Najeeb Rahman v. A Washington-Adduci

Filing 4

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER SUMMARILY DISMISSING ACTION WITHOUT PREJUDICE by Judge Dale S. Fischer. (See document for details) Case Terminated. Made JS-6 (ib)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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NAJEEB RAHMAN,
Petitioner,

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vs.

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A. WASHINGTON-ADDUCI, Warden,

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Respondent.

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CASE NO. CV 11-10283 DSF (RZ)
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
SUMMARILY DISMISSING ACTION
WITHOUT PREJUDICE

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Because Petitioner brings a habeas action that improperly challenges

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conditions of his confinement, rather than the validity or duration of that confinement, this

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action is not a proper petition for habeas corpus relief. The Court thus will dismiss the

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action summarily, without prejudice to Petitioner’s pursuit of relief through a civil rights

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action.

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Petitioner Najeeb Rahman is an federal inmate at Terminal Island. In this

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U.S.C. § 2241 habeas action, he asserts that prison officials have barred him from personal

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telephone calls with family and friends, based on a charge that he misused phone privileges

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at another facility. But the principal purpose of a habeas corpus writ is to provide a remedy

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for prisoners challenging the fact or duration of their confinement and who, thus, are

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seeking either immediate release or a sooner-than-currently-scheduled release. See Preiser

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v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484, 93 S. Ct. 1827, 36 L. Ed. 2d 439 (1973) (holding that

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habeas petition, not civil rights action, was proper vehicle for seeking restoration of good-

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time credits). The Supreme Court has left open the possibility that habeas petitions “may

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. . . also be available to challenge . . . prison conditions,” which ordinarily must be

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challenged by way of a civil rights action. Id. at 499-500; accord, Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S.

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520, 527 n.6, 99 S. Ct. 1861, 60 L. Ed. 2d 447 (1979) (noting the possibility of habeas as

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a means to address prison conditions, but declining to decide the issue). Nor has the Ninth

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Circuit completely foreclosed the possible use of habeas actions to challenge prison living

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conditions. See Docken v. Chase, 393 F.3d 1024, 1030 & n.6 (9th Cir. 2004) (collecting

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cases illustrating how the Ninth and several other “Circuits have struggled . . . with the

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distinction between the two remedies” but noting that “[n]one ha[s] suggested that the

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avenues for relief must always be mutually exclusive”).

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But allowing a habeas corpus action to challenge prison conditions appears

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to be the rare exception, both in this jurisdiction and others. The Ninth Circuit has made

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clear that the preferred, “proper” practice is to limit habeas cases to claims that would lead

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to the petitioner’s release sooner than otherwise would occur, and to confine other prisoner

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claims to civil rights suits. See Badea v. Cox, 931 F.2d 573, 574 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding

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that, because the subset of prisoner-plaintiff claims that could have been brought in a

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habeas action had become moot, district court could and should proceed with remaining

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claims, which challenged conditions, and not fact or duration, of confinement); accord,

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Crawford v. Bell, 599 F.2d 890, 891-92 & n.1 (9th Cir. 1979) (affirming dismissal of

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habeas petition because petition’s challenges to conditions of confinement must be brought

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in civil rights action).

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Several cases from other jurisdictions also persuasively hold that habeas

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corpus ordinarily is a proper vehicle only for those claims that, if successful, would result

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in the petitioner’s accelerated release. See, e.g., Carson v. Johnson, 112 F.3d 818, 820-21

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(5th Cir. 1997) (applying a “bright-line rule” whereby prisoner’s action properly may be

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a habeas petition if and only if a favorable ruling automatically would entitle prisoner to

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accelerated release; all other prisoner actions sound in civil rights, not habeas); Turner v.
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Johnson, 46 F. Supp. 2d 655, 665 (S.D. Tex. 1999) (“when a reassignment from

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administrative segregation . . . would not automatically shorten [a prisoner’s] sentence or

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lead to his immediate release, no liberty interest is implicated” under the Due Process

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Clause) (following Carson, supra); Frazier v. Hesson, 40 F. Supp. 2d 957, 962 (W.D.

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Tenn. 1999) (holding that prisoner may not employ habeas corpus petition “to attack his

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confinement to segregation or . . . a maximum security classification”). Judge Easterbrook,

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writing for the Seventh Circuit in Sylvester v. Hanks, 140 F.3d 713 (7th Cir. 1998), openly

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questioned whether the state prisoner-petitioner in that case properly could utilize habeas

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corpus, rather than a civil rights action, to challenge his three-year assignment to

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disciplinary segregation for conspiring to incite a prison riot – but the Seventh Circuit’s

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decision did not require an answer to that question. 140 F.3d at 714 (dicta).

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Here, if Petitioner’s claim were to succeed, he would not be entitled to an

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accelerated release from confinement. Instead, he would have his personal-telephone-use

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privileges restored. The Court sees no justification in this instance for deviating from what

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the Supreme Court in Preiser, the Ninth Circuit in Badea, and other courts elsewhere have

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held to be the “proper” course, namely requiring conditions-of-confinement claims like

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Petitioner’s to be brought in a civil rights lawsuit, not in a habeas corpus petition.

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For the foregoing reasons, the Court DISMISSES the action WITHOUT
PREJUDICE.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

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DATED: 1/5/12

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DALE S. FISCHER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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