Maria F Ruvalcaba et al v. City of Los Angeles et al

Filing 91

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION IN LIMINE NO. 1 41 in its entirety by Judge Otis D. Wright, II. (lom)

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United States District Court
Central District of California

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MARIA F. RUVALCABA; S.I.D.L.;

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D.A.D.L.; ESTATE OF MARIA DEL

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CARMEN RUVALCABA,

Case № 2:12-cv-06683-ODW(MANx)

Plaintiffs,

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ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’
MOTION IN LIMINE NO. 1 [41]

v.

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CITY OF LOS ANGELES; CHIEF

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CHARLIE BECK; ANTHONY

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BONNER; EUNICE SOTO; FERNANDO

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ORTEGA; BRAXTON SHAW; DOES 5–

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10, inclusive,

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Defendants.

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The Court indicated at the pretrial conference that it intended to grant Plaintiffs’

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Motion in Limine No. 1 to exclude certain items of evidence that were unknown to

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Defendants at the time of the incident. (ECF No. 41.) Plaintiffs rebriefed the issues.

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(ECF No. 88.) Having reviewed the supplemental briefing and Defendants’ original

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opposition, the Court hews to its original decision to GRANT the Motion.

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Plaintiffs seek to exclude various pieces of evidence that Defendant Fernando

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Ortega, the officer who shot decedent Maria del Carmen Ruvalcaba, including the

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decedent’s criminal history, 911 call, alleged attack by the decedent on Los Angeles

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County Fire personnel, decedent’s breaking of a window, decedent’s toxicology

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results, and family criminal history.

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irrelevant since Officer Ortega testified that he did not know about it before shooting

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the decedent.

They argue that this information is legally

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But Defendants oppose the Motion, asserting that the information in question is

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necessary to support Officer Ortega’s version of events, such as the decedent’s

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demeanor and conduct before the shooting. They posit that since the information

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tends to support their position that the decedent was belligerent with the officers prior

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to being shot, hearing this evidence would lend support to Officer Ortega’s testimony.

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They also cite several Ninth Circuit and district court opinions, which they contend

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support their position regarding this corroborating evidence.

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The Court agrees with Plaintiffs that this information is irrelevant. While

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Federal Rule of Evidence 401 generally provides that evidence is relevant if “it has

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any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the

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evidence,” the fact must be “of consequence in determining the action.” Fed. R.

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Evid. 401(a), (b).

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reasonable for Officer Ortega to use deadly force against the decedent—that is,

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whether the decedent threatened the officers with a weapon and “pose[d] an

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immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others.” Tennessee v. Garner, 471

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U.S. 1, 11 (1985); Smith v. City of Hemet, 394 F.3d 689, 701 (9th Cir. 2005). In

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determining the reasonableness of an officer’s conduct, “the question is whether the

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officers’ actions are ‘objectively reasonable’ in light of the facts and circumstances

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confronting them.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989).

The relevant legal issue is whether it was constitutionally

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As Plaintiffs have noted, Ninth Circuit case law appears to be inconsistent on

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whether information not known to an officer is admissible to support the officer’s

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version of the events. In Boyd v. City and County of San Francisco, 576 F.3d 938 (9th

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Cir. 2009), the court considered whether it was proper to admit evidence unknown to

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an officer at the time the officer shot the decedent. The court concluded that in “a

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case such as this, where what the officer perceived just prior to the use of force is in

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dispute, evidence that may support one version of events over another is relevant and

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admissible.” Id. at 944. In coming to this holding, the court cited to a footnote in

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Graham, in which the Supreme Court stated in relevant part, “Of course, in assessing

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the credibility of an officer’s account of the circumstances that prompted the use of

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force, a factfinder may consider, along with other factors, evidence that the officer

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may have harbored ill-will toward the citizen.” 490 U.S. at 399 n.12. But the Ninth

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Circuit construed this passage as “indicating that a factfinder may consider outside

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evidence ‘in assessing the credibility of an officer’s account of the circumstances that

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prompted the use of force.’” Boyd, 576 F.3d at 944.

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But in later cases, the Ninth Circuit retreated from this broad interpretation of

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the Graham footnote. See, e.g., Hayes v. Cnty. of San Diego, 736 F.3d 1223, 1232-33

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(9th Cir. 2013) (“[W]e can only consider the circumstances of which [the officers]

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were aware when they employed deadly force. . . . Accordingly, when analyzing the

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objective reasonableness of the officers’ conduct under Graham, we cannot consider

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the fact that [the decedent] was intoxicated or that he had previously used a knife in

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harming himself.”); Glenn v. Wash. Cnty., 673 F.3d 864, 873 n.8 (9th Cir. 2011) (“We

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cannot consider evidence of which the officers were unaware—the prohibition against

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evaluating officers’ actions ‘with the 20/20 vision of hindsight’ cuts both ways.”

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(citing Graham)). It is therefore apparent that the Ninth Circuit has clarified its

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position on unknown, preshooting knowledge, holding that it is inadmissible to

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establish the reasonableness of an officer’s conduct.

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Officer Ortega testified at his deposition that he had not heard the 911 call prior

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to confronting the decedent and was not told about the alleged attack on Los Angeles

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County Fire personnel. In fact, he did not know of “any information of any specific

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act of violence” by the decedent prior to interacting with her. Moreover, he could not

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possibly have known about her toxicology results before she died. Thus, under Hayes

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and Glenn—the latest word from the Ninth Circuit—the Court must exclude this

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information as irrelevant to the reasonableness of Officer Ortega’s conduct.

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The Court similarly finds that Plaintiff Maria F. Ruvalcaba’s immigration status

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is irrelevant, as it does not bear upon any legal issue involved in the case or her

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credibility. Additionally, any potential witnesses’ criminal history over 10 years old

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and unrelated to crimes involving moral turpitude is also irrelevant and inadmissible

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per Federal Rule of Evidence 609 unless Defendants can demonstrate that its

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“probative value, supported by specific facts and circumstances, substantially

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outweighs its prejudicial effect” when a witness with such a conviction testifies. See

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Fed. R. Evid. 609(b)(1).
The Court accordingly GRANTS Plaintiffs’ Motion in Limine No. 1 in its
entirety. (ECF No. 41.)
IT IS SO ORDERED.

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September 8, 2014

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____________________________________
OTIS D. WRIGHT, II
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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