Mercado Latino Inc v. Indio Products Inc et al

Filing 154

ORDER by Judge Dean D. Pregerson: GRANTING 131 DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. (shb)

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1 2 JS-6 3 O 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 MERCADO LATINO, INC. dba CONTINENTAL CANDLE COMPANY, 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. 14 15 INDIO PRODUCTS, INC., a California corporation, 16 Defendants. 17 ____________________________ ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Case No. CV 13-01027 DDP (RNBx) ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [Dkt. No.128] 18 19 Presently before the court is Defendant Indio Products, Inc. 20 (“Indio”)’s Motion for Summary Judgment. Having considered the 21 submissions of the parties and heard oral argument, the court 22 grants the motion and adopts the following Order. 23 I. Background 24 A. Factual History 25 Plaintiff Mercado Latino, Inc. (“Mercado”) began manufacturing 26 candles in 1991. Mercado is headquartered in Southern California, 27 which is its largest market, but also sells products nationwide. 28 Mercado sells three tiers of prayer candles. Sales of Mercado’s highest-priced “Sanctuary Series” candles run in the millions 1 annually, as they have since the launch of the product in 1991. 2 Mercado also sells the “Carisma” line of candles, its lower-tier 3 candles that are sold at dollar-type stores (e.g. 99 Cents Only). 4 Customers for Mercado’s Sanctuary Series candles include Target, 5 Walmart, and other big chains, as well as independent markets and 6 boutiques. 7 Defendant Indio Products, Inc. (“Indio”) also manufactures and 8 sells multiple lines of prayer candles, including the allegedly 9 infringing Templar line and the non-accused, higher-end Eternalux 10 line, which is sold at a higher price point than the Templar line. 11 Indio began selling the Templar line of candles in 2012. 12 not sold the Eternalux and Templar candles to the same stores 13 because the two lines serve different prayer candle sub-markets. 14 Templar candles are generally sold to dollar-type stores, with 99 15 Cents Only stores accounting for 80% of all Templar candle sales. 16 Some of Mercado’s Sanctuary Series candles bear the Asserted Indio has 17 Sanctuary Series Trade Dress (“ATD”), which is comprised of “a 18 clear cylindrical container that is approximately 2.25 x 2.25 x 8.0 19 inches in length, width and height, filled with a solid, single 20 color wax, the clear cylindrical container has an opaque die-cut 21 label with two opposite sides – a ‘front’ and ‘back’. The front 22 side of the die-cut label has a silhouette outlined by a black 23 border with a top portion that tapers together and forms a pointed 24 tip that resembles a ‘bullet’ shape, with segments of shapes in 25 varying and alternating sizes and colors, similar to a stained 26 glass window. Placed over that label is a depiction of a saint or 27 other religious icon. Directly beneath the depiction of the saint 28 or religious icon, (sic) is a separate segment on the label that 2 1 resembles a scroll with the name of the saint or religious icon.” 2 (SAC at ¶12.) 3 the Asserted Trade Dress. 4 bear no label at all.1 5 dimensions as Sanctuary Series candles, and are also in a clear 6 cylindrical glass jar with an opaque label bearing an image of a 7 religious figure and religious décor and prayers. Some Sanctuary series candles, however, do not bear Indeed, some Sanctuary Series candles Indio’s Templar candles have the same 8 B. Procedural History 9 Mercado’s initial Complaint alleged causes of action for 10 copyright infringement, trade dress infringement, and other claims, 11 as did Mercado’s First Amended Complaint (“FAC”). 12 trade dress featuring “the unique combination of the following 13 design elements: a depiction of a saint or religious icon, with a 14 border that appears to be a ‘bullet’ shape in the style of a 15 stained glass window and the name of the saint or the religious 16 icon underneath the depiction.” 17 regarding trade dress are more extensive, as set forth above. 18 (FAC ¶ 21.) The FAC alleged The SAC’s allegations Indio moved for judgment on the pleadings. (Dkt. 79.) This 19 Court denied the motion, concluding that (1) Mercado’s SAC alleged 20 the ATD with sufficient specificity, (2) although the SAC asserts a 21 product design claim rather than a packaging claim, a question of 22 fact remained regarding whether the ATD had acquired secondary 23 meaning, (3) factual questions remained with respect to 24 functionality, and (4) questions of fact remained regarding 25 26 27 28 1 Other candles, such as the “Lucky Lottery” candle, are not part of the Sanctuary Series “line,” and do not bear the ATD, but were included in a Sanctuary Series catalog. 3 1 Mercado’s adequately-pleaded likelihood of confusion allegations. 2 (Dkt. 95.) 3 II. 4 Indio now moves for summary judgment on all claims. Legal Standard Summary judgment is appropriate where the pleadings, 5 depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 6 together with the affidavits, if any, show “that there is no 7 genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled 8 to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 9 seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing the A party 10 court of the basis for its motion and of identifying those portions 11 of the pleadings and discovery responses that demonstrate the 12 absence of a genuine issue of material fact. 13 Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). 14 the evidence must be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party. See 15 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 242 (1986). 16 moving party does not bear the burden of proof at trial, it is 17 entitled to summary judgment if it can demonstrate that “there is 18 an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.” 19 Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. 20 See Celotex Corp. v. All reasonable inferences from If the Once the moving party meets its burden, the burden shifts to 21 the nonmoving party opposing the motion, who must “set forth 22 specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” 23 Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256. 24 party “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the 25 existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on 26 which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” 27 477 U.S. at 322. 28 that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving Summary judgment is warranted if a Celotex, A genuine issue exists if “the evidence is such 4 1 party,” and material facts are those “that might affect the outcome 2 of the suit under the governing law.” 3 There is no genuine issue of fact “[w]here the record taken as a 4 whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the 5 nonmoving party.” 6 Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). 7 Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio It is not the court’s task “to scour the record in search of a 8 genuine issue of triable fact.” 9 1278 (9th Cir. 1996). Keenan v. Allan, 91 F.3d 1275, Counsel have an obligation to lay out their 10 support clearly. Carmen v. San Francisco Sch. Dist., 237 F.3d 11 1026, 1031 (9th Cir.2001). 12 file for evidence establishing a genuine issue of fact, where the 13 evidence is not set forth in the opposition papers with adequate 14 references so that it could conveniently be found.” 15 III. The court “need not examine the entire Id. Discussion 16 A. The Product Design “Issue” 17 As an initial matter, Plaintiff argues that this Court’s prior 18 conclusion regarding Plaintiff’s product design claim, as opposed 19 to a packaging claim, was merely “passing dicta” and a “passing 20 comment.” 21 notwithstanding any “inelegancies” in its pleadings, it “has always 22 preserved that it viewed and intended to assert its Trade Dress as 23 a product packaging claim, [and] clarifies that it does not intend 24 to ‘expand’ its present claim of trade dress ‘to the candle 25 itself,’ but rather, only the enveloping label or packaging.” 26 (Opp. at 4:12-15; 6:25.) (Opposition at 4:1, 5.) Plaintiff further asserts that, This claim is untenable.2 27 2 28 The court also notes that Plaintiff’s Opposition violates (continued...) 5 1 First, this Court’s discussion of the product design issue was 2 hardly a “passing comment.” As stated in the court’s Order Denying 3 Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the pleadings, “The distinction 4 [between product design and product packaging] is important because 5 product design trade dress can never be inherently distinctive, and 6 therefore always requires a showing of secondary meaning to support 7 a claim of infringement.” 8 explained that Plaintiff’s ATD could not possibly be considered a 9 packaging claim, given that the ATD includes essential physical (Dkt. 95 at 6.) This Court further 10 aspects such as a cylindrical container and solid, single-colored 11 wax. (Dkt. 95 at 7.) 12 Second, Plaintiff’s characterization of its product design 13 allegations as mere “inelegancies” of a pleading intended to assert 14 a packaging claim strains belief. 15 its claimed trade dress to include product design features appears 16 to have been the product of a deliberate decision, as evinced by 17 the differences between the Second Amended Complaint’s 18 comprehensive description of the ATD and the First Amended 19 Complaint’s comparatively limited trade dress allegations. 20 the SAC, unlike the FAC, specifically highlights “clear 2.25x2.25.8 21 cylindrical container” and “filled with solid color wax” as 22 infringing elements of Indio’s trade dress. 23 and furthermore, Plaintiff never sought reconsideration of this 24 Court’s product design determination, nor sought leave to amend the 25 SAC’s trade dress allegations. Plaintiff’s decision to expand (SAC ¶ 23.) Indeed, Third, Plaintiff’s belated “request” for 26 27 28 2 (...continued) several of the local rules of this district. 9, 11-3.1.1, 11-3.6. 6 See C.D. Cal. L.R. 7- 1 leave to amend, such as it is, made in passing within Plaintiff’s 2 opposition to the instant motion, is denied. (Opp. at 7:3-5.) 3 B. Secondary Meaning 4 Trade dress is the “total image of a product, including 5 features such as size, shape, color, texture, and graphics[.]” 6 Millennium Labs., Inc. v. Ameritox, Ltd., 817 F.3d 1123, 1126 (9th 7 Cir. 2016) (internal quotation and citations omitted). 8 bringing a trade dress claim must prove “(1) that its claimed dress 9 is nonfunctional; (2) that its claimed dress serves a A plaintiff 10 source-identifying role[,] either because it is inherently 11 distinctive or has acquired secondary meaning; and (3) that the 12 defendant’s product . . . creates a likelihood of consumer 13 confusion.” 14 1252, 1258 (9th Cir. 2001). 15 product design case, Plaintiff must prove that the ATD has acquired 16 secondary meaning. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 17 529 U.S. 205, 216 (2000). 18 Clicks Billiards, Inc. v. Sixshooters, Inc., 251 F.3d As discussed above, because this is a “A product’s trade dress acquires secondary meaning when the 19 purchasing public associates the dress with a single producer or 20 source rather than just the product itself.” 21 Fred Meyer, Inc., 809 F.2d 1378, 1383 (9th Cir. 1987). 22 meaning can be established in many ways, including (but not limited 23 to) direct consumer testimony; survey evidence; exclusivity, 24 manner, and length of use of a mark; amount and manner of 25 advertising; amount of sales and number of customers; established 26 place in the market; and proof of intentional copying by the 27 defendant.” 28 Inc., 198 F.3d 1143, 1151 (9th Cir.1999). First Brands Corp. v. “Secondary Filipino Yellow Pages, Inc. v. Asian Journal Publ'ns, 7 1 Indio argues that Plaintiff cannot point to sufficient 2 evidence to create a triable issue regarding secondary meaning. 3 The most persuasive evidence of secondary meaning is an expert 4 survey of purchasers. 5 F.2d 609, 615 (9th Cir. 1989). 6 citation to the record, that it conducted a “consumer survey, which 7 provides compelling evidence” of secondary meaning. 8 11:17-18.) 9 report to which Plaintiff refers did not attempt to gauge whether Vision Sports, Inc. v. Melville Corp., 888 Plaintiff asserts, without any (Opp. at As Plaintiff acknowledged at argument, however, the 10 consumers associate the trade dress with a single source. Rather, 11 the survey was designed “to test whether the appearance of the 12 Indio Templar candles creates a likelihood of confusion to the 13 Sanctuary Series trade dress.” 14 support of Opposition, Ex. A at 4.) 15 as evidence of actual confusion, might bear on both likelihood of 16 confusion and secondary meaning, Plaintiff has cited no authority 17 for the proposition that a survey geared toward consumer confusion 18 can be used to demonstrate secondary meaning. 19 Ajac Transmission Parts Corp., 768 F.2d 1001, 1015 (9th Cir. 1985). 20 Plaintiff also claims that it has other direct evidence of 21 secondary meaning, pointing to the declaration of Kirk Zehnder, 22 Plaintiff’s Vice President of Business Development. 23 conclusorily asserts that “consumers have come to associate our . . 24 . trade dress with us as a uniform source . . . .” 25 ¶ 26.) 26 of consumers contact Plaintiff every year to ask for Sanctuary 27 Series products, that fact is insufficient to create a triable 28 issue regarding secondary meaning, as not all Sanctuary Series (Declaration of Hal Poret in Although some evidence, such See Transgo, Inc. v. Zehnder (Zehnder Decl. Although Zehnder also states that “dozens if not hundreds” 8 1 products bear the Asserted Trade Dress. 2 consumer inquiries attached to Zehnder’s declaration, even those 3 asking for Sanctuary Series candles by name, identify the ATD. 4 (Declaration of Janice Marinelli, Ex. A1 at 50:17-51:1, 91:9-19; 5 Ex. A2 at 40-41; 72; Zehnder Decl., Ex. 14.) 6 consumer inquiries cited by Zehnder explicitly ask for candles that 7 do not bear the trade dress.3 (See, e.g., Zehnder Decl., Ex. 14 at 8 79 (“I am looking for the White candles you make[.] Just the plain 9 glass.”) There is, therefore, no direct evidence that the ATD has 10 11 Furthermore, none of the Indeed, some of the acquired secondary meaning. Indirect evidence, such as evidence of sales, advertising, and 12 exclusivity of use, may also be used to prove secondary meaning. 13 Filipino Yellow Pages, 198 F.3d at 1151. 14 be on the effectiveness of the plaintiff’s efforts. 15 Corp. v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 809 F.2d 1378, 1383 (9th Cir. 1987). 16 Plaintiff first argues that it has been using the ATD exclusively 17 since 1991. 18 however, does not support that assertion. 19 declaration of Mercado Vice President Richard Rodriguez to which 20 Plaintiff cites makes no reference to length of use or exclusivity. 21 (Declaration of Richard Rodriguez in opposition to motion, ¶ 10.) 22 Although Rodriguez does elsewhere state that Mercado began selling 23 Sanctuary Series products in 1991 and has done so continuously 24 since then, there is no indication of when Sanctuary Series 25 products began featuring the ATD, what proportion of the Sanctuary (Opp. at 12:8-11.) The focus, however, must First Brands The evidence Plaintiff cites, The portion of the 26 27 28 3 Furthermore, Zehnder testified that the white Sanctuary Series, with no label, is Mercado’s top selling candle. (Marinelli Decl., Ex. 2 at 73.) 9 1 Series products bore the ATD, or whether any use of the ATD was 2 exclusive. 3 cited by Plaintiff is a portion of the Zehnder declaration, which 4 says no different, and indeed refers back to the Rodriguez 5 declaration. 6 could rely on this evidence to find either length or exclusivity of 7 use of the Asserted Trade Dress. 8 9 (See Rodriguez Decl., ¶ 64.) (Zehnder Decl. ¶ 25.) The only other evidence No reasonable trier of fact Mercado next argues, again largely without citation to the record, that it has produced evidence of marketing and promotional 10 efforts sufficient to create a triable issue as to secondary 11 meaning. 12 indeed be relevant, provided that the advertising features the 13 trade dress itself and is extensive enough to effectively create an 14 association with the advertiser’s product. 15 LLC v. MGA Entm't Inc., 581 F.3d 1138, 1146 (9th Cir. 2009); First 16 Brands, 809 F.2d at 1383; see also Int'l Jensen, Inc. v. Metrosound 17 U.S.A., Inc., 4 F.3d 819, 824 (9th Cir. 1993) (“While evidence of a 18 manufacturer's sales, advertising and promotional activities may be 19 relevant in determining secondary meaning, the true test of 20 secondary meaning is the effectiveness of this effort to create 21 it.”). 22 Plaintiff never itself undertook any advertising efforts. 23 Plaintiff used “advertising allocation,” or an allowance to 24 retailers who would themselves promote and advertise the “Sanctuary 25 Series line.”4 (Opp. at 12.) Evidence of advertising activities can See Art Attacks Ink, Here, however Plaintiff’s own evidence establishes that (Rodriguez Decl., ¶ 26). Instead, Although Plaintiff’s 26 4 27 28 As discussed above, the declarations do not specify whether the Sanctuary Series products advertised by retailers actually displayed the ATD. For this same reason, evidence regarding (continued...) 10 1 declarants state that retailers promoted Sanctuary Series candles 2 for at least twenty years, the record includes only three examples 3 of such advertisements.5 4 circulars and one black-and-white coupon, all three of which do 5 appear to display the Asserted Trade Dress. 6 7.) 7 of these advertisements were distributed, or for how long. 8 Cont'l Lab. Prod., Inc. v. Medax Int'l, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 992, 9 1001 (S.D. Cal. 2000). These consist of two supermarket (Rodriguez Decl., Ex. There is, however, no indication of where or how many copies See Furthermore, although these advertisements 10 do bear images of the trade dress, they can hardly be said to 11 “feature” the ATD. 12 candles alongside between one and a dozen food products. 13 advertisements all identify the product only as “Religious Candles” 14 or “Candle(s),” and none makes any mention of the “Sanctuary 15 Series” product line.6 16 Rodriguez’s testimony that mass retailers did some kind of 17 advertising of Sanctuary Series products, are insufficient to 18 establish that Mercado’s (or its retail customers’) advertising All three examples display Sanctuary Series The These examples, even coupled with 19 20 21 22 4 23 24 25 26 (...continued) Sanctuary Cities sales, with no distinction between products bearing the Asserted Trade Dress and other products, is of no moment. See Rodriguez Decl., Ex. 8. 5 Plaintiff’s Opposition does not cite to the portions of the record that include these three examples. 6 27 28 The black-and-white coupon, which offers a free “Candle” (in Spanish) with purchase of a food product, does identify the candle as a “Continental Candle” product. Mercado acquired Continental Candle in 1991. (Rodriguez Decl., ¶ 4.) 11 1 efforts effectively linked the Asserted Trade Dress with a single 2 source.7 3 Lastly, Plaintiff argues that evidence that Defendant copied 4 the Asserted Trade Dress creates a triable issue of fact regarding 5 secondary meaning. 6 copying strongly supports an inference of secondary meaning.” 7 Vision Sports, 888 F.2d at 615. 8 relied, however, specified that “[p]roof of exact copying, without 9 any opposing proof, can be sufficient to establish a secondary The Ninth Circuit has stated that “proof of The cases upon which Vision Sports 10 meaning.” 11 Transgo court explained, under such circumstances, there would be 12 no reason to copy other than to capitalize upon pre-existing 13 secondary meaning. 14 recognized that a party might copy trade dress for other reasons, 15 particularly where trade dress includes functional features. 16 Fuddruckers, Inc. v. Doc's B.R. Others, Inc., 826 F.2d 837, 844 17 (9th Cir. 1987). 18 copying does not create a presumption of secondary meaning. 19 Transgo, 768 F.3d at 1016 (emphasis added). Id. As the Subsequently, however, the Ninth Circuit See For that reason, evidence of even deliberate Id. Here, Plaintiff does not assert that there is any evidence of 20 exact copying. Rather, Plaintiff points, without any citation to 21 the record, to the “striking similarity” of the two trade dresses 22 23 24 7 25 26 27 28 For this same reason, Rodriguez’s testimony that “just because Mercado doesn’t currently have copies of . . . advertising[] doesn’t mean the advertising didn’t occur” is of no moment. Even assuming that some kind of advertising did occur, Rodriguez’s declaration is insufficient to establish that such advertising even bore the Asserted Trade Dress, let alone featured it or effectively created an association in consumers’ minds with Plaintiff. 12 1 as evidence of deliberate copying.8 2 such evidence exists, it is not sufficient to demonstrate secondary 3 meaning. 4 dress claims based upon product design. 5 Laboratory Products court explained, the rather circular logic that 6 copying is evidence of secondary meaning because a copier wouldn’t 7 copy unless a trade dress had already acquired secondary meaning is 8 less persuasive in the product design context. 9 114 F. Supp. 2d at 1009-10. (Opp. at 13.) Even assuming The Vision Sports line of cases does not address trade As the Continental Cont’l Lab. Prod., Indeed, notwithstanding Vision Sports, 10 the Ninth Circuit has recognized that an alleged infringer might 11 copy a trade dress for functional reasons, wholly apart from any 12 desire to deceive consumers as to the origin of a product. 13 Fuddruckers, 826 F.2d at 844; Cont’l Lab. Prod. 114 F. Supp. 2d at 14 1010. 15 “intentional copying supports a finding of secondary meaning only 16 where the defendant intended to confuse consumers and pass off its 17 product as the plaintiff’s.” 18 1010. 19 Thus, as the Continental Laboratory Products court stated, Cont’l. Lab. Prod., 114 F.Supp. 2d at There is no evidence of such intent here.9 None of the evidence cited by Plaintiff is sufficient to 20 establish, either directly or indirectly, that consumers associated 21 the Asserted Trade Dress with a single source. In the absence of 22 23 8 24 25 26 27 28 Although Plaintiff’s Opposition does, in one instance, cite to “Exhibit A,” there are several such exhibits in the record. It is unclear which of these Plaintiff intends to reference. (Opp. at 13:27). 9 Although Mercado does allege a trademark infringement claim related to Indio’s sale of repackaged Mercado candles, that claim does not involve, nor is there evidence of, any attempts by Indio to pass off its own candles as Mercado candles by adopting similar trade dress. 13 1 evidence of secondary meaning, Plaintiff’s trade dress infringement 2 claim must fail. 3 C. Functionality 4 Trade dress is presumed to be functional. 15 U.S.C. § 5 1125(a)(3); TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 6 23, 30 (2001). 7 therefore, prove that its claimed dress is non-functional. 8 Billiards, 251 F.3d at 1258. 9 arbitrary” trade dress is not functional. A plaintiff alleging trade dress infringement must, Clicks “[O]rnamental, incidental, or Id. A product feature 10 is functional, however, “if it is essential to the use or purpose 11 of the article or if it affects the cost or quality of the article, 12 that is, if exclusive use of the feature would put competitors at a 13 significant non-reputation-related disadvantage.” 14 Inc. v. Champion Discs, Inc., 158 F.3d 1002, 1006 (9th Cir. 1998). 15 A plaintiff’s burden to show non-functionality is, therefore, 16 heavier in the product design context. 17 Abbyson Living Corp., No. CV 16-02781 AB (KSX), 2016 WL 9108405, at 18 *4 (C.D. Cal. June 22, 2016) (citing Samara Bros., 529 U.S. at 19 212). 20 Disc Golf Ass'n, Red Star Traders, LLC v. Plaintiff correctly observes that, as with other elements of a 21 trade dress claim, the functionality analysis looks to the overall 22 combination of trade dress elements rather than to individual 23 elements. 24 is a question of “(1) whether the design yields a utilitarian 25 advantage, (2) whether alternative designs are available, (3) 26 whether advertising touts the utilitarian advantages of the design, 27 and (4) whether the particular design results from a comparatively 28 simple or inexpensive method of manufacture. See Clicks Billiards, 251 F.3d at 1259. 14 Functionality Disc Golf Ass'n, 158 1 F.3d at 1006. 2 a single (and general) citation to evidence of the existence of 3 other prayer candles that do not bear the Asserted Trade Dress. 4 (Marinelli Decl., Ex. A-7.) 5 indeed, support the contention that alternative designs are 6 available. 7 Plaintiff’s entire functionality argument makes only The existence of such candles does, Plaintiff totally ignores, however, evidence pertinent to 8 other factors. 9 Plaintiff, that one purpose of devotional candles is to “indulge” 10 the religious figure depicted, and that because candles are “part 11 of the church,” they “must have images that are respected” so as to 12 function as “a little altar in the house.” 13 at 23-24.) 14 that devotional candles are used to pray to the depicted religious 15 figure as merely an “amusing assertion,” other evidence in the 16 record indicates that Plaintiff not only shared that view, but 17 promoted its products as particularly well-suited to that purpose. 18 (Opp. at 17:25.) 19 the Asserted Trade Dress was intended to simulate “light shining 20 through stained glass windows in cathedrals,” and Plaintiff’s own 21 product information sheets explained, “When burned, Sanctuary 22 Series simulate the effect of light shining through a stained glass 23 window.” 24 evidence directly contradicts Plaintiff’s unsupported assertion 25 that the Asserted Trade Dress is merely suggestive, evocative, or 26 fanciful. 27 28 Defendant points to evidence, submitted by (Zehnder Decl., Ex. 1 Although Plaintiff now attempts to dismiss the idea Plaintiff’s interrogatory responses stated that (Marinelli Decl., Ex. 5 at 100; Ex. 12 at 38.) This (Opp. at 17:27.) Trade dress “need only have some utilitarian advantage to be considered functional.” Disc Golf Ass'n, 158 F.3d at 1007. 15 1 Regardless whether other candle designs might also serve to invoke 2 or honor a particular figure or function as an altar or other 3 approximation of a church inside a home, the undisputed evidence 4 shows that the Asserted Trade Dress is particularly well-suited to 5 that purpose, and that Plaintiff promoted that utilitarian 6 advantage. 7 demonstrate that its Asserted Trade Dress is non-functional.10 Accordingly, Plaintiff cannot meet its burden to 8 D. Trademark Infringement 9 Plaintiff’s SAC also alleges a cause of action for trademark 10 infringement under the Lanham Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1114. 11 alleges that Defendant passed its candles off as Mercado candles by 12 selling Mercado candles in Indio boxes. 13 Vallarta supermarkets began to sell Indio’s Eternalux candles. 14 (Declaration of Pooya Bahktiari ¶ 55.) 15 wanted to sell one line of prayer candles, Indio agreed to “buy 16 back” all of Vallarta’s remaining stock of Mercado Candles. 17 Indio removed loose candles from Vallarta shelves and placed them 18 in shipping boxes. 19 closeout vender Vernon Sales. 20 (Id. ¶ 57.) (SAC ¶ 35.) Plaintiff In 2012, Because Vallarta only (Id.) Indio then sold those boxes to (Id.) Indio argues that Mercado’s trademark rights in the candles at 21 issue were extinguished as soon as Mercado sold the candles to 22 Vallarta. 23 right of a producer to control distribution of its trademarked 24 product does not extend beyond the first sale of the product.” (Mot. at 21-22.) Under the first sale doctrine, “the 25 26 27 28 10 Having determined that Plaintiff cannot succeed on two of the essential elements of its trade dress claim, the court need not address Defendant’s remaining arguments. 16 1 Sebastian Int'l, Inc. v. Longs Drug Stores Corp., 53 F.3d 1073, 2 1074 (9th Cir. 1995). 3 of fact remain regarding its trademark claim, Mercado cites to no 4 law or facts to support that assertion or its suggestion that some 5 exception to the first sale doctrine applies. 6 some cases, where there is a likelihood of downstream confusion, 7 the first sale doctrine may not apply. 8 v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 603 F.3d 1133, 1136-38 (9th Cir. 2010). 9 Here, however, there is no evidence that Vernon Sales, or anyone 10 else, was confused about the nature or origin of the bought-back 11 candles, or that any other potential exception to the first sale 12 doctrine would apply. 13 summary judgment on the trademark infringement claim. 14 IV. 15 16 Although Mercado asserts that triable issues It is true that in See Au-Tomotive Gold Inc. Accordingly, Defendant is entitled to Conclusion For the reasons stated above, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.11 17 18 IT IS SO ORDERED. 19 20 Dated: July 17, 2018 DEAN D. PREGERSON United States District Judge 21 22 23 24 11 25 26 27 28 Summary judgment is also granted on Plaintiff’s claims for unfair competition and intentional interference with prospective economic advantage. Plaintiff appears to concede that its unfair competition claim is predicated upon its trade dress claim (Opp. at 24:23-25.) Although Plaintiff asserts that its intentional interference claim is viable independent of the other claims, Plaintiff does not articulate how that is the case or identify any independent wrongful acts. 17

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