Elite Logistics Corporation v. Mol America, Inc. et al
Filing
84
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 63 by Judge Dean D. Pregerson. (lc). Modified on 8/29/2013 (lc).
1
2
O
3
4
5
6
7
8
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
10
11
12
ELITE LOGISTICS CORPORATION
and on behalf of all others
similarly situated,
13
Plaintiff,
14
v.
15
MOL AMERICA, INC.,
16
Defendants.
___________________________
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Case No. CV 11-02952 DDP (PLAx)
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION
FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
[Dkt. No. 63]
17
18
Presently before the court is Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial
19
Summary Judgment Regarding Declaratory and Injunctive Relief.
20
Having considered the submissions of the parties and heard oral
21
argument, the court denies the motion and adopts the following
22
order.
23
I.
24
Background
Defendant MOL (America) Inc. (“MOL”) is an international ocean
25
carrier, and transports cargo in shipping containers MOL owns.
26
(Declaration of Don Licata, ¶3).
27
truckers, such as Plaintiff, transport MOL’s cargo containers from
28
ports to inland distribution centers, then return the empty
Independent motor carriers, or
1
containers to MOL at the port.
2
cargo owners, not the truckers, for the overland transport.
3
6.)
4
7.)
5
(Id. ¶ 5.)
MOL contracts with the
The cargo owners, in turn, hire and pay the truckers.
(Id. ¶
(Id. ¶
MOL’s contracts with cargo owners provide for some period of
6
“free time,” during which MOL does not charge customers for the use
7
of its shipping containers.
8
returned after the expiration of the “free time” period, MOL
9
assesses a “detention charge.”
(Id. ¶ 13.)
When containers are
(Id. ¶ 10.)
In other words, MOL
10
allows its cargo customers to check out, or borrow, the shipping
11
containers containing the cargo owners’ property at no charge for a
12
certain time period.
13
unloaded, then returned to MOL within the “free time” period.
14
the container is returned late, however, MOL charges a late return
15
fee.1
16
Ideally, the container can be delivered,
If
While cargo owners contract with MOL to transport containers
17
to the inland container yard, the independent truckers actually
18
pick up, transport, and return MOL’s containers.
19
not, however, parties to the transportation service contract.2
20
Nevertheless, when truckers are late returning MOL’s containers,
21
for whatever reason, it is the truckers, not the contracting cargo
22
owners, who must pay the late fee.
(Id. ¶ 15.)
The truckers are
Truckers pay the
23
24
25
1
The parties refer to this late fee either as a “detention
charge” or “per diem.”
2
26
27
28
Though the record is somewhat unclear, the parties appear to
agree that this case only concerns what the parties dub either “CY
moves” or “merchant haulage” scenarios where truckers deliver
containers to a container yard. In “door move” scenarios, in
contrast, MOL itself hires a trucker to deliver cargo to the cargo
owner’s facility. (Licata Decl. ¶¶ 6-7).
2
1
late fees, then in turn bill cargo owners for those fees.
2
(Declaration of Erich Wise, Ex. A at 20).
3
pay late fees, they may be denied access to shipping containers and
4
essentially foreclosed from doing business.
5
6
(Id. at 21).
In 2005, California enacted Business and Professions Code §
2298, which states:
7
(b) An intermodal marine equipment provider or
intermodal marine terminal operator shall not impose per
diem, detention, or demurrage charges on an intermodal
motor carrier relative to transactions involving cargo
shipped by intermodal transport under any of the following
circumstances:
(1) When the intermodal marine or terminal truck
gate is closed during posted normal working hours. No per
diem, detention, or demurrage charges shall be imposed on
a weekend or holiday, or during a labor disruption period,
or during any other period involving an act of God or any
other planned or unplanned action that closes the truck
gate.
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
If truckers refuse to
Cal. Bus. & Profs. Code § 2298.
15
By this motion for partial summary judgment, Elite seeks a
16
declaratory judgment that California Business and Professions Code
17
§ 2298 prohibits MOL from charging late fees on any weekend or
18
holiday, as well as related injunctive relief.3
19
II.
20
Legal Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate where the pleadings,
21
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
22
together with the affidavits, if any, show “that there is no
23
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled
24
to judgment as a matter of law.”
25
seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing the
26
court of the basis for its motion and of identifying those portions
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
A party
27
3
28
This motion does not seek summary judgment regarding
damages.
3
1
of the pleadings and discovery responses that demonstrate the
2
absence of a genuine issue of material fact.
3
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
4
the evidence must be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party.
5
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 242 (1986).
6
If the moving party does not bear the burden of proof at trial, it
7
is entitled to summary judgment if it can demonstrate that “there
8
is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.”
9
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.
10
See Celotex Corp. v.
All reasonable inferences from
See
Once the moving party meets its burden, the burden shifts to
11
the nonmoving party opposing the motion, who must “set forth
12
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.”
13
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256.
14
party “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the
15
existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on
16
which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.”
17
477 U.S. at 322.
18
that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving
19
party,” and material facts are those “that might affect the outcome
20
of the suit under the governing law.”
21
There is no genuine issue of fact “[w]here the record taken as a
22
whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-
23
moving party.”
24
475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
25
Summary judgment is warranted if a
Celotex,
A genuine issue exists if “the evidence is such
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
It is not the court’s task “to scour the record in search of a
26
genuine issue of triable fact.”
Keenan v. Allan, 91 F.3d 1275,
27
1278 (9th Cir. 1996). Counsel has an obligation to lay out their
28
support clearly.
Carmen v. San Francisco Sch. Dist., 237 F.3d
4
1
1026, 1031 (9th Cir. 2001).
2
file for evidence establishing a genuine issue of fact, where the
3
evidence is not set forth in the opposition papers with adequate
4
references so that it could conveniently be found."
5
III. Discussion
The court “need not examine the entire
Id.
6
A.
7
MOL argues that Section 2298 is preempted by the Federal
Preemption
8
Aviation Administration Authorization Act (“FAAAA”), 49 U.S.C. §
9
14501(c)(1).
That statute states, in relevant part, that “a State
10
. . . may not enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other
11
provision having the force and effect of law related to a price,
12
route, or service of any motor carrier . . . with respect to the
13
transportation of property.”
49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1).
14
The question presented here is whether Section 2298 is
15
sufficiently connected with, or makes reference to, motor carrier
16
rates, routes, or services.
17
Assoc., 552 U.S. 364, 370 (2008)(citing Morales v. Trans World
18
Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 378 (1992).
19
that because truckers pass the cost of late fee charges on to cargo
20
owners, any law affecting the upstream fees charged to the truckers
21
affects or is related to the fees the truckers themselves charge,
22
and is therefore preempted. (Opp. at 13).
23
Rowe v. New Hampshire Motor Transp.
MOL appears to argue
Section 2298 regulates the fees that marine equipment
24
providers such as MOL may charge motor carriers.
The statute does
25
not require anything of the carriers themselves.
Thus, the effect
26
of Section 2298 on motor carriers’ rates or services with respect
27
to transportation of property is indirect, at best.
28
having even an indirect effect on rates, routes, or services may,
5
While a law
1
in some cases, be preempted, the FAAA does not preempt state laws
2
that affect prices, routes, or services “in only a tenuous, remote,
3
or peripheral manner.”
4
S.Ct. 1769, 1778 (2013) (citations and alteration omitted); Rowe,
5
552 U.S. at 370.
6
Dan’s City Used Cars, Inc. v. Pelkey, 133
In Rowe, Maine passed a law (1) requiring tobacco retailers to
7
use delivery services that used particular recipient-verification
8
services and (2) forbidding transportation of tobacco under certain
9
circumstances and from certain shippers.
Rowe, 552 US. at 368.
10
The Supreme Court held that Maine’s recipient-verification law,
11
which regulated shippers rather than carriers, was “less ‘direct’
12
than it might be,” but nevertheless effectively required motor
13
carriers to offer services that they otherwise would not provide,
14
thus hampering the competitive market forces that the FAAA was
15
designed to protect.
16
purposes, the state statute’s imposition of civil liability upon
17
motor carriers for failure to conduct certain specific inspection
18
procedures directly regulated shippers’ services.
19
Accordingly, the Court held Maine’s law preempted.4
20
Id. at 371-72.
More damningly for preemption
Id. at 372-73.
Id. at 377.
Here, unlike the statute at issue in Rowe, California Business
21
& Professions Code § 2298 has no regulatory effect, whether direct
22
or indirect, on motor carriers’ services.
At most, by limiting
23
24
25
26
27
28
4
In American Trucking Associations, Inc. v. City of Los
Angeles, the Supreme Court recently held that the FAAA preempted a
Port of Los Angeles requirement that truckers display certain
placards and submit parking plans to city authorities. Am.
Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 133 S.Ct. 2096, 2100,
2105. There, however, there was no dispute whether the Port’s
regulations were related to truckers’ services. Id. at 202. The
issue rather, was whether the Port’s regulations had the force and
effect of law. Id.
6
1
truckers’ exposure to certain fees, Section 2298 has a tenuous
2
impact on truckers’ prices.
3
this peripheral link, asserting that it invoices per diem fees
4
separate and apart from its freight rates, which are independent of
5
such charges. (Wise Decl., Ex. A.)
6
fees into its fee structure, the effect of that increased cost
7
would be remote, akin to that of other state-imposed input costs
8
resulting from such regulations as highway weight and clearance
9
restrictions, speed limits, and fuel taxes.
Elite, for its part, disputes even
Even if Elite did build late
Section 2298's impact
10
on truckers’ prices, routes, and services, if any, is sufficiently
11
remote as to fall outside the ambit of the FAAA preemption
12
provision.
13
14
B.
Meaning of Section 2298
Section 2298 prohibits late fees “[w]hen the intermodal
15
marine or terminal truck gate is closed during posted normal
16
working hours.”
17
container if the truck gate is closed.
18
that MOL cannot, and does not, currently charge late fees when the
19
truck gate is closed.
20
A trucker cannot, of course, return an overdue
The parties appear to agree
Elite contends, however, that Section 2298 forbids the
21
imposition of late fees on any weekend or holiday, regardless
22
whether the terminal is open for business.
23
points to the second sentence of Section 2298(b)(1), which reads,
24
“No per diem, detention, or demurrage charges shall be imposed on a
25
weekend or holiday, or during a labor disruption period, or during
26
any other period involving an act of God or any other planned or
27
unplanned action that closes the truck gate.”
28
7
Specifically, Elite
1
Courts need not look beyond the clear language of a statute
2
to determine its meaning.
3
758, 770 (2010).
4
forth a number of “planned and unplanned action[s]” that could
5
conceivably result in the closing of the truck gate.
6
limitation other than the closed gate language, the statute would
7
be so broad as to be meaningless.
8
Joaquin, 42 Cal. 4th 1121, 1135 (2008); Hensel Phelps Const. Co. v.
9
San Diego Unified Port Dist., 197 Cal. App. 4th 1020, 1034 (2011).
Clayworth v. Pfizer, Inc., 49 Cal.4th
The second sentence of Section 2298(b)(1) sets
Absent any
See Metcalf v. Country of San
10
Without any geographical or temporal restriction on the terms
11
“labor disruption period” or “act of God,” the statute might
12
theoretically be applicable at any given moment.
13
sense to read into those phrases a requirement that each scenario
14
disrupt operations at the terminal, as the “closes the truck gate”
15
language, which Plaintiff seeks to ignore with respect to weekends
16
and holidays, serves precisely that purpose.
17
Nor would it make
To the extent the statutory language is ambiguous, Section
18
2298's legislative history confirms that it applies only when the
19
truck gate is closed.
20
768, 787 (2013).
21
Section 2298 stated that the bill “stems from the complaints of the
22
commercial vehicle operators . . . regarding the penalties imposed
23
for the late return of cargo containers which they characterize as
24
unfair and unwarranted.
25
are ‘charged late fees for the return of empty containers, even
26
when terminals are closed . . . .”
27
7/1/2005.
28
charges “[w]hen the marine terminal or terminal truck terminal is
See Alejo v. Torlakson, 212 Cal. App. 4th
The legislative analysis of the bill that became
These vehicle operators argue that they
CA. B. An., S.B. 45 Assem.,
A later analysis specified that the bill prohibits late
8
1
closed.”
2
confirms that Section 2298 applies only when the truck gate is
3
closed, and not, as Plaintiff contends, on any and all weekends and
4
holidays.
CA. B. An., S.B. 45 Sen., 8/18/2005.
This history
5
Because Section 2298 prohibits late fees only on weekends and
6
holidays when the truck gate is closed, Elite’s Motion for Summary
7
Judgment Regarding Declaratory and Injunctive relief is denied,
8
insofar as it seeks a declaratory judgment that MOL cannot charge
9
late fees on any weekend or holiday and injunctive relief against
10
such charges.
11
C.
12
MOL also contends that Elite lacks standing to pursue the
Pass-On Defense
13
relief requested because it passes on any late fee charges to the
14
cargo customer, and therefore has not sustained any injury.
15
at 20.)
16
event, the court need not reach the issue, having rejected Elite’s
17
interpretation of Section 2298 and determined that Elite’s motions
18
must be denied.
19
Supreme Court has rejected such a “pass-on” defenses, even outside
20
the antitrust context.
21
310, 334; Clayworth, 49 Cal. 4th at 789 (“That a party may
22
ultimately be unable to prove a right to damages . . . does not
23
demonstrate that it lacks standing to argue for its entitlement to
24
them. . . . [M]itigation, while it might diminish a party’s
25
recovery, does not diminish the party’s interest in proving it is
26
entitled to recovery.).
27
///
28
///
MOL did not, however, fully brief its argument.
(Opp.
In any
The court notes, however, that the California
Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court, 51 Cal.4th
9
1
2
3
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary
Judgment Regarding Declaratory and Injunctive relief is DENIED.
4
5
6
7
IT IS SO ORDERED.
8
9
10
Dated: August 29, 2013
DEAN D. PREGERSON
United States District Judge
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
10
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?