Terrance D Rutherford v. FIA Card Services, N.A. et al
Filing
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ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS MOTIONS TO DISMISS FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT WITH PREJUDICE 47 , 50 , 73 by Judge Dean D. Pregerson. ( MD JS-6. Case Terminated ) . (lc) Modified on 11/16/2012 .(lc). Modified on 11/16/2012 (lc).
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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TERRANCE D. RUTHERFORD,
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Plaintiff,
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v.
FIA CARD SERVICES, N.A.,
ALASKA AIRLINES, INC.,
HORIZON AIR INDUSTRIES,
INC.,
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Defendants.
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___________________________
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Case No. CV 11-04433 DDP (MANx)
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’
MOTIONS TO DISMISS FIRST AMENDED
COMPLAINT
[Dkt. Nos. 47, 50 & 73]
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Presently before the court are two Motions to Dismiss
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Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint (“FAC”).
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submissions of the parties and heard oral argument, the court
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grants the motions and adopts the following order
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I.
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Having considered the
Background
Plaintiff, a resident of Los Angeles, California, works for
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Alaska, an Alaska corporation whose principal place of business is
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in Washington.
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with a principal place of business in Washington (FAC ¶ 8).
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which operates Bank of America’s credit card operations, is a
(FAC ¶¶ 5, 7.)
Horizon is Washington corporation
FIA,
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Delaware corporation with a Delaware principal place of business.
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(FAC ¶ 6).
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All Defendants do business in California.
(FAC ¶ 11.)
The Airlines and FIA entered into a marketing partnership (the
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“Affinity Agreement”), under which FIA agreed to issue “Alaska
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Airlines” brand credit cards and make payments to Alaska.
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12, 14, 16.)
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employees would be trained by the airlines and paid by the Bank to
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market the Alaska credit cards to consumers.
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(FAC ¶¶
The Airlines and Bank further agreed that airline
(FAC ¶¶ 19, 21-22.)
Plaintiff alleges that the airlines made a written offer to
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Airlines employees, under which employees were promised varying
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levels of payment for submitting credit card applications that the
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Bank ultimately processed.1
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the terms of the Incentive Program and the Bank’s offer “through
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various means including web, email, and flyers.”
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Plaintiff alleges that this offer was accepted, and a contract
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formed (the “Incentive Contract”) once an airline employee sent a
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completed credit card application to the Bank.
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Under the Incentive Contract, the Bank was obligated to pay airline
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employees up to forty-five dollars per application within a period
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of approximately two-months.
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(Id. ¶ 20.)
The airlines presented
(FAC ¶¶ 30, 31).
(FAC ¶ 42.)
(FAC ¶ 27, 29.)
The airlines also
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A “processed” application contains enough information to
allow FIA to approve or reject the application. (Complaint ¶ 20.)
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The FAC is somewhat unclear on the identity of the alleged
offeror. The FAC alleges that “[o]n behalf of itself and the
airlines . . . Bank of America offered to pay . . . .” (FAC ¶ 24)
(emphasis added). The FAC also states, however, that “[t]hese
offers were made to airline employees in writing by the airlines,”
and that “[t]he airlines presented Bank of America’s offer.” (FAC
¶¶ 26, 44) (emphasis added). Because the FAC uses the term
“Incentive Contracts,” these allegations could conceivably refer to
separate and distinct contracts. Plaintiff’s opposition, however,
refers only to a single “Incentive Program Contract.”
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allegedly occasionally offered employees additional incentives to
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submit credit applications, such as cash, trips, and prizes.
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¶¶ 50-51.)
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(FAC
In 2007, Plaintiff submitted approximately 1,000 credit card
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applications completed by members of his church.
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500 of the applications were ultimately approved by the bank.
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(Id.)
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to the applications into Plaintiff’s paycheck.
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(FAC ¶ 65.)
Over
Nevertheless, the Bank never deposited any payment related
(Id.)
Plaintiff filed this purported class action against FIA and
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the Airlines on May 23, 2011, alleging causes of action for breach
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of contract and unjust enrichment.
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complaint, with leave to amend, on March 27, 2012.
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subsequently filed the FAC.
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Airlines entered into a written, unilateral contract (or contracts,
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see n. 2 supra) with Plaintiff.
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alleges that Bank of America breached the contract each time it
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failed to pay Plaintiff, and that the Airlines breached the
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contract each time the Airlines did “not ensure” that Plaintiff was
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paid.
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This court dismissed the
Plaintiff
The FAC alleges that both the Bank and
(FAC ¶¶ 81, 85.)
The FAC further
(FAC ¶¶ 88-89.)
The FAC also alleges that Plaintiff is an intended beneficiary
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of the Affinity Agreement between the Bank and the Airlines.
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¶ 92.)
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duty to make payments to Plaintiff, and that the Bank and Airlines
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breached that duty by failing to pay Plaintiff or failing to ensure
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payments were made to him.
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Bank now move to dismiss the FAC in its entirety.
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\\\
(FAC
Plaintiff alleges that the Airlines and the Bank both had a
(FAC ¶¶ 93-96.)
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The Airlines and the
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II.
Legal Standard
A complaint will survive a motion to dismiss when it contains
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“sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to
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relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
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662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
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570 (2007)).
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“accept as true all allegations of material fact and must construe
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those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Resnick
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v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000).
When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court must
Although a complaint
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need not include “detailed factual allegations,” it must offer
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“more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me
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accusation.”
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allegations that are no more than a statement of a legal conclusion
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“are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id. at 679.
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other words, a pleading that merely offers “labels and
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conclusions,” a “formulaic recitation of the elements,” or “naked
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assertions” will not be sufficient to state a claim upon which
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relief can be granted.
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quotation marks omitted).
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Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Conclusory allegations or
In
Id. at 678 (citations and internal
“When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should
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assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly
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give rise to an entitlement of relief.” Id. at 679.
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must allege “plausible grounds to infer” that their claims rise
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“above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
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“Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for
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relief” is a “context-specific task that requires the reviewing
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court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.”
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556 U.S. at 679.
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Plaintiffs
Iqbal,
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III.
Discussion
A.
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The Incentive Contract
1.
Choice of Law
As explained in the court’s earlier order dismissing
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Plaintiff’s original complaint, this court, sitting in diversity,
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applies California’s choice of law rules to determine whether
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California or Washington law applies.
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Fastbucks Franchise Corp., 622 F.3d 996, 1002 (9th Cir. 2010).
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California employs several different choice of law analyses.
Bridge Fund Capital Corp. v.
See
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Arno v. Club Med Inc., 22 F.3d 1464, 1469 n. 6 (Noting conflict
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among California courts).
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under California Civil Code § 1646, look to the place of
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performance or contract formation.
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Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 472 F.Supp.2d 1183, 1197 (S.D.
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Cal. 2007).
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Some courts, applying a statutory test
See, e.g., Costco Wholesale
Other courts have suggested, however, that California’s modern
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approach limits § 1646 analyses to matters of contract
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interpretation, and that other choice of law questions are more
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properly analyzed under a “governmental interests” analysis.
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Frontier Oil Corp. v. RLI Ins. Co., 153 Cal.App.4th 1436, 1459-1460
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(2007).
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seeking to invoke foreign law must establish that 1) the foreign
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law materially differs from California law, and 2) the
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jurisdictions’ interests in applying their own law truly conflict.
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Pokorny v. Quixtar, Inc., 601 F.3d 987, 994-995 (9th Cir. 2010);
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Washington Mutual Bank, FA v. Superior Court, 24 Cal.4th 906, 919
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(2001).
Under the governmental interests analysis, the party
If there is a true conflict, the court must then weigh the
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competing interests and apply the law of the state whose interest
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stands to be most impaired.
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Id.
In instances where the parties have not made a choice of law,
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as is the case here, some courts apply a third test, based on
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Section 188 of the Restatement (Second), Conflict of Laws (the
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“Restatement”).
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Cal.App.4th 825, 838 (2005).
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determine which state “has the most significant relationship to the
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transaction and the parties.”
See, e.g. ABF Capital Corp. v. Berglass, 130
The Section 188 approach seeks to
Restatement § 188(2).
The relevant
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factors include the place of contract formation, the place at which
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the contract was negotiated, the place of performance, the location
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of the contract’s subject matter, and the location of the parties.
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Id.; See also Shannon-Vail Five v. Bunch, 27- F.3d 1207, 1211 (9th
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Cir. 2001).
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significant relationship to the matter, the court then applies that
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information to factors set out in section 6(2) of the Restatement,
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such as the interstate system’s needs, the various states’
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respective interests in the issue, the protection of reasonable
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expectations, and the provision of uniform, predictable results.
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Berglass, 130 Cal.App.4th at 838.
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Having thus determined which state has the most
The majority of these factors weigh in favor of applying
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California law to this dispute.
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himself a resident of California, where both the Bank and the
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Airlines also have a significant business presence.
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agrees with Plaintiff that the subject matter of the written
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contract is not a relevant factor.
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At the outset, Plaintiff is
The court
(Opp. to Alaska Mot. at 5).
The place of contract formation and performance, however, also
appears to be California.
Plaintiff argues that the place of
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contract formation and performance “could be numerous states and
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Canada.”
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may have formed a unilateral contract with Defendants and performed
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it in a number of states, Plaintiff here has not.
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appears to be an artfully pled attempt to avoid California law,
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Plaintiff’s FAC does not specify the location from which he sent
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the completed credit card applications to the Bank.
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allege, however, that Plaintiff gathered the applications from
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members of his church.
(Opp. to Airlines’ Mot. at 5.)
While another plaintiff
Indeed, in what
The FAC does
Common sense dictates that Plaintiff, a
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resident of Los Angeles, also attends church in California.
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Furthermore, one of the writings alleged to comprise the contract
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states, “If customers hand you back the application, it must be
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dropped into the mail as soon as possible.”
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the urgency with which the contract requires applications be
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mailed, Plaintiff would have been required to mail the applications
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to the Bank soon after collecting them from fellow churchgoers.
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In light of the fact that the Section 188(2) factors weigh
(FAC, Ex. 8.)
Given
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heavily in favor of California, the interstate system’s needs, the
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various interests of the respective states, consideration of the
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parties’ reasonable expectations, and the need for uniformity would
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be best served by the application of California law to this
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dispute.
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Contract.
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Accordingly, California law applies to the Incentive
2.
Statute of Limitations
The Airlines argue that under California law, Plaintiff’s
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claim is time barred.
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out a two-year statute of limitations for oral contracts and a
(Airlines’ Mot. at 12).
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California law sets
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four-year statute of limitations for written contracts.
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Civ. Pro. §§ 337(1), 339(1).
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Cal. Code
Plaintiff responds that he has alleged a continuing breach,
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and therefore the statute of limitations is not at issue.
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Bank Mot. at 6-7.)
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“failure to pay all sums owed, and the airlines’ failure to ensure
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that all sums are paid . . . is continuing.”
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Plaintiff further appears to argue that the statute of limitations
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is not a factor because he has pled that neither he nor other,
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(Opp. to
Indeed, the FAC does state that the Bank’s
unnamed class members have been paid.
(FAC ¶ 68.)
(FAC ¶¶ 64, 66, 67).
At this stage, however, no class has yet been certified, and
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only Plaintiff’s individual claims are at issue.
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plaintiff cannot himself establish a live case or controversy, he
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may not seek relief on behalf of himself or any other member of a
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purported class.
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F.3d 1018, 1022 (9th Cir. 2003).
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the allegations pled as to Plaintiff himself.
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alleges a single instance of performance under the alleged written
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contract.
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contract occurred in 2007.
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contract claim until May 23, 2011.3
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deciding that a written contract exists, California’s four-year
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statute of limitations on a written contract has run.
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breach of contract claim based on the Incentive Contracts is,
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therefore, dismissed with prejudice.
If a named
Lierboe v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 350
The court therefore looks only to
Plaintiffs only
That performance and acceptance of the unilateral
Plaintiff did not file a breach of
Thus, assuming without
Plaintiff’s
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In perhaps another instance of artful pleading, Plaintiff
does not specify the month in which he submitted the credit card
applications to the Bank.
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B.
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The parties agree that Delaware law controls the Affinity
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Agreement, of which Plaintiff asserts he is an intended third-party
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beneficiary.
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third party beneficiary may, in some cases, have standing to
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enforce a contract.
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Wilmington, 630 A.2d 629, 633 (Del. 1993).
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parties’ intent to view the third party as a beneficiary is,
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however, essential.
The Affinity Agreement
(Affinity Agreement, § 18(e)).
Under Delaware law, a
Triple C Railcar Serv., Inc., v. City of
Id.
The contracting
In other words, “[i]n order for there to
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be a third party beneficiary, the contracting parties must intend
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to confer the benefit.”
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F.2d 530, 535 (3d Cir. 1988) (quoting Ins. Co. of N. Am. v.
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Waterhouse, 424 A.2D 675, 679 (Del.Super. 1980).
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parties’ intent is determined by the language of the contract
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itself.
Pierce Assocs., Inc. v. Nemous Found., 865
The contracting
Id.
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Here, Plaintiff argues that Section 7(d), which describes an
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employee incentive program, evinces the parties’ intent to confer
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third party beneficiary status upon airline employees.
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15-16.)
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states that there are no third party beneficiaries to the contract.
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(Affinity Agreement § 18(g) (emphasis added).)
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with Plaintiff that, in some cases, the structure of an agreement
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may indicate an attempt to create third party beneficiaries even in
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the absence of language to that effect.
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disclaiming third party beneficiaries may not be dispositive when
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contradicted by other contractual provisions granting rights to
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third parties.
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Corp., 421 F.3d 234, 245 (3d. Cir. 2005)
The court disagrees.
(Opp. at
The Affinity Agreement expressly
The court agrees
Indeed, even language
See, e.g., Caldwell Trucking PRP v. Rexon Tech.
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That is not, however, the
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situation here.
Here, the employee incentive program section
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comprises a single paragraph of an agreement that spans over fifty-
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five pages.
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explicitly contradicted by any other provision of the Affinity
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Agreement.
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for breach of the Affinity Agreement, which must therefore be
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dismissed with prejudice.4
The express language of Section 18(g) is not
Plaintiff therefore lacks standing to bring his claim
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C.
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Plaintiff’s Third Cause of Action for Unjust Enrichment is not
Unjust Enrichment
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an independent cause of action under California law.
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Superior Court, 165 Cal.App.4th 901, 911 (2008); Serna v. Bank of
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America, N.A., No. CV 11-10595 CAS; 2012 WL 2030705 * 11 (C.D. Cal.
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June 4, 2012).
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dismissed with prejudice.
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IV.
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Jogani v.
Plaintiff’s unjust enrichment claim is therefore
Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, the Motions to Dismiss are
GRANTED, with prejudice.
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
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Dated:November 16, 2012
DEAN D. PREGERSON
United States District Judge
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Though not raised by either party, it appears that even if
Plaintiff did have standing to bring a third party claims, such a
claim would be time-barred. 10 Del. C. § 8106.
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