Cellular Accessories For Less Inc v. Trinitas LLC et al
Filing
86
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 52 AND GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 53 by Judge Dean D. Pregerson . (lc). Modified on 9/16/2014 (lc).
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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CELLULAR ACCESSORIES FOR
LESS, INC., a California
corporation,
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Plaintiff,
v.
TRINITAS LLC, a Texas
limited liability company;
DAVID OAKS, an individual,
Defendants.
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Case No. CV 12-06736 DDP (SHx)
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND GRANTING
IN PART DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
[Dkts. 52, 53]
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Presently before the court are a motion for summary judgment
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by Plaintiff Cellular Accessories for Less, Inc. (“Cellular”) and a
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motion for summary judgment by Defendants Trinitas LLC (“Trinitas”)
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and David Oakes (collectively, “Defendants”).
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address one claim in common, a breach of contract claim, but
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otherwise address distinct issues.
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I. BACKGROUND
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These motions
Cellular and Trinitas are both sellers of mobile phone
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accessories to businesses.
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“Sales Account Manager” from June 2, 2004 to December 27, 2010,
David Oakes worked for Cellular as a
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when he was terminated.
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Mitchell Langstein.)
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start of his employment in 2004.
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Employment Agreement contained a clause reading: “CAFL [i.e.,
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Cellular] requests that proprietary information remains the
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property of this organization and may not leave, either physically
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or electronically unless approved in writing by Mitch[ell
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Langstein].”
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base” within the sweep of “proprietary information.”
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Id.
(Ex. A, Decl. David Oakes; Mot. Decl.
Oakes signed an “Employment Agreement” at the
(Ex. A, Oakes Decl.)
The
That clause also included Cellular’s “customer
Id.
Oakes also signed a “Statement of Confidentiality” on January
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7, 2008, which stated that he would not “knowingly disclose, use,
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or induce or assist in the use or disclosure of any Proprietary
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Information . . . or anything related to Proprietary Information .
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. . without the Company’s prior express written consent.”
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Oakes Decl.)
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Statement as:
(Ex. D,
“Proprietary Information” was defined in the
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information (a) that is not known by actual or potential
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competitors of the company or is generally unavailable to the
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public, (b) that has been created, discovered, developed, or
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which has otherwise become known to the Company . . . and (c)
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that has material economic value or potential material
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economic value to the Company’s present or future business.
The parties agree that Oakes signed the Statement; however,
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Id.
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they disagree as to whether a valid contract was formed thereby.
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(Def.’s Mot. Summ. J., § III.B.3.a.)
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In late 2010, shortly before being terminated, Oakes emailed
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himself a digital file created with the ACT computer program (“ACT
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file”) containing the contact information for some 900+ business
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and personal contacts.
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his LinkedIn contact information after his termination.
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Oakes Decl.)
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himself the direct contact information for the purchasing agents of
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certain clients, information on clients’ billing preferences and
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procedures, clients’ past pricing requests, and at least one
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internal strategy document regarding a client, Honeywell.
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J, L, Decl. Obi Iloputaife.)
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(Ex. B, Oakes Decl.)
He also maintained
(Ex. C,
Finally, Plaintiff alleges that he also emailed
(Exs. B-
Plaintiff also alleges that Oakes emailed or otherwise
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contacted clients after his termination and accused Cellular of
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“major unethical and deceitful acts done deliberately by management
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towards its clients.”
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Melanie Cogburn, at transcript pages 182-183.)
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(Ex. N, Iloputaife Decl; Ex. A, Decl.
After leaving Cellular, Oakes started his own company in Texas
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which eventually became the company known as Trinitas.
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directly competes with Cellular for business in the corporate
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mobile phone accessory market.
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Trinitas
Plaintiff brings an action for damages and injunctive relief
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on claims of “copyright infringement . . . breach of contract,
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unfair competition, common law unfair competition, trade secret
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misappropriation, unjust enrichment, intentional interference with
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prospective business advantage, and trade libel.”
(Compl. ¶ 4.)
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In these motions for summary judgment, Plaintiff seeks summary
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judgment on the issues of breach of contract and unfair competition
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resulting from that breach.
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all issues except copyright infringement, arguing that (1) there is
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no triable issue of fact on the trade secret claim under the
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California Uniform Trade Secrets Act (“CUTSA”); (2) Plaintiff’s
Defendant seeks summary judgment on
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common-law torts are preempted by CUTSA; (3) there was no breach of
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contract because there was no contract, no breach, and/or no actual
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damages; and (4) that there is no triable issue of fact with regard
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to trade libel.
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II. LEGAL STANDARD
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A party may move for summary judgment with regard to any claim
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or defense or any part of any claim or defense.
Fed.R.Civ.P.
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56(a).
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that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
The court must grant summary judgment if “the movant shows
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movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Id.
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complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the
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nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts
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immaterial.”
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The moving party bears the burden of identifying “those portions of
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the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
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admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which it
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believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material
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fact” regarding a particular claim or defense.
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quotation marks omitted).
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III. DISCUSSION
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A. CUTSA Trade Secret Misappropriation
“[A]
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
Id. (internal
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California has adopted a statutory trade secrets scheme, the
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California Uniform Trade Secrets Act (“CUTSA”), Cal. Civil Code §
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3426 et seq.
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misappropriation” of trade secrets may be enjoined, Cal. Civ. Code
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§ 3426.2, and a plaintiff may also sue for damages equal to “the
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actual loss caused by misappropriation” as well as any “unjust
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enrichment caused by misappropriation that is not taken into
Under CUTSA, “[a]ctual or threatened
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account in computing damages for actual loss.”
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3426.3.
Cal. Civ. Code §
Trade secrets are defined as any
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information, including a . . . compilation . . . that:
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(1) Derives independent economic value, actual or potential,
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from not being generally known to the public or to other
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persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or
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use; and
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(2) Is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the
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circumstances to maintain its secrecy.
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Cal. Civ. Code § 3426.1.
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Misappropriation is defined as, inter
alia,
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[d]isclosure or use of a trade secret of another without
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express or implied consent by a person who . . . [a]t the time
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of disclosure or use, knew or had reason to know that his or
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her knowledge of the trade secret was . . . [a]cquired under
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circumstances giving rise to a duty to maintain its secrecy or
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limit its use . . . .
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Id.
Three different types of information might be subject to trade
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secret law in this case.
First, the parties do not dispute that
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Oakes emailed himself the ACT file, as well as numerous additional
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items described above.
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that Oakes retained contacts in his LinkedIn social networking
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account that he created while employed at Cellular.
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Cellular alleges, and provides exhibits to show, that Oakes emailed
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himself a number of other files and documents relating to
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customers, including the direct contact information for those with
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the power to do business, information about purchasing and billing
Second, the parties also do not dispute
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Third,
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preferences or requirements, and specific strategy information
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relating to one client, Honeywell.
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that Oakes took all the documents alleged in this third category of
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information, but neither do they precisely admit it.
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Reply does admit that Oakes took certain documents relating to
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Honeywell and its “purchasing requirements.”
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Defendants do not directly deny
Defendants’
(Def.’s Reply, § I.)
The removal of the ACT file, containing customer information,
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is the primary point of contention.
"It is well-established that a
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customer list may constitute a protectable trade secret." Gable
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Leigh, Inc. v. North Am. Miss, No. CV 01-01019 MMM(SHX); 2001 WL
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521695 at *15 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 13, 2001) (citing cases).
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such lists are not automatically trade secrets, because many
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customer lists contain no information which is not “easily
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discoverable through public sources.”
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Snelling, Inc., 732 F. Supp. 1034, 1044 (N.D. Cal. 1990).
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where “the employer has expended time and effort identifying
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customers with particular needs or characteristics,” the list can
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be a protectable trade secret. Mor-Life, Inc. v. Perry, 56 Cal.
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App. 4th 1514, 1521 (1997).
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determining whether a customer list is a trade secret is the amount
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of effort involved in compiling it.
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the information are “sophisticated,” “difficult,” or “particularly
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time consuming,” that tends to show that it is a trade secret.
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Paper & Packaging Products, Inc. v. Kirgan, 183 Cal. App. 3d 1318,
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1326 (1986).
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lists be the product of some significant effort is that information
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which is easily and publicly available does not convey enough
However,
Scott v. Snelling &
But
Thus, the chief factual issue in
If the methods used to compile
Am.
The underlying rationale for requiring that customer
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“independent economic value” to its holder to satisfy the first
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prong of the § 3426.1 definition.
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Scott, 732 F. Supp. at 1044.
Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to carry its burden
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of showing that the ACT file is the product of significant effort.
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Defendant contends that all the information in the ACT file is
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easily obtained through public sources.
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extensive information about Fortune 1000 companies, through a
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standard internet search.”
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“Anyone can easily get
(Def.’s Mot. Summ. J., § B.1.)
However, whether the information in Oakes’ ACT file could be
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so easily obtained is in dispute.
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declares that “[t]o build a list of cellular accessories
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procurement officers requires the expenditure of a significant
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amount of time and money,” that “Cellular hires and pays employees
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who are tasked with cold-calling companies and working their way
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past the ‘gatekeepers’ to reach the right procurement officer,”
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that David Oakes was similarly required, during his employment with
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Cellular, to make such calls, that Oakes and other employees were
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encouraged to “network” with employees at prospect companies, that
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Oakes made such networking contacts in the course of his
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employment, and that, in short, “information found in [the]
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customer list is not available in public directories.”
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Decl. Mitchell Langstein, ¶¶ 32-35, 39, 40-41, 49-52.
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M, Opp’n Decl. Rasheed McWilliams (deposition of Mitchell Langstein
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describing method by which sales agents attempt to identify
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“decision makers” at target companies).)
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Cellular CEO Mitchell Langstein
(Reply
See also Ex.
Indeed, Oakes’ own declaration supports this narrative: “I was
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directed to generate business . . . .
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customer lists, but was told to begin making cold calls to generate
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I was given no leads or
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new business for the company . . . .
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depended on a number of factors, including the relationships I was
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able to form with the individuals . . . .
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calls, I would put their information into my ACT file.”
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Decl., ¶¶ 2-3.)
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Getting business usually
As I began to make
(Oakes
On the other hand, Oakes also says that “All individuals I
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talked to–at any company–had already been contacted by other
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competitors,” (Oakes Decl., ¶ 2), and that LinkedIn suggested
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contacts to him automatically–facts which, if true, tend to show
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that his information-gathering techniques were not especially
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“sophisticated” or “difficult.”
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Kirgan, 183 Cal. App. 3d at 1326.
In short, there is a genuine issue of fact as to how difficult
the information in the ACT file was to obtain.
Defendants also argue that David Oakes’ LinkedIn contacts were
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not a trade secret, because Cellular encouraged its employees to
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create and use LinkedIn accounts, (Oakes Decl. ¶ 2), and Oakes’
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LinkedIn contacts would have been “viewable to any other contact he
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has on LinkedIn.”
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on the other hand, that LinkedIn information is only available to
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the degree that the user chooses to share it.
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Mitchell Langstein, ¶ 44; Pl.’s Opp’n, § III.B.5.)
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according to Plaintiff’s declarant, it is not automatically the
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case that contact information is “viewable to any other contact.”
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Oakes’ declaration does not say whether this characterization of
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the functionality of LinkedIn is accurate, or if it is, whether he
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had set his contacts to be viewable.
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take judicial notice of the functions of LinkedIn, and because the
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parties’ declarants do not make sufficiently clear whether and to
(Def.’s Mot. Summ. J., § II.)
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Plaintiff argues,
(Reply Decl.
Therefore,
Because the Court declines to
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what degree Oakes’ LinkedIn contacts were indeed made public (and
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whether this was done with Cellular’s explicit or implicit
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permission), there remain issues of material fact as to the
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LinkedIn information.
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As to the third type of information–the emails containing
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contact information, emails indicating customer preferences, and
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internal memo–Defendant does not address the matter separately, but
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asserts that Oakes retained the Honeywell documents “for
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posterity,” and that information about clients’ purchasing
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requirements or preferences cannot be a trade secret because the
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cellular accessories business is a “commodity business that shifts
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and changes all the time.”
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clear that if a customer list (gathered with a sufficient amount of
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effort) can provide independent economic value to a business,
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documentation of the past behavior and preferences of those
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customers can be, too–even if market conditions change.
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Honeywell memo, it appears to describe a successful method for
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meeting a customer’s needs, which could likewise provide
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independent economic value.
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information, in conjunction with additional trade secret
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information, such as customer product, pricing and payment
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preferences, to win business from [and] maintain relationships with
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clients.”
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a genuine issue of material fact with regard to the economic value
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of this information, too.
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(Def.’s Reply, § I.)
But it seems
As to the
“Cellular uses its customer
(Reply Decl. Mitchell Langstein, ¶ 17.)
Thus, there is
Finally, Defendants argue (presumably with regard to all three
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kinds of information) that Cellular fails to meet its burden as to
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the second § 3426.1 definition of trade secret: showing that it
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took reasonable steps to protect the information.
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is a disputed issue of fact.
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great lengths to keep its proprietary information confidential and
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protected, using layers of passwords and SSL encryption,” and
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describes in some detail which items are encrypted or password-
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protected.
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disputes this, admitting that his email was password-protected but
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asserting that employee computers were generally left on and
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unprotected.
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But this, too,
Cellular claims that it “goes to
(Reply Decl. Mitchell Langstein, ¶ 23-24.)
Oakes
(Oakes Decl., ¶ 7.)
With regard to both prongs, then, Defendants ask the Court to
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make credibility determinations between competing statements by
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motivated parties on both sides, each putting forth some factual
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allegations which are not facially incredible.
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not the Court’s role at summary judgment,1 which may be granted
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only where “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact”
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Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a).
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That, however, is
Defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to trade secret
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misappropriation is denied.
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B. Preemption
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CUTSA “has, for the most part, superseded prior California
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common law on trade secret issues.”
Scott, 732 F. Supp. at 1044.
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Thus, CUTSA preempts other claims “based on the same nucleus of
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facts as trade secret misappropriation.”
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Bank of Am. Tech. & Operations, Inc., 171 Cal. App. 4th 939, 962
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(2009).
K.C. Multimedia, Inc. v.
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“That an affidavit is self-serving bears on its credibility,
not on its cognizability for purposes of establishing a genuine
issue of material fact.” United States v. Shumway, 199 F.3d 1093,
1104 (9th Cir. 1999).
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Defendant contends that several of Plaintiff’s tort
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claims–statutory and common law unfair competition, unjust
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enrichment, and interference with prospective business
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advantage–are based on the same nucleus of facts as its trade
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secret claim, and are therefore preempted.
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§ III.B.2.)
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the factual foundations of its tort claims, insisting that “they
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arise from David Oakes’ defamatory and libelous acts following his
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termination.”
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(Def.’s Mot. Summ. J.,
Plaintiff responds that Defendant has mischaracterized
(Pl.’s Mot. Summ. J., § II.C.)
Plaintiff’s Third Cause of Action (statutory unfair
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competition) and Fourth Cause of Action (common law unfair
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competition) appear to be based primarily on the allegation of
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copyright infringement.
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these claims may also rely on trade secret misappropriation, see
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id. at ¶ 58, they are preempted.
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(Compl. ¶¶ 50-60.)
To the extent that
Plaintiff’s Sixth Cause of Action (unjust enrichment) is also
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preempted, to the extent that it is a common law claim based on the
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same nucleus of facts as the trade secret claim.
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plaintiff may also recover for unjust enrichment by trade secret
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misappropriation under CUTSA itself.
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Such statutory recovery would obviously not be preempted.
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However, a
Cal. Civil Code § 3426.3.
Finally, Plaintiff’s Seventh Cause of Action (interference
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with prospective business advantage) is based in part on the trade
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secret claim.
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However, to the extent that it is based on the trade libel claim,
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id. at ¶ 80, it is not preempted.
(Compl. ¶ 79.)
To that extent, it is preempted.
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Thus, each of these tort claims is preempted, and summary
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judgment is granted, to the extent that it relies on the nucleus of
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1
facts of the trade secrets claim.
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based on some alternative set of facts as well, each claim survives
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preemption in part.
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C. Trade Libel
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However, because each is also
In California, trade libel must be proved by showing, “at a
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minimum: (1) a publication [of a disparaging statement]; (2) which
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induces others not to deal with plaintiff; and (3) special
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damages.”
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766, 773 (1985) (parentheses omitted).
Nichols v. Great Am. Ins. Companies, 169 Cal. App. 3d
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Cellular alleges that Defendants “published one or more false
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statements which were intended to disparage CELLULAR ACCESSORIES’s
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good and services.”
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judgment were filed, the only evidence Cellular had produced of
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such statements were a declaration and deposition of its CEO
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Mitchell Langstein alleging he had heard from some customers that
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David Oakes had made certain potentially disparaging remarks to his
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customers via email.
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86.)
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However, at the time motions for summary
(E.g., Opp’n Decl. Mitchell Langstein, ¶¶ 79-
This evidence suffers two defects.
First, Langstein’s
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allegation as to the contents of an email is not the best evidence
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of the contents of that email.
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photograph is required in order to prove its content . . . .”
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R. Evid. 1002; United States v. Bennett, 363 F.3d 947, 954 (9th
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Cir. 2004) (holding that “a printout or other representation” of
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electronically stored data is the best evidence of that data).
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Second, even if the contents of the email could be acceptably
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reconstructed through testimony or declarations, Langstein nowhere
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directly alleges that he personally saw the emails.
“An original writing, recording, or
12
Fed.
At best, he
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alleges that some of his customers alerted him to the contents of
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the emails.
3
pages 79-83.)
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(nor does there appear to be any forthcoming at trial), Langstein’s
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statements, based on inadmissible hearsay, are not enough to prove
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the contents of the email.
7
(E.g., Ex. A, Decl. Melanie Cogburn, at transcript
As there is no direct evidence from those customers
Fed. R. Evid. 801-802.
Cellular attempts to cure these defects by attaching to its
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reply an email purported to be from another of Cellular’s
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customers, Gary Merritt.
(Ex. N, Iloputaife Decl.)
This email
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might meet the best evidence rule—although it is a third party’s
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email quoting the Oakes email, not the Oakes email itself, which
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could raise hearsay issues.
13
In any event, Cellular has, without explanation, introduced
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this evidence only at the reply stage, thus denying Defendants the
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opportunity to respond to it. Given that the email, if authentic,
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would already have been in Cellular’s possession at the time the
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company initiated this proceeding, the Court sees no reason for
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such a long delay in presenting this evidence.
19
discretion to ignore evidence introduced for the first time in a
20
reply brief, In re McAllister, No. BAP CC-13-1578, 2014 WL 3955008
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(B.A.P. 9th Cir. Aug. 13, 2014) (“[C]onsideration of new arguments
22
or evidence in a reply falls within the discretion of the trial
23
court.”), and because considering the email at this stage would
24
prejudice the Defendants for no good reason, the Court chooses not
25
to do so.
26
The Court has the
Thus, Defendants have successfully pointed to an absence of
27
any admissible evidence to show publication of a disparaging
28
statement that induced others not to deal with Plaintiff, an
13
1
essential element of the trade libel claim.
2
granted to the Defendants on this claim.
3
Summary judgment is
Because Cellular’s interference with prospective business
4
advantage survives only to the extent that it relies on the facts
5
of the trade libel claim, § III.B. supra, and because those facts
6
are not proven, Defendants are granted summary judgment on that
7
claim as well.
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D. Breach of Contract and Related Claims
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Plaintiff and Defendants both move for summary judgment on the
10
issue of breach of contract.2
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undisputed that David Oakes signed both the Employment Agreement
12
and the Statement of Confidentiality; that those documents mandated
13
that Oakes not disclose or remove proprietary information; and that
14
it is also undisputed that Oakes took the ACT file and certain
15
other information as well.
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law it is entitled to judgment as to breach of contract.
17
Cellular argues that it is
Thus, Cellular contends, as a matter of
Defendant Oakes counters that there was no valid contract as
18
to the Statement of Confidentiality, because there was no new
19
consideration; that even if there was a contract, there was no
20
breach, because the information in question was not confidential or
21
proprietary; and that there is no allegation of actual damages.
22
The Court finds that both the Employment Agreement and the
23
Statement of Confidentiality could be found by a rational trier-of-
24
fact to be valid agreements.
25
Agreement does not appear to contain any provision specifying its
26
length or end date, and so it is presumed to be an at-will
As a starting point, the Employment
27
28
2
This claim is solely against Defendant Oakes.
14
1
agreement.
Cal. Labor Code § 2922.
Absent some sort of
2
integration or anti-modification clause, an at-will employment
3
agreement can generally be modified by an employer at any time; the
4
modification essentially terminates the prior agreement and creates
5
a new, unilateral contract, which the employee accepts by
6
continuing to work for the employer under the modified terms.
7
DiGiacinto v. Ameriko-Omserv Corp., 59 Cal. App. 4th 629, 633
8
(1997) (holding that a modification to an at-will employment
9
contract reducing the employee’s salary did not breach, but rather
10
terminated and replaced, the employment contract).
11
for continued employment is, itself, consideration for the new
12
agreement.
See
13
The opportunity
Id.
The Statement of Confidentiality being a modification of the
14
Employment Agreement that created a new, valid contract, the
15
question is whether Defendants violated that contract.
16
Statement of Confidentiality forbade employees to disclose or use
17
proprietary information, which it defined on substantially the same
18
terms as the CUTSA trade secret definition: namely, information
19
that is not known to competitors or the public, obtained by the
20
company, that confers an economic benefit.
21
Because of this, resolution of the breach of contract claim would
22
require resolution of essentially the same disputed facts discussed
23
above in § III.A.3
24
Defendant Oakes did not breach the contract.
The
(Ex. D, Oakes Decl.)
Thus, it cannot be said as a matter of law that
25
However, Defendants are correct that a breach of contract
26
claim requires a showing of damages; those damages are in “the
27
3
28
Note that this does not render the contract claim preempted
by CUTSA. Cal. Civ. Code § 3426.7(b).
15
1
amount which will compensate the party aggrieved for all the
2
detriment proximately caused [by the breach], or which, in the
3
ordinary course of things, would be likely to result therefrom.”
4
Cal. Civ. Code § 3300.
5
must be “clearly ascertainable in both their nature and origin.”
6
Cal. Civ. Code § 3301.
7
in tort cases, requires that the damages be proximately caused by
8
the defendant's breach, and that their causal occurrence be at
9
least reasonably certain.”
10
The causal element is critical.
Damages
“Causation of damages in contract cases, as
Vu v. California Commerce Club, Inc.,
58 Cal. App. 4th 229, 233 (1997).
11
Thus, in order to defeat Defendants’ motion for summary
12
judgment, Cellular is required to put forth evidence from which a
13
rational trier-of-fact could conclude that Oakes’ breach of the
14
proprietary information provisions in his contract in fact caused
15
Cellular a loss of business.
16
burden.
Here, Cellular has not carried that
17
Cellular asserts that “[o]ver the course of three years,
18
Cellular lost and Defendant gained a proportional increase in
19
sales” to those customers.
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trend, if it could be shown, might well be enough to show damages
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circumstantially.
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proportional loss and gain by the parties.
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satisfactorily show that in the three years after Oakes was
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terminated from his employment with Cellular, Trinitas’ sales
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volume increased–including sales to some past or current customers
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of Cellular.
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exhibits show nothing at all about Cellular’s sales; so far as the
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Court can determine, Plaintiff’s sole piece of evidence regarding
(Pl.’s Opp’n, § III.B.2.)
Such a
But Cellular does not show a trend of
Its evidence does
(Ex. N, Opp’n Decl. Rasheed McWilliams.)
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But its
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its own sales figures is Mitchell Langstein’s statement that “[i]n
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2012, there was a large reduction in the volume of Cellular’s sales
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to Atmos Energy.”
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that fact, alone, is not sufficient to allow direct comparison
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between Cellular’s and Trinitas’ sales.
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the reduction in fact “proportional” to Trinitas’ gain?
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Cellular lose sales in the other years?
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can be answered on Plaintiff’s evidence.
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(Opp’n Decl. Mitchell Langstein, ¶ 87.)
But
How large is “large”?
Was
Did
None of these questions
Plaintiff’s proof of causation with regard to damages–and,
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indeed, the existence of any actual loss at all–is not sufficient
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to allow a rational trier-of-fact to find for Plaintiff on a breach
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of contract claim.
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Any related claims, including unfair competition based specifically
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on breach of contract, therefore also fail.
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IV. CONCLUSION
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Defendant’s motion is granted on this claim.
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is denied as to the
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CUTSA trade secret claim.
It is granted as to the trade libel and
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interference with prospective business advantage claims.
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granted in part as to the statutory and common law unfair
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competition claims, inasmuch as they are based on trade secret
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misappropriation, but denied inasmuch as they may be based on the
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facts of other claims.
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unjust enrichment claim, inasmuch as it is based on common law
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principles rather than recovery under CUTSA.
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motion for summary judgment is granted, and Plaintiff’s motion
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///
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///
It is
The motion is granted in part as to the
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Finally, Defendant’s
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denied, as to the breach of contract claim and any unfair
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competition claims dependent on that claim.
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
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Dated: September 16, 2014
DEAN D. PREGERSON
United States District Judge
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