Alex Rosas et al v. Leroy Baca et al

Filing 54

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION 20 AND DENYING DEFENDANTS MOTION TO DISMISS 36 by Judge Dean D. Pregerson (lc)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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ALEX ROSAS and JONATHAN
GOODWIN, on behalf of
themselves and of those
similarly situated,

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Plaintiffs,
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v.
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LEROY BACA, Sheriff of Los
Angeles County Jails; PAUL
TANAKA, Undersheriff, Los
Angeles Sheriff's
Department; CECIL RHAMBO,
Assistant Sheriff, Los
Angeles Sheriff's Department
and DENNIS BURNS, Chief of
Custody Operations Division,
Los Angeles Sheriff's
Department,

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Defendants.
___________________________

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Case No. CV 12-00428 DDP (SHx)

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION
FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION AND
DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO
DISMISS

[Dkt Nos. 20, 36]

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I.

Introduction
Presently before the court is Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class

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Certification under Rule 23(b)(2).

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submissions of the parties and heard oral argument, the court

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grants the motion and adopts the following order.

Having considered the

The court notes

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that the threshold for satisfying class certification requirements

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is relatively low.

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580, 594 (C.D. Cal. 2008).

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certification motion is a procedural step allowing this matter to

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go forward.

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on the ultimate merits of the lawsuit.

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See Parkinson v. Hyundai Motor Am., 258 F.R.D.
The granting of this class

It is not intended, and does not constitute an opinion

The court has great confidence in the leadership and integrity

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of both sides to this dispute.

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effective partners in crafting cooperative solutions to issues

The parties have proved to be

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raised in other, related matters before this court.

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this order shall be read to discourage the parties from continuing

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to pursue collaborative efforts to address jail-related matters of

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mutual concern.

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I.

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Nothing in

Background
The Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department has the

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responsibility of running the largest and likely most challenging

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jail system in the country.

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discharges over 150,000 inmates a year and is responsible, among

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other matters, for delivering inmates to courthouses located

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throughout the county.

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individuals charged with crimes ranging from misdemeanors to

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homicides, and includes pre-trial detainees, inmates who have been

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convicted and sentenced, and, under California’s “realignment”

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program, an increasing number of state prisoners.

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It is a system which admits and

The inmate population is comprised of

A substantial portion of the inmate population has serious

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medical and mental health needs, disability issues, and drug and

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alcohol dependency problems.

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low-level offenders, a significant number are hard-core gang

While many inmates are non-violent or

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members or present other serious security threats.

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often housed in outdated facilities that are long past their life

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cycles, and were never designed to accommodate inmates as numerous

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and complex as today’s jail population.

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against a challenging backdrop of dwindling fiscal resources and an

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increasing inmate population, that the Sheriff’s Department has

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endeavored to fulfill its custodial responsibilities to both

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inmates and the public.

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Inmates are

It is in this context,

The American Civil Liberties Union’s mission, in part, is to

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protect inmates’ constitutional rights, and further to ensure that

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inmates are housed in a safe, humane environment that provides

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opportunities for rehabilitation.

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the ACLU’s monitors have, by order of this court and with the

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cooperation of the Sheriff’s Department, had access to the jail,

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inmates, and senior Sheriff’s Department jail supervisors.

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Consistent with these interests,

The Sheriff’s Department and the ACLU have a long history of

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both litigation and collaboration on jail-related matters.

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some of that history, this court has decided contested issues and

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worked with the parties to identify and resolve issues of mutual

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concern, often without the need of formal litigation.

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Angeles County Office of Independent Review has also been of great

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assistance to the court and the parties in resolving disputes.

During

The Los

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Here, the ACLU, on behalf of Plaintiffs, has presented

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evidence to the court and to the Sheriff’s Department of alleged

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instances of deputy-on-inmate and inmate-on-inmate altercations.

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The ACLU asserts that such examples are the result of deficiencies

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in the management of the jail system.

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3, 13.)
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(First Amended Complaint ¶¶

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The Sheriff’s Department has acknowledged the ACLU’s concerns,

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and has made commendable efforts to implement positive jail reforms

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and new initiatives, such as the establishment of new investigatory

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and management task forces.

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contributions to these reform efforts.

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the Sheriff’s Department and the ACLU sincerely share the common

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goal of making the downtown Los Angeles jail the best possible

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facility.

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The ACLU has made significant
The court has no doubt that

The court recognizes that, while the Sheriff’s Department and

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ACLU continue to work together to achieve this common goal,

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differences may arise requiring a judicial resolution.

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lawsuit is a vehicle by which the plaintiffs may seek relief.

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Here, Plaintiffs seek only declaratory and injunctive relief on

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behalf of themselves and other current and future inmates in the

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downtown Los Angeles Jail Complex.1

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plaintiffs do not seek monetary damages.

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III. Legal Standard

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(FAC ¶¶ 3, 215.)

This

The

The party seeking class certification bears the burden of

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showing that each of the four requirements of Rule 23(a) and at

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least one of the requirements of Rule 23(b) are met.

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Dataprods. Corp., 976 F.2d 497, 508-09 (9th Cir. 1992).

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sets forth four prerequisites for class certification:

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See Hanon v.
Rule 23(a)

(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members
is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact
common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the
representative parties are typical of the claims or
defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties

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The Jail Complex is comprised of three interconnected
facilities: Men’s Central Jail, Twin Towers Correctional Facility,
and the Inmate Reception Center (collectively, “the Jails”).
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will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the
class.

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Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a); see also Hanon, 976 F.2d at 508.
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These four requirements are often referred to as numerosity,
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commonality, typicality, and adequacy.

See General Tel. Co.

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v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 156 (1982).

In determining the

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propriety of a class action, the question is not whether the
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plaintiff has stated a cause of action or will prevail on the
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merits, but rather whether the requirements of Rule 23 are
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met.

Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 178

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(1974).

This court, therefore, considers the merits of the

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underlying claim to the extent that the merits overlap with
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the Rule 23(a) requirements, but will not conduct a “mini13
trial” or determine at this stage whether Plaintiffs could
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actually prevail.

Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 657 F.3d

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970, 981, 983 n.8 (9th Cir. 2011).
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IV.

Discussion

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A.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)

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1.

Numerosity

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Plaintiffs must first demonstrate that “the class is so
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numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable.”

Fed.

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R. Civ. P. Rule 23(a)(1).

The Jails currently house

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thousands of inmates, and are certain to house many more in
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the future.

The court therefore agrees with Plaintiffs’

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undisputed assertion that the numerosity requirement has been
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satisfied.
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2.

Commonality

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Second, the Plaintiffs must demonstrate that “there are

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questions of law or fact common to the class.”

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P. 23(a)(2).

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All questions of fact and law need not be common to satisfy

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the rule. The existence of shared legal issues with divergent

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factual predicates is sufficient . . . .”

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Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1019 (9th Cir. 1998).

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single common question will do,” so long as that question has

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the capacity to generate a common answer “apt to drive the

Fed. R. Civ.

“Rule 23(a)(2) has been construed permissively.

Hanlon v. Chrysler
Indeed, “even a

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resolution of the litigation.”

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Dukes, 131 S.Ct. 2541, 2551, 2556 (2011) (citations, internal

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quotations, and alterations omitted).

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v.

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Defendant argues that the commonality requirement is

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lacking here because “most class members have not been harmed

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in any way,” and that the “common denominator” of having been

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subjected to the risk of misconduct is insufficient.

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at 4-5.)

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“commonality is satisfied where the lawsuit challenges a

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system-wide practice or policy that affects all of the

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putative class members.”

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868 (9th Cir. 2001) abrogated on other grounds by Johnson v.

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California, 543 U.S. 499 (2005).

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individual factual differences among class members pose no

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obstacle to commonality.

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Oakland, No. C11-2867 THE, 2012 WL 994644 at *2 (N.D. Cal.

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March 23, 2012).

(Opp.

In a civil rights suit such as this one, however,

Armstrong v. Davis, 275 F.3d 849,

Under such circumstances,

Id.; see also Spalding v. City of

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Here, Plaintiffs contend that Sheriff’s department

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supervisors knew of, and were deliberately indifferent to, a
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pattern or practice of deputies using or threatening violence

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against inmates and facilitating inmate-on-inmate violence.

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As a result, Plaintiffs assert, all class members are at

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significant risk of excessive violence at the hands of

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deputies.

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yield a common answer to the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment

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issues Plaintiffs have raised on behalf of all inmates.

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23(a)(2)’s commonality requirement is, therefore, satisfied.

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Resolution of these common questions is likely to

3.

Rule

Typicality

Rule 23(a) also requires a plaintiff to demonstrate that

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“the claims or defenses of the representative parties are

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typical of the claims or defenses of the class.”

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Civ. P. 23(a)(3). “[R]epresentative claims are ‘typical’ if

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they are reasonably co-extensive with those of absent class

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members; they need not be substantially identical.”

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150 F.3d at 1020.

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Rosas was threatened by Sheriff’s deputies after witnessing a

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display of excessive force against another inmate, and was

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later himself the target of violence.

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complaint also alleges that named Plaintiff Goodwin was

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physically assaulted by deputies without provocation.

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¶¶ 228-231.)

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suffered by the named Plaintiffs may differ from those

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suffered by other class members, the complaint alleges that

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the same pattern and practice of violence, and deliberate

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indifference thereto, exposes every class member, including

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the named Plaintiffs, to the same risk of violent attack.

Fed. R.

Hanlon,

The complaint alleges that named Plaintiff

(FAC ¶¶ 220-223.)

The

(FAC

While the precise nature of the injuries

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Plaintiffs’ claims are therefore typical of the claims of

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absent class members.

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4.

Adequacy

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Finally, the plaintiffs must demonstrate that "the

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representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the

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interests of the class."

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“Resolution of two questions determines legal adequacy: (1)

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do the named plaintiffs and their counsel have any conflicts

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of interest with other class members and (2) will the named

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plaintiffs and their counsel prosecute the action vigorously

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on behalf of the class?”

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Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4).

Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1020.

Defendant points to no conflict of interest among

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Plaintiffs’ counsel, but asserts that counsel is nevertheless

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inadequate by dint of alleged misconduct in a related case.

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(Opp. at 5.)

Defendant’s contention is without merit.

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Defendant also argues that named Plaintiffs Goodwin and

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Rosas are inadequate class representatives because they have

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not shown that they are likely to suffer from unlawful

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deputy-on-inmate violence in the future, and therefore lack

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Article III standing.2

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demonstrate an injury in fact sufficient to confer standing,

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a plaintiff must demonstrate an “invasion of a legally

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protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized,

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and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.”

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D’Lil v. Best W. Encina Lodge & Suites, 538 F.3d 1031, 1036

(Opp. At 6-7.)

In order to

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This argument also serves as the basis for Defendant’s
separately filed Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ First Amended
Complaint (Dkt. No. 45).
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(9th Cir. 2008), citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504

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U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992).

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Plaintiffs have not shown an imminent harm.

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Defendant argues that the named

To support his argument, Defendant relies primarily upon

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City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983).

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a plaintiff sought injunctive relief after police officers

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allegedly applied a chokehold on the plaintiff at a traffic

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stop, without provocation.

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Court held that because the plaintiff could not show a real

In Lyons,

Lyons, 461 U.S. at 97.

The

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and immediate threat that he would again be stopped and

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placed in a chokehold, he could not make a showing of

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irreparable injury and, therefore, lacked standing to pursue

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injunctive relief.

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Id. at 105, 111.

Lyons, however, is readily distinguishable.

Unlike the

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plaintiff in Lyons, who could do no more than speculate that

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he might someday once again interact with law enforcement

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officers, Plaintiffs here remain incarcerated in the Jails,

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and will necessarily come into frequent contact with

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Sheriff’s deputies, including some of the very deputies who

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are alleged to have engaged in unlawful violent activity.

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Furthermore, Plaintiffs here have alleged a widespread

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pattern of violence and indifference to that violence,

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supported by numerous declarations from inmates, experts, and

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civilian witnesses.

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pattern of injurious acts in the past, “there is a sufficient

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possibility that they will engage in them in the near future

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to satisfy the ‘realistic repetition’ requirement” necessary

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to demonstrate an actual injury.

Where defendants have engaged in a

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Armstrong, 275 F.3d at 861;

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see also LaDuke v. Nelson, 762 F.2d 1318, 1324 (9th Cir.

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1985) (distinguishing Lyons from case involving a standard

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pattern of unconstitutional behavior).

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pattern of unlawful behavior that is likely to recur, the

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named Plaintiffs here have demonstrated injury in fact, and

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are adequate class representatives.

Having alleged a

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B.

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A party seeking class certification must also

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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)

demonstrate that at least one of the following three

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conditions is satisfied: (1) the prosecution of separate

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actions would create a risk of: (a) inconsistent or varying

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adjudications, or (b) individual adjudications dispositive of

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the interests of other members not a party to those

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adjudications; (2) the party opposing the class has acted or

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refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class;

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or (3) questions of law or fact common to the members of the

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class predominate over any questions affecting only

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individual members, and a class action is superior to other

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available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of

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the controversy.

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Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571, 580 (9th Cir. 2010) (en

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banc).

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See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b); Dukes v.

As noted above, Plaintiffs here seek certification under

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Rule 23(b)(2).

Defendant contends that Plaintiffs have

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provided no evidence whatsoever that Rule 23(b)(2) is

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satisfied.

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that Sheriff’s command and supervisory staff have been and

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remain aware of the alleged pattern and practice of unlawful

(Opp. at 3.)

The FAC clearly alleges, however,

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violence and are deliberately indifferent to it.

The

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complaint further alleges that multiple deputies ignored

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named Plaintiff Rosas’ requests for a complaint form.

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223.)

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stating that Defendant has failed to rein in deputies’

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abusive behavior.

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in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification ¶

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10).

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that Plaintiffs have sufficiently demonstrated that the party

(FAC ¶

Plaintiffs have also submitted expert declarations

(See, e.g., Declaration of Thomas Parker

In light of these allegations, the court is satisfied

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opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds

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generally applicable to the class.

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V.

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Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, Plaintiff’s Motion to

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Certify Class is GRANTED.3

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comprised of all present and future inmates confined in the

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Jail Complex in downtown Los Angeles, pursuant to Federal

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Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2).

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the certification of the plaintiff class has no bearing on

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the viability or veracity of Plaintiffs’ claims.

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remains available to assist the parties in mediating

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disputes, while recognizing the possibility that further

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litigation may also be necessary.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

The court hereby certifies a class

The court reiterates that

The court

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Dated: June 7, 2012
DEAN D. PREGERSON
United States District Judge

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For the reasons discussed in Section III.A.4, supra,
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the FAC is DENIED.
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