J P Parnell v. Kamala Harris

Filing 11

ORDER SUMMARILY DISMISSING CASE by Judge Dolly M. Gee. (See document for details). Case Terminated. Made JS-6. (ib)

1

O

2
3
4
5
6
7
8

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

10
11

J.P. PARNELL,

12
13
14
15
16

Petitioner,
vs.
KAMALA HARRIS,
Respondent.

CASE NO. CV 12-1417 DMG (RZ)

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

ORDER SUMMARILY DISMISSING
ACTION

17

Because Petitioner challenges conditions of his confinement rather than the validity

18

or duration of that confinement, this action is not a proper petition for habeas corpus relief.

19

Thus, the Court will dismiss the action summarily, albeit without prejudice to Petitioner’s

20

pursuit of relief through a civil rights action.

21
22

I.

23

BACKGROUND

24

Petitioner J.P. Parnell is a state inmate. He is dissatisfied with certain conditions

25

of his confinement. (His first-mentioned grievances are (1) the prison’s “ban on natural

26

sugar products in favor of artificial sweeteners . . . to thwart the manufacture of jailhouse

27

wine (pruno),” and (2) “the proscription on prisoners leaving the dining room with whole

28

pieces of fruit[.]” Pet. at 5A.) But Petitioner does not pray for a reversal of any conviction

1

or seek an accelerated release from confinement, and therefore habeas is not the proper

2

vehicle for review of Petitioners’ claim(s).

3
4

II.

5

HABEAS CORPUS GENERALLY MAY CHALLENGE THE FACT OR

6

DURATION OF CONFINEMENT, BUT NOT THE CONDITIONS THEREOF

7

The principal purpose of a habeas corpus writ is to provide a remedy for prisoners

8

challenging the fact or duration of their confinement and who, thus, are seeking either

9

immediate release or a sooner-than-currently-scheduled release. See Preiser v. Rodriguez,

10

411 U.S. 475, 484, 93 S. Ct. 1827, 36 L. Ed. 2d 439 (1973) (holding that habeas petition,

11

not civil rights action, was proper vehicle for seeking restoration of good-time credits).

12

The Supreme Court has left open the possibility that habeas petitions “may . . . also be

13

available to challenge . . . prison conditions,” which ordinarily must be challenged by way

14

of a civil rights action. Id., 411 U.S. at 499-500; accord, Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 526

15

n.6, 99 S. Ct. 1861, 60 L. Ed. 2d 447 (1979) (noting the possibility of habeas as a means

16

to address prison conditions, but declining to decide the issue). Nor has the Ninth Circuit

17

completely foreclosed the possible use of habeas actions to challenge prison living

18

conditions. See Bostic v. Carlson, 884 F.2d 1267, 1269 (9th Cir. 1989) (assuming without

19

discussion that habeas could provide relief on a prisoner’s claim of having been placed in

20

disciplinary segregation without due process); see also Fierro v. Gomez, 77 F.3d 301, 304

21

n.2 (9th Cir. 1996) (indicating that the issue remains unresolved in this Circuit), vacated

22

on other grounds, 519 U.S. 918, 117 S. Ct. 285, 136 L. Ed. 2d 204 (1996).

23

But such use of the habeas corpus action appears to be the exception. The Ninth

24

Circuit has made clear that the preferred, “proper” practice is to limit habeas cases to

25

claims that would lead to the petitioner’s release sooner than otherwise would occur, and

26

to confine other prisoner claims to civil rights suits. See Badea v. Cox, 931 F.2d 573, 574

27

(9th Cir. 1991) (holding that, because the subset of prisoner-plaintiff claims that could have

28

been brought in a habeas action had become moot, district court could and should proceed
-2-

1

with remaining claims, which challenged conditions, and not fact or duration, of

2

confinement); accord, Crawford v. Bell, 599 F.2d 890, 891-92 & n.1 (9th Cir. 1979)

3

(affirming dismissal of habeas petition because petition’s challenges to conditions of

4

confinement must be brought in civil rights action).

5

Here, if Petitioner’s claims about the conditions of his confinement were to succeed,

6 he would not thereby be entitled to an accelerated release from confinement. The Court sees
7 no justification in this instance for deviating from what the Supreme Court in Preiser and
8 the Ninth Circuit in Badea have held to be the “proper” course, namely requiring conditions9 of-confinement claims like Petitioners’ to be brought in a civil rights lawsuit, not in a habeas
10 corpus petition.
11
12

III.

13

CONCLUSION

14

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DISMISSES the action without prejudice to his

15 pursuit of civil rights relief instead of habeas relief.
16

IT IS SO ORDERED.

17
18 DATED: April 16, 2012
19
20
21

DOLLY M. GEE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

22
23
24
25
26
27
28
-3-