cir. 2000). Moreover, plaintiffs have not identified the users who uploaded the
videos and obtained testimony from these individuals, and without such evidence, the
Court cannot make a finding that the youtube.com videos actually depict post-injunction
performances. Accordingly, there is no evidence that defendant has performed these
three works by Sublime at a time after the injunction.
Defendant has admitted that the other two performances actually occurred, and
these admissions are sufficient to authenticate the videos. See 31 C. Wright & V. Gold,
Federal Practice and Procedure § 7105 at 39 (Updated April 2013) (evidence may be
authenticated through a judicial admission); see also Orr, 285 F.3d at 777 n.20.
Accordingly, the Court must determine whether these performances violated the terms of
the injunction. First, regarding the alleged performance of “Pawn Shop” in Sacramento,
California, the Court finds that there is insufficient evidence to determine which work
defendant was performing. No lyrics are sung in the video of defendant’s performance,
and based on the instrumental performance alone, it is not clear whether defendant was
performing the song “Pawn Shop” or the song “War Deh Round a John Shop.” While the
comments posted on the youtube.com video state that the song performed is “Pawn
Shop,” as mentioned above, these comments are inadmissible hearsay. The youtube.com
video relied upon by plaintiffs therefore does not demonstrate a violation of the
injunction by clear and convincing evidence.
Regarding “Santeria,” however, the Court finds that defendant has admitted to
performing a work of Sublime in violation of the injunction. Defendant contends that at
the outset of the concert depicted in the video he did not know that Sublime’s music
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No.
CV 06-6059 CAS (FMOx)
Date
July 22, 2013
Title
SUBLIME, ET AL. V. SUBLIME REMEMBERED, ET AL.
would be performed, but this fact does not excuse defendant from his duty to refrain from
performing Sublime’s music. The Court therefore concludes that defendant has violated
the injunction by performing the song “Santeria” subsequent to the issuance of the
injunction.
C.
Maintaining a Website
The parties agree that defendant maintains a website promoting the band Long
Beach Rehab on facebook. There is, however, no evidence that this band performs the
music of Sublime, or has performed the music of Sublime. While defendant has admitted
to performing the song “Santeria” since the injunction issued, there is no evidence that
this performance involved the band Long Beach Rehab.
Additionally, plaintiffs contend that defendant maintains a page on facebook.com
for the band Sublime LBC, which has purportedly performed the music of Sublime.
There appears to be no evidence that defendant created this website, nor is there any
evidence that the site existed at the time the injunction was entered. Consequently, the
existence of a page on facebook.com for the band Sublime LBC does not demonstrate a
violation of the injunction.
D.
Removing Online Videos
Finally, plaintiffs identified several videos posted on youtube.com and
facebook.com that purportedly depict defendant performing the music of Sublime.
Plaintiffs contend that the injunction requires defendant to take steps to remove these
videos from the Internet, even if defendant was not the one who posted the videos
originally. In response, defendant admits that there are videos on youtube.com and other
websites depicting him performing Sublime’s music, but argues that the injunction does
not require him to take down all of these videos. According to defendant, his only duty
under the injunction is to remove videos that he posted or over which he has control.
The language setting out defendant’s duty to remove online videos states that
defendant must “[t]ake down or cause to be taken down all videos posted on
Youtube.com, Vidilife.com, or elsewhere on the Internet” that depict defendant
performing Sublime’s music. The use of the term “posted” in this language is
ambiguous. The term could mean “posted by defendant or someone acting on his
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No.
CV 06-6059 CAS (FMOx)
Date
July 22, 2013
Title
SUBLIME, ET AL. V. SUBLIME REMEMBERED, ET AL.
behalf,” but it could also mean “posted by any person.” Since neither party has submitted
any evidence tending to support either of these interpretations, the Court must resolve this
ambiguity in defendant’s favor. Project B.A.S.I.C. v. Kemp, 947 F.2d 11, 16 (1st Cir.
1991) (“[A]ny ambiguities or uncertainties in . . . a court order must be read in a light
favorable to the person charged with contempt.”). Moreover, defendant’s interpretation
is more natural than plaintiffs’, because defendant can only possess the authority and
capability to “[t]ake down or cause to be taken down” videos that he has posted.
Plaintiffs’ proposed interpretation therefore leads to the absurd result that defendant must
execute an impossible task to comply with the injunction.
The Court therefore interprets section 1.I of the injunction to only apply to videos
posted by defendant or anyone acting on his behalf. Since there is no contention that
defendant has failed to take down online videos that he posted, defendant has not violated
this provision of the injunction.
E.
Remedies
The remaining issue is what remedy should be ordered due to the violation of the
injunction identified above, namely the post-injunction performance of “Santeria.”
“Sanctions for civil contempt may be imposed to coerce obedience to a court order, or to
compensate the party pursuing the contempt action for injuries resulting from the
contemptuous behavior, or both.” General Signal Corp. v. Donallco, Inc., 787 F.2d 1376,
1380 (9th Cir. 1986). Coercive fines, or any portion thereof, are payable to the Court
rather than to the opposing party. Id. When imposing a coercive civil contempt sanction,
a court should consider: (1) the character and magnitude of the harm from continued
noncompliance; (2) the probable effectiveness of any sanctions in achieving future
compliance; (3) the amount of defendant’s financial resources; and (4) the willfulness of
the violating party. See U.S. v. United Mine Workers of America, 330 U.S. 258,
303–304 (1946); General Signal Corp, 787 F.2d at 1380. The amount of a compensatory
fine, on the other hand, should be based upon the movant’s actual losses suffered as a
result of the violation. Id.; see also Shuffler v. Heritage Bank, 720 F.2d 1141, 1148 (9th
Cir. 1983).
Here, the Court finds that coercive fines, payable to the Court, should be imposed
to insure prospective compliance with the injunction. The fines should be small,
however, in light of the fact that (1) only a single violation of the injunction has been
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No.
CV 06-6059 CAS (FMOx)
Date
July 22, 2013
Title
SUBLIME, ET AL. V. SUBLIME REMEMBERED, ET AL.
demonstrated, (2) that violation occurred contrary to defendant’s expectations, and (3)
there is no evidence that defendant has profited substantially or harmed plaintiffs
substantially due to the violation of the injunction. Accordingly, defendant is ordered to
pay a coercive fine of five hundred dollars due to his violation of the injunction.
Additionally, plaintiffs have stated their intent to pursue a stipulated judgment
against defendant in the amount of $68,030.15. Dkt. #141, Lemkin Decl. ¶ 11. Plaintiffs
claim that they are entitled to this relief under section 5 their settlement agreement with
defendant, which provides:
In the event a court of competent jurisdiction determines that Houlihan
Parties or any of them violate the Amended Permanent Injunction, in
addition to any and all remedies and relief afforded them by law, [plaintiffs]
may file the Stipulated Judgment attached hereto as Exhibit B in the amount
of the Judgment and Costs ($68,030.15), plus accrued interest at the
maximum legal rate from June 4, 2009, and immediately execute on and
enforce said Stipulated Judgment by any procedures allowable by law.
Settlement Agreement, § 5.
After considering the parties’ settlement agreement, the Court finds that the
violation of the injunction in this case should not result in plaintiffs’ being permitted to
file the stipulated judgment referenced in the parties’ settlement agreement. “A contract
must be so interpreted as to give effect to the mutual intention of the parties as it existed
at the time of contracting, so far as the same is ascertainable and lawful.” Cal. Civ. Code
§ 1636. “The language of a contract is to govern its interpretation, if the language is clear
and explicit, and does not involve an absurdity,” and “[w]hen a contract is reduced to
writing, the intention of the parties is to be ascertained from the writing alone, if
possible.” Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1638 – 1639. Additionally, “[a] contract must receive such
an interpretation as will make it lawful, operative, definite, reasonable, and capable of
being carried into effect, if it can be done without violating the intention of the parties.”
Id. § 1643.
Here, to determine whether plaintiffs may avail themselves of the remedy set out in
section 5 of the settlement agreement, the Court must consider whether its findings above
amount to a conclusion that defendant has “violate[d]” the injunction within the meaning
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No.
CV 06-6059 CAS (FMOx)
Date
July 22, 2013
Title
SUBLIME, ET AL. V. SUBLIME REMEMBERED, ET AL.
of the agreement. To resolve this issue, the Court must consider whether any violation of
the injunction permits plaintiffs to pursue the stipulated judgment, or whether plaintiffs
may only pursue the stipulated judgment if defendant has committed a material violation
of the injunction.
The most reasonable interpretation of the settlement agreement is that only a
material violation suffices. First, the Court notes that the plain language of the agreement
does not resolve this question. The agreement uses the term “violate,” but contains no
language explaining how broadly or narrowly this term should be construed. While the
plain language therefore does not specify what sort of violation is necessary to trigger the
remedy set out in section 5 of the parties’ settlement agreement, the circumstances under
which the parties executed the contract strongly suggest that only a material violation
suffices. The parties executed their settlement agreement after plaintiffs secured a
judgment against defendant in the amount of $64,900 and an order to tax costs against
defendant in the amount of $3,130.15. Dkt. # 99, 102. In the parties’ settlement
agreement, plaintiffs agreed to acknowledge satisfaction of this judgment in exchange for
defendant’s agreement to comply with the terms of the injunction. Dkt. #141, Lemkin
Decl. ¶ 11; Dkt. #118 (satisfaction of judgment). Accordingly, the essence of the parties’
bargain is that plaintiffs would not collect their judgment as long as defendant would
abide by the terms of the injunction.
Construed in this context, section 5 of the agreement is best interpreted as an
embodiment of the principle that “[w]hen a party’s failure to perform a contractual
obligation constitutes a material breach of the contract, the other party may be discharged
from its duty to perform under the contract.” Brown v. Grimes, 192 Cal. App. 4th 265,
277 (2011) (citing 1 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law, Contracts §§ 813, 814 p. 906 (10th
ed. 2005)). This interpretation is appropriate because section 5 of the agreement excuses
plaintiffs from upholding their end of the settlement agreement if defendant has breached
his obligations under the agreement. Because a material breach is necessary under
California law to excuse performance, here too, the best interpretation of the parties’
settlement agreement is that only a material violation of the injunction permits plaintiffs
to deny defendant the benefit of the settlement agreement and pursue the stipulated
judgment.
Consequently, the Court finds that plaintiffs may file the stipulated judgment
referenced in section 5 of the parties’ settlement agreement only in the event that
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No.
CV 06-6059 CAS (FMOx)
Date
July 22, 2013
Title
SUBLIME, ET AL. V. SUBLIME REMEMBERED, ET AL.
defendant has engaged in a material violation of the injunction. Here, no such finding
has been made. “Whether a partial breach of a contract is material depends on the
importance or seriousness thereof and the probability of the injured party getting
substantial performance.” Brown, 192 Cal. App. 4th at 278. As discussed above, the
violation of the injunction found by the Court did not cause substantial harm to plaintiffs,
and therefore was not a material violation of the injunction.
Accordingly, the Court finds that plaintiffs are not entitled to file the stipulated
judgment referenced in section 5 of the parties’ settlement agreement. If, however,
additional violations of the injunction occur, plaintiffs may be entitled to avail themselves
of that remedy if all of defendant’s conduct, in the totality of the circumstances, amounts
to a material violation of the injunction.
IV.
CONCLUSION
In accordance with the foregoing, the Court hereby GRANTS IN PART and
DENIES IN PART plaintiffs’ request to find defendant in contempt. Additionally, the
Court hereby ORDERS defendant to pay the sum of five hundred dollars ($500) to the
clerk of court by August 26, 2013.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
00
Initials of Preparer
CV-06-6059 CAS (FMOx) (07/13)
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
:
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CMJ
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