Terry Williams-IIunga v. Andrea Gonzalez et al
Filing
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ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS MOTION TO DISMISS 36 , 40 AND DENYING PLAINTIFFS MOTION TO STRIKE, DISQUALIFY COUNSEL, AND RECONSIDER ORDER DENYING PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 45 by Judge Dean D. Pregerson .( MD JS-6. Case Terminated ). (lc) Modified on 2/13/2013 (lc).
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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TERRY WILLIAMS-ILUNGA,
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Plaintiff,
v.
ANDREA GONZALEZ; ANA TROUBWISNEV; PRODUCER-WRITERS
GUILD OF AMERICA PENSION
PLAN; TRUSTEES OF THE
PRODUCER-WRITERS GUILD OF
AMERICA; WRITERS GUILD OF
AMERICA WEST; WRITERS GUILD
OF AMERICA EAST,
)
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Case No. CV 12-08592 DDP (AJWx)
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION
TO DISMISS AND DENYING
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO STRIKE,
DISQUALIFY COUNSEL, AND
RECONSIDER ORDER DENYING
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
[Dkt. Nos. 36, 40, & 45]
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Defendants.
___________________________
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Presently before the court are Defendants Writers Guild of
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America, West, Inc., and Writers Guild of America East, Inc.
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(collectively “Union Defendants”)’s Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. No.
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36), Defendants Producer-Writers Guild of America Pension Plan
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(“the Plan”), Andrea Gonzalez, and Ana M. Troub-Wisnev’s Motion to
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Dismiss (Dkt. No. 40), and Plaintiff Terry Williams-Ilunga
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(Williams)’s Motion to Strike Defendants’ Coordinated Motions to
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Dismiss, to Disqualify Counsel and for Reconsideration of Order
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Denying Plaintiff’s Request for Issuance of Preliminary Injunction
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(Dkt. No. 45). Having considered the parties’ submissions, the
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court adopts the following order.
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I. BACKGROUND
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Williams is the wife of Ilunga Adell (“Adell”), a beneficiary
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of Defendant Producer-Writers Guild of America Pension Plan (“the
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Plan”), an employee pension benefit plan as defined by ERISA §3(2),
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29 U.S.C. § 1002(2).
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entitlement to pension benefits.
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Williams seeks benefits otherwise payable to Adell to satisfy
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Adell’s child support obligations ordered by the Los Angeles
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Superior Court in the couple’s ongoing divorce proceedings.
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at 38, Exh. 4 at ¶ 15.)
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recover benefits in satisfaction of child support obligations if
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the spouse possesses a valid Qualified Domestic Relations Order
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(“QDRO”). 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(A)-(B).
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Adell has satisfied the conditions for
(FAC at 36, Exh. 4 at ¶ 7.)
(Id.
Under ERISA, a spouse or former spouse can
In July 2011, the Plan received a “Notice of Lien” and “Writ
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of Execution” for the state court’s judgment that Adell owed
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Williams $114,592.69 in unpaid child support.
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¶¶ 28-29; Ex Parte App. for Temporary Restraining Order, Decl. of
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Robert A. Pool (“Pool Decl.”) ¶ 11; Opp. to App. for Temporary
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Restraining Order, Decl. of Ana Wisnev (“Wisnev Decl.”) ¶ 19.)
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Plan did not award Williams the benefits she was seeking, asserting
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that she did not have a valid QDRO.
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Decl. ¶ 12; Wisnev Decl. ¶ 19.)
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(FAC at 40, Exh. 4
The
(FAC at 41, Exh. 4 ¶ 30; Pool
Previously, separate state court proceedings had been
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initiated in 1998 to dissolve Adell’s marriage to his former
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spouse, Rosalyn Willis (“Willis”), and award her spousal support.
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(Wisnev Decl. ¶ 12.)
Willis submitted a QDRO on September 12,
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2012, and payments began to her on November 1, 2012.
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Exh. 4 ¶ 37.; Pool Decl. ¶ 14; Wisnev Decl. ¶¶ 14-15.)
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(FAC at 42,
Williams brought a series of motions in the Divorce
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Proceedings to obtain a QDRO and/or injunctive relief to prevent
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the Plan from paying benefits to Adell and/or Willis. [(Wisnev
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Decl. ¶¶ 10, 23, 28; see also FAC at 3, 42, Exh. 4 ¶ 33; Pool Decl.
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¶ 18]. Those applications were denied. (Wisnev Decl. ¶¶ 23, 30;
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Opp. to Ex Parte App. for TRO, Decl. of Neelam Chandna [“Chandna
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Decl.”] ¶¶ 5-7 & 14.) Most recently, Williams sought emergency
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relief in the Divorce Proceedings via an “Ex Parte Application for
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Nunc Pro Tunc Relief or Alternatively to Shorten Time,” which
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sought to enjoin the Plan from paying any other benefits (precisely
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the relief she later sought from this Court). (Wisnev Decl. ¶¶
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30-32; Chandna Decl. ¶¶ 5, 14.) The state court first denied
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Williams’ request at a hearing on October 5.
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Chandna Decl. 14.)
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(Wisnev Decl. ¶ 30;
However, the state court has been considering the propriety of
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entering a QDRO for the immediate recovery of the child support
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payments Williams seeks. Toward that end, the court directed
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Williams to meet and confer with the Plan to draft a QDRO that
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would entitle her to this relief, consistently with ERISA, and has
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also appointed an expert to recommend an appropriate QDRO for
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Williams. (Wisnev Decl. ¶¶ 21-28, 30; Chandna Decl. ¶¶ 5-6, 14].
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Additionally, the court ordered Williams to notify Willis that
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Williams was seeking a QDRO. It also suggested that Williams move
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for the proceedings involving her and Willis to be consolidated so
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that a single judge could adjudicate their competing claims to
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Adell’s pension benefits, but Williams refused to do so. (Wisnev
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Decl. ¶ 14; Chandna Decl. ¶¶ 7-8.)
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On the morning of October 30, 2012, the parties appeared in
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the Divorce Proceedings, at which time the court denied Williams’
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renewed request for injunctive relief. [Wisnev Decl. ¶ 31; Chandna
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Decl. ¶ 14]. Instead, the court set a hearing for December 11, 2012
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to consider the expert’s recommendation on a QDRO to enable
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Williams to recover Plan benefits. (Wisnev Decl. ¶ 31; Chandna
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Decl. ¶ 14.) On November 15, 2012, Williams filed a notice of
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appeal of the state court’s September 24, 2012, ruling that, inter
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alia, refused to enter the QDRO Williams sought at that time.
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On October 5, 2012, the same day that the state court first
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denied her request for emergency relief (Wisnev Decl. ¶ 30),
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Williams filed her original complaint in this lawsuit.
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applications filed in state court, the Complaint sought to compel
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the Plan to recognize her child support orders, and asserted four
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causes of action relating to her efforts to obtain child support
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payments from the Plan. (Id.) On October 30, immediately after
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losing a motion for interim relief in the Divorce Proceedings,
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Williams filed an ex parte application without notice to
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Defendants, seeking a temporary restraining order (TRO) and
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preliminary injunction to prevent the Plan from distributing
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benefits—essentially the same relief the state court denied earlier
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the same day in the Divorce Proceedings. (Ex Parte App. for TRO;
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Wisnev Decl. ¶ 31; Chandna Decl. ¶¶ 14-15.) On October 31, this
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Court granted Williams’ request for a TRO and set a preliminary
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injunction hearing for November 7. (Order Granting Ex Parte App.
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Like the
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for TRO.) At the November 7 hearing, this Court denied Williams’
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request for a preliminary injunction.
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II. LEGAL STANDARD
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Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a complaint is
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subject to dismissal when the plaintiff's allegations fail to state
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a claim upon which relief can be granted.
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whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as true all
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allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the
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light most favorable to the plaintiff.”
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“When determining
Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d
443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000).
In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009), the Supreme
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Court explained that a court considering a 12(b)(6) motion should
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first “identify[] pleadings that, because they are no more than
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conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.”
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Next, the court should identify the complaint’s “well-pleaded
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factual allegations, . . . assume their veracity and then determine
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whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.”
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Id.; see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th
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Cir. 2009) (“In sum, for a complaint to survive a motion to
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dismiss, the non-conclusory factual content, and reasonable
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inferences from that content, must be plausibly suggestive of a
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claim entitling the plaintiff to relief”) (internal quotation marks
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omitted).
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III. DISCUSSION
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Id.
A. Motions to Dismiss and Strike
i. State Court Proceedings
All Defendants move to dismiss on several grounds pertaining
to the concurrent state proceedings, namely, res judicata, the
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Rooker-Feldman doctrine, and Younger abstention. Defendants Writers
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Guild of America, West, Inc. and Writers Guild of America, East,
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Inc. (collectively, “Union Defendants”) also move to dismiss on the
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grounds that the FAC contains no factual allegations with respect
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to them and does not state the purported basis for their liability.
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Ms. Williams did not file an opposition to the Motions to Dismiss.
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She did file a Motion to Strike Defendants’ Coordinated Motions to
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Dismiss (“Motion to Strike”). Because Ms. Williams filed no formal
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opposition to the Motions to Dismiss, the court construes her
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Motion to Strike as an opposition so far as it is able.1
Defendants invoke important doctrines of judicial economy and
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of federalism.
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resources, providing that “when there is a final judgment on the
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merits, further claims by the parties or their privies based upon
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the same cause of action are barred.”
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Carpenters Pension Trust Fund For Northern California v. Reyes, 688
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F.2d 671, 673 (9th Cir. 1982).
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prevents duplicative judgments so as to protect the jurisdictional
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authority of state courts.
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1041, 1050 (9th Cir. 2010) (The Rooker-Feldman doctrine “stands for
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the relatively straightforward principle that federal district
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courts do not have jurisdiction to hear de facto appeals from state
Res judicata prevents a waste of judicial
Board of Trustees of
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine also
See e.g. Carmona v. Carmona, 603 F.3d
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Typically, a motion to strike can be used only to strike
portions of pleadings. See Fed. R. Civ. P 12(f) (“Motion to
Strike. The court may strike from a pleading an insufficient
defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous
matter. The court may act: (1) on its own; or (2) on motion made by
a party either before responding to the pleading or, if a response
is not allowed, within 21 days after being served with the
pleading.”)
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court judgments.”).
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abstention doctrine “forbids federal courts from staying or
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enjoining pending state court proceedings.”
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Corp. v. Roden, 495 F.3d 1143, 1147 (9th Cir. 2007), quoting
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Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 41 (1971)(internal quotation marks
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and modifications omitted).
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Similarly but separately, the Younger
AmerisourceBergen
Defendants have demonstrated that many if not all of the same
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questions are at issue in state court, by Plaintiff’s own
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admissions in the Complaint.
They point out that all nine causes
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of action in the FAC relate to Ms. Williams efforts to obtain child
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support payments from the Plan.
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Plan’s response to a subpoena in April 2011, presumably issued with
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respect to the Divorce Proceedings, seeking information about
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Adell’s benefits [e.g. Comp. ¶ 14]; Count II alleges a ‘Wrongful
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Denial of Benefits for the Plan’s failure to pay benefits to
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satisfy her child support order [e.g. Comp. ¶ 27]; Count III
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alleges a breach of fiduciary duty based on the Plan’s allegedly
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wrongful denial of benefits [e.g. Comp. ¶ 34]; and Counts IV
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through IX similarly complain that the Plan ‘rejected payment of
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pension assets for child support’ [Comp. ¶ 39].
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Williams alleges that she is being ‘force[d] to relitigate matters
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previously adjudicated by the Los Angeles Superior Court.’ [Comp. ¶
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41].”
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“Count I complains about the
Elsewhere, Ms.
(Plan Mot. at 7.)
Ms. Williams did not directly address the substance of
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Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss regarding the ongoing state
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proceedings.
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preliminary injunction, Defendants misled the court “to believe
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that all was being taken care of in State Court.”
She stated only that at the hearing on the
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(Williams Mot.
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at 12.)
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court proceedings with no commentary, apparently to inform this
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court of the deficiencies in state court proceedings.
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direction from Ms. Williams, however, it is impossible for this
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court to discern what the state court is or is not addressing in
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this complex, long-running divorce and child support case based
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solely on a portion of the transcript of one hearing.
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Williams has apparently not challenged any of the overlap, the
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court has no choice but to find that Ms. Williams concedes these
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Without any
Because Ms.
points to Defendants.2
ii. Union Defendants’ Grounds to Dismiss
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Ms. Williams copied eight pages of transcript from state
Likewise, Ms. Williams did not challenge the Union Defendants’
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claim that the FAC makes no factual allegations against them.
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court finds that the FAC apparently does not make any such
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allegations beyond mentioning them in the caption.
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Ms. Williams lack of opposition on this point, the court finds for
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the Union Defendants on this point as well.
Combined with
iii. Ms. Williams’ Grounds of OPposition
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The
Through her Motion to Strike, Ms. Williams appears to oppose
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the Motions to Dismiss based on Defendants’ failure to have a
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conference prior to the filing of the Motions, as required by local
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rules.
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exempt in L.R. 16-12, . . . counsel contemplating the filing of any
Local Rule 7-3 provides that “In all cases not listed as
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Defendants have not shown conclusively that there is a total
overlap between all the issues, nor have they separated out which
issues have been subject to final judgment and which are still
pending. However, because Ms. Williams has failed to oppose any of
these grounds, the court must assume that she concedes that all
issues have either already been adjudicated or are pending before
state court.
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motion shall first contact opposing counsel to discuss thoroughly,
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preferably in person, the substance of the contemplated motion and
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any potential resolution.”
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obligated to confer with Plaintiff because she is pro se and falls
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in the exemption under L.R. 16-12.
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Local Rule 16-12 exempts conferences only where pro se litigants
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are in custody (“(c) Any case in which the plaintiff is appearing
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pro se, is in custody, and is not an attorney”).
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court does not find this without more to be a reason to deny the
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Motions to Dismiss. The court expects strict compliance with all
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federal and local rules but finds that Ms. Williams has not alleged
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that she was not prejudiced by the lack of conference.
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Additionally, Ms. Williams herself appears not to have complied
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with this rule in filing her Motion to Strike.
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Mot. to Strike at 2 n.2.)
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Defendants argue that they were not
This appears to be incorrect.3
Nonetheless, the
(See Plan Opp. to
Ms. Williams’ final argument that could be construed as an
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opposition to the motion to dismiss is that Defendants “direct[ed]
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Plaintiff to request injunctive relief in Federal Court.”
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(Williams Reply at 8.)
This appears, however, to have been based
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on a misunderstanding.
Defendants indicate that “the Plan
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explained that the state court lacked jurisdiction to enter
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This notwithstanding Judge Wright’s Order in Spencer v. U.S.
Office of Personnel Management, 2012 WL 1865500 *3 (C.D.Cal. 2012),
which does not mention the “in custody” requirement (“Local Rule
7–3 provides that “[i]n all cases not listed as exempt in L.R.
16–12, ... counsel FN2 contemplating the filing of any motion shall
first contact opposing counsel to discuss thoroughly, preferably in
person, the substance of the contemplated motion and any potential
resolution.” Local Rule 16–12(c), however, exempts “[a]ny case in
which the plaintiff is appearing pro se.” Therefore, Plaintiff's
failure to meet and confer prior to filing his Motion for Summary
Judgment is not grounds for denial of Plaintiff's Motion.”)
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‘restraining orders or injunctions’ against the Plan - not that
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[the state court] lacked jurisdiction to enter qualified domestic
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relations orders to adjudicate Williams’ claim for benefits.”
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(Producer-Writers Guild Mot. at 5 n.3.) The problem is not that
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this court lacks jurisdiction to hear the case but rather that the
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same case is being heard in state court.
B. Motion to Disqualify Counsel
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Ms. Williams also moves to disqualify opposing counsel
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(apparently including Neelam Chandna, J. David Sackman, the law
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firm of Reich, Adell & Cvitan, Jeremy M. Mittman, Kara L. Lincoln,
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Myron D. Rumeld, and the law firm of Proskauer Rose, LLP) on the
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ground of a conflict of interest.
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argues that the Writers Guild of America owes duties to its
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members, whereas the Producer-Writers Guild of America Pension Plan
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owes duties to both Plan participants and their beneficiaries.
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“The problem is that the Plan Directors . . . consist of ‘Employer
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Directors and Union Directors collectively,’ all of which are
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parties to the ‘collective bargaining agreement,’ whose primary
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responsibilities are to Writers Guild or ‘Union’ members, not their
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families.”
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concurrent representation of both the Guilds and the Plan, have and
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continue to operate under substantial conflict of interest in
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attempting to represent the Guilds’ interests and incentives and
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the Plan’s interests as fiduciaries owing the duty of disclosure
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and preservation of pension benefits for Alternate Payees pursuant
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to domestic relations orders. . . . Clearly, the interests of the
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Guilds are divergent to those of the Plan.
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juggle the interests of both the funding source of the pension plan
(Williams Reply at 4.)
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(Mot. to Strike at 3-5.)
She
“Counsel now claiming
Counsel’s attempt to
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and the Plan’s duties and responsibilities as fiduciaries,
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constitutes a glaring conflict of interest.”
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5.)
(Williams Reply at 4-
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Ms. Williams appears to be saying that Defendants have
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conflicting interests and that the Plan, in particular, should be
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representing her interests, rather than opposing them.
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logic, however, it seems that there could be no case in which a
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Plan beneficiary and a Plan were on opposing sides.
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recognizes that Ms. Williams feels that the Plan is working against
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her when it should be assisting her, but the court does not see any
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grounds on which to disqualify Defendants’ counsel.
By this
The court
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C. Motion for Reconsideration
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The court has already rejected a preliminary injunction and
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one motion for reconsideration, and Ms. Williams now presents no
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previously unavailable facts or law.
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to reconsider the Order Denying a Preliminary Injunction.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The court once again declines
The court sympathizes with Ms. Williams in her long struggle
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to obtain her child support payments.
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parties’ submissions, the court must find that the state court
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proceedings concern the same issues as those raised by Ms. Williams
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in this court, that there is no basis to disqualify Defendants’
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counsel, and that there is no basis on which to reconsider the
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denial of a preliminary injunction.
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///
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However, on the basis of the
The court therefore GRANTS
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Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss and DENIES Plaintiff’s Motions.
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
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Dated:
February 13, 2013
DEAN D. PREGERSON
United States District Judge
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