Reginald Smith v. County of Los Angeles et al

Filing 161

ORDER RE DEFENDANT BARBARA FRYERS MOTION TO DISMISS 147 by Judge Dean D. Pregerson: Because Plaintiff has sufficiently stated a claim for a constitutional violation and Defendant does not enjoy qualified or quasi-judicial immunity on Plaintiffs facts, the motion to dismiss is DENIED. (lc). Modified on 5/19/2015 (lc).

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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REGINALD LENARD SMITH,

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Plaintiff,

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v.
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES; LOS
ANGELES COUNTY SHERIFF'S
DEPARTMENT; Does 1 through
10, both their personal and
official capacities,
Defendants.
___________________________

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Case No. CV 11-10666 DDP (PJWx)
ORDER RE DEFENDANT BARBARA
FRYER’S MOTION TO DISMISS
[Dkt. No. 147]

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Presently before the Court is Defendant Barbara Fryer’s motion

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to dismiss claims in Plaintiff’s Fourth Amended Complaint (“FAC”)

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as to her.

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submissions, the Court adopts the following order.

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I.

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Having heard oral arguments and considered the parties’

BACKGROUND
The facts of this case have been laid out in several previous

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orders and need not be recited in detail.

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136.)

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battery under the name “Reggie Lamar Smith”; he then failed to

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appear for sentencing.

(See, e.g., Dkt. No

Briefly, in 1991, Robert Lee Cooks was convicted of sexual

(FAC, ¶¶ 45-46.)

A bench warrant was

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issued against him using identifiers (name, birth date, and general

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physical description) actually belonging to Plaintiff Reginald

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Lenard Smith.

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detained twice on Cooks’ warrant; he brings this action under 42

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U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged constitutional violations by the entity

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defendants and, now, Ms. Fryer.

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(Id. at ¶ 47.)

Plaintiff has subsequently been

Plaintiff alleges that Ms. Fryer contributed to the

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constitutional violations because she investigated the case and

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generated the identifiers – Plaintiff’s identifiers – that were

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added to the Cooks warrant.

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that Fryer “knew or should have known” at the time that “there was

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no credible evidence that Plaintiff’s identifiers belonged to, or

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had been used by, the suspect Cook.”

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Plaintiff alleges that Fryer (1) “knew” the victim who provided the

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name “Reggie Smith” during the investigation was “not credible,”

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(2) “knew or should have known” that Plaintiff had completed a

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background investigation as part of an LASD hiring process a few

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months prior to the investigation, and that background check

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“established” that Plaintiff was not the black male who was the

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subject of the investigation, and (3) Fryer “probably knew” that

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the identifiers she discovered in a computer search “actually

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belonged to another person knew was not the suspect.”

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(Id. at ¶¶ 41, 47.)

Plaintiff alleges

(Id. at ¶ 42.)

Specifically,

(Id.)

Plaintiff further alleges that Fryer learned in 1995 that “the

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very limited name and incorrect birth date information LASD had

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used to describe the subject of” the warrant had been insufficient

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to identify Cooks when law enforcement officials ran a warrant

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check on him.

(Id. at ¶ 51.)

Fryer allegedly took no steps in

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1995 to revise the outstanding warrant to more accurately identify

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Cooks as the true subject of the warrant.

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II.

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LEGAL STANDARD
In order to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a

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claim, a complaint need only include “a short and plain statement

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of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”

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Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 55 (2007) (quoting Conley v.

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Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)).

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“sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to

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A complaint must include

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relief that is plausible on its face.”

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662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).

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considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court must “accept as true

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all allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in

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the light most favorable to the plaintiff.”

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F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000).

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III. BACKGROUND

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A.

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Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
When

Resnick v. Hayes, 213

Quasi-Judicial Immunity
Defendant argues that she has absolute “quasi-judicial

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immunity” from suit for her acts or omissions in this matter,

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because Plaintiff’s arrests were made under a bench warrant issued

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by the Superior Court and because Plaintiff has not “allege[d] any

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meaningful causal link between” Fryer’s acts or omissions and the

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judge’s decision to issue the warrant with the incorrect

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identifiers.

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(Mot. Dismiss at 4, 6-7.)

Quasi-judicial immunity is an absolute immunity from suit for

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court officials like grand jurors and prosecutors who “exercise a

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discretionary judgment on the basis of evidence presented to them.”

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Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 423 n.20 (1976).
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It may also

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extend to subordinates of a judge, like clerks, “when they perform

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tasks that are an integral part of the judicial process.”

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v. U.S. Bankr. Court for Dist. of Nevada, 828 F.2d 1385, 1390 (9th

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Cir. 1987).

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aware of any, extending absolute immunity to law enforcement

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officials who, in the course of their investigative duties, provide

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information to the court.

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that an officer seeking a warrant from the court has only qualified

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immunity and is not equivalent to a quasi-judicial figure like a

Mullis

Defendant cites to no authority, nor is the court

On the contrary, it is well-established

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prosecutor.

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fortiori, an investigator who merely provides information to the

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court on which a warrant is based, and is therefore performing a

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function even less “integral” to the judicial process, enjoys only

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qualified immunity for her actions.

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B.

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Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 342-43 (1986).

A

Qualified Immunity
Under the doctrine of “qualified immunity,” “government

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officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded

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from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not

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violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of

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which a reasonable person would have known.”

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457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).

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constitutional violation, the court must conclude both that there

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was a constitutional violation and that the right violated was

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clearly established.

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(2009).

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the other is clearly not satisfied, but ordinarily the court will

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determine the question of the constitutional violation first.

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at 236.

Harlow v. Fitzgerald,

To hold an official liable for a

Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232

The court may address either prong first if one element or

Indeed, if there is no constitutional violation on
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Id.

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Plaintiff’s facts, qualified immunity is largely irrelevant; the

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complaint will be dismissed for failure to state a claim.

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Whether Plaintiff States a Claim for a Fourth Amendment

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Violation in 1991

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The Fourth Amendment provides that “no Warrants shall issue,

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but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and

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particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons

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or things to be seized.”

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already held in this case, a law enforcement officer or agency that

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deliberately or recklessly misleads a court may be held responsible

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for the outcome of the court’s actions in material reliance on that

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information.

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Angeles, 477 F.3d 652, 664 (9th Cir. 2007).)

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up in the context of an officer directly seeking a warrant.

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Malley, 475 U.S. at 345-46 (an officer violates the Fourth

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Amendment, and may be subject to suit, if “a reasonably

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well-trained officer in petitioner's position would have known that

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his affidavit failed to establish probable cause.”).

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liability for a Fourth Amendment violation caused by an

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investigator’s misrepresentations is not limited to the context of

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an officer directly seeking a warrant.

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Cnty. of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119, 1126 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[A]

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coroner's reckless or intentional falsification of an autopsy

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report that plays a material role in the false arrest and

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prosecution of an individual can support a claim under 42 U.S.C. §

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1983 and the Fourth Amendment.”).

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U.S. Const. amend. IV.

As the Court has

(Dkt. No. 136 at 12-14 (citing Galen v. Cnty. of Los
This rule often comes

However,

See, e.g., Galbraith v.

Deliberately or recklessly providing false information to the
court can therefore be a Fourth Amendment violation if it causes an
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infirm warrant to be issued and a plaintiff is arrested on that

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warrant.

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warrant could be found to be infirm.

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a person charged with a crime must truly name him, or describe him

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sufficiently to identify him.”

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F.3d 608, 615 (9th Cir. 2014) (brackets omitted) (citing West v.

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Cabell, 153 U.S. 78, 85 (1894)).

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in this case did not truly name Robert Lee Cooks, and as it is

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further alleged that the warrant actually had Plaintiff’s birth

In this case, assuming Plaintiff’s facts as stated, the
“A warrant for the arrest of

Gant v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 772

As it is alleged that the warrant

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date rather than Cooks’, the warrant (as alleged) did not describe

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Cooks sufficiently to identify him.

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officer in Defendant’s position would know that identifiers

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provided to the court may be (and often are) used in bench

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warrants.

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court relied on the CDOJ and DMV identifiers defendant Fryer

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generated as stated above.”1

Additionally, a reasonable

Finally, Plaintiff alleges that “the prosecutor and the

(FAC, ¶ 43.)

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Defendant argues that Plaintiff was required to plead that
“the Superior Court did not have access to other identifying
information about Cooks which may have differed from the
information Fryer obtained (such as information Cooks provided to
law enforcement at the time he was booked).” (Reply at 1.) That
is not correct, for two reasons. First, a plaintiff is not
required, at the pleading stage, to specifically disclaim every
fact that might possibly undermine his claim. Plaintiff has pled
his theory of the case. He is not required to anticipate
Defendant’s theory. Second, even if the Superior Court had access
to other information, if it relied on Defendant’s allegedly false
information, that reliance still formed the basis for the court’s
decision. In many cases where an officer misleads the court, there
will be other, possibly contradictory evidence. See, e.g.,
Galbraith, 307 F.3d 1119, 1121-22, 1126 (9th Cir. 2002) (coroner
who ruled out suicide in a murder case held liable for Fourth
Amendment violation for false autopsy report, although there was
also a police report indicating the death likely was a suicide).
The question is not whether the court weighed competing facts, but
whether its independent judgment was undermined by the inclusion of
false statements. Smiddy v. Varney, 665 F.2d 261, 266-67 (9th Cir.
(continued...)
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The question, then, is whether Defendant Fryer’s part in the

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creation of the allegedly infirm warrant was deliberate or

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reckless.

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for the truth.

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Thus, the standard appears to be similar to the standard for malice

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in defamation cases, where recklessness may be demonstrated either

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by a showing that the defendant actually entertained serious doubts

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about the truth of her statement or by more circumstantial

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evidence, “such as absence of verification, inherent

Recklessness in this context means reckless disregard
Hervey v. Estes, 65 F.3d 784, 788 (9th Cir. 1995).

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implausibility, obvious reasons to doubt the veracity [or] accuracy

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of information, and concessions or inconsistent statements by the

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defendant.”

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J., dissenting) (citing St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 732

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(1968)); see also United States v. Ranney, 298 F.3d 74, 78 (1st

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Cir. 2002) (applying the defamation standard to warrant

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affidavits).

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Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 210 (1979) (Marshall,

Plaintiff asserts the following: (1) Defendant searched law

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enforcement databases on Plaintiff’s name, apparently because Cooks

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had used the name “Reggie Smith,” and then attributed Plaintiff’s

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date of birth, driver’s license number, and “CII number” to Cooks

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in her report; (2) Defendant knew that the alleged victim in Cooks’

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case who provided the name “Reggie Smith” was not credible, because

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she had lied to investigators, including about her knowledge of

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Cooks’ identity; (3) that Defendant “knew or should have known” of

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an employment-related background investigation of Plaintiff that

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(...continued)
1981), overruled as to other matters by Beck v. City of Upland, 527
F.3d 853, 865 (9th Cir. 2008).
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definitively would have shown he was not Cooks; and (4) that

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Defendant “probably knew” that the identifiers she found in her

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computer search belonged to someone other than Cooks.

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42.)

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(FAC, ¶ 41-

The Court analyzes Plaintiff’s allegations by setting aside

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those that are merely conclusory recitations of the elements of the

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alleged constitutional violation, which are not entitled to a

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presumption of truth, and then asking whether what remains is

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sufficient to state a claim for relief.

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556

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U.S. 662, 680-81 (2009).

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allegations on the ground that they are unrealistic or

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nonsensical,” but only because they are conclusorily stated.

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However, the court does not “reject . . .

Id.

Plaintiff’s allegation that Defendant “probably knew” that the

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identifiers she retrieved during her computer search belonged to

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someone other than Cooks suffers from two flaws.

First, it is not

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clear what legal standard “probably knew” meets.

If the Court

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interprets that phrase to mean that Defendant should have known

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that she had the wrong identifiers, that is not sufficient to prove

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recklessness, because “should have known” is a negligence (i.e.,

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reasonable person) standard, and “[o]missions or misstatements

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resulting from negligence or good faith mistakes” do not suffice to

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meet the standard under the Hervey/Galbraith/Galen line of cases.

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Ewing v. City of Stockton, 588 F.3d 1218, 1224 (9th Cir. 2009).

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Second, assuming that “probably knew” means that she must have

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actually known, the allegation veers toward a conclusory recitation

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of the elements, since the alleged constitutional violation is that

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Defendant knew the information was false (as to Cooks), yet placed

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it before the Superior Court.
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Plaintiff’s allegation regarding the employment background

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check likewise supports only an inference of negligence.

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that Defendant “knew or should have known” that Plaintiff applied

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for employment with the LASD, and that there was a relevant

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background investigation file available, does not mean that she did

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know any of that, or even that she entertained serious doubts that

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she had the right man’s identifiers.

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know about the application and the background investigation, can it

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be said that she know of an obvious reason to doubt the veracity or

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The fact

Nor, if she did not actually

accuracy of the identifiers she found.
On the other hand, if Defendant actually knew that the alleged

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victim in the Cooks case was so lacking in credibility that even

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her statement of her attacker’s name was, by itself, inherently

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implausible, then searching for identifiers on that name and

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providing it to the court could have been reckless.

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alleges that Defendant knew, at the time she made her search, that

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the alleged victim “had tried to conceal her knowledge of Cooks’

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identity.”

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support an inference that the victim’s identification of Cooks as

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“Reggie Smith” was inherently implausible, causing Defendant to

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entertain serious doubts as to the accuracy of the identifiers she

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obtained.

(FAC, ¶ 42.)

Plaintiff

That knowledge on Defendant’s part could

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Additionally, apart from the question of what Defendant

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actually knew or suspected at the time, her actions as alleged by

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Plaintiff themselves could support a finding of recklessness.

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search a database on a very common last name and a reasonably

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common first name, and to conclude, with no additional

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corroboration, that a match on those names must be the person in
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To

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question, and to then provide a court with that person’s date of

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birth – perhaps the most important identifier after the suspect’s

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name – could be construed as acting in the “absence of

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verification,” when there are “obvious reasons to doubt the . . .

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accuracy of information.”

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dissenting) (citing St. Amant, 390 U.S. at 732).

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Lando, 441 U.S. at 210 (Marshall, J.,

Finally, as a policy matter, the Court notes that in Fourth

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Amendment law, “there is no ready test for determining

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reasonableness other than by balancing the need to search (or

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seize) against the invasion which the search (or seizure) entails.”

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Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968); see also Winston v. Lee, 470

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U.S. 753, 763 (1985) (“Our inquiry therefore must focus on the

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extent of the intrusion on respondent's privacy interests and on

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the State's need for the evidence.”).

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formal arrest is quite serious indeed.

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628, 637 (7th Cir. 2013) (Rovner, J., concurring) (noting that

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reasonableness depends on the degree of restraint imposed and that

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arrest and imprisonment are a greater form of restraint that

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temporary handcuffing or a Terry stop).

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misidentification by a police officer during a stop on the street

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will not ordinarily result in serious deprivation of liberty and

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can be quickly corrected.

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sort of background check, however, is both unlikely to be

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challenged or corrected and the potential foundation for a serious

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intrusion on the personal liberty of the individual – as the

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undisputed facts of this case show.

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factual basis for an arrest warrant is therefore a context in which

The invasion entailed by
Rabin v. Flynn, 725 F.3d

A momentary

A positive misidentification in this

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Providing a court with the

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the “absence of verification” and the “obvious reasons to doubt”

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the accuracy of the information matter significantly.

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Thus, although Plaintiff’s factual allegations suffer some

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defects, they are sufficient to plausibly state a claim for relief.

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2.

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Effect of Modification of Warrant Record in 1995
Plaintiff alleges that “LA County Defendants, including

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defendant Fryer, did nothing to further identify Cooks as the

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subject of [the] warrant” after being informed by law enforcement

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officials in 1995 that it did not adequately describe him.

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Defendant argues that this is factually incorrect, and that the

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warrant record was updated in 1995 to include Cooks’ name, inmate

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number, location, and “CII” and FBI numbers, as reflected in an

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exhibit lodged under seal in a previous round of motions.

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at 7 (citing Dkt. No. 93).)

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(Reply

Defendant’s argument is raised for the first time in her

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Reply.

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the first time in a reply brief.”

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997 (9th Cir. 2007).

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was raised before in the motion to dismiss the Second Amended

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Complaint.

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to address it here.

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“The district court need not consider arguments raised for
Zamani v. Carnes, 491 F.3d 990,

In a sense, the issue of the 1995 revision

(Dkt. No. 86.)

Nonetheless, there are good reasons not

First, the previous motion was aimed at a different operative

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complaint, with different defendants.

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in opposition to the entity Defendants’ argument at that time may

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not be fully applicable to Defendant Fryer, or, alternatively,

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there might be different arguments, not raised at that time, that

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are relevant to Defendant Fryer.

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opportunity, on this operative complaint and with regard to this

The arguments Plaintiff made

Thus Plaintiff has not had an

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Defendant, to adequately present arguments in opposition to

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Defendant Fryer’s argument regarding the alleged 1995 revisions.

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Second, it is true that when an official provides false

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information that creates a Fourth Amendment violation, a later good

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faith attempt to prevent the false information from being used can

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mitigate or eliminate the official’s liability.

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Everett, 582 F.3d 910, 926 (9th Cir. 2009).

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alleged that Defendant Fryer took no such action.

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Defendant points the Court to an exhibit suggesting that someone

Stoot v. City of

Plaintiff here has
(FAC, ¶ 51.)

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(not necessarily Defendant) took action to update the warrant,

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although, notably, not suggesting that anyone took action to remove

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allegedly false and confusing information, such as Plaintiff’s name

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as the primary name of the subject and Plaintiff’s date of birth.2

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The question of the effect of the alleged 1995 revisions thus

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appears to be a fact-intensive one.

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motion to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint, for example,

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Plaintiff argued that law enforcement officials search for

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identifiers by field and would not necessarily be alerted to the

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remarks section allegedly added to the record in 1995.

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95 at 14-15.)

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altered, apparently more than once, between 1995 and 2012, when the

In the opposition to the

(Dkt. No.

Plaintiff also argued that the record has been

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Defendant points out that she did not have the authority to
modify the underlying warrant, which was created by the Superior
Court. (Reply at 7.) But Defendant cites no authority to show
that she could not adjust the fields of the warrant record in the
County’s database to more accurately identify the true subject of
the warrant, perhaps keeping “Reggie Smith” as an AKA. (Indeed,
the legal relationship between Superior Court warrants and the
County’s database remains somewhat obscure to the Court.) And
assuming she lacks the authority to adjust the fields of the
record, she does not explain why she could not have requested that
the Superior Court modify the underlying warrant.
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copy Defendants present to the Court was generated, making it

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difficult to know what information a law enforcement official would

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have seen in 2007 or 2011, when Plaintiff was arrested.

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Finally, Plaintiff pointed to his two arrests as prima facie

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evidence that the alleged revisions were in any event ineffective.

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(Id.)

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the present motion, they do suggest two things: this issue should

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not be resolved when Plaintiff has not had a chance to respond, and

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these arguments are likely better dealt with at the summary

(Id.)

Although the Court does not consider these arguments as to

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judgment phase, on a complete factual record.

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3.

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Whether the Right at Issue Was Clearly Established
The question of whether a right is clearly established “must

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be undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not as

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a broad general proposition.”

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(2001).

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a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing

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violates that right. This is not to say that an official action is

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protected by qualified immunity unless the very action in question

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has previously been held unlawful, but it is to say that in the

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light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness must be apparent.”

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Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987) (citation omitted).

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Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201

“The contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that

The Court finds that a reasonable official would understand

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that recklessly or knowingly providing false information to a court

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is unlawful and that a warrant which names or otherwise identifies

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someone other than its true subject is constitutionally deficient.3

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3

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Note that this is not the same as saying that a warrant that
correctly identifies its true subject, but incidentally identifies
another person as well, is infirm under the Fourth Amendment. The
(continued...)
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These principles are identified in a long line of cases, many of

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which are cited above in the discussion of the alleged 1991

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violation.

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Defendant therefore does not enjoy qualified immunity from

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suit in this case.

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IV.

CONCLUSION

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Because Plaintiff has sufficiently stated a claim for a

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constitutional violation and Defendant does not enjoy qualified or

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quasi-judicial immunity on Plaintiff’s facts, the motion to dismiss

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is DENIED.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Dated: May 19, 2015
DEAN D. PREGERSON
United States District Judge

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(...continued)
latter kind of warrant is an inevitable consequence of the fact
that people share names, birthdays, and physical characteristics;
Fourth Amendment doctrine does not, at present, require more
precise biometric identification. Rivera v. Cnty. of Los Angeles,
745 F.3d 384, 388 (9th Cir. 2014). (Cf. Dkt. No. 32 (order of
Judge Feess discussing the easy availability of unique biometric
identification numbers and noting that although controlling case
law does not require it, “requiring the use of biometric
identifiers would not be at all burdensome and would provide a more
precise description of the person sought than traditional
identifiers”).) Filling a warrant with information that does not
belong to its true subject but does belong to some other person, on
the other hand, does not satisfy the Fourth Amendment’s
particularity requirement, because that information cannot possibly
guide the arresting official to the right person, about whom there
is probable cause to make an arrest. If the Fourth Amendment
protects against the infamous “general warrants” that authorized
arrest “without naming any one,” Sprigg v. Stump, 8 F. 207, 213
(C.C.D. Or. 1881), logically it must also protect against warrants
that authorize arrest of the wrong person entirely.
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