Russell Johnson III v. Lucent Technologies, Inc. et al

Filing 132

MINUTES (IN CHAMBERS) by Judge Christina A. Snyder: Plaintiff's motion for relief from judgment 124 is DENIED. Court Reporter: Not Present. (gk)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Case No. 
Title 

CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
‘O’
2:08-cv-06002-CAS(CTx)
Date December 14, 2017
RUSSELL H. JOHNSON, III v. LUCENT TECHNOLOGIES, INC., ET
AL.

dEC 

Present: The Honorable 

CHRISTINA A. SNYDER 

Catherine Jeang 
Deputy Clerk 

N/A 

Tape No.

Attorneys Present for Defendants: 

Not Present 
Court Reporter / Recorder

Attorneys Present for Plaintiffs: 

Not Present 
Not Present 
(IN CHAMBERS) – PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM
Proceedings:  
JUDGMENT (Dkt. 124, filed November 20, 2017)

I.

INTRODUCTION & BACKGROUND

The Court finds this motion appropriate for decision without oral argument. Fed.
R. Civ. P. 78; C.D. Cal. L.R. 7-15. Accordingly, the hearing date of December 18, 2017
is vacated and the matter is hereby taken under submission.
On August 4, 2014, the Court granted defendant Lucent Technologies’ (“Lucent”)
motion for summary judgment on the basis that plaintiff’s claims for retaliation in
violation of 42. U.S.C. § 1981 and for intentional infliction of emotional distress were
precluded by res judicata, and, nonetheless, failed on the merits as a matter of law. Dkt.
113. On August 18, 2014, the Court issued a judgment determining that plaintiff’s action
was fully and finally dismissed on the merits. Dkt. 115.
Plaintiff appealed the Court’s August 18, 2014 judgment to the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals, dkt. 116, and on September 27, 2016, the Ninth Circuit subsequently
affirmed the Court’s judgment in a memorandum, dkt. 112.
On November 20, 2017, plaintiff filed the instant motion for relief from judgment
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). Dkt. 125 (“Motion”). Lucent filed an opposition on
December 6, 2017. Dkt. 129 (“Opp’n”).
II.

LEGAL STANDARDS

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) provides that the Court may reconsider a
final judgment and any order based on: “(1) mistake, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2)
newly discovered evidence; (3) fraud; (4) a void judgment; (5) a satisfied or discharged

CV-6002 (12/17)

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL

Page 1 of 3 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Case No. 
Title 

CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
‘O’
2:08-cv-06002-CAS(CTx)
Date December 14, 2017
RUSSELL H. JOHNSON, III v. LUCENT TECHNOLOGIES, INC., ET
AL.

judgment; or (6) extraordinary circumstances which would justify relief.” School Dist.
No. 1J, Multnomah County, Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993).
Under Rule 60(b) (6), the so-called catch-all provision, the party seeking relief
“must demonstrate both injury and circumstances beyond [his] control that prevented
[him] from proceeding with the action in a proper fashion.” Latshaw v. Trainer Wortham
& Co., Inc., 452 F.3d 1097, 1103 (9th Cir. 2006). In addition, the Ninth Circuit has
confirmed that “[t]o receive relief under Rule 60(b)(6), a party must demonstrate
extraordinary circumstances which prevented or rendered [her] unable to prosecute [her]
case.” Lal v. California, 610 F.3d 518, 524 (9th Cir. 2010). This Rule must be “used
sparingly as an equitable remedy to prevent manifest injustice and is to be utilized only
where extraordinary circumstances prevented a party from taking timely action to prevent
or correct an erroneous judgment.” Id. (quoting United States v. Washington, 394 F.3d
1152, 1157 (9th Cir. 2005)). Any Rule 60(b) motion must be brought within a reasonable
time and no later than one year after entry of judgment or the order being challenged.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1).
III.

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff asserts that his motion is based upon the following: (1) a sworn affidavit
of Tim Vawter, who was allegedly “drugged at defendant’s facility” in 1982; (2) the
response from the Pennsylvania State Police concerning the “White Power” sign erected
in front of Johnson’s home; (3) the fact that Johnson was not allowed to attend the second
day of the first ERISA trial against Lucent in 1989; and (4) his former attorney’s alleged
failure to timely prosecute the instant action. Motion at 2. Plaintiff contends that
Vawter’s affidavit is “newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could
not have been discovered in time under Rule 59(b).” Id. at 3. Plaintiff further argues that
Lucent has used ERISA as “weaponized psychiatry,” and that relief from judgment is
supported insofar as Judge Bybee—who was a member of the Ninth Circuit panel that
affirmed the Court’s August 18, 2014 judgment—is purportedly biased with respect to
plaintiff’s claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id. at 7–8, 17.
In opposition, Lucent contends that, to the extent plaintiff moves under Rule
60(b)(1), (2), or (3), the motion is untimely because it was filed more than three years
after the Court’s final judgment on August 18, 2014. Opp’n at 1. Insofar as plaintiff
filed the motion pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6), Lucent asserts that the motion should be

CV-6002 (12/17)

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL

Page 2 of 3 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Case No. 
Title 

CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
‘O’
2:08-cv-06002-CAS(CTx)
Date December 14, 2017
RUSSELL H. JOHNSON, III v. LUCENT TECHNOLOGIES, INC., ET
AL.

denied on the merits because plaintiff has failed to show extraordinary circumstances
justifying the reopening of a final judgment. Id. at 2.
The Court agrees that, insofar as plaintiff filed the instant motion pursuant to Rule
60(b)(1), (2), or (3), the motion is untimely because the instant motion was filed more
than three years after the Court’s August 18, 2014 final judgment order. See Fed. R. Civ.
P. 60(c)(1); Nevitt v. United States, 886 F.2d 1187 (9th Cir. 1989). Moreover, plaintiff
fails to demonstrate how Vawter’s affidavit is relevant and why it is newly discovered
evidence that could not have been discovered earlier with reasonable diligence.
Insofar as plaintiff filed the instant motion pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6), plaintiff fails
to show extraordinary circumstances justifying relief from judgment. Plaintiff does not
contend that his former attorney was “grossly negligent,” see Lal, 610 F.3d 518 at 524,
and he fails to demonstrate “both injury and circumstances beyond [his] control that
prevented [him] from proceeding with the action in a proper fashion.” Latshaw, 452 F.3d
1097, 1103 (9th Cir. 2006). Furthermore, plaintiff’s references to the Pennsylvania State
Police’s 2015 response to his Right-to-Know request, his inability to attend the second
day of his 1989 ERISA trial, and Judge Bybee’s purported bias do not explain or relate to
how plaintiff was prevented from prosecuting his case before this Court.
IV.

CONCLUSION

In accordance with the foregoing, plaintiff’s motion for relief from judgment is
DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Initials of Preparer

CV-6002 (12/17)

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL

: 
00 
                       CMJ 

00 

Page 3 of 3