Caronda Graham et al v. County of Los Angeles et al

Filing 40

ORDER Denying Defendants' Motion to Dismiss 22 by Judge Dean D. Pregerson. For the reasons stated above, Defendants Motion to Dismiss First Amended Complaint of Plaintiff, Deborah Jefferey, is DENIED. (See Order for Details). (sch)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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CARONDA GRAHAM, individually
and as successor-ininterest; SHAR'RHONDA DAVIS,
individually and as
successor-in-interest; and
DEBORAH JEFFERY,
individually,

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Plaintiffs,

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v.
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES,
DEPUTY GRIMES; DEPUTY
RANIAG; DEPUTY AUSTIN,
DEPUTY GRIFFITH,

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Defendants.
___________________________

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Case No. CV 10-05059 DDP (Ex)
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION
TO DISMISS

[Motion filed on 12/8/2010]

Presently before the court is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

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First Amended Complaint of Deborah Jeffrey.

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submissions of the parties, the court denies the motion and adopts

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the following order.

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I.

Having considered the

Background

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Plaintiff Deborah Jeffery (“Jeffery”) was engaged to be

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married to Reynard Davis (“Davis.”) (First Amended Complaint

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(“FAC”) ¶ 4).

On July 4, 2009, Davis was physically restrained and

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tased by the individual Defendants, who are peace officers employed

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by the County defendant.

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Defendants used unlawful force against Davis, resulting in Davis’s

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death.

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filed this civil rights suit, alleging ten causes of action.

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these, Jefferey brings only one cause of action, the Fourth Claim

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for Relief for Interference with Familial Relationship and Freedom

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of Association, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

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Defendants now move to dismiss Jeffery from the FAC for lack of

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(FAC ¶¶ 17, 22).

(FAC ¶¶ 5, 16).

The FAC alleges that

Davis’s mother, sister, and Jefferey
Of

(FAC ¶ 53).

standing under Federal Rule of Procedure 12(b)1 and 12(b)(6).
II.

Legal Standard

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Standing pertains to a federal court’s subject matter

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jurisdiction, and may therefore be raised in a motion to dismiss

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under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1).

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Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 598 F.3d 1115, 1122 (9th Cir. 2010).

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Where the jurisdictional issue is separate from the merits of the

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case, the court may evaluate the merits for itself, without

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presuming a plaintiff’s allegations as true.

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Inc. v. General Tel. & Elec. Corp., 594 F.2d 730, 733 (9th Cir.

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1979).

Chandler v. State

Thornhill Pub. Co.,

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Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a complaint is

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subject to dismissal when the plaintiff's allegations fail to state

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a claim upon which relief can be granted.

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12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, “all

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allegations of material fact are accepted as true and should be

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construed in the light most favorable to [the] plaintiff.”

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v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 433, 447 (9th Cir. 2000).

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2

When considering a

Resnick

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In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009), the

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Supreme Court explained that a court considering a 12(b)(6) motion

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should first “identify[] pleadings that, because they are no more

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than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.”

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Id.

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factual allegations, . . . assume their veracity and then determine

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whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.”

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Id.; see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th

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Cir. 2009) (“In sum, for a complaint to survive a motion to

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dismiss, the non-conclusory factual content, and reasonable

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inferences from that content, must be plausibly suggestive of a

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claim entitling the plaintiff to relief” (internal quotation marks

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omitted)).

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III.

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Next, the court should identify the complaint’s “well-pleaded

Discussion
Defendants argue that only spouses, parents, and children of

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decedents may bring constitutional claims for loss of companionship

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and society under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 .

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Jefferey was merely the fiancé of the decedent, Defendants assert,

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she lacks standing to bring the Fourth Claim for Relief.

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disagrees.

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(Motion at 3).

Because

The court

In Ward v. City of San Jose, the Ninth Circuit adopted the

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Seventh Circuit’s rule that, unlike parents or children, siblings

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do not possess a Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest in

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companionship.

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(9th Cir. 1991) (citing Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205,

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1248 (7th Cir. 1984), overruled by Russ v. Watts, 414 F.3d 783 (7th

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Cir. 2005).

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Circuit, expressed an unwillingness “to attach constitutional

Ward v. City of San Jose, 967, F.2d 280, 283-284

In so doing, the Ninth Circuit, like the Seventh

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significance to [emotional] attachments outside the closely guarded

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parent-child relationship.”

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v. Spokane County, 438 F.Supp.2d 1252, 1265 (E.D. Wash. 2006)

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(applying Ward and dismissing siblings’ 14th Amendment claim);

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Palacios v. City of Oakland, 970 F.Supp. 732, 745 (N.D. Cal. 1997).

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Bell, 746 F.2d at 1247; See also Rentz

Here, however, Jefferey does not bring a 14th Amendment

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companionship claim.

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JEFFERY also had a cognizable interest under the Free Association

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Clause of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution to

The Fourth Claim for Relief states, “DEBORAH

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continued association with her fiancé, DECEDENT.”

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a result of the excessive force by Defendants . . . Plaintiff

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DEBORAH JEFFERIES [sic] was deprived of her constitutional right

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and freedom of association with her fiancé, DECEDENT.

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“Defendants . . . thus violated the Fourteenth [] Amendment rights

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of CARONDA GRAHAM AND SHAR’RHONDA DAVIS . . . and the First

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Amendment rights of DEBORAH JEFFERY . . . .”

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(FAC ¶ 53).

“As

(FAC ¶ 54).

(FAC ¶ 55).

It is well established that “implicit in the right to engage

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in activities protected by the First Amendment [is] a corresponding

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right to associate with others . . . .”

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Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984).

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Roberts, has held that “dating and other social activities are

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worthy of some protection under the first amendment . . . .”

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Inc. v. Clark County, 836 F.2d 1185, 1194 (9th Cir. 1988).

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First Amendment protects “certain intimate human relationships . .

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. that presuppose deep attachments and commitments to the

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necessarily few other individuals with whom one shares not only a

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special community of thoughts, experiences, and beliefs but also

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distinctively personal aspects of one’s life.”
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Roberts v.United States

The Ninth Circuit, applying

IDK,
The

Freeman v. City of

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Santa Ana, 68 F.3d 1180, 1188 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Board of

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Directors of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. 537, 545 (1987)

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(internal quotation marks omitted).

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Davis, her fiancé, was sufficiently personal and intimate to merit

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the protection of the First Amendment, under which Jeffery has

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standing to pursue her claim.

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Authority, 2010 WL 2431077 at *8 (W.D.N.Y. 2010) (discussing

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extension of First Amendment right of intimate association to

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fiancés).

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IV.

Jeffery’s relationship with

See Matusick v. Erie County Water

Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

First Amended Complaint of Plaintiff, Deborah Jefferey, is DENIED.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Dated: August 25, 2011

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DEAN D. PREGERSON

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United States District Judge

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