Mercado Latino Inc v. Indio Products Inc et al

Filing 25

ORDER by Judge Dean D. Pregerson: granting 20 defendants Motion to Dismiss Case.Plaintiffs copyright claim is dismissed with prejudice. All other claims are dismissed with leave to amend. Any amended complaint shall be filed within ten days of the date of this order. (lc). Modified on 6/12/2013 .(lc).

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1 2 O 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 MERCADO LATINO, INC. dba CONTINENTAL CANDLE COMPANY, 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. 14 15 INDIO PRODUCTS, INC., a California corporation, 16 Defendant. ___________________________ ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Case No. CV 13-01027 DDP (RNBx) ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS Dkt. No. 20] 17 18 Presently before the court is Defendant Indio Products, Inc. 19 (“Indio”)’s Motion to Dismiss. 20 of the parties and heard oral argument, the court grants the motion 21 and adopts the following order. 22 I. 23 Having considered the submissions Background Indio and Plaintiff Mercado Latino, Inc. (“Mercado”) both sell 24 devotional prayer candles bearing images of saints and other 25 religious figures. 26 35.) 27 within a “bullet” shape in the style of a stained glass window, 28 surrounded by a patterned border of colorful, geometric shapes. (First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) ¶¶ 21, 28, Mercado’s “Sanctuary Series” candles depict a religious icon 1 (FAC ¶ 21, Ex. E; Motion to Dismiss, Ex. 2.) 2 copyrights on “the original and distinctive artwork shown on 3 Sanctuary Series candles.” 4 trademarked the name “Sanctuary Series” and a design consisting of 5 three circles within a window. 6 owns trade dress “comprised of candles with distinctive 7 appearance,” and featuring “the unique combination of the following 8 design elements: a depiction of a saint or religious icon, with a 9 border that appears to be a ‘bullet’ shape in the style of a (FAC ¶¶ 12-14.) Mercado obtained Mercado also (FAC ¶¶ 18-19.) Mercado allegedly 10 stained glass window and the name of the saint or the religious 11 icon underneath the depiction.” 12 (FAC ¶ 21.) In its First Amended Complaint, Mercado alleges that Defendant 13 Indio copied Mercado’s copyrights and passed off inferior Indio 14 candles as Mercado products. 15 alleges that Indio infringed upon Mercado’s Sanctuary Series trade 16 dress and trademarks. 17 federal unfair competition under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) and 18 intentional interference with prospective economic advantage. 19 Indio now moves to dismiss all five claims. 20 II. (FAC ¶¶ 29-31.) The FAC further Mercado also alleges causes of action for Legal Standard 21 II. 22 A complaint will survive a motion to dismiss when it contains Legal Standard 23 “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to 24 relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 25 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 26 570 (2007)). 27 “accept as true all allegations of material fact and must construe 28 those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Resnick When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court must 2 1 v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000). 2 need not include “detailed factual allegations,” it must offer 3 “more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me 4 accusation.” 5 allegations that are no more than a statement of a legal conclusion 6 “are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id. at 679. 7 other words, a pleading that merely offers “labels and 8 conclusions,” a “formulaic recitation of the elements,” or “naked 9 assertions” will not be sufficient to state a claim upon which Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 10 relief can be granted. 11 Although a complaint Conclusory allegations or In quotation marks omitted). 12 Id. at 678 (citations and internal “When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should 13 assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly 14 give rise to an entitlement of relief.” Id. at 679. 15 must allege “plausible grounds to infer” that their claims rise 16 “above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. 17 “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for 18 relief” is a “context-specific task that requires the reviewing 19 court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” 20 556 U.S. at 679. 21 III. Discussion Plaintiffs Iqbal, 22 A. Copyright Infringement 23 To state a claim for copyright infringement, a Plaintiff must 24 allege “(1) ownership of a valid copyright, and (2) copying of 25 constituent elements of the work that are original.” 26 Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991). 27 satisfy the copying prong, a copyright plaintiff must also allege 28 that the works are substantially similar 3 Feist Pubs., in their protected To 1 elements. 2 (C.D. Cal. 2011). 3 requirements at the pleading stage. 4 at 1098; Zella v. E.W. Scripps Co., 529 F.Supp.2d. 1124, 1130-31 5 (C.D. Cal. 2007); Lafarga v. Lowrider Arte Magazine, No. SACV 11- 6 1501 DOC, 2012 WL 3667441 at *3 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2012); Minden 7 Pictures, Inc. v. Pearson Education, Inc., No. C 11-05385 WHA, 2012 8 WL 1595081 at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 4, 2012); Fractional Villas, Inc. 9 v. Tahoe Clubhouse, No. 08cv1396-IEG, 2009 WL 160932 at *2 (S.D. 10 Wild v. NBC Universal, Inc., 788 F.Supp.2d 1083, 1098 Courts in this circuit regularly apply these See, e.g., Wild, 788 F.Supp.2d Cal. Jan. 22, 2009).1 11 Courts employ a two-part analysis, comprised of an “intrinsic” 12 and “extrinsic” test, to determine whether two works are 13 substantially similar. 14 815, 822 (9th Cir. 2002). 15 allege sufficient facts to satisfy the extrinsic test. 16 10.) 17 protectable expressive elements. 18 scenes a faire that flow necessarily from ideas are not 19 protectable, and therefore play no role in an extrinsic analysis. 20 Id. 21 Cavalier v. Random House, Inc., 297 F.3d Here, Indio argues that the FAC fails to (Mot. at The extrinsic test is an objective comparison of specific, Id. at 822-23. General ideas and Mercado argues that the protectable elements of the Sanctuary 22 series candles are “the artwork of border with appearance of 23 cathedral window-shaped stained glass.” 24 Mercardo’s opposition makes no attempt, however, to dispute Indio’s 25 contention that Indio candles are not substantially similar to (Opp. at 6-7, FAC Ex. B.) 26 27 28 1 The bulk of Plaintiff’s opposition is devoted to the assertion that the validity of its claims cannot be analyzed prior to summary judgment. (Opp. at 2, 4, 5-6, 8-9, 12-15.) 4 1 Mercado’s Sanctuary Series candles. 2 enough to grant Indio’s motion to dismiss. 3 Mercado’s implicit concession, however, it does not appear that the 4 two lines of candles are substantially similar. 5 That alone would be reason Even putting aside As an initial matter, the elements identified by Mercado are 6 not all protectable. 7 elements before applying the extrinsic test. 8 Entertainment, Inc., 616 F.3d 904, 913 (9th Cir. 2010.) 9 seeks protection for artwork with the “appearance of cathedral The court must filter out the unprotected Mattel, Inc. v. MGA Mercado 10 window-shaped stained glass.” 11 depicting a stained-glass cathedral window, is not copyrightable. 12 Feist, 499 U.S. at 344-45; 13 Cir. 2003) (“[N]o copyright protection may be afforded to the idea 14 of producing a glass-in-glass jellyfish sculpture.”). 15 An idea alone, such as the idea of Satava v. Lowry, 323 F.3d 805, 810 (9th To the extent that Mercado argues that the shape of the 16 artwork is a protectable element of expression, the court 17 disagrees. 18 on the additional artwork of the border with the stained glass 19 cathedral window shape.” (emphasis added)).) 20 (i.e., scenes a faire) and unoriginal components are not 21 protectable. 22 822-23; Dream Games of Arizona, Inc. v. PV Onsite, 561 F.3d 983, 23 988 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[E]lements of expression that necessarily 24 follow from an idea, or expressions that are as a practical matter, 25 indispensable or at least standard in the treatment of an idea are 26 [also] not protected.” (internal quotation and alteration 27 omitted.)). 28 unprotected) image of a religious figure is hardly an original or (See Opp. at 7 (“The copyright cause of action is based Standard features Mattel, 616 F.3d at 913–14; Cavalier, 297 F.3d at The placement of a border around an (admittedly 5 1 unique expression. 2 conical shape in a depiction of a religious icon in any way novel 3 or groundbreaking. 4 “cathedral window shape,” the bullet-type design is a widespread 5 and longstanding staple of devotional iconography, to which Mercado 6 can lay no copyright claim. Nor is the use of a “bullet,” arched, or As evinced by Plaintiff’s own use of the term 7 Thus, the only protectable element of expression to which to 8 apply the extrinsic test is Mercado’s border artwork design itself. 9 The extent of copyright protection afforded to an idea or element 10 depends on the possible range of expression of that idea or 11 element. 12 copyright protection is “thinner,” and a work must be “virtually 13 identical” to infringe. 14 expression is broad, substantial similarity is sufficient to 15 establish infringement. 16 Indio’s assertion that there is but a narrow range of potential 17 expression for border artwork. 18 ways” to design a border, Indio’s work need only be substantially 19 similar to Mercado’s design. 20 Mattel, 616 F.3d at 913-14. Where the range is narrow, Where the range of possible Id. Id. Here, the court disagrees with Because there are “gazillions of Id. Indio’s border artwork design is not, however, substantially 21 similar to Mercado’s design. Mercado’s border design features five 22 colors in roughly equal proportions, fairly large rectangles and 23 semicircles in a symmetrical arrangement, and the name of the 24 particular religious figure within the border itself. 25 design is primarily blue, contains a large number of irregular 26 shapes laid out in a somewhat jumbled and asymmetrical pattern, 27 contains a distinctive, inset image of a dove or angel at the top 28 of the border, and does not incorporate any text. 6 Indio’s 1 Because the protected elements of Mercado’s expression are not 2 similar to Indio’s expression, Mercado cannot state a viable 3 copying claim. 4 dismissed, with prejudice. Mercado’s copyright claim must therefore be 5 B. 6 Mercado’s trade dress claim under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Trade Dress 7 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), as currently pled, is premised upon the 8 same facts as its copyright claim. 9 Sanctuary Series trade dress as “a depiction of a saint or other 10 religious icon, with a border that appears to be a “bullet” shape 11 in the style of a stained glass window and the name of the saint or 12 the religious icon underneath the depiction.” 13 explained above, these are the same elements for which Mercado 14 seeks copyright protection. 15 claims allege that Indio attempts to confuse consumers and to pass 16 its own candles off as Mercado candles. 17 The FAC describes Mercado’s (FAC ¶ 21.) As Both the copyright and trade dress (FAC ¶¶ 31, 36-37.) The Supreme Court has cautioned that the Lanham Act should not 18 be overextended into areas traditionally covered by copyright law. 19 Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Cent. Fox Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 34 (2003). 20 To the extent that the Copyright Act provides an adequate remedy, 21 therefore, Lanham Act claims are preempted. 22 F.2d 1353, 1364-65 (9th Cir. 1990); Salt Optics, Inc. v. Jand, 23 Inc., No. SACV 10-828, 2010 WL 4961702 at *7 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 19, 24 2010). 25 Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 Mercado’s opposition to Indio’s preemption argument is 26 puzzling. Mercado merely and conclusorily states that “Defendant 27 has engaged in wrongful conduct under both the Lanham Act and the 28 Copyright Act.” This naked assertion, however, is insufficient to 7 1 sustain Mercado’s Lanham Act claim. Apparently recognizing as 2 much, Mercado argues that there is an independent basis for its 3 trade dress claim because “Plaintiff has discovered instances of 4 Defendant selling Plaintiff’s candles bearing Plaintiff’s trade 5 dress inside boxes bearing Defendant’s name.” 6 Declaration of R. Joseph Decker ¶ 2.) 7 mention of these facts. 8 attempting to pass off its candles as Mercado products, the only 9 basis for that allegation is that “Defendants have placed their (Opp. at 13; The FAC, however, makes no While the FAC does allege that Indio is 10 infringing Defendants’ Candles in direct competition with Mercado’s 11 Sanctuary Series.” 12 allegations regarding false packaging or repackaging of Mercado 13 candles. 14 leave to amend.2 (FAC ¶ 37.) Nowhere does the FAC state any Mercado’s trade dress claim is therefore dismissed, with 15 C. 16 Mercado’s opposition suggests that the remaining trademark Remaining claims 17 claim and state law interference with economic advantage claim are 18 also premised upon Indio’s re-boxing of Mercado candles in Indio 19 boxes.3 20 includes no such allegations. 21 leave to amend. 22 IV. (Opp. at 14-15; Decker Decl. ¶ 2.) The FAC, however, These claims are dismissed with Conclusion 23 24 25 26 2 Mercado’s unfair competition claim, which is also based on Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, is based upon the same facts as its trade dress claim, and is therefore also dismissed with leave to amend. 3 27 28 Plaintiff does not dispute that, to the extent its intentional interference claim overlaps with its copyright claim, the state law claim is preempted. See Wild, 788 F.Supp.2d at 11101111. 8 1 For the reasons stated above, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is 2 GRANTED. Plaintiff’s copyright claim is dismissed with prejudice. 3 All other claims are dismissed with leave to amend. 4 complaint shall be filed within ten days of the date of this order. Any amended 5 6 7 8 9 IT IS SO ORDERED. 10 11 12 Dated: June 12, 2013 DEAN D. PREGERSON United States District Judge 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 9

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