Caronda Graham et al v. County of Los Angeles et al

Filing 67

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 48 by Judge Dean D. Pregerson. (lc)

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NO JS-6

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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CARONDA GRAHAM, individually
and as successor-ininterest; SHAR'RHONDA DAVIS,
individually and as
successor-in-interest; and
DEBORAH JEFFERY,
individually,

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Plaintiffs,

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v.
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES,
DEPUTY GRIMES; DEPUTY
RANIAG; DEPUTY AUSTIN,
DEPUTY GRIFFITH,

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Defendants.
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___________________________

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Case No. CV 10-05059 DDP (Ex)

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

[Dkt. No. 48]

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Presently before the court is Defendants’ Motion for Summary

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Judgment or, in the Alternative, for Partial Summary Judgment

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(“Motion”).

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oral argument, the court grants the motion and adopts the following

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order.

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After reviewing the parties’ moving papers and hearing

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I.

Background

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This action arises from the death of Raynard Davis (“Davis”)

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following an encounter with Los Angeles County Sheriff’s deputies,

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during which Davis was tased twice in the chest.

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Davis lost control of his vehicle and drove approximately one

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hundred yards off of a road in Lancaster, California.

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Angeles Sheriff’s Department deputies and Los Angeles Fire

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Department paramedics and firefighters arrived on the scene of the

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accident, Davis was sitting in his car with swollen eyes and blood

On July 4, 2009,

When Los

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on his face.

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the firefighters tried to get information from Davis, who was

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speaking incoherently and exhibiting erratic behavior.

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at 29:19-22.)

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prevent him from exiting the vehicle, and deputies verbally

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commanded Davis to stay in the car.

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Davis’ behavior in the car was “combative.”

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19.)

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car’s steering wheel.

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weighed 440 pounds, pushed himself up to face the firefighters and

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Deputy Nathan Grimes, and exited the car.

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Nathan Grimes in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (“Grimes

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Decl.”) ¶ 7.)

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(Opp. Ex. A at 30:17-18.)

Deputy John Griffith and

(Mot. Ex. J

Firefighters attempted to treat Davis in his car and

(Mot. Ex. I at 27:2-13.)
(Opp. Ex. A at 29:16-

Davis said “Leave me alone,” and hit his hands against the
(Mot. Ex. M at 14:18-21.)

Then Davis, who

(Declaration of Deputy

After he got out of the car, it appeared to the firefighters

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and deputies that Davis was walking towards them in an “aggressive

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manner,” as if Davis wanted to fight with them.

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20:17-19; Opp. Ex. A at 48:14-17.)

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to the deputies “I am going to fuck you guys up” (Opp. Ex. A at

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47:8-12) and “I’m gonna kick your ass.”
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(Opp. Ex. C at

Before he was tased, Davis said

(Declaration of Deputy

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Kristoffer Ranaig in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment

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(“Ranaig Decl.”) ¶ 9.)

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Deputy Nathan Grimes, Grimes said “If you come any closer, I’m

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gonna tase you.”

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clenched, continued to approach.

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Grimes drew his taser, aimed at Davis, and fired.

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was the only deputy on the scene to draw his taser.

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instruction, or request was given for any of the deputies to draw

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their tasers.

As Davis approached the firefighters and

(Grimes Decl. ¶¶ 7-8.)

Davis, with fists

(Opp. Ex. A at 51:12-14.)

Deputy

Deputy Grimes
No order,

Deputy Grimes deployed his taser in dart mode, and

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the darts punctured Davis’ left chest wall.

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darts and several deputies moved in to restrain him. The other

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deputies struggled and had a difficult time handcuffing Davis, who

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was resisting by separating his arms.

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Deputy Grimes tased Davis a second time in order to get Davis to

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cooperate with the other deputies.

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Davis removed the

(Opp. Ex. C at 34:2-35:22.)

(Grimes Decl. ¶ 10.)

Deputy Grimes contacted his supervisor, Sergeant Steve

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Sylvies, to report the use of force.

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arrived at the scene.

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treatment.

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carried Davis to the ambulance in a cargo net.

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by firefighters and paramedics, Davis kicked one of the

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firefighters and had to be hobbled by Deputy Kristoffer Ranaig and

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Deputy Griffith.

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Sergeant Sylvies later

Once handcuffed, Davis continued to resist

(Mot. Ex. H at 27:22-28:22.)

Firefighters eventually
While being carried

(Ranaig Decl. ¶ 14.)

Davis was then transported by ambulance to the emergency room

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at Antelope Valley Hospital at about 10:15 p.m.

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thrash around and resist treatment, tried to spit on medical staff,

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and continued to say “I’m going to fuck you all up.”

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at 18:24-19:3.)

Davis continued to

(Mot. Ex. R

Davis was placed in four-point restraints and a
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spit mask, and medical staff then administered calming agents.

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Laboratory tests of Davis’ blood and urine returned positive for

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cocaine metabolite, cannabinoids, and phencyclidine (PCP).

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also showed blood alcohol levels of roughly 0.16 or 0.17 milligrams

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per deciliter.

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Tests

At approximately 3:30 a.m., Davis’ condition began to

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deteriorate.

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2009.

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He died a few hours later at 7:09 a.m. on July 5,

On July 9, 2010, Davis’ two daughters, Shar’Rhonda Davis and

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Caronda Graham, and his fiancée, Deborah Jeffrey (collectively,

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“Plaintiffs”) filed a complaint against Deputy Grimes, Deputy

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Griffith, Deputy Raniag, Deputy Austin (collectively, the

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“Individual Defendants”), and the County of Los Angeles

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(collectively, “Defendants”).

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filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) asserting the following

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causes of action: (1) unreasonable search and seizure (detention

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and arrest), actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) unreasonable

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search and seizure (excessive force), actionable under 42 U.S.C. §

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1983; (3) denial of medical care, actionable under 42 U.S.C. §

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1983; (4) interference with familial relationship and association,

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actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (5) conspiracy to violate civil

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rights, actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and § 1985; (6) municipal

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and supervisory liability, actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (7)

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false arrest/false imprisonment; (8) battery; (9) negligence; and

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(10) violation of the Bane Act, California Civil Code § 51.7.

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Defendants now move for summary judgment.

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On December 8, 2010, Plaintiffs

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II.

Legal Standard

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Summary judgment is appropriate where “the pleadings,

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depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,

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together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine

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issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled

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to a judgment as a matter of law.”

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seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing the

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court of the basis for its motion and of identifying those portions

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of the pleadings and discovery responses that demonstrate the

FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c).

A party

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absence of a genuine issue of material fact.

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Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).

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the evidence must be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party.

See

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Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 242 (1986).

If the

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moving party does not bear the burden of proof at trial, it is

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entitled to summary judgment if it can demonstrate that “there is

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an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.”

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See Celotex Corp. v.

All reasonable inferences from

Id.

Once the moving party meets its burden, the burden shifts to

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the nonmoving party opposing the motion, who must “set forth

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specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.”

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Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256.

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party “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the

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existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on

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which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.”

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477 U.S. at 322.

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that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving

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party,” and material facts are those “that might affect the outcome

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of the suit under the governing law.”

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There is no genuine issue of fact “[w]here the record taken as a

Summary judgment is warranted if a

Celotex,

A genuine issue exists if “the evidence is such

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Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.

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whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-

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moving party.”

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475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).

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Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,

It is not the Court’s task “to scour the record in search of a

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genuine issue of triable fact.”

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1278 (9th Cir. 1996). Counsel has an obligation to lay out their

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support clearly.

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1026, 1031 (9th Cir. 2001).

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file for evidence establishing a genuine issue of fact, where the

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evidence is not set forth in the opposition papers with adequate

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references so that it could conveniently be found."

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III.

Keenan v. Allan, 91 F.3d 1275,

Carmen v. San Francisco Sch. Dist., 237 F.3d
The Court “need not examine the entire

Id.

Discussion

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A.

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Plaintiffs do not oppose Defendants’ motion with respect to

Plaintiffs’ Non-opposition

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their first, third, fifth, and seventh claims.

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Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED with respect to

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those claims.

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B.

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Causation is an implicit requirement of a civil rights cause

Accordingly,

Causation

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of action.

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F.2d 1350, 1355 (9th Cir. 1981).

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no evidence that any Defendant caused Davis’ death or, therefore,

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Plaintiffs’ individual injuries.

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that the facts that Davis was tased and then died the next day “are

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more than enough for a reasonable inference to be drawn that one

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had something to do with the other.”

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argue that this inference “is supported by the testimony of the

Arnold v. International Business Machines Corp., 637
Here, Plaintiffs have put forth

Plaintiffs conclusorily state

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(Opp. at 31.)

Plaintiffs

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medical examiner,” who, Plaintiffs argue, “did not attribute the

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cause of death to drug intoxication.”

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(Id.)

Plaintiffs’ argument is unpersuasive.

Plaintiffs have not

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submitted an expert report, and instead cite solely to the

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testimony of Dr. Pedro Ortiz-Colom, a medical examiner and forensic

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pathologist at the Coroner’s Office for the County of Los Angeles.

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While Dr. Ortiz-Colom did not attribute the cause of Davis’ death

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to drug intoxication, he did testify that drugs “contribute[d]

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significantly to [Davis’] death.”

(Opp. Ex. E at 62:5-6.)

Dr.

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Ortiz-Colom further testified that Davis’ death was caused by “drug

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induced excited delirium.”

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Ortiz-Colom, excited delirium is a condition “produced by

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overstimulation of the body systems usually under the influence of

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a drug or drugs.”

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(Id. at 62:8-9.)

According to Dr.

(Mot. Ex. T at 13:7-9.)

Dr. Ortiz-Colom’s reports and testimony not only fail to

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support Plaintiffs’ arguments, but also bolster Defendants’

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contention that the tasing was not a factor in Davis’ death.

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Ortiz-Colom’s coroner report on Davis states:

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Dr.

Davis died of the complications of drug use and underlying
contributing heart and liver disease. Review of the autopsy
finding and medical records support the conclusion that the
cause of death was due [to] a condition best described as
Excited Delirium . . . In general the theory behind this
condition is that there is an abnormal elevation and secretion
of catecholamines triggered by the stimulating effects of the
drug(s) in the body . . . Other significant contributing
conditions include an enlarged heart and fatty liver. Both of
these conditions can lead to sudden cardiac arrhythmias and
metabolic disturbances. The medical derangements in
combination with the drugs taken may have contributed to
[Davis’] death.
(Mot., Ex. T.)
Dr. Ortiz-Colom further testified that he did not see “any
indication of the tasing” nor “any evidence of tasing in the
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autopsy.”

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did not “find any evidence that the tasing had any effect on

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[Davis’] death.”

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“any evidence that anybody including the police officers did

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something that was a contributing cause” to Davis’ death.

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26:2-9.)

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of a traumatic factor in the cause of death.”

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Two additional experts, Drs. Fukumoto and Kroll, also testified

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that the use of a taser did not cause Davis’ death.

(Mot. Ex. T at 24:9-11.)

(Id. at 24:22-25.)

Furthermore, Dr. Ortiz Colom

He did not think there was

(Id. at

Dr. Ortiz-Colom also stated that there was no “evidence
(Id. at 42:21-24).

(Declaration

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of Richard Fukumoto, M.D. in Support of Mot. ¶ 12; Declaration of

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Mark Kroll in Support of Mot. at 6-12.)

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no evidence to the contrary.

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evidence that Defendants’ conduct caused Davis’ death.

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Plaintiffs cannot establish the necessary element of causation,

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Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED with respect to

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Plaintiffs’ individual claims.

Plaintiff has put forth

Plaintiffs have not presented any
Because

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C.

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Defendants assert that they are entitled to qualified

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immunity against Plaintiffs’ claims brought as Davis’ successors

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in interest.

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qualified immunity, the court asks two distinct questions.

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v. MacPherson, 630 F.3d 805, 823 (9th Cir. 2010).

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determine whether officers’ conduct violated a constitutional

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right and, if so, whether that right was clearly established.

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The court may, in its discretion, address either prong of the

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analysis first.

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“If no constitutional right would have been violated were the

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allegations established, there is no necessity for further

Qualified Immunity

In evaluating a police officer’s assertion of
Bryan

The court must

Id.

Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009).

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inquiries concerning qualified immunity.”

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U.S. 194, 201 (2001).

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Saucier v. Katz, 533

Allegations of excessive force are examined under the Fourth

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Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable seizures.

Graham v.

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Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989); Deorle v. Rutherford, 272 F.3d

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1272, 1279 (9th Cir. 2001).

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turn on credibility determinations, summary judgment in such cases

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is generally disfavored, particularly where police officer

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defendants are the only eyewitnesses and cross examination is the

Because excessive force cases often

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only means of contesting a defendant’s version of events.

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v. City of Hemet, 394 F.3d 689, 701 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc);

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Scott v. Henrich, 39 F.3d 912, 915 (9th Cir. 1994).

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must determine whether a defendant’s actions are “objectively

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reasonable,” when viewed from the perspective of a reasonable

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officer on the scene.

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requires a balancing of the intrusion on a person’s liberty with

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the countervailing government interests at stake.

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394 F.3d at 701.

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the severity of the crime that prompted the use of force, threats

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posed by the subject to the safety of others, and whether the

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suspect was resisting arrest.

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Francisco, 441 F.3d 1090, 1095 (9th Cir. 2006).

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Graham, 490 U.S. at 396-397.

Smith

The court

This analysis

City of Hemet,

Relevant factors include the type of force used,

Tatum v. City and County of San

Here, Plaintiffs’ non-opposition to Defendants’ motion with

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respect to the unlawful detention and false arrest causes of

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action suggests that the parties agree that, to the extent

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deputies detained or seized Davis in the course of obtaining

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medical treatment for him, there was a reasonable basis to do so.

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See also Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006)
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(“The need to protect or preserve life or avoid serious injury is

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justification for what would be otherwise illegal absent an

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exigency or emergency.”).1

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The fact that deputies had a reasonable basis to detain

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Davis, who was injured and incoherent after his car accident, does

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not, of course, alone render Deputy Grimes’ use of a taser

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reasonable.

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deliver an electrical charge that overrides the central nervous

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system, rendering a target limp.

A taser, when deployed in dart mode, is designed to

See Mattos v. Agarano, 661 F.3d

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433, 443 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc); See also Glenn v. Washington

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County, 673 F.3d 864, 877 (9th Cir. 2011) (Describing advantages

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of taser over more intrusive beanbag shotgun).

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dart therefore constitutes an “intermediate or medium, though not

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insignificant, quantum of force.”

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The use of a taser

Bryan, 630 F.3d 805 at 826.

A use of force of such magnitude may be warranted if the

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governmental interests at stake are sufficiently compelling.

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Here, Davis was a large, 440-pound man who appeared to be acting

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erratically.

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deputies to remain in his vehicle while firefighters administered

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medical treatment.

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deputies and paramedics, slamming his hands against the steering

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wheel and saying “Leave me alone.”

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restrain Davis physically by pushing him down into the car seat,

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but were unable to do so.

He ignored commands from both paramedics and

Davis began to act aggressively toward

Firefighters attempted to

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Though the “community caretaking” or “emergency doctrine”
exception to the Fourth Amendment typically arises in the context
of warrantless searches, courts in this circuit have extended the
doctrine to warrantless arrests as well. See, e.g. Goldsmith v.
Snohomish County, 558 F.Supp. 2d 1140, 1151-1152 (W.D. Wash. 2008).
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Upon exiting the car, Davis began to threaten paramedics and

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deputies, stating “I am going to fuck you guys up.”

It appeared

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to paramedic Joe Carvalho that Davis was “coming after one of us .

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. . like he was coming after somebody.”

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evidence establishes that Deputy Grimes warned Davis that Davis

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needed to stop, and would be tased if he continued to advance on

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paramedics and deputies.2

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clenched.

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safety of deputies, paramedics, and indeed for Davis himself, did

The uncontroverted

Davis continued to approach, with fists

Only at that point, with a reasonable fear for the

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Deputy Grimes deploy a taser dart.

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Deputy Grimes’ use of a taser dart was objectively reasonable in

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light of the surrounding circumstances.

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(Mot. Ex. M at 24:18-25:3.)

Deputy Grimes later tased Davis a second time.

Though

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declining to specify the quantum of force associated with a taser

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applied in direct contact mode, the Ninth Circuit recently found

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such force less serious than a dart-mode tasering, albeit still

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extremely painful.

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with the initial tasering, Deputy Grimes’ second use of the taser

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was reasonable in light of the totality of the circumstances.

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intermediate-level taser darts did not appear to have a

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significant effect on Davis, and unquestionably failed to render

Mattos, 661 F.3d at 443.

Nevertheless, as

The

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Plaintiffs’ counsel cites to the deposition of Deputy Austin
in an attempt to create a material dispute regarding whether Deputy
Grimes gave a warning before tasing Davis. Plaintiffs argue that
Deputy Grimes fired his taser at Davis “without any warning.”
(Opp. at 8) Deputy Austin, however, never testified that Grimes
did not give a warning. To the contrary, Deputy Austin testified
that Grimes did warn Davis that he was on the verge of being tased.
(Austin Depo., Ex. X at 50.) Plaintiffs omit this page of the
relevant deposition, citing instead to Austin’s statement that he
did not describe Deputy Grimes’ warning in the written police
report.
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him limp and helpless.

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resist treatment and detention even after the initial tasing, and

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physically struggled against three deputies who were attempting to

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restrain him.

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(Grimes Decl. ¶ 9.) Davis continued to

(Mot. Ex. M at 34:2-9.)

Throughout the incident, Davis repeatedly yelled “I’m going

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to fuck you up.”

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Mikeal Smith ¶ 11.)

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able to place Davis in handcuffs.

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violently resist detention and treatment, kicking a firefighter

(Mot. Ex. M at 49-:13-20; Declaration of Deputy
Only after the second tasing were deputies
Even then, Davis continued to

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who was attempting to carry him to the ambulance.

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took the reasonable precaution of hobbling him.3

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medical staff, without the involvement of the defendant deputies,

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implemented more serious measures such as four-point restraints, a

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spit mask, and sedatives, did Davis finally cease resisting.

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Deputies then
Only after

The use of a taser, particularly in dart mode, constitutes a

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significant use of force.

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interests at stake here, including the safety of the responding

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deputies, paramedics, and Davis himself, outweigh the intrusion

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upon Davis’ individual liberty.

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testimony of responding officers, firefighters, paramedics, and

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hospital staff, establishes that Deputy Grimes’ use of force was

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objectively reasonable in light of the surrounding circumstances.

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Accordingly, there was no constitutional violation, and the

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defendant deputies are entitled to qualified immunity.

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D.

Nevertheless, the governmental

The record, including the

State Claims

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In any event, Plaintiffs’ excessive force claims appear to
be limited to the two tasings.
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Having determined that there was no constitutional violation,

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and that Defendants’ use of force was objectively reasonable, the

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court also GRANTS Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on

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Plaintiffs’ remaining state claims.

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IV.

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Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, Defendants’ Motion for Summary

Judgment is GRANTED.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Dated: July 19, 2012
DEAN D. PREGERSON
United States District Judge

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