Catalina Ricaldai v. US Investigations Services, LLC et al
Filing
79
ORDER DENYING IN PART AND GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 48 by Judge Dean D. Pregerson. (lc) Modified on 5/25/2012 (lc).
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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CATALINA RICALDAI, on behalf
of herself and all others
similarly situated,
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Plaintiff,
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v.
US INVESTIGATIONS SERVICES,
LLC, a Delaware limited
liability company,
Defendant.
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Case No. CV 10-07388 DDP (PLAx)
ORDER DENYING IN PART AND
GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANT’S
MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT
[Docket No. 48]
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Presently before the court is Defendant’s Motion for Partial
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Summary Judgment (“Motion”).
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papers and heard oral argument, the court denies the Motion in
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part, grants the Motion in part, and adopts the following Order.
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I.
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Having reviewed the parties’ moving
BACKGROUND
From July 2003 to November 2008, Plaintiff Catalina Ricaldai
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(“Ricaldai”) worked as a field investigator for Defendant US
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Investigations Services, LLC (“USIS”).
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conduct background investigations of individuals seeking employment
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with or already employed by the federal government.
USIS field investigators
During
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Ricaldai’s employment at USIS, field investigators typically worked
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remotely out of their homes and with a company car, gathering
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records, conducting interviews, and preparing written reports.
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(Pl.’s Statement of Genuine Issues in Opp’n to Mot. (“SS”), Nos. 1-
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2, 6-9.)
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hours each week and eight hours per day unless they had approved
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overtime.”
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investigation within the time allotted to the file.”
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USIS therefore “trained investigators to build their own daily work
“USIS expected California-based investigators to work 40
USIS also “expected investigators to close their
(Mot. at 5.)
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schedule based on the work they had to complete for their
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investigations, not based on a particular schedule.”
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(SS No. 13.)
Under California state law, if an employee works five or more
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hours in a day, the employee has the right to a 30-minute meal
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period, free of any job duties and starting no later than the fifth
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hour of work.1
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Rptr. 3d 315, 343-44 (Cal. 2012) (discussing Labor Code section
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512).
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employees must be free to attend to any personal business they may
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choose during the 30-minute period.
See Brinker Rest. Corp. v. Super. Ct., 139 Cal.
The meal break is not limited to the right to eat; rather,
See id. at 340.
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During Ricaldai’s employment, the USIS employee handbook
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section on timekeeping included the statement: “Do not start work
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early, finish work late, work during a meal break or perform any
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other extra or overtime work unless you are authorized to do so.”
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(Decl. of Lara K. Strauss in Supp. of Mot. (“Strauss Decl.”), Ex. E
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at 41.)
USIS also posted in its district offices the required
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If an employee works no more than six hours in a day, the
meal period may be waived by mutual consent of the employer and
employee. See Brinker, 139 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 344.
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Industrial Welfare Commission (“IWC”) wage order regarding meal
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periods.
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however, otherwise train or advise employees as to their meal
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period rights.
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that her trainers and supervisors, along with particular company
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policies, unlawfully pressured her to work during meal periods.
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USIS also failed to record meal periods, in violation of the
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applicable IWC wage order.
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claims that she therefore never took the 30-minute, duty-free meal
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See 8 Cal. Code Regs. tit. 8, § 11040(22).
(SS at 45-53.)
USIS did not,
To the contrary, Ricaldai argues
See id. § 11040(7)(A)(3).
Ricaldai
period provided by California law.
Specifically, Ricaldai alleges that during a 2003 field
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training for “update investigations,” her trainer told her “to pack
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her lunch because they would not have time to stop and eat lunch.”
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(SS Nos. 56-58; Decl. of Christine C. Choi in Supp. of Pl.’s Opp’n
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to Mot. (“Choi Decl.”), Ex. 1 at 66, 75, 79.)
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training period, Ricaldai and her trainer did in fact “eat lunch
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while they were looking at the paperwork and reviewing the
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interviews they had done.”
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instructing Ricaldai on how to fill out her time cards, the trainer
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told her that: “it was not okay for [Ricaldai] to do something else
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during the course of the day for personal reasons, such as go to a
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doctor’s appointment,” and that Ricaldai “had to work eight hours a
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day and request time off from the district manager if she needed to
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incorporate any personal activities.”
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this field training and a one-week training in Pennsylvania,
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Ricaldai was also “told that she had to ‘zone’ her work,” meaning
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that “if she was in a particular geographic area, she had to make
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sure to fill her day in the zone with scheduled interviews, visits
(SS No. 59.)
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Throughout the
Further, while
(SS Nos. 60-61.)
During
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to the court, or walks around the neighborhood to try and get more
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interviews.”
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(SS Nos. 62, 65-66.)
Likewise, at a 2004 training and during quarterly “‘check
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rides’ with the district manager or team lead” throughout her
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employment, Ricaldai and the trainer or supervisor again had
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“working lunch[es].”
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days that Ricaldai had a check ride, she and her supervisor “would
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sit down, grab a sandwich, go through a checklist, and talk about
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different things that they liked or did not like during the
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(SS Nos. 68-72; Choi Decl., Ex. 1 at 80.)
interviews that [Ricaldai] had conducted.”
On
(SS No. 72.)
More broadly, Ricaldai asserts that “it was not possible for
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[her] to take 30 minutes of off-duty time during the day because it
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was the culture of the job to get as much testimony as possible.”
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(SS No. 73.)
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a waste and a failure to correctly zone the geographic area.”
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Ricaldai also “had to accommodate the schedules and availability of
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witnesses.”
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“[a]lways took a working lunch wherein she would review paperwork
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and type reports on her laptop,” and “[n]ever did any type of
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personal activity during the course of her day without previously
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requesting time off.”
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According to Ricaldai, “[a]ny time off was considered
(SS Nos. 74-75.)
Ricaldai therefore allegedly
(SS Nos. 76-78.)
Based on these alleged meal period violations - and overtime
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issues not relevant to this Motion - Ricaldai filed a putative
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class action suit against USIS in California state court, on August
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26, 2010.
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2010, pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 28 U.S.C.
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§ 1332(d).
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(“Complaint”) on June 9, 2011.
USIS removed the action to this court on October 4,
Ricaldai filed a Second Amended Class Action Complaint
In her Complaint, Ricaldai alleges
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six causes of action: 1) failure to provide meal periods, in
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violation of California Labor Code (“Labor Code”) sections 226.7
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and 512; 2) failure to properly calculate and pay overtime, in
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violation of Labor Code section 1194(a); 3) failure to timely pay
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wages, in violation of Labor Code section 203; 4) failure to
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maintain and provide accurate itemized statements, in violation of
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Labor Code section 226; 5) enforcement of the Private Attorneys
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General Act (“PAGA”), Labor Code § 2698; and 6) unlawful business
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practices, in violation of California Business and Professions Code
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section 17200.
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predicated on her meal period and overtime claims.
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Ricaldai’s third through sixth causes of action are
USIS filed this Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on
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September 9, 2011.
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a matter of law on Ricaldai’s meal period claim, because Ricaldai
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indisputably had the independence and flexibility to set her own
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schedule and take the required breaks.
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that it is entitled to summary judgment on claims three through
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six, to the extent they are based on Ricaldai’s meal period claim.
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Last, USIS contends that Ricaldai’s PAGA and Labor Code section 226
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claims are time-barred, and that the section 226 claim also fails
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because Ricaldai does not allege certain required elements.
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II.
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USIS argues that it is entitled to judgment as
USIS therefore also argues
LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate where “the movant shows that
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there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant
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is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”
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56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986).
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In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the evidence is viewed
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in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and all
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Fed. R. Civ. P.
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justifiable inferences are drawn in its favor.
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Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986).
Anderson v. Liberty
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A genuine issue exists if “the evidence is such that a
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reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party,”
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and material facts are those “that might affect the outcome of the
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suit under the governing law.”
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fact exists “[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a
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rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party.”
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Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,
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Id. at 248.
No genuine issue of
587 (1986).
It is not enough for a party opposing summary judgment to
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“rest on mere allegations or denials of his pleadings.”
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477 U.S. at 259.
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pleadings to designate specific facts showing that there is a
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genuine issue for trial.
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existence of a scintilla of evidence” in support of the nonmoving
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party’s claim is insufficient to defeat summary judgment.
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Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.
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weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences
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from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge,” when he
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or she is ruling on a motion for summary judgment.
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III. DISCUSSION
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A.
Anderson,
Instead, the nonmoving party must go beyond the
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324.
The “mere
But “[c]redibility determinations, the
Id. at 255.
Meal Period Claim
1.
California Meal Period Law after Brinker
The California Supreme Court recently clarified the law
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regarding meal periods, in Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Superior
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Court, 139 Cal. Rptr. 3d 315 (Cal. 2012).
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concluded that “an employer must relieve the employee of all duty
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Relevant here, the court
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for the designated period, but need not ensure that the employee
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does no work.”
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“worker must be free to attend to any personal business he or she
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may choose during the unpaid meal period.”
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Cal. Dep’t of Indus. Relations, Div. of Labor Standards
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Enforcement, Opinion Letter No. 1991.06.03, at 1).
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the meal period requirement is only “satisfied if the employee (1)
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has at least 30 minutes uninterrupted, (2) is free to leave the
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premises, and (3) is relieved of all duty for the entire period.”
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Id. at 338.
The court further explained that a
Id. at 340 (quoting
Accordingly,
Id.
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The court also emphasized that, although employers are not
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required to ensure that employees do not voluntarily choose to work
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during a meal period, “an employer may not undermine a formal
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policy of providing meal breaks by pressuring employees to perform
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their duties in ways that omit breaks.”
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Cicairos v. Summit Logistics, Inc., 133 Cal. App. 4th 949, 962–63
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(2005) (finding potential meal period violations where “defendant’s
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management pressured drivers to make more than one daily trip,
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making drivers feel that they should not stop for lunch”); Jaimez
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v. DAIOHS USA, Inc., 181 Cal. App. 4th 1286, 1304–05 (2010)
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(finding potential violations based on evidence that scheduling
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policy “made it extremely difficult” for employees to both timely
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complete deliveries and take all required breaks); Dilts v. Penske
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Logistics, LLC, 267 F.R.D. 625, 638 (S.D. Cal. 2010) (finding
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potential violations given evidence of informal anti-meal-period
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policies “enforced through ‘ridicule’ or ‘reprimand’”)).
Id. at 343 (citing
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In other words, the “wage orders and governing statute do not
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countenance an employer’s exerting coercion against the taking of,
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creating incentives to forego, or otherwise encouraging the
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skipping of legally protected breaks.”
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at 343.
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[its meal period] obligation if it relieves its employees of all
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duty, relinquishes control over their activities and permits them a
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reasonable opportunity to take an uninterrupted 30–minute break,
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and does not impede or discourage them from doing so.”
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Brinker, 133 Cal. App. 4th
Thus, as the court summarized: “The employer satisfies
Id.2
Finally, in a concurring opinion joined by Justice Liu,
Justice Werdegar emphasized that relevant IWC wage orders also
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require employers to record meal periods.
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J., concurring) (citing Cal. Code Regs. tit. 8, § 11050); see also
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Cal. Code Regs. tit. 8, § 11040(7)(A)(3) (same).
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therefore concluded that the burden is on the employer to show that
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it relieved an employee of all duty for a meal period, if the
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employer fails to record the meal period as required.
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Justices explained in detail:
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Id. at 353 (Werdegar,
The Justices
As the
If an employer’s records show no meal period for a given
shift over five hours, a rebuttable presumption arises that
the employee was not relieved of duty and no meal period
was provided. An employer’s assertion that it did relieve
the employee of duty, but the employee waived the
opportunity to have a work-free break, is not an element
that a plaintiff must disprove as part of the plaintiff’s
case-in-chief. Rather, as the Court of Appeal properly
recognized, the assertion is an affirmative defense, and
thus the burden is on the employer, as the party asserting
waiver, to plead and prove it.
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The court also held that if an employee does in fact
voluntarily decide to work during a meal period - free of employer
pressure or coercion - the employer may still have to pay for that
time worked. See id. at 342 n.19. Specifically, although the
employer would not be liable for the “premium pay” penalty for a
meal period violation, the employer would be liable for “regular
compensation” for the time worked, if it “knew or reasonably should
have known that the worker was working through the authorized meal
period.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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. . . .
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As the Division of Labor Standards Enforcement (DLSE) has
explained, even under the less restrictive wage order
applicable to agricultural employees, if “a meal period is
not taken by the employee, the burden is on the employer to
show that the agricultural employee had been advised of his
or her legal right to take a meal period and has knowingly
and voluntarily decided not to take the meal period.
Again, we emphasize, the burden is on the employer.”
(Dept. Industrial Relations, DLSE Opinion Letter No.
2003.08.13 (Aug. 13, 2003) p. 2 [interpreting IWC wage
order No. 14 (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 11140)].)
To
place the burden elsewhere would offer an employer an
incentive to avoid its recording duty and a potential
windfall from the failure to record meal periods. Both the
United States Supreme Court and the courts of this state
have rejected such an approach.
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Brinker, 133 Cal. App. 4th at 353 & n.1 (Werdegar, J., concurring)
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(citations omitted).
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2.
Application of Brinker
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According to USIS, Ricaldai’s meal period claim fails as a
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matter of law, because it is undisputed that: 1) Ricaldai had
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complete control over her schedule, given her remote work and the
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availability of overtime; and 2) USIS adequately informed Ricaldai
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of her meal period rights, by posting the relevant IWC wage order
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and including a statement prohibiting work during meal periods in
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its employee handbook.
USIS therefore contends that, even if
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Ricaldai never took the required meal breaks, this decision was
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entirely voluntary.
Ricaldai argues, to the contrary, that there
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is a genuine dispute as to this meal period issue, because USIS: 1)
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failed to record any meal periods, as required; 2) never informed
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employees of essential aspects of their meal period rights; and 3)
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instead, had affirmative policies and trainings that pressured
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Ricaldai not to take duty-free breaks.
Although the question is a
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close one, and USIS makes valid points that certainly could
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convince a trier of fact that USIS complied with its meal period
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obligations, the court finds that Ricaldai has raised a genuine
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issue of material fact.
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find that USIS policies and practices unlawfully discouraged
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Ricaldai from taking the required duty-free meal periods.
Specifically, a reasonable juror might
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As an initial matter, the court notes its agreement with
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Justices Werdegar and Liu that it is the employer’s burden to rebut
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a presumption that meal periods were not adequately provided, where
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the employer fails to record any meal periods.
Otherwise,
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employers would have an incentive to ignore their recording duty,
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leaving employees the difficult task of proving that the employer
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either failed to advise them of their meal period rights, or
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unlawfully pressured them to waive those rights.
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Cal. App. 4th at 353 & n.1 (Werdegar, J., concurring) (citing
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Cicairos, 133 Cal. App. 4th at 961 (“[W]here the employer has
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failed to keep records required by statute, the consequences for
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such failure should fall on the employer, not the employee.”
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(internal quotation marks omitted))).
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no dispute that USIS failed to record any meal periods.
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See Brinker, 133
Here, as mentioned, there is
However, even if the burden of proof were on Ricaldai, the
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court would still find a genuine issue of material fact.
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discussed, Ricaldai has provided evidence that during initial all-
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day trainings, her trainer expressly informed her that there would
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not be time for meal breaks.
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took working lunches, where Ricaldai was not relieved of all duties
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as required by California law.
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period violations fall outside the relevant statute of limitations.
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They still support an inference, however, that USIS implicitly
As
Ricaldai and her trainer therefore
As USIS notes, these apparent meal
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trained Ricaldai to not take duty-free meal periods.
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be said for Ricaldai’s claim that trainers and supervisors had her
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take working lunches during subsequent trainings and check rides.
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As USIS argues, it is unclear whether any of these later trainings
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or check rides lasted five hours or more; thus, the working lunches
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did not necessarily violate the meal period requirement.
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if there was no direct violation on these occasions, USIS’ ongoing
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practice of having Ricaldai take working lunches still supports an
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inference of employer pressure to work through meal periods.
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The same can
But even
This inference is further supported by evidence that USIS
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prohibited employees from taking any personal time during the
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workday, without employer permission.
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initial trainer allegedly instructed her that “it was not okay . .
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. to do something else during the course of the day for personal
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reasons,” and that she had to request time off “if she needed to
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incorporate any personal activities” in her eight-hour day.
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Although ambiguous, a reasonable factfinder might conclude that
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these instructions applied even to personal errands lasting thirty
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minutes or less.
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law, because meals breaks are expressly usable for personal
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matters.
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thirty-minute period,” where the worker “must be free to attend to
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any personal business he or she may choose.”
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App. 4th at 340 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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the meal break is essentially personal time, where the employee is
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free to eat or to do anything else for half an hour.
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all personal activities during the workday is therefore the
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equivalent of eliminating meal periods.
As mentioned, Ricaldai’s
If so, the instructions would clearly violate the
As Brinker emphasized, employees are entitled to a “full
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Brinker, 133 Cal.
Accordingly,
Prohibiting
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Last, evidence that USIS instructed employees to fill each
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work day in a given geographic area with relevant job duties - and
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considered any time off “a waste and a failure” - provides some
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support for the conclusion that USIS unlawfully discouraged duty-
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free meal periods.
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In sum, Ricaldai offers evidence that she was implicitly
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trained to take working lunches, expressly told that personal
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errands were prohibited without prior authorization, specifically
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directed to fill her entire day in each geographic area with job
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duties, and correspondingly discouraged from taking any time off.
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Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to Ricaldai, a
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rational trier of fact could conclude that USIS pressured her to
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take working lunches instead of duty-free meal periods, in
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violation of California meal period law under Brinker.
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Contrary to USIS’ argument, it does not change the summary
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judgment analysis that USIS exerted no direct control over Ricaldai
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during her work day and allowed for overtime, and that Ricaldai
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therefore admitted at deposition that she technically could have
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scheduled her work day to incorporate a duty-free meal period while
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still completing her tasks.
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evidence that, viewed in the light most favorable to Ricaldai, USIS
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nonetheless unlawfully discouraged Ricaldai from scheduling a meal
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period during her workday.
As discussed, there is sufficient
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Nor is USIS entitled to summary judgment simply because
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Ricaldai admitted at deposition that, if she had read the employee
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handbook section on timekeeping, she would have known not to work
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during meal periods.
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that the aforementioned USIS policies and practices pressured her
Throughout the deposition, Ricaldai insisted
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to instead always work through meal breaks.
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unclear whether Ricaldai’s admission meant that, if she had read
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the relevant handbook statement, it would have overridden the
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countervailing employer pressure.
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is particularly plausible given that the employee handbook
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contained only a single statement as to meal periods - not to work
7
during them - and did not inform employees of their other essential
8
meal period rights - i.e. to take a 30-minute meal break every
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workday of five hours or more, and to do so prior to the fifth hour
It is therefore
Indeed, the opposite conclusion
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of work.
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any USIS pressure undermined its limited formal policy as to meal
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periods, is for the trier of fact to resolve.
In any event, this ambiguity, and the question of whether
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B.
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Because the court finds that USIS is not entitled to summary
Derivative Claims
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judgment on Ricaldai’s meal period claim, none of her other claims
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fail simply because they are derivative of this claim.
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C.
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PAGA & Labor Code Section 226 Claims
1.
Statute of Limitations
Ricaldai concedes that her PAGA claim is barred by
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California’s one-year statute of limitations for statutory claims
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seeking a penalty or forfeiture.
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340(a).
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Ricaldai’s fifth cause of action.
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See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §
USIS is therefore entitled to summary judgment on
Ricaldai argues that her Labor Code section 226 (“Section
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226”) claim is not similarly time-barred, however, because she is
26
also seeking actual damages under the statute.
27
(providing a three-year statute of limitations for all other
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statutory claims).
See id. § 338(a)
Ricaldai cites to a district court decision in
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this Circuit that thoroughly addresses this legal issue and
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directly supports her position.
3
and Co., No. 08cv821, 2008 WL 2899825, at *4-5 (S.D. Cal. July 25,
4
2008).
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no need to repeat the analysis here.
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contentions, Ricaldai does adequately seek and allege actual
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damages in her Complaint,3 and does not concede the absence of such
8
damages in her deposition, as discussed more below.
9
10
See Singer v. Becton, Dickinson
The court agrees with the well-reasoned decision and finds
2.
Also, contrary to USIS’
Injury & Intent Requirements
Finally, USIS argues that it is entitled to summary judgment
11
on Ricaldai’s Section 226 claim, because Ricaldai has failed to
12
show that she suffered an “injury” from any violation of the
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statute, or that any such violation was “knowing and intentional.”
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Cal. Labor Code § 226(e).
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The court disagrees.
USIS is correct that “an employee may not recover for
16
violations of Section 226(a) unless he or she demonstrates an
17
injury arising from the missing information.”
18
Corp., 192 Cal. App. 4th 1136, 1142-43 (2011) (stating also that
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“‘deprivation of that information,’ standing alone is not
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cognizable injury”).
21
McKenzie v. Fed. Express Corp.:
Price v. Starbucks
However, as the court helpfully summarized in
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(See Compl. ¶ 51 (“As a result of Defendants’ violation of
California Labor Code Section 226(a), Plaintiff and Class Members
suffered injuries, including employee confusion over whether they
received all wages owed to them, difficulty and expense involved in
reconstructing pay records, and forcing employees to make
mathematical computations to analyze whether the wages paid in fact
properly compensated them.”); id. ¶ 52 (“Pursuant to California
Labor Code Section 226(e), Plaintiff and Class Members are entitled
to recover . . . all actual damages . . . .”); id. at 24 ¶ 5(b)
(seeking, among other relief, “[a] monetary award as damages . . .
pursuant to Labor Code Section 226(e)”).)
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1
[Price] went on to explain that “mathematical injury that
requires computations to analyze whether the wages paid in
fact compensated [the employee] for all hours worked” is
sufficient to establish injury.
[192 Cal. App. 4th at
1143] (internal quotation omitted).
Specifically, the
court noted that this can be proven if the injury arises
“from inaccurate or incomplete wage statements,” which
require the plaintiff to engage “in discovery and
mathematical computations to reconstruct time records to
determine if they were correctly paid.” Id. (citations
omitted). Likewise, the California Court of Appeals in
Jaimez v. DAIOHS USA, Inc., noted that “[w]hile there must
be some injury in order to recover damages [under §
226(e)], a very modest showing will suffice.” 181 Cal.
App. 4th 1286, 105 Cal. Rptr. 3d 443, 460 (2010).
The
court further explained that “‘this lawsuit, and the
difficulty and expense [the plaintiff has] encountered in
attempting to reconstruct time and pay records,’ may well
be ‘further evidence of the injury’ he has suffered.” Id.
(quoting Wang v. Chinese Daily News, Inc., 435 F. Supp. 2d
1042, 1050 (C.D. Cal. 2006)).
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5
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7
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10
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275 F.R.D. 290, 294 (C.D. Cal. 2011); see also Elliot v.
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Spherion Pac. Work, LLC, 572 F. Supp. 2d 1169, 1181 (C.D. Cal.
14
2008) (cited approvingly in Price and citing cases finding
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injuries such as “the possibility of not being paid overtime”
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and “employee confusion over whether they received all wages
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owed them”).
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Applying this standard, the court finds that there is a
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genuine issue of material fact as to the injury requirement.
20
Contrary to USIS’ characterization, Ricaldai has provided
21
evidence of more than mere technical violations of Section
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226.
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overtime rate on her wage statements, but was in fact paying
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her an incorrect and reduced overtime rate:
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wage statements, I received a ‘Spanish Incentive’ as part of
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my wages.
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‘Spanish Incentive’ income was included when calculating my
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overtime pay.”
According to Ricaldai, USIS not only failed to list her
“As shown on my
Based on my computations, I do not believe that the
(Decl. of Catalina Ricaldai in Supp. of Pl.’s
15
1
Opp’n to Mot. ¶¶ 3-4.)
2
“had to perform mathematical computations to determine whether
3
her paychecks were accurate.”
4
(describing the alleged injury in more detail).)4
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trier of fact could believe Ricaldai, and conclude that she
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suffered an actual injury from having to make these
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calculations, and from not knowing that she was being
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underpaid.
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inconsistent with her declaration.
Ricaldai claims that she therefore
(Id. ¶ 3; see also supra note 3
A rational
Nor is Ricaldai’s deposition testimony clearly
Although Ricaldai at one
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point responded affirmatively that she was not confused by her
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wage statements and could not recall inaccuracies, there is no
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indication that she was referring to all aspects of the
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statements - in particular, the missing and erroneous overtime
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rates.
(See Strauss Decl., Ex. C at 182-86.)
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With regard to Section 226(e)’s “knowing and intentional”
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requirement, USIS cites to decisions granting summary judgment
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to defendants because the court found a “good faith dispute”
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as to whether the employees were exempt from Section 226’s
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coverage.
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C-11-1379, 2012 WL 1564733, at *17 (N.D. Cal. May 2, 2012).
21
Here, USIS does not contend that Ricaldai is exempt from
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statutory coverage.
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“cannot possibly demonstrate that USIS knowingly violated wage
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statement obligations since the reason USIS did not include
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the meal period premium on [her] wage statements is because it
See, e.g., Hurst v. Buczek Enters., LLC, No.
Instead, it maintains that Ricaldai
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4
27
28
As discussed, USIS also failed to record meal periods. If
Ricaldai succeeds on her meal period claim, USIS further violated
Section 226 by failing to include premium pay for each missed meal
period.
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1
did not believe (and still does not believe) that it owes
2
[her] for any alleged meal period violations.”
3
The court disagrees.
4
similar circumstances, the factual question of whether an
5
employer had a good faith belief that it was not violating
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Section 226 is generally for the factfinder to resolve at
7
trial.
8
08-05396, 2010 WL 728205, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 2010) (“UPS
9
cannot carry its burden on summary judgment simply by
(Mot. at 21.)
As numerous courts have recognized under
See, e.g., Lopez v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., No. C
10
asserting in a conclusory fashion in an argumentative pleading
11
that it acted under a good faith belief plaintiff was exempt.
12
The presence or absence of a good faith belief on UPS’s part
13
is a factual question that must be resolved at trial.”); Rieve
14
v. Coventry Health Care, Inc., No. SACV 11-1032, 2012 WL
15
1441341, at *19 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 2012); Perez v.
16
Safety-Kleen Sys., Inc., 253 F.R.D. 508, 517 (N.D. Cal. 2008);
17
Cornn v. United Parcel Serv., No. C03-2001, 2006 WL 449138, at
18
*3 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2006).
19
Here, even if the court were convinced that any wage
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statement meal period omissions were made in good faith, it is
21
still entirely unclear whether USIS acted in good faith with
22
regard to the alleged overtime errors.
23
fact could therefore conclude, as Ricaldai alleges, that USIS
24
“knowingly and intentionally failed to provide” Ricaldai with
25
accurate and itemized wage statements, “and did so in order to
26
conceal [its] liability from [Ricaldai].”
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IV.
CONCLUSION
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17
A reasonable trier of
(Compl. ¶ 53.)
1
In sum, and for all the foregoing reasons, the court
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DENIES USIS’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to
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Ricaldai’s first, third, fourth, and sixth causes of action,
4
for meal period violations, failure to timely pay wages,
5
Section 226 violations, and unfair business practices.
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court, however, GRANTS USIS’ Motion for Partial Summary
7
Judgment as to Ricaldai’s fifth cause of action, for
8
enforcement of the Private Attorneys General Act.
The
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
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Dated: May 25, 2012
DEAN D. PREGERSON
United States District Judge
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