Global Acquisitions Network et al v. Bank of America Corporation et al

Filing 94

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR ENTRY OF JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO RULE 54(b) 75 by Judge Dean D. Pregerson. (lc). Modified on 9/13/2013. (lc).

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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GLOBAL ACQUISITIONS NETWORK,
a Wyoming corporation; SHAWN
CORNEILLE, an individual,

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Plaintiffs,

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v.
BANK OF AMERICA CORPORATION,
a Delaware corporation;
ORIANA CAPITAL PARTNERS,LLC,
a Connecticut limited
liability company; ZANCO, a
company of unknown business
form, HLB FINANCIAL, LLC, a
company of unknown form; W/C
INVESTMETN HOLDINGS INC., a
Florida corporatin; DEXTER
CHAPPELL, an individual;
VALERIE CHAPPELL, an
individual; JON LEARY, an
individual; GLEN McINERNEY
also known as LARRY BENNETT,
an individual; CHRISTOPHER
RAY ZANCO, an individual;
BERNARD WOODSON, an
individual,

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Defendants.

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___________________________

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Case No. CV 12-08758 DDP (CWx)
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR ENTRY OF
JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO RULE 54(b)
[Docket No. 75 ]

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I. Background

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Plaintiffs have sued Bank of America, Oriana Capital Partners,

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LLC, Dexter Chappell, and Jon Lear.

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Complaint (“FAC”).)

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against Bank of America: negligence, breach of fiduciary duty,

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fraudulent inducement, fraud, intentional misrepresentation,

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negligent misrepresentation, and conspiracy.

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causes of action are also asserted against Jon Leary, Dexter

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Chappell, and Oriana Capital Partners, LLC. (FAC ¶¶ 91-98, 99-109,

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(See generally First Amended

Plaintiffs asserted seven causes of action

All of these seven

115-151.)

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The factual allegations in this action are presented at length

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in the court’s Order Granting Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss With

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Leave to Amend Certain Claims (the “Order”), dated February 19,

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2013.

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court will not recite them again.

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claims against Bank of America on June 6, 2013.

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attempted to appeal that order.

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appeal, Plaintiffs state, this Court would need to enter final

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judgment on Plaintiffs’ case against Bank of America.

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before the Court is Plaintiffs’ Motion for Entry of Separate

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Judgment (“Motion”).

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II. Legal Standard

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Because the basic allegations of the FAC are identical, the
The Court dismissed the FAC’s
Plaintiffs have

In order to continue with their

Presently

“When an action presents more than one claim for relief ...

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the court may direct entry of a final judgment as to one or more,

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but fewer than all, claims or parties only if the court expressly

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determines that there is no just reason for delay.”

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54(b).

Fed.R.Civ.P.

A district court has discretion when deciding whether to

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enter judgment under Rule 54(b).

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Elec. Co., 446 U.S. 1, 8 (1980).

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See Curtiss–Wright Corp. v. Gen.

A district court must first determine that there “is a

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decision upon a cognizable claim for relief, and it must be ‘final’

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in the sense that it is ‘an ultimate disposition of an individual

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claim entered in the course of a multiple claims action.’”

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7 (quoting Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427, 436

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(1956)).

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there is any just reason for delay.”

Id. at

Next, “the district court must go on to determine whether
Id. at 8.

In making this

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determination, a district court should “consider such factors as

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whether the claims under review were separable from the others

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remaining to be adjudicated and whether the nature of the claims

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already determined was such that no appellate court would have to

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decide the same issues more than once even if there were subsequent

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appeals.”

Id.

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“Whether a final decision on a claim is ready for appeal is a

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different inquiry from the equities involved, for consideration of

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judicial administrative interests is necessary to assure that

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application of the Rule effectively preserves the historic federal

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policy against piecemeal appeals.”

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873, 878 (9th Cir. (2005) (internal quotation marks and citations

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omitted).

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III. Analysis

Wood v. GCC Bend, LLC, 422 F.3d

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Because Plaintiffs’ claims against Bank of America are not

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separable from Plaintiffs’ other claims, a separate judgment is

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improper in this case.

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in deciding whether to enter a separate judgment, and the more

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factual issues overlap between the parties, the more likely a

The Court must consider judicial resources

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separate judgment is to be inappropriate.

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As the Ninth Circuit stated:

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Wood, 422 F.3d at 882.

The greater the overlap the greater the chance that this
court will have to revisit the same facts-spun only
slightly differently-in a successive appeal. The
caseload of this court is already huge. More than
fifteen thousand appeals were filed in the last year. We
cannot afford the luxury of reviewing the same set of
facts in a routine case more than once without a
seriously important reason.

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Id.

Here the factual overlap is substantial.

Several other

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remaining parties were also sued under the same claims as Bank of
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America.

The FAC’s allegations indicate a substantial amount of

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factual overlap between Plaintiffs’ claims against Bank of America
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and other Defendants, as the following except from the FAC
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exemplifies:
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“As alleged above, BOA [Bank of America] Bank
Officer/John Doe I, assured Plaintiffs in the 28 February
9, 2012 telephone conference call that: (1) Defendants
OCP [Oriana Capital Partners] and Dexter Chappell had
more than sufficient funds available in their respective
bank accounts with BOA to fund and pay themselves the NRL
Plaintiffs were seeking; and (2) Defendants OCP and
Dexter Chappe11 had been involved with and had experience
in similar past CMO transactions. BOA Bank Officer/John
Doe 1 knew or should have known Plaintiffs would
reasonably rely on the assurances given by him, and based
on them, would entrust the custody and control of the GAN
[Global Acquisition Network] CMOs [Collateralized
Mortgage Obligations] to Defendants OCP, Dexter Chappell
and [Jon] Leary. However, BOA Bank Officer/John Doe 1
negligently made these representations and assurances,
since Defendants OCP and Dexter Chappell breached the
NRLA, failed to timely fund and pay the NRL to
Plaintiffs, and failed to timely return the GAN CMOs to
Plaintiffs, after Defendants breached the NRLA and
Plaintiffs demanded the return of the GAN CMOs.”

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(FAC ¶ 94.)

The factual overlap between the claims against Bank of

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American and other Defendants suggests that this Motion should be
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denied.
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It is of no moment that the clerk has entered default against

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several of Bank of America’s co-defendants and that “Plaintiffs’

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[sic] reasonably believe that given the past evasice conduct, and

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responsiveness of this Defendant, Dexter Chappell will not respond

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to the [FAC].”

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do not know what Defendant Chappell will do, and the Court has not

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entered a final judgment against the defaulting Defendants.

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(Reply Brief at 2 (citing no evidence.)

Plaintiffs

Finally, Plaintiffs $450 appellate filing fee, which
Plaintiffs claim will be lost if this Motion is denied, is not a

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reason to grant this motion.

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forfeiting their fee, they should have filed the instant Motion

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before appealing.

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IV. Conclusion

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If Plaintiffs did not want to risk

For the reasons stated above, the Court DENIES the Motion.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Dated: September 13, 2013
DEAN D. PREGERSON
United States District Judge

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