Hakob Ayvazian v. The Moore Law Group et al

Filing 42

ORDER by Judge Otis D Wright, II: granting 23 Defendant The Moore Law Groups Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions against Plaintiff Hakob Ayvazian in the amount of $2,750.00. (lc) Modified on 6/26/2012 (lc).

O

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

10

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

11
12

HAKOB AYVAZIAN, an individual,

13
14
15
16
17
18
19

v.

Plaintiffs,

THE MOORE LAW GROUP, A
California Company; NELSON &
KENNARD, A California Professional
Company; ENCORE RECEIVABLE
MANAGEMENT, INC., a Kansas
Corporation; REDLINE RECOVERY
SERVICES, LLC, A New York Limited
Liability Company; ASSET
ACCEPTANCE, LLC, A Delaware
Limited Liability Company,

Case No. 2:12-CV-01506-ODW(Ex)
ORDER GRANTING SANCTIONS
PURSUANT TO FEDERAL RULE
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE RULE 11
[23]

Defendants.

20
21

I.

22

INTRODUCTION

23

Before the Court is Defendant The Moore Law Group’s (“TMLG”) Motion for

24

Sanctions against Plaintiff Hakob Ayvazian pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

25

Procedure 11. (ECF No. 23.) For the reasons discussed below, TMLG’s Motion is

26

GRANTED.1

27

1

28

Having carefully considered the papers filed in support of and in opposition to the instant Motion,
the Court deems the matter appropriate for decision without oral argument. Fed. R. Civ. P. 78; L. R.
7-15.

II.

1

BACKGROUND

2

Plaintiff filed this action on February 28, 2012, claiming TMLG (and myriad

3

other Defendants) violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), the Fair Debt

4

Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), California’s Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection

5

Practices Act (“Rosenthal Act”), and California’s Consumer Credit Reporting

6

Agencies Act (“CCRAA”), and committed the intentional torts of invasion of privacy

7

and defamation—all by allegedly running Plaintiff’s credit report without a

8

permissible purpose.

9

allegations, save for alleging the specific dates Plaintiff alleges TMLG ran Plaintiff’s

10

credit report (March 24, 2011, and March 25, 2011). (Compl. 8:21.) Plaintiff then

11

broadly alleges on information and belief that “at some point Defendants must have

12

tried to purchase debts alleged to be owed by Plaintiff, considered purchasing debts

13

alleged to be owed by Plaintiff, or looked into Plaintiff’s history as a potential debtor

14

for overdue and unsatisfied account balances to collect on.” (Compl. 8:26–9:1.)

15

Plaintiff offers no other facts tied specifically to her or any of the Defendants named

16

in this case.

But Plaintiff’s Complaint pleads no facts supporting these

17

TMLG, on the other hand, maintains that it ran Plaintiff’s credit report only

18

once—on March 25, 2011—in direct relation to collection on Plaintiff’s account.

19

(Mot. 6.) TMLG further contends that it initially mailed Plaintiff a demand letter on

20

April 26, 2011, giving Plaintiff notice of the debt and Plaintiff’s right to request

21

verification of the debt within 30 days. (Id.)

22

In light of the factual deficiencies in Plaintiff’s Complaint, TMLG contends it

23

served Plaintiff a “safe harbor” letter pursuant to Rule 11(c)(2) on May 11, 2012,

24

which was at least 21 days prior to the date TMLG filed its Motion for Sanctions.

25

(Mot. 2 n.1 & Lazo Decl. ¶ 7.) The letter contained TMLG’s proposed Notice of

26

Motion and Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions, the Memorandum of Points and Authorities

27

in support of the Motion, and the declaration of Terri Lazo in support of the Motion.

28

2

1

(Mot. 2 n.1 & Lazo Decl. ¶ 7.) Following Plaintiff’s failure to act on TMLG’s notice,

2

TMLG filed the instant Motion on June 4, 2012. (ECF No. 23.)

3

TMLG now seeks sanctions in the amount of $2,750.00 for attorney’s fees for

4

the nine hours spent investigating account history notes, preparing the safe harbor

5

letter and drafting the instant Motion, preparing TMLG’s concurrently filed motion

6

for summary judgment (ECF No. 14), plus an estimated additional one hour for

7

traveling to and attending the hearing on the Motion. (Lazo Decl. ¶¶ 7–10.) TMLG’s

8

Counsel, Terri Lazo’s hourly rate is $275.00 per hour. (Lazo Decl. ¶ 8.)
III.

9

LEGAL STANDARD

10

The Ninth Circuit has held that Rule 111 is designed to deter the filing of

11

frivolous pleadings. Riverhead Sav. Bank v. Nat’l Mortg.Equity Corp., 893 F.2d

12

1109, 1115 (9th Cir. 1990). Because Rule 11 “is not intended to chill an attorney’s

13

enthusiasm or creativity in pursuing factual or legal theories,” Riverhead, 893 F.2d at

14

1115), courts have interpreted the rule to “prescribe sanctions, including fees, only in

15

the ‘exceptional circumstance,’ where a claim or motion is patently unmeritorious or

16

frivolous.” Riverhead, 893 F.2d at 1115 (quoting Doering v. Union Cnty. Bd. of

17

Chosen Freeholders, 857 F.2d 191, 194 (3rd. Cir. 1988)).

18

The Ninth Circuit defines a frivolous claim or pleading for Rule 11 purposes as

19

one that is “legally or factually ‘baseless’ from an objective perspective . . . and made

20

without a reasonable and competent inquiry.” Q-Pharma v. Andrew Jergens Co., 360

21
22
23
24
25
26
27

1

The Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b)(1)–(3) provides:
By presenting to the court a pleading . . . an attorney . . . certifies that to the best of
[his] knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the
circumstances: (1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to
harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation; (2) the
claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by existing law...; [and]
(3) the factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified,
will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further
investigation or discovery.

28

3

1

F.3d 1295, 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (quoting Christian v. Mattel, Inc., 286 F.3d 1118,

2

1127 (9th Cir. 2002)). Furthermore, in assessing a case for frivolousness, “[t]he key

3

question . . . is whether a complaint states an arguable claim—not whether the pleader

4

is correct in his perception of the law.” Riverhead, 893 F.2d at 1115 (quoting Hudson

5

v. Moore Bus. Forms, Inc., 827 F.2d 450, 453 (9th Cir. 1987)).

6

Sanctions “may be composed of either or both a penalty payable to the court,

7

and/or an award of reasonable attorneys’ fees to the opposing party for those fees and

8

other expenses incurred as a direct result of the violation,” Truesdell v. S. Cal.

9

Permanente Med. Grp., 209 F.R.D. 169, 175 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P.

10

11(c)(2)), provided the amount of such sanctions “is limited to what suffices to deter

11

repetition of the conduct or comparable conduct by others similarly situated,”

12

Fed.R.Civ.P. 11(c)(4).

13

An award of attorney’s fees may only be made “on motion and [if] warranted

14

for effective deterrence.” Id. “Whenever the district court imposes sanctions on an

15

attorney, it must . . . afford the attorney notice and an opportunity to be heard.”

16

Weissman v. Quail Lodge, Inc., 179 F.3d 1194, 1198 (9th Cir.1999).

17

IV.

DISCUSSION

18

Plaintiff’s entire claim is based on the allegation that TMLG violated the

19

FDCPA, Rosenthal Act, FCRA, and CCRAA, and committed intentional torts of

20

invasion of privacy and defamation, all by running Plaintiff’s credit report without a

21

permissible purpose. Plaintiff’s Complaint offers virtually no facts tied specifically to

22

Plaintiff or any of the Defendants named in this case. The Court will briefly consider

23

each claim in view of the allegations in the Complaint.

24

First, Plaintiff alleges violations of the FDCPA, 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e), and

25

California’s Rosenthal Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 1788.17, broadly arguing that TMLG

26

failed to provide notice of debts and used deceptive and unconscionable means to

27

collect debts. The Rosenthal Act provides that, with limited exceptions, “every debt

28

collector collecting or attempting to collect a consumer debt shall comply with the

4

1

provisions of” the FDCPA. Cal. Civ. Code § 1788.17. Because the Rosenthal Act

2

specifically incorporates provisions of the FDCPA, “[l]ike the FDCPA, the RFDCPA

3

applies only to debt collectors.” See Izenberg v. ETS Servs., LLC., 589 F. Supp. 2d

4

1193, 1198 (C.D. Cal. 2008).

5

A “debt collector” under the Rosenthal Act is “any person who, in the ordinary

6

course of business, regularly, on behalf of himself or herself or others, engages in debt

7

collection.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1788.2(c). Section 1788.2(c) expressly excludes “an

8

attorney or counselor at law”; thus, “[a] creditor’s counsel retained for the purpose of

9

collecting a debt is not a ‘debt collector’ within the meaning of the Rosenthal Act.”

10

Owings v. Hunt & Henriques, No. 08cv1931-L(NLS), 2010 WL 3489342, at *3 (S.D.

11

Cal. Sept. 3, 2010) (citing Carney v. Rotkin, Schmerin & McIntyre, 206 Cal. App. 3d

12

1513, 1518, 1526 (1988) (rejecting the contention that section 1788.2(c) exempts

13

attorneys but not law firms).

14

TMLG is a law firm. Thus, it is expressly exempted from liability under both

15

the FDCPA and the Rosenthal Act. A sufficient inquiry into fact and the legal

16

standards of each act would have clearly revealed this to Plaintiff.

17

Moreover, Plaintiff’s FDCPA and Rosenthal Act claims are rife with glaring

18

pleading deficiencies, which suggest a serious lack of factual investigation prior to

19

filing suit. Plaintiff’s Complaint cursorily alleges that “Defendants are debt collectors

20

as defined in 15 U.S.C. §1692a(6)and [sic] Cal. Civ. Code §1788.2(c),” without any

21

explanation of how TMLG constitutes a debt collector under either statute.

22

(Compl. 8:6–8.) In addition, Plaintiff fails to allege whatsoever that TMLG was

23

attempting to collect a “debt” within the meaning of the FDCPA, 15 U.S.C.

24

§ 1692a(5), or a “consumer debt” under the RFDCPA, Cal. Civ. Code §1788.2(e), (f).

25

Plaintiff’s Complaint therefore facially fails to state either claim against TMLG, or

26

any Defendant for that matter.

27

Plaintiff further alleges that TMLG violated the FCRA, 15 U.S.C. § 1681(b),

28

and the CCRAA, Cal. Civ. Code § 1785.11, on grounds that TMLG “[obtained] and

5

1

[reviewed] Plaintiff’s credit report from CRA’s without having permissible purpose.”

2

The CCRAA applies on its face only to the furnishing of a consumer credit report by a

3

consumer credit reporting agency. Plaintiff’s allegations can in no way state a claim

4

under either the FCRA or CCRAA, as TMLG is not a credit reporting agency. In

5

addition, Plaintiff concedes that TMLG obtained a credit report from credit reporting

6

agencies, not that it furnished a credit report as a credit reporting agency.

7

Plaintiff lastly accuses Defendant of committing invasion of privacy and

8

defamation. Even a cursory review of the legal standards regarding Plaintiff’s tort

9

claims would indicate that merely alleging that Defendant ran Plaintiff’s credit report

10

without permission is wholly insufficient to state arguable claims for these torts.

11

The conclusory allegations set forth in this action are not only insufficient to

12

meet pleading standards, but are so baseless as to render Plaintiff’s Complaint

13

frivolous and a clear abuse of the judicial process. Rule 11(b)(3) requires factual

14

allegations to have evidentiary support upon reasonable investigation. Plaintiff has

15

provided no support for the claims in his Complaint, and has made no showing that he

16

made a competent inquiry into law and fact before bringing this action. By carelessly

17

stating facts that have no evidentiary support, Plaintiff has failed to comply with

18

Rule 11.

19

Finally, the Court notes that although Mr. Ayvazian is a pro se litigant, his

20

Complaint is almost identical (save for the named defendants) to multiple federal

21

complaints filed against TMLG by one specific attorney: Arshak Bartoumian. In its

22

Motion, TMLG notes a high probability that these complaints are ghostwritten by

23

Mr. Bartoumian on behalf of Mr. Ayvazian. The Court agrees. These nearly identical

24

actions have been either directly filed by Mr. Bartoumian or filed by other pro se

25

litigants for whom Mr. Bartoumian has subsequently substituted in as the attorney of

26

record.

27

The Court reminds the Plaintiff that the practice of “ghostwriting” violates the

28

rules of professional conduct, and undermines the litigant’s status as pro se. Ricotta v.

6

1

State of Cal., 4 F. Supp. 2d 961, 987 (S.D. Cal. 1998) (noting that “attorneys cross the

2

line . . . when they gather and anonymously present legal arguments, with the actual or

3

constructive knowledge that the work will be presented . . . in a motion before the

4

[c]ourt.”). The likelihood that the impermissible practice of ghostwriting was used in

5

the present Complaint is but another factor in support of the Court’s decision to grant

6

sanctions under Rule 11.

7

In sum, the Court finds that TMLG’s Motion for sanctions is timely, and

8

Plaintiff has received adequate notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond. The

9

Court further finds that TMLG has met its burden in bringing a motion for sanctions.

10

Plaintiff’s Complaint is the exact type of frivolous pleading that Rule 11 was designed

11

to deter. Plaintiff has set forth baseless allegations and has not pleaded facts sufficient

12

to maintain claims as a matter of law. The Court therefore GRANTS TMLG’s

13

Motion for Sanctions under Rule 11 in the amount of $2,750.00.2

14

V.

For the reasons discussed above, Defendant’s Motion for Rule 11 sanctions is

15
16

CONCLUSION

GRANTED in the amount of $2750.00.

17

IT IS SO ORDERED.

18
19

June 26, 2012

20
21

____________________________________
OTIS D. WRIGHT, II
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

22
23
24
25
26
27
28

2

The Court notes that Defendant did not expend the estimated one hour for traveling to and
attending the hearing on this Motion. However, Plaintiff additionally sought costs. (Lazo Decl. 11.)
The Court finds that the $275.00 that results from applying Ms. Lazo’s rate of $275 per hour by the
estimated one hour should sufficiently cover Defendant’s costs and serve as an amount necessary to
deter future similar conduct by Plaintiff and others similarly situated.

7