Ricardo Lara et al v. County of Los Angeles et al

Filing 20

ORDER by Judge Dean D. Pregerson: granting in part and denying in part Defendants County of Los Angeles and Lee Baca 16 Motion to Dismiss.The Third Cause of Action against Defendant Baca in his official capacity is DISMISSED. (lc). Modified on 1/8/2013 (lc). Modified on 1/8/2013 (lc).

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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RICARDO LARA, ANA LARA,

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Plaintiffs,

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v.
COUNTYOF LOS ANGELES; LEE
BACA IN HIS OFFICIAL
CAPACITY AS SHERIFF OF LOS
ANGELES COUNTY; LEE BACA IN
HIS INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY;
DEFENDANT DOE DEPUTY "LOPEZ"
AND DOE DEFENDANTS,

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Defendants.

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___________________________

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Case No. CV 12-08469 DDP (JCGx)
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION
TO DISMISS IN PART AND GRANTING
IN PART

[Dkt. No. 16]

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Presently before the court is Defendants County of Los Angeles

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and Lee Baca (“Baca”)’s Motion to Dismiss.

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submissions of the parties, the court denies the motion in part,

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grants the motion in part, and adopts the following order.

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I.

Having considered the

Background

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In February 2012, Plaintiff Ricardo Lara (“Lara”) was

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incarcerated at Pitchess Honor Ranch, a Los Angeles County

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detention facility.

(Complaint ¶ 16.)

On February 7, Sheriff’s

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Department deputies instructed another inmate to force Plaintiff to

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perform more than five hundred repetitions of a strenuous physical

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exercise.

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directly and through other inmates, that Lara would suffer

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additional punishment if he did not perform the exercises.

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19-20.)

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he began to urinate blood.

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inmates, and at deputies’ behest, Lara was not allowed to lie down

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or sleep at night.

(Id. ¶¶ 19-21.)

Deputies communicated to Lara, both

(Id. ¶¶

The exercises rendered Lara unable to stand or walk, and
(Id. 22-24.)

(Id. ¶ 26.)

Under threat from other

The following day, Lara was forced

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to crawl onto a bus on his hands for transport to work at a laundry

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facility.

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¶ 27.)

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(Id. ¶ 26.)

Deputies did not summon medical aid.

(Id.

Lara did not receive medical attention until the morning of

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February 9, and was hospitalized that evening.

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Lara underwent several surgeries and remained on bed rest until

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February 29, when he was discharged to a jail medical ward, where

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he recuperated for several months.

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(Id. ¶¶ 32, 33.)

(Id. ¶¶ 34-35.)

On October 3, 2012, Lara and his wife filed the instant civil

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rights action, alleging numerous violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1083 and

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state law against the County, Sheriff Lee Baca, and unnamed Doe

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deputies.

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Defendants Baca and the County now move to dismiss the

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Complaint.1

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///

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Though this Motion to Dismiss is ostensibly brought on
behalf of both Defendant Baca and the County, the motion only seeks
dismissal of claims against Baca.
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II.

Legal Standard
A complaint will survive a motion to dismiss when it contains

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“sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to

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relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

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662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,

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570 (2007)).

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“accept as true all allegations of material fact and must construe

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those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Resnick

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v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000).

When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court must

Although a complaint

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need not include “detailed factual allegations,” it must offer

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“more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me

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accusation.”

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allegations that are no more than a statement of a legal conclusion

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“are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id. at 679.

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other words, a pleading that merely offers “labels and

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conclusions,” a “formulaic recitation of the elements,” or “naked

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assertions” will not be sufficient to state a claim upon which

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relief can be granted.

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quotation marks omitted).

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Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

Conclusory allegations or

In

Id. at 678 (citations and internal

“When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should

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assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly

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give rise to an entitlement of relief.” Id. at 679.

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must allege “plausible grounds to infer” that their claims rise

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“above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

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“Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for

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relief” is a “context-specific task that requires the reviewing

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court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.”

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556 U.S. at 679.
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Plaintiffs

Iqbal,

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III. Discussion

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A.

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Defendants argue that the Fourth Cause of Action, brought

Sufficiency of the Pleadings

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against Baca in his individual capacity, should be dismissed for

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failure to state a cause of action.

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individually liable if he is personally involved in a

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constitutional injury or where there is a “sufficient causal

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connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the

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constitutional violation.”

A supervisor may be

Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207-08

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(9th Cir. 2011) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

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refusal to terminate the acts of subordinates, inaction in training

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or control of subordinates, acquiescence in constitutional

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violations, or reckless or callous indifference to constitutional

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rights may constitute sufficient causal connection to a violation

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to confer individual liability upon a supervisor.

Knowing

Id.

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In Starr, the Ninth Circuit found supervisory liability

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allegations against Sheriff Baca sufficient where the plaintiff’s

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complaint alleged several incidents of deputy-on-inmate violence

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and inmate-on-inmate violence in Los Angeles County jails, that

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Sheriff Baca received notice of the incidents, and that Sheriff

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Baca acquiesced in the unconstitutional actions of his

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subordinates.

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Id. at 1216.

Here, the Complaint makes allegations similar to those in

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Starr, albeit with less detail.

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here appear to paraphrase the allegations in Starr.

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the Complaint alleges that Merrick Bobb, Special Counsel to the

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County Board of Supervisors, informed Baca in 2003 that deputies in

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the jails were undertrained, and that this deficiency posed a

Indeed, many of the allegations

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For example,

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danger.

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Complaint further alleges that high ranking Sheriff’s Department

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officials informed Baca of the existence of deputy gangs and

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excessive force as early as 2006.

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Complaint also alleges that Baca publicly admitted to knowledge of

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“indiscriminate and rampant use of force” prior to Lara’s

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incarceration.

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alleges here that Baca received numerous reports of inmate abuse

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from the Office of Independent Review and the American Civil

(Complaint ¶ 47.)

See Starr, 652 F.3d at 1211.

(Compl. ¶ 38.)

(Compl. ¶¶ 48, 52.)

The

The

Like the plaintiff in Starr, Lara

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Liberties Union.

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The Complaint further alleges that, despite his knowledge of

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incidents of jail violence, derived from the sources listed above,

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Baca did not take any steps to address those dangers.

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54-55.)

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as those in Starr, neither are they bare assertions insufficient to

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suggest an entitlement to relief.

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allegations are therefore sufficient to survive this motion to

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dismiss.

(Id. ¶¶ 50-52.)

See Starr, 652 F.3d at 1211.

(Compl. ¶¶

While the allegations here are not as specific or detailed

Lara’s supervisory liability

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B.

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Defendants also contend that Plaintiffs’ Third Cause of Action

Redundancy of Official Capacity Claim

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against Baca in his official capacity is duplicative of the claim

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against the County. (Mot. at 8.)

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that brought by Plaintiffs, are generally an alternative way of

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pleading an action against the local government entity of which the

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named officer is an agent.

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436 U.S. 658, 690 n. 55 (1978); Chew v. Gates, 27 F.3d 1432, 1446

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n. 15 (9th Cir. 1994).

Official capacity claims, such as

See Monell v. Dep’t. of Social Servs.,

As such, judgments against public servants

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in their official capacities impose liability on local entities.

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Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 471-472 (1985).2

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Where plaintiffs sue both a local government entity and agents

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of that entity in their official capacities, courts may dismiss the

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official capacity claims as duplicative.

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954 F.Supp. 202, 204 (C.D. Cal. 1997); Vance v. County of Santa

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Clara, 928 F.Supp. 993, 996 (N.D. Cal. 1996); c.f. Clements v.

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Airport Authority of Washoe County, 69 F.3d 321, 337 n.20 (9th Cir.

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1995).

See, e.g. Luke v. Abbott,

Because Plaintiffs’ claim against Baca in his official

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capacity is duplicative of the claim against the County,

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Plaintiffs’ Third Cause of Action is dismissed as to Defendant Baca

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in his official capacity.

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IV.

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Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is

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GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

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against Defendant Baca in his official capacity is DISMISSED.

The Third Cause of Action

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Dated: January 8, 2013
DEAN D. PREGERSON
United States District Judge

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Courts are divided on the question whether a Plaintiff may
choose to name either an individual in an official capacity or the
local entity itself. Compare Bell v. Baca, 2002 WL 368532 *2 (C.D.
Cal. 2002) (declining to substitute local entity as defendant in
lieu of official capacity defendant) with Luke v. Abbott, 954
F.Supp. 202, 204 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (dismissing officer sued in his
official capacity and substituting local entity as defendant).
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