Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation v. Dennis W. Walsh et al

Filing 4

MINUTES OF IN CHAMBERS - COURT ORDER by Judge Percy Anderson: Defendant has failed to meet the burden of showing that federal question jurisdiction exists over this action. Because the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, this action is hereby remanded to the Los Angeles County Superior Court, Case No. 12U02363. ( Case Terminated. Made JS-6 ) Court Reporter: Not Reported. (Attachments: # 1 CV-103 Remand Transmittal Letter) (gk)

JS-6

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No.

CV 12-8571 PA (SHx)

Title

Federal Home Loan Mort. Corp. v. Dennis W. Walsh

Present: The
Honorable

Date

October 10, 2012

PERCY ANDERSON, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Paul Songco

Not Reported

N/A

Deputy Clerk

Court Reporter

Tape No.

Attorneys Present for Plaintiff:

Attorneys Present for Defendants:

None

None

Proceedings:

IN CHAMBERS - COURT ORDER

The Court is in receipt of a Notice of Removal filed by defendant Dennis W. Walsh
(“Defendant”), on October 5, 2012. [Docket No. 1.] In its Complaint, plaintiff Federal Home Loan
Mortgage Corporation (“Plaintiff”) alleges a single state law claim for unlawful detainer. Defendant,
who is appearing pro se, asserts that this Court has subject matter jurisdiction on the basis of federal
question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
Federal courts are of limited jurisdiction, having subject matter jurisdiction only over matters
authorized by the Constitution and Congress. See, e.g., Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S.
375, 377, 114 S. Ct. 1673, 1675, 128 L. Ed. 2d 391 (1994). A “strong presumption” against removal
jurisdiction exists. Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 567 (9th Cir. 1992). In seeking removal, the
defendant bears the burden of proving that jurisdiction exists. Scott v. Breeland, 792 F.2d 925, 927 (9th
Cir. 1986).
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, this Court has original jurisdiction over civil actions “arising under”
federal law. Removal based on § 1331 is governed by the “well-pleaded complaint” rule. Caterpillar,
Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392, 107 S. Ct. 2425, 2429, 96 L. Ed. 2d 318 (1987). Under the rule,
“federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of plaintiff’s properly
pleaded complaint.” Id. at 392, 107 S. Ct. at 2429, 96 L. Ed. 2d 318. If the complaint does not specify
whether a claim is based on federal or state law, it is a claim “arising under” federal law only if it is
“clear” that it raises a federal question. Duncan v. Stuetzle, 76 F.3d 1480, 1485 (9th Cir. 1996). Thus,
plaintiff is generally the “master of the claim.” Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 392, 107 S. Ct. at 2429, 96 L.
Ed. 2d 318. “A case may not be removed to federal court on the basis of a federal defense, including the
defense of pre-emption.” Id. at 393, 107 S. Ct. at 2430, 96 L. Ed. 2d 318 (emphasis in original). The
only exception to this rule is where plaintiff’s federal claim has been disguised by “artful pleading,”
such as where the only claim is a federal one or is a state claim preempted by federal law. Sullivan v.
First Affiliated Sec., Inc., 813 F.2d 1368, 1372 (9th Cir. 1987).
Here, the underlying Complaint contains only a single cause of action for unlawful detainer.
Defendant alleges that removal is proper because Plaintiff’s actions in attempting to evict Defendant
from his home violated the Protecting Tenants at Foreclosure Act (the “PTFA”), 12 U.S.C. § 5220.
CV-90 (06/04)

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JS-6

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No.

CV 12-8571 PA (SHx)

Date

Title

October 10, 2012

Federal Home Loan Mort. Corp. v. Dennis W. Walsh

Section 702(a) of the PTFA provides,
In the case of any foreclosure on . . . any dwelling or residential property
. . . any immediate successor in interest in such property pursuant to the
foreclosure shall assume such interest subject to–
(1) the provision, by such successor in interest of a notice to vacate to any
bona fide tenant at least 90 days before the effective date of such notice;
and
(2) the rights of any bona fide tenant, as of the date of such notice of
foreclosure –
(A) under any bona fide lease entered into before the notice of
foreclosure to occupy the premises until the end of the remaining
term of the lease, except that a successor in interest may terminate
a lease effective on the date of sale of the unit to a purchaser who
will occupy the unit as a primary residence, subject to the receipt
by the tenant of the 90 day notice under paragraph (1); or
(B) without a lease or with a lease terminable at will under State
law, subject to the receipt by the tenant of the 90 day notice under
subsection (1), . . . .
If a successor in interest violates the provisions of the PTFA, then a tenant may have a claim for
the violation, but a successor in interest in a foreclosed property does not eject occupants by alleging a
federal claim under the PTFA. Rather, the PTFA merely provides terms with which the successor in
interest must comply. Accordingly, this action does not “arise under” the PTFA. Moreover,
Defendant’s position regarding the propriety of Plaintiff’s unlawful detainer vis-à-vis the PTFA does not
constitute a proper basis for removal, as neither a federal defense nor an actual or anticipated federal
counterclaim forms a basis for removal. See, e.g., Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49, 61-62, 129 S.
Ct. 1262, 1272, 173 L. Ed. 2d 206 (2009).
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant has failed to meet the burden of showing that federal
question jurisdiction exists over this action. Because the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, this
action is hereby remanded to the Los Angeles County Superior Court, Case No. 12U02363. See 28
U.S.C. § 1447(c).
IT IS SO ORDERED.

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CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL

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