Jacquelyne Hollander v. The Irrevocable Trust Established by James Brown in August 1, 2000 et al

Filing 33

MINUTES (IN CHAMBERS) Order by Judge Philip S. Gutierrez granting 17 Defendants' motion to dismiss, 22 JOINDER in MOTION to Dismiss: Thus, based on the foregoing, the Court concludes that the probate exception applies, and, accordingly, that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this action. Defendants' motion to dismiss is therefore GRANTED and the case is DISMISSED with prejudice. (see document for further details) (MD JS-6. Case Terminated.) (bm)

Link to doc. # 17 & 22
O / JS-6
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No.

CV 10-7249 PSG (AJWx)

Title

Jacqueline Hollander v. The Irrevocable Trust Established by James Brown in
August 1, 2000, et al.

Present:

Date

June 30, 2011

The Honorable Philip S. Gutierrez, United States District Judge

Wendy K. Hernandez
Deputy Clerk

Not Present
Court Reporter

Attorneys Present for Plaintiff(s):

Attorneys Present for Defendant(s):

Not Present
Proceedings:

n/a
Tape No.

Not Present

(In Chambers) Order GRANTING Defendants’ motion to dismiss

Pending before the Court is Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff Jacqueline
Hollander’s (“Plaintiff”) Complaint. The Court finds the matter appropriate for
decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78; L.R. 7-15. Having considered the
papers submitted in support of and in opposition to Defendants’ motion, the Court GRANTS the
motion.
I.

Background

Plaintiff Jacqueline Hollander (“Plaintiff”) brings this action against The Irrevocable
Trust Established by James Brown in August 1, 2000 (the “Trust”), Russell L. Baunight, UMG
Recordings, Inc., Universal Music Group, Inc., Warner Music Group, Inc., and Warner/Chappell
Music, Inc. (collectively, “Defendants”), seeking a declaration that she had a partnership with
the late entertainer James Brown (“Brown”), that the trust established by Brown in 2000 was an
“extension” of that partnership, and thus, that she is legally entitled to the assets and proceeds of
the Trust as the “surviving partner.” See Prayer for Relief ¶ 1; see also Compl. ¶ 32. Plaintiff
further requests a declaration that the Trust assets to which she purportedly is entitled include
“all of the copyrights and trademarks donated to the Trust by James Brown…with all rights and
privileges afforded that ownership.” Prayer for Relief ¶ 2(e). Additionally, based on the
foregoing determinations, she seeks another declaration that Defendants Warner and Universal

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Link to doc. # 17 & 22
O / JS-6
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No.

CV 10-7249 PSG (AJWx)

Date

June 30, 2011

Title

Jacqueline Hollander v. The Irrevocable Trust Established by James Brown in
August 1, 2000, et al.

infringed Plaintiff’s copyrights and that she is therefore entitled to statutory damages well as for
reimbursement of royalties owed. Id. ¶¶ 3(1)-(2); ¶4(1)-(3).
This is Plaintiff’s fourth attempt to litigate these issues in federal court and her second
attempt to litigate them before this Court.1 In her first action before the Court, she similarly
sought declaratory judgment and an accounting against Defendants based on allegations that, as
a result of a previous partnership with deceased entertainer James Brown, she is the lawful
owner of Trust assets that are to be distributed to Brown’s heirs and others under a settlement
agreement approved by a South Carolina state court. See Jacqueline Hollander v. The
Irrevocable Trust Established by James Brown in August, 1 2000, et al., CV 10-3357 PSG
(AJWx) (the “First Action”), Compl. ¶¶ 14-17 (May 5, 2010). However, on July 7, 2010, the
Court dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint upon determining that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction
over the case. Id., Dkt. # 50 (July 7, 2010). In so holding, the Court reasoned that to grant
Plaintiff the declaratory relief she desired would require the Court to assert control over property
that was the subject of probate proceedings in South Carolina, in contravention of the “probate
exception” to federal subject matter jurisdiction. See Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293, 311,
126 S. Ct. 1735, 164 L. Ed. 2d 480 (2006).
On September 29, 2010, approximately six weeks after the Court’s dismissal of the First
Action, Plaintiff filed this lawsuit, seeking essentially the same relief. See Compl., Dkt. # 1
(Sept. 29, 2010). Defendants now move to dismiss her Complaint for lack of federal subject
matter jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction, improper venue, and untimely service. See Dkt. # 17
(May 17, 2011).
II.

Legal Standard

Plaintiff unsuccessfully brought two lawsuits against Defendants in the Northern District of
Illinois seeking the same relief. See Anderson Decl., Ex. A (Bauknight Decl., ¶ 11, Ex. 2
(Orders from the Northern District of Illinois dismissing Hollander I and Hollander II
complaints)).

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Link to doc. # 17 & 22
O / JS-6
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No.

CV 10-7249 PSG (AJWx)

Date

June 30, 2011

Title

Jacqueline Hollander v. The Irrevocable Trust Established by James Brown in
August 1, 2000, et al.

The probate exception is a jurisdictional limitation on federal courts that “reserves to
state probate courts the probate or annulment of a will and the administration of a decedent’s
estate; it also precludes federal courts from endeavoring to dispose of property that is in the
custody of a state probate court.” Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293, 311-12, 126 S. Ct. 1735,
164 L. Ed. 2d 480 (2006). A federal court may, however, “exercise its jurisdiction to adjudicate
rights in such property where the final judgment does not undertake to interfere with the state
court’s possession save to the extent that the state court is bound by the judgment to recognize
the right adjudicated by the federal court.” Markham v. Allen, 326 U.S. 490, 66 S. Ct. 296, 90 L.
Ed. 256 (1946). Thus, a federal court may adjudicate rights regarding property that is the subject
of a probate proceeding so long as the relief sought would not require the federal court “to assert
control over property that remains under the control of the state courts.” Lefkowitz v. Bank of
N.Y., 528 F.3d 102, 107 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding that the federal district court properly dismissed
claims under the probate exception where plaintiff sought “to mask in claims for federal relief
her complaints about the administration of her [parents’] estates, which have been proceeding in
probate courts”).
III.

Discussion
A.

South Carolina Probate Proceedings

Following the death of James Brown in 2006, probate proceedings were instituted in
Aiken County, South Carolina probate court.2 Compl. ¶ 13. In January and February 2009,
Plaintiff filed a notice of appearance in the South Carolina James Brown Trust & Estate
litigation and objected to the global settlement agreement. See Anderson Decl., Ex. A at 8-10.
Notwithstanding Plaintiff’s objection, on May 26, 2009, the Probate Court issued an Order
approving the global settlement agreement. Anderson Decl. ¶ 4, Ex. A. The settlement
agreement has since been appealed, and final approval of the Probate Court’s May 26, 2009
Order is currently pending before the South Carolina Supreme Court. Anderson Decl., ¶ 5, Ex.
B.
Litigation of Mr. Brown’s Trust and Estate was subsequently transferred to South Carolina
Circuit Court, which, operates as the Probate Court for purposes of this action. Bauknight Decl.
¶ 4 [Dkt. # 17-2 (May 17, 2011)].

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Link to doc. # 17 & 22
O / JS-6
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No.

CV 10-7249 PSG (AJWx)

Title

Jacqueline Hollander v. The Irrevocable Trust Established by James Brown in
August 1, 2000, et al.
B.

Date

June 30, 2011

Analysis

As previously indicated, Plaintiff now seeks an Order declaring that she legally owns all
asserts and proceeds in the Trust, including all intellectual property donated to the Trust.
Defendants, however, argue that this case should be dismissed because, among other reasons, it
falls within the probate exception to federal subject matter jurisdiction. Mot. 3:12-7:25. For
reasons explained below, the Court agrees.
In opposing Defendants’ motion, Plaintiff presents essentially three arguments as to
why her Complaint does not fall within the probate exception. First, she argues that because the
Probate Court improperly exercised jurisdiction of the Trust without making the Trust a party to
the probate action, the remaining partnership assets, specifically Brown’s intellectual property,
are not part of the general Estate of James Brown (“Estate”). Compl. ¶¶ 13, 19-20; Opp’n 5:87:10. Second, she claims that because the copyrights of James Brown “comprise approximately
ninety percent of the total estate[,]” and because the “ownership of [copyrights] is relegated to
interpretation only be the federal courts,” federal subject matter jurisdiction therefore exists over
this action. Opp’n 8:1-23. Third, she asserts that “the question of whether James Brown and
Plaintiff were partners almost twenty years before James Brown died is not a question that
should be the exclusive province of the Probate Court of South Carolina or the Circuit Court [of
South Carolina].” Opp’n 5:1-7.
None of these arguments, however, carry the day. First, Plaintiff is mistaken in
believing that she can evade the probate exception by alleging that the Trust contains assets
(namely, intellectual property) that are not part of the probate estate. As the Court made clear in
its July 7, 2010 Order, “the relationship between the Estate and the Trust and claims of various
parties upon both have been subject of probate proceedings.” See Dkt. #50 (July 7, 2010).
Further, as Defendants correctly point out, “ownership of James Brown’s intellectual property –
whether by his Estate or by the Trust – is a central element of the settlement agreement now on
appeal to the South Carolina Supreme Court.” Reply 2:11-13. Accordingly, even though the
Estate was strategically excluded as a defendant in this case, differentiating between the Estate
and Trust would run afoul of the rule in Marshall forbidding federal courts from asserting
control over property that is in the custody of a state probate court. Marshall, 547 U.S. at 31112.
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Link to doc. # 17 & 22
O / JS-6
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No.

CV 10-7249 PSG (AJWx)

Date

June 30, 2011

Title

Jacqueline Hollander v. The Irrevocable Trust Established by James Brown in
August 1, 2000, et al.

Plaintiff’s second argument, that the Court has subject matter jurisdiction based on her
copyright claim, is equally unconvincing. Even if Plaintiff did articulate a cognizable claim for
copyright infringement (as opposed to a claim for declaratory relief regarding her ownership
rights to the intellectual property), the “probate exception” is not limited to claims based on
diversity jurisdiction. As the Seventh Circuit explained,
[t]here is no good reason to strain to give a different meaning to the
identical language in the diversity and federal-question statutes. The
best contemporary reasons for keeping federal courts out of the
business of probating wills . . . are as persuasive when a suit is filed
in federal court on the basis of federal law as when it is based on
state law.
Jones v. Brennan, 465 F.3d 304, 307 (7th Cir. 2006). Moreover, because the South Carolina
Probate Court took in rem jurisdiction over the intellectual property first, jurisdiction in this
Court is also improper under the doctrine of prior exclusive jurisdiction. See U.S. v. One Oil
Painting Entitled “Femme en Blanc” by Pablo Picasso, 362 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1180 (C.D. Cal.
2005) (“The doctrine of prior exclusive jurisdiction prohibits a court from ‘assuming in rem
jurisdiction over a res that is already under the in rem jurisdiction of another court.’”) (quoting
United States v. One 1985 Cadillac Seville, 866 F.2d 1142, 1145 (9th Cir. 1989)).
Lastly, the Court rejects Plaintiff’s attempt to circumvent the probate exception by
characterizing this action as merely involving the “non-probate question” of whether she and
James Brown entered into a partnership. Her request for declaratory relief regarding her
partnership with Mr. Brown, rather, belies a thinly-veiled attempt to re-litigate broader claims
regarding her ownership interest in the Trust and entitlement to Mr. Brown’s intellectual
property. See Lefkowitz, 528 F.3d at 107. Given the circumstances of this case and nature of
Plaintiff’s allegations, an order by this Court declaring that a partnership was established would,
in effect, determine the rights of interested parties and therefore interfere with administration of
the estate by the Probate Court. 3 See id.; see also Gustafson v. Zumbrunnen, 546 F.3d 398, 400
Plaintiff attempts to analogize the question of partnership raised in this case with the plaintiff’s
claim of tortious interference in Marshall, see Opp. 5:1. Such efforts, however, are misguided.

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Link to doc. # 17 & 22
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No.

CV 10-7249 PSG (AJWx)

Date

June 30, 2011

Title

Jacqueline Hollander v. The Irrevocable Trust Established by James Brown in
August 1, 2000, et al.

(7th Cir. 2008) (Posner, J.) (noting that a case is not within the probate exception when the
judgment sought would not “reallocate the estate’s assets among contending claimants or
otherwise interfere with the probate court’s control over and administration of the estate”).
IV.

Conclusion

Thus, based on the foregoing, the Court concludes that the probate exception applies,
and, accordingly, that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this action.4 Defendants’
motion to dismiss is therefore GRANTED and the case is DISMISSED with prejudice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

In Marshall, the plaintiff sought in personam judgment against the defendant based on a widely
recognized tort. Marshall, 547 U.S. at 312. Because the claim did not involve the
administration of an estate, the probate of a will, or a res in the custody of a probate court, the
Marshall Court held that the probate exception did not apply. Id. Here, however, Plaintiff’s
claim directly involves the probate of Brown’s will.
4
Because the Court determines that it lacks jurisdiction over this action, it need not address the
alternative grounds for dismissal presented in Defendants’ motion.
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