Ernest DeWayne Jones v. Robert K. Wong

Filing 75

ORDER by Judge Cormac J. Carney: DENYING WITHOUT PREJUDICE MOTION FOR EVIDENTIARY HEARING 59 . (See document for details.) Mr. Jones' motion for an evidentiary hearing is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. The parties shall submit a proposed merits briefing schedule on or before April 16, 2012. Petitioners merits briefing shall set forth how each claim satisfies section 2254(d)(1) and/or section 2254(d)(2) on the basis of the record that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits. (rla)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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SOUTHERN DIVISION

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ERNEST DEWAYNE JONES,
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Petitioner,
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vs.
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MICHAEL MARTEL, Acting Warden )
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of California State Prison at San
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Quentin,
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Defendant.
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I. INTRODUCTION

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Case No.: CV 09-02158-CJC
DEATH PENALTY CASE

ORDER DENYING WITHOUT
PREJUDICE PETITIONER’S
MOTION FOR EVIDENTIARY
HEARING

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On April 6, 2011, the Court ordered supplemental briefing from the parties on

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Petitioner Ernest Dewayne Jones’ Motion for an Evidentiary Hearing, to address “his

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entitlement to an evidentiary hearing in view of the Supreme Court’s holding in Cullen v.

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Pinholster, [131 S. Ct. 1388 (2011)].” (Dkt. No. 62.) Mr. Jones’ supplemental briefing

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advances three central arguments in support of his request for an evidentiary hearing.

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Mr. Jones argues that: (1) Pinholster did not alter the principles governing his right to an
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evidentiary hearing; (2) an evidentiary hearing is warranted given the lack of state court

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process afforded to him; and (3) that an evidentiary hearing in federal court may be

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needed to uncover new evidence. For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Jones’ motion is

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DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Mr. Jones must first demonstrate that he has

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satisfied the requirements of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

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(“AEDPA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), based solely on the state court record, before this

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Court will consider his request for an evidentiary hearing.

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II. ANALYSIS

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A. Section 2254(d) Limited to State Court Record

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Section 2254(d), as amended by AEDPA provides:

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An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody
pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to
any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings
unless the adjudication of the claim―
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

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(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the
State court proceeding.

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28 U.S.C. §2254(d). Recently, in Pinholster, the Supreme Court held that when

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determining whether a petitioner has satisfied section 2254(d), a court may only consider

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evidence in the state court record. 131 S. Ct. at 1398, 1400 n.7. Specifically, the

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Supreme Court held that “review under [section] 2254(d)(1) is limited to the record that

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was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits.” Id. at 1398. The
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Supreme Court was also clear that the statutory language of section 2254(d)(2), which

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requires that a court assess whether a factual determination was unreasonable “in light of

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the evidence presented in the State court proceeding,” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), similarly

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limits a federal court’s review under that subsection to the state court record. See id. at

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1400 n.7.

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Mr. Jones asserts that despite the Supreme Court’s ruling, this Court ought to grant

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his motion for an evidentiary hearing before it requires him to demonstrate that based

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upon the state court record his petition satisfies the requirements of section 2254(d). He

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argues that “the Supreme Court’s decision in Pinholster did not alter the well-established

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principles governing his right to an evidentiary hearing.” (Petr.’s Supp. Br., at 4

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(capitalization edited).) He explains that “Pinholster did nothing more than clarify how a

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federal court is to conduct the inquiry under section 2254(d)(1).” (Id. at 8.) Mr. Jones

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cites Wellons v. Hall, 130 S. Ct. 727, 730 (2010), for the proposition that “[a]n evaluation

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of the ‘deference owed under’ section 2254(d)(1) to the state court decision relates to

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‘whether to grant habeas relief,’ not whether to grant an evidentiary hearing.” (Petr.’s

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Supp. Br., at 8 (quoting Wellons, 130 S. Ct. at 730).) He argues that “[i]n Pinholster, the

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Supreme Court made it clear that it was not departing from its prior law on evidentiary

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hearings under the AEDPA” such as Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465 (2007), Michael

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Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420 (2000), and Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963).

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According to Mr. Jones, Pinholster does not prevent this Court from granting him an

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evidentiary hearing pursuant to section 2254(e) at this stage of his petition.

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Mr. Jones is correct that the Supreme Court in Pinholster noted that it “need not

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decide . . . whether a district court may ever choose to hold an evidentiary hearing before

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it determines that [section] 2254(d) has been satisfied.” 131 S. Ct. at 1411 n.20.

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However, even if there are limited circumstances in which a district court can conduct an

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evidentiary hearing before finding section 2254(d) to be satisfied, the Supreme Court
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made it clear that a district court is not required to do so. A district court should be very

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reluctant to conduct an evidentiary hearing especially where, as here, principles of

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federalism dictate that the district court first determine whether the requirements of

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section 2254(d) be have been met. See id. at 1399 (“[W]hen the state-court record

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precludes habeas relief under the limitations of [section] 2254(d), at district court is not

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required to hold an evidentiary hearing” (internal quotation omitted)); see also id. (citing,

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as “consistent . . . with [its] holding,” Landrigan, 550 U.S. at 474 (“Because the

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deferential standards prescribed by [section] 2254 control whether to grant habeas relief,

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a federal court must take into account those standards in deciding whether an evidentiary

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hearing is appropriate.”)).

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The Ninth Circuit has found the decision in Pinholster to have significant

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implications for a petitioner’s entitlement to an evidentiary hearing. The Ninth Circuit

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held in Stokley v. Ryan that Pinholster’s application would “foreclose[] the possibility of

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a federal evidentiary hearing” for a petitioner to present evidence beyond the state court

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record. 659 F.3d 802, 809 (9th Cir. 2011). The petitioner in Stokely, Stokley, moved the

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district court for an evidentiary hearing on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.

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In support of his motion, Stokley introduced declarations from four medical experts. The

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district court denied his motion for an evidentiary hearing and denied the claim. Stokley

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appealed.

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In supplemental briefing to the Ninth Circuit following the decision in Pinholster,

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the state argued “that Pinholster applies to preclude consideration of the declarations

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Stokley supplied for the first time in federal court.” Id. at 807. Stokley took a different

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approach, arguing that his federal claim was “fundamentally new and different from the

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ineffective assistance claim presented to the state courts in his supplemental petition.” Id.

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The Ninth Circuit noted that “[i]f accepted, Stokley’s argument would mean that

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Pinholster does not apply to his federal claim.” Id.
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The Ninth Circuit held that it need not resolve whether Stokley’s claim was,

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indeed, a new claim, because Stokley was not entitled to relief on the merits in any event.

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Id. Notably, however, the Ninth Circuit observed that “if Pinholster applies, it directly

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bars Stokley from receiving the only relief he seeks―a hearing to present new evidence

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in federal court.” Id. The Ninth Circuit emphasized that “Pinholster’s limitation on the

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consideration of Stokley’s new evidence” from the medical experts “forecloses the

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possibility of a federal evidentiary hearing, the only relief Stokley currently seeks.” Id at

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809 (emphasis added).

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Here, Mr. Jones has made no argument that his federal claims are fundamentally

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different from those he presented to the state court. The Court, therefore, is not required

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to hold an evidentiary hearing before Mr. Jones demonstrates his satisfaction of section

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2254(d) on the basis of the state court record.

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Finally, Mr. Jones argues that Pinholster is inapplicable because he has already

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demonstrated a violation of (d)(2). He asserts that the California Supreme Court erred by

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summarily denying his case despite his having made a satisfactory prima facie showing

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of entitlement to habeas relief. The Court does not have an adequate record before it to

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determine whether Mr. Jones can satisfy the requirements of section 2254(d) based solely

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on the state court record. Accordingly, the parties must submit briefing regarding

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whether section 2254(d) bars this Court from granting Mr. Jones the relief he seeks,

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based solely on the record before the state court.

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B. Effect of the State Court Process Afforded to Mr. Jones

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Mr. Jones also asserts in his supplemental brief that “[t]o the extent that this Court

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desires the parties to address the application of section 2254(d)(1), Pinholster does not

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control here, because it addressed only the situation in which a petitioner has received all
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state process necessary to develop factually and present his claims.” (Petr.’s Supp. Br., at

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11.) In Pinholster, the California Supreme Court issued an order to show cause (“OSC”)

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why relief should not be granted, and the parties filed a return and a traverse. See

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Docket, In re Pinholster, Case No. S034501. The California Supreme Court vacated the

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order to show cause as improvidently issued and denied the petition. Id.; see also Brief

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of Respondent [Pinholster] in Opposition to the Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Cullen v.

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Pinholster, 2010 WL 4148534, May 12, 2010, at * 31 (“The California Supreme Court

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held no hearing, originally issued an OSC and then withdrew it for unknown reasons, and

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finally issued a post-card denial of the petition.”). Mr. Jones argues that because he was

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not granted an OSC, his “state court proceedings are materially distinguishable” because

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“[t]he issuance of an order to show cause critically transforms the state habeas process.”

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(Petr.’s Supp. Br., at 14.)

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This argument is unpersuasive. In Pinholster, the California Supreme Court made

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the same determination in the petitioner’s case that it did in Mr. Jones’ case: that

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petitioner failed to state a prima facie case for relief. It explicitly considered Pinholster’s

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first state habeas petition to have been “summarily denied” notwithstanding the parties’

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briefing on an order to show cause at one point in the case. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1396

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n.1. The United States Supreme Court explained in Pinholster:

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Under California law, the California Supreme Court’s summary denial of a
habeas petition on the merits reflects that court’s determination that the
claims made in the petition do not state a prima facie case entitling the
petitioner to relief. It appears that the court generally assumes the
allegations in the petition to be true, but does not accept wholly conclusory
allegations, and will also review the record of the trial . . . to assess the
merits of the petitioner’s claims.

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131 S. Ct. at 1402 n.12 (internal quotation and citations omitted). The Supreme Court in

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Pinholster made clear that federal courts must give deference to all state court decisions

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ultimately made on the merits under § 2254(d), including summary denials. Pinholster,
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131 S. Ct. at 1419 (citing Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 788 (2011)). In addition,

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the Supreme Court in Pinholster cited and approved of California’s practices in capital

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cases of issuing summary denials without hearings. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1402–03

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n.12. The absence of an OSC, evidentiary hearing, or discovery in the state court is

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therefore no longer a basis for conducting an evidentiary hearing under section 2254(d).

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Thus, Mr. Jones is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing regarding his claims simply

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because the state court issued a summary denial on them. While it is possible that, as Mr.

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Jones asserts, the California Supreme Court violated sections 2254(d)(1) and 2254(d)(2)

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in summarily denying his claims, the Court cannot make such a determination on the

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present record, and Mr. Jones must make that showing as to each claim based on the

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record before the state court.

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C. Development of New Evidence

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Mr. Jones argues that “evidence first developed on federal habeas may ultimately

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lead to relief if that evidence forms the basis for a ‘new claim[].’” (Petr.’s Supp. Br., at

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petitioners in Carter v. Martel, No. CV 06-4532 RGK and Coffman v. Johnson, CV 06-

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7304 ABC. In Carter, which was quoted by the court in Coffman, the district court

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explained:

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Petitioner’s argument refers to the majority’s treatment of a
hypothetical claim described by Justice Sotomayor in her dissent. Justice
Sotomayor considered a Brady claim denied on the merits by the state court
on the basis that the withheld evidence did not show the requisite
materiality. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1417. Before the statute of limitations
has run on filing a federal habeas petition, the hypothetical petitioner
receives additional withheld documents, but is barred from filing a
successive petition under state law. See id. at 1418. (citing as an example
Virginia’s bar on successive petitions). Justice Sotomayor states that if “the
new evidence merely bolsters a Brady claim that was adjudicated on the
merits in state court, it is unclear how the petitioner can obtain federal
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habeas relief after today’s holding.” Id. In response, the majority stated that
“[t]hough we do not decide where to draw the line between new claims and
claims adjudicated on the merits, Justice Sotomayor’s hypothetical . . . may
well present a new claim.” Id. at 1401 n.10. (citation omitted).
In contrast to Justice Sotomayor’s hypothetical, however, the state of
California does not bar petitions as successive where they present new facts
previously unknown to the petitioner. See In re Martinez, 46 Cal. 4th 945,
946 (2009); In re Martin, 44 Cal. 3d 1, 26, 27 n.3 (1987). . . .
Because relief might be available from the state court, the “new
claim” Petitioner envisions would be unexhausted. See 28 U.S.C. §
2254(b)(1). Once the unexhausted claim were before the Court, the
proceedings would have to be stayed pursuant to Rhines v. Weber[, 544 U.S.
269, 278 (2005)], or the claim would have to be dismissed. . . . In either
event, the claim could not proceed to an evidentiary hearing or relief while it
remained unexhausted.

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Carter v. Martel, CV 06-4532 RGK, Dkt. No. 70, at 5–7 (June 30, 2011). The district
court further observed that any request to have an evidentiary hearing on a petitioner’s
existing, unexhausted claims, in the hopes of developing new evidence to support a new
claim, puts forth only a “speculative basis for proceeding with further evidentiary
development.” Id. at 8. Mr. Jones, like the petitioner in Carter, “cites no authority to
suggest that a federal court should serve as a forum to develop additional evidence in
support of fully exhausted claims. To the contrary, ‘when the state-court record
precludes habeas relief under the limitations of [section] 2254(d), a district court is not
required to hold an evidentiary hearing.’” Id. (quoting Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1399
(internal quotation omitted)). Accordingly, Mr. Jones’ contention that he “should be
afforded an opportunity to develop facts that may lead to additional claims and or
evidence in support of the claims already presented to the California Supreme Court” is
unpersuasive. Mr. Jones must demonstrate a violation of section 2254(d)(1) or
2254(d)(2) based upon the state court record in order for this Court to grant him the relief
he seeks. Should Mr. Jones uncover new evidence, he may file a successive petition in
California state court.
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III. CONCLUSION

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For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Jones’ motion for an evidentiary hearing is

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DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. The parties shall submit a proposed merits briefing

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schedule on or before April 16, 2012. Petitioner’s merits briefing shall set forth how

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each claim satisfies section 2254(d)(1) and/or section 2254(d)(2) on the basis of the

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record that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits..

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DATED:

March 26, 2012
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CORMAC J. CARNEY

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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