Debra Cox et al v. Princess Cruise Lines Ltd et al
ORDER re: Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment 86 by Judge Ronald S.W. Lew. The Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. Because Plaintiff's admissible evidence creates a genuine issue of material fact for each element of negligence, Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff's negligence claim is DENIED. Because Defendant is not a "person engaged in the business of selling [the ramp at issue] for use or consumption," Defendant is not subject to Plaintiff's strict product liability claim as a matter of law. The Court therefore GRANTS Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff's strict liability claim. (jre)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
12 DEBRA COX,
16 PRINCESS CRUISE LINES,
CV-13-01765 RSWL (JEMx)
ORDER re: Defendant’s
Motion for Summary
Currently before the Court is Defendant Princess
Cruise Lines, Ltd.’s (“Defendant” or “Princess”) Motion
for Summary Judgment, or in the alternative for Partial
Summary Judgment, or in the alternative for an Order
Treating Specified Facts as Established 
Defendant’s Motion  arises out of
Plaintiff Debra Cox’s (“Plaintiff” or “Cox”) action
against Princess for claims of negligence and strict
1 liability in tort for an injury Plaintiff suffered
2 while traversing over a handicap accessible ramp
3 provided by Defendant on a cruise ship owned and
4 operated by Defendant.
First Amend. Compl. (“FAC”) ¶¶
5 8-26, ECF No. 32.
The Court, having reviewed all papers submitted and
7 pertaining to Defendant’s Motion , NOW FINDS AND
8 RULES AS FOLLOWS: The Court GRANTS in part and DENIES
9 in part Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment .
Plaintiff alleges that on October 24, 2012,
13 Plaintiff embarked on a fourteen-day round-trip cruise
14 from Los Angeles, California, to Hawaii aboard the
15 Golden Princess, a cruise ship owned and operated by
FAC ¶ 8.
Plaintiff has a disability
17 consisting of a below-the-right-knee leg amputation,
18 and she relies on a mobility scooter for
Id. ¶ 9.
Prior to embarking on the
20 cruise, Plaintiff advised Defendant of her disability
21 and of her need for a handicap accessible room.
22 Defendant Princess accommodated Plaintiff by placing
23 her in a handicap, wheelchair accessible cabin with a
To allow disabled passengers to access
25 the balcony from the cabin, Defendant supplied a ramp
26 that enables wheelchairs and mobility scooters to go
These facts are supplied merely for context and are not
“findings of facts.”
1 over the cabin door threshold and outside to the
Id. ¶ 8.
The ramp consists of two metal
3 wedges that are not attached to each other or anything
4 else, but that merely sit on either side of a sliding5 door threshold between the cabin room and an outdoor
See Def.’s Mot. 4:12-17; Poczynock Decl. ¶ 9;
7 FAC ¶¶ 18-19.
A metal flap attached to one side of the
8 ramp must be flipped over to rest across the gap
9 between the two wedge pieces before a wheelchair or
10 scooter traverses the ramp.
11 Cuaresma Decl. 20-34.
See Tabale Decl. 23-43;
One wedge is placed inside the
12 cabin, on carpeted flooring, while the other wedge is
13 placed on the outdoor deck, which has hard plastic
See Poczynock Decl. ¶¶ 12, 16.
Plaintiff alleges that two days into her cruise, on
16 October 26, 2012, Plaintiff used the ramp to go out
17 onto the cabin balcony.
Id. ¶ 10.
On her way back
18 into the cabin, Plaintiff alleges that the ramp pulled
19 apart, which caused Plaintiff’s mobility scooter to tip
20 over, resulting in a displaced intertrochanteric
21 fracture of Plaintiff’s right femur.
22 and other facts, Plaintiff alleges claims of negligence
23 and strict liability against Defendant.
Id. ¶¶ 7-26.
Plaintiff and her husband, Ted Cox, filed the
26 instant Action against Defendant Princess on March 12,
27 2013 alleging several claims , some of which have
28 subsequently been dismissed .
On October 30, 2013,
1 the Court granted  Plaintiffs’ request for leave to
2 file a first amended complaint.
Plaintiffs’ FAC ,
3 filed November 5, 2013, alleged Negligence and Strict
4 Liability in Tort against Defendant Princess and then5 Defendant Fincantieri-Cantieri Navali Italiana S.p.A.,
6 the Italian company that built the Golden Princess,
7 including the ramp at issue in this case.
8 Fincantieri filed a Motion to Dismiss for lack of
9 personal jurisdiction  on April 7, 2014, which the
10 Court granted  on May 30, 2014.
On June 15, 2015, Defendant filed the present
12 Motion for Summary Judgment  as to both claims
13 asserted against it by Plaintiff.
The Opposition 
14 and Reply  were timely filed.
The Motion  was
15 set for hearing on August 13, 2015, and was taken under
16 submissions  on August 6, 2015.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
A “court shall grant summary judgment” when the
19 movant “shows that there is no genuine dispute as to
20 any material fact and the movant is entitled to
21 judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
22 The party moving for summary judgment has the initial
23 burden of proof to show no genuine dispute as to any
24 material fact.
Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz
25 Cos., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102-03 (9th Cir. 2000); see Fed.
26 R. Civ. P. 56(a).
The burden then shifts to the non-
27 moving party to produce admissible evidence showing a
28 triable issue of fact.
Fritz, 210 F.3d at 1102-03; see
1 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
When a defendant moves for
2 summary judgment, summary judgment “is appropriate when
3 the plaintiff fails to make a showing sufficient to
4 establish the existence of an element essential to
5 [her] case, and on which [she] will bear the burden of
6 proof at trial.”
Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp.,
7 526 U.S. 795, 805–06 (1999).
Request for Judicial Notice
Plaintiff requests that the Court take judicial
11 notice of a print-out of a page on Princess’s website
12 that advertises the “Princess AcessSM” program.
13 Requ. Judicial Not. 1, Ex. A, ECF No. 99-20.
14 Plaintiff’s request is DENIED AS MOOT because the fact
15 and content of the print-out are not relevant to the
16 Court’s determination of the present Motion for Summary
Fed. R. Evid. 201(b); see Story, No. 2:14-
18 cv-02422-JAM-DAD, 2015 WL 2339437, at *1 (E.D. Cal. May
19 13, 2015) (denying a request for judicial notice when
20 the material underlying the request was found not
21 relevant to the issues presented by the motion).
Both Plaintiff and Defendant make evidentiary
Pl.’s Evid. Objs., ECF No. 99-19; Pl.’s
25 Evid. Objs., ECF No. 103; Def.’s Evid. Objs., ECF No.
Because the Court only relies on admissible
1 evidence to determine a motion for summary judgment,2 to
2 the extent the parties object to evidence relied upon
3 by the Court, the objections are OVERRULED.3
Motion for Summary Judgment
Plaintiff’s claims are governed by federal maritime
See Order re: Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss
Regarding Defendant’s objections to the Rule 26 Reports on
8 hearsay grounds, the Court need not rely on the reports
themselves to determine the present Motion, and thus the
9 objections are OVERRULED AS MOOT, but, nevertheless, see Fed. Rs.
10 Evid. 702-705; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4); 28 U.S.C. § 1746; HTI
Holdings, Inc. v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., No. 10-cv-06021-TC,
2011 WL 4595799, at *3 (D. Or. Aug. 24, 2011) (in the context of
summary judgment, overruling a hearsay objection to an expert
report because “under Fed. R. Evid. 703, hearsay is admissible as
a type of fact or data reasonably relied upon by an expert”);
Reynolds v. Ala. Dep’t of Transp., No. 2:85cv665-MHT(WO), 2013 WL
6230491, at *9 n.8 (M.D. Ala. Dec. 2, 2013) (implying that an
expert report could be considered at summary judgment if the
expert provided affidavit attesting to his conclusions in the
report); see also Hayes v. Douglas Dynamics, Inc., 8 F.3d 88, 92
(1st Cir. 1993) (“[N]onmovants may rely on the affidavits of
experts in order to defeat a motion for summary judgment.”);
Smith v. Prudential Ins. CO. of Am., 864 F. Supp. 2d 654, 659
(M.D. Tenn. 2012) (stating that unsworn expert reports may not be
considered at the summary judgment stage, but that expert
testimony may be considered in summary judgment proceedings
“through an affidavit or declaration that satisfies the general
requirements . . . in Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4)).
See, e.g., Caldwell v. City of Selma, No.
1:13–cv–00465–SAB, 2015 WL 1897806, at *2 n.2 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 16,
2015) (overruling evidentiary objections in a summary judgment
context because the Court “relied only on admissible evidence”
and stating that “[i]t is not the practice of the Court to rule
on evidentiary matters individually in the context of summary
judgment, unless otherwise noted,” which “is particularly true
when the evidentiary objections consist of general objections
such as relevance”); Capital Records, LLC v. BlueBeat, Inc., 765
F. Supp. 2d 1198, 1200 n.1 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (stating that the
Court would not “scrutinize each objection and give a full
analysis of each argument raised,” and that “[t]o the extent that
the Court relied on objected-to evidence, it relied only on
admissible evidence and, therefore, the objections are
1 Portions of Plaintiff’s Complaint 5:1-6:6 (June 25,
2 2013), ECF No. 22 (holding that federal maritime law
3 applies to Plaintiff’s claims in this action).
The elements of a negligence cause of action in an
6 admiralty case are: 1) the existence of a duty of care
7 owed by the defendant to the plaintiff; 2) breach of
8 that duty of care; 3) a causal connection between the
9 offending conduct and the resulting injury (“proximate
10 cause”); and 4) actual loss, injury, or damage suffered
11 by the plaintiff.
Ravins v. Alvarez, Nos. CV 01–4003
12 NM (MANx), CV 03–5793 NM, 2004 WL 5642455, at *8 (C.D.
13 Cal. July 29, 2004) (citing Pearce v. United States,
14 261 F.3d 643, 647–48 (6th Cir. 2001)); see also Cape
15 Flattery Ltd. v. Titan Maritime LLC, 607 F. Supp. 2d
16 1179, 1189 (D. Haw. 2009).
“The question of the existence of a duty is a
19 matter of law . . . .”
20 912 n.8 (9th Cir. 1994).
Sutton v. Earles, 26 F.3d 903,
“[A] a shipowner owes a duty
21 of reasonable care to those aboard the ship who are not
22 crew members.”
In re Catalina Cruises, Inc., 137 F.3d
23 1422, 1425 (9th Cir. 1998).
Because Plaintiff was a
24 non-crewmember aboard Defendant’s ship, Defendant owed
25 Plaintiff at least “a duty of reasonable care.”
26 Catalina Cruises, Inc., 137 F.3d at 1425.
“The degree of care required is always that which
1 is reasonable, but the application of reasonable will
2 of course change with the circumstances of each
3 particular case.”
4 F.3d at 1425.
In re Catalina Cruises, Inc., 137
“‘What is required ... is merely the
5 conduct of the reasonable man of ordinary prudence
6 under the circumstances, and the greater danger, or the
7 greater responsibility, is merely one of the
8 circumstances, demanding only an increased amount of
9 care. In some instances, reasonable care under the
10 circumstances may be a very high degree of care; in
11 other instances, it may be something less.’”
12 other words, the greater the foreseeable risk, the
13 greater the care and precaution required for a finding
14 of reasonable care.4
Plaintiff argues various theories of breach.
16 theory is that Defendant breached its duty of care to
17 Plaintiff by supplying Plaintiff with an obviously
18 unsafe ramp because the ramp consisted of two wedges
19 that did not connect to each other or anything else,
21 *3 (S.D.N.Y.e.g., Jaffess v. (“‘TheLines, Inc., 1988 the 42049, at
Apr. 22, 1988)
extent to which
22 circumstances surrounding maritime travel are different from
those encountered in daily life and involve more danger to the
passenger, will determine how high a degree of care is reasonable
in each case.’”). Plaintiff’s admissible evidence establishes a
triable issue of fact as to whether Defendant was subject to a
higher degree of care due to the greater risk and danger of the
location (a ship at sea), Plaintiff’s characteristics (a
handicapped individual), the chattel at issue (a ramp upon which
a handicapped individual will traverse), and the location of the
chattel at issue (extending from an outside balcony exposed to
outdoor conditions into a cruise ship cabin). See In re
Catalina Cruises, Inc., 137 F.3d at 1425.
1 and one side of the ramp was placed on a surface
2 without sufficient friction to hold that section of the
3 ramp in place when used for its intended purpose.
4 Poczynok Decl. ¶ 9, 12, 15-16.; Debra Cox Decl. 72-76.
5 Plaintiff argues that because Defendant supplied and
6 installed the ramp, Defendant was on notice of the
7 ramp’s unsafe condition.
Plaintiff’s admissible evidence is sufficient to
9 create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether
10 Defendant’s act of supplying Plaintiff with the
11 unconnected ramp pieces and placing one of those ramp
12 pieces on a hard plastic outdoor deck created a
13 dangerous condition, or an unreasonable risk, that
14 Defendant failed to take appropriate measures to
See, e.g., Dupuis v. Marriot Corp., No.
16 3:12–CV–00580–AC, 2014 WL 199096, at *8-*9 (D. Or. Jan.
17 15, 2014) (finding that when the parties disputed
18 whether a revolving door posed an unreasonable risk to
19 those passing through the door, and whether the
20 defendant took appropriate measures to address that
21 risk, that summary judgment on that issue was not
22 appropriate because “whether a risk was foreseeable and
23 whether the defendant’s conduct was reasonable are
24 empirical questions that should only be decided by the
25 court in extreme cases” (internal quotation marks
With regard to notice,5 Plaintiff’s admissible
2 evidence is sufficient to create a genuine issue of
3 material fact as to whether Defendant had at least
4 constructive notice of the dangerous condition of the
See Deykina v. Chattin, No. 12–CV–2678
6 (ARR)(CLP), 2014 WL 4628692 at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 15,
7 2014)(“Even if defendant lacked actual notice of a
8 structural defect . . . plaintiff could still recover
9 if a jury concluded that defendant should have known
10 about the defect.”).
“‘To constitute constructive notice, a defect must
12 be visible and apparent and it must exist for a
13 sufficient length of time prior to the accident to
14 permit [the defendant] to discover and remedy it.’”
15 Deykina v. Chattin, 2014 WL 4628692 at *8.
16 Defendant supplied and installed the ramp, Defendant
17 knew about the ramp, the disconnected nature of the
18 ramp, the fact that one side of the ramp was placed on
19 hard flooring on an outdoor deck, and that the ramp was
20 intended to be used by a handicapped individual in a
21 wheelchair or motorized scooter.
The alleged defects
22 of the ramp and the ramp’s placement were all “visible
23 and apparent” to Defendant and existed for a long
24 enough period of time for Defendant to know about them
“Under maritime law, . . . a defendant is generally not
liable for negligence unless it had actual or constructive notice
of the particular hazard that led to the injury.” Mansoor v.
ZAANDAM M/V, 274 F. App’x 553, at *1 (9th Cir. 2008).
1 and do something to mitigate the risk.
2 2014 WL 4628692 at *8-*9 (“Here, there can be no
3 question that an alleged structural defect in the
4 stairs existed for a sufficient length of time prior to
5 the accident . . . .”); See Eidem v. Target Corp., 2011
6 WL 3756144 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2011) (noting that
7 evidence of “notice” is required to ensure that
8 defendant had “notice of the defect in sufficient time
9 to correct [the defect]”).
As such, Plaintiff’s admissible evidence
11 establishes a triable issue of fact as to whether
12 Defendant was on at least constructive notice of the
13 allegedly dangerous condition created by the ramp and
14 the ramp’s placement.
See, e.g., Deykina, 2014 WL
15 4628692 at *8 (noting that when a plaintiff alleges a
16 “readily obvious structural defect,” summary judgment
17 for the defendant is improper even if actual notice is
18 not established); Smith v. N.Y. Enter. Am., Inc., No.
19 06 Civ. 3082(PKL), 2008 WL 2810182, at *6 (S.D.N.Y.
20 July 21, 2008) (“‘[I]t is a matter of simple logic
21 whether [a certain fact scenario] may create a
22 hazardous and unsafe condition and that determination
23 should be for the finder of fact . . . .’”).
In light of the above analysis, the Court finds
25 that Plaintiff’s admissible evidence establishes a
26 genuine issue of material fact as to whether Defendant
1 breached a duty of reasonable care owed to Plaintiff.6
2 See Spry v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 951 F.2d 362 (9th
3 Cir. 1991) (affirming a finding of constructive notice
4 based upon a finding that there was a condition on the
5 ship that was unsafe because the condition “could
6 prevent a person from stepping on a secure, non-slip
7 surface” and because the “condition existed for a
8 sufficient time prior to plaintiff’s fall” to charge
9 defendant with constructive notice of the unsafe
“Causation in fact is one necessary element of
13 proximate cause.”
USAir Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Navy,
14 14 F.3d 1410, 1412-13 (9th Cir. 1994).
15 Plaintiff’s admissible evidence creates a genuine issue
16 of material fact as to whether Defendant’s alleged
17 negligence was the cause-in-fact of Plaintiff’s injury.
Defendant argues that because Princess “simply placed the
ramp (which the shipyard had provided) on the intended balcony
floor surface (which the shipyard also provided),” Princess
cannot be liable for breach of a duty of reasonable care. Def.’s
Reply 6:20-28. Such logic is unsound; just because another
entity built the product does not mean the party supplying the
product is immune from negligence liability. For example, if the
Supplier knew or should have known that the product had some
characteristic that made it unsafe, and yet provided the product
to the User without taking reasonable care to ensure the User’s
safety, the Supplier can certainly be liable for negligence, even
if the Supplier did not build the product at issue. See, e.g.,
Spry v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 951 F.2d 362 (9th Cir. 1991)
(affirming negligence liability based upon an unsafe condition in
the design of the stairs of a cruise ship based upon the
defendant’s constructive notice of the unsafe condition and
failure to take reasonable precautions to keep passengers safe).
1 Plaintiff’s admissible evidence supports a finding that
2 because the balcony-side portion of the ramp was not
3 connected to anything and was placed on a hard flooring
4 with insufficient friction, the ramp pulled apart
5 during Plaintiff’s foreseeable use of the ramp, which
6 caused Plaintiff to lose her balance, reach for help,
7 and fall to her injury.
See Poczynock Decl.; Debra Cox
In other words, “but for” Defendant’s alleged
9 negligence, Plaintiff’s injury would not have occurred.
10 See USAir Inc., 14 F.3d at 1412-13 (stating that
11 “causation in fact asks whether negligent conduct was
12 necessary antecedent to the injury without which the
13 injury would not have occurred).
“The ‘larger, more abstract question’” is whether
15 Defendant’s alleged negligence was a proximate cause of
16 Plaintiff’s injuries, “that is, whether [the Defendant]
17 should be held liable for negligently causing [the
18 Plaintiff’s] injuries.”
Id. at 1413.
19 includes the rule that an unforeseeable, intervening
20 cause (i.e., a “superseding cause”) of a plaintiff’s
21 injury cuts off the defendant’s liability for that
22 injury, even if the defendant’s actions were the cause23 in-fact of the plaintiff’s injury.
Id. (“A superseding
24 cause must be something more than a subsequent act in a
25 chain of causation; it must be an act that was not
26 reasonably foreseeable at the time of the defendant's
27 negligent conduct.”).
Here, Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s shifting of
1 her weight and reaching for something to steady herself
2 was a superseding cause that cut off Defendant’s
Def.’s Reply 10:1-7.
4 admissible evidence creates a genuine issue of material
5 fast as to whether Plaintiff’s movement was a
6 foreseeable act in the chain of causation.
7 Plaintiff’s actions were foreseeable, Defendant’s
8 negligence would be the proximate cause of Plaintiff’s
See USAir Inc., 14 F.3d at 1413.
Plaintiff alleges physical injury, and Defendant
12 does not dispute the fact that Plaintiff was injured.
13 See FAC ¶ 10.
Because Plaintiff’s admissible evidence creates a
15 genuine issue of material fact for each element of
16 negligence, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment as
17 to Plaintiff’s negligence claim is DENIED.
Under strict liability, “fault lies in the placing
Strict Liability Claim
20 of a defective product in the stream of commerce” that,
21 when “used in a reasonably foreseeable way” injures the
Emerson G.M. Diesel, Inc. v. Alaskan
23 Enters., 732 F.2d 1468, 1473 (9th Cir. 1984).
24 Ninth Circuit uses the standard articulated in Section
25 402-A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts as the
26 applicable expression of strict product liability for
27 admiralty cases.
Pan-Alaska Fisheries, Inc. v. Marine
28 Const. & Design Co., 565 F.2d 1129, 1134 (9th Cir.
Section 402-A states the following:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective
condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or
liability for physical harm thereby caused to
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of
selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the
user or consumer without substantial change
in the condition in which it is sold.
(2)The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies
(a) the seller has exercised all possible
care in the preparation and sale of his
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the
product from or entered into any contractual
relation with the seller.
21 Restatement (Second) Torts § 402-A; Pan-Alaska
22 Fisheries, 565 F.2d at 1135.
Comment “f” to Section 402-A explains that
24 liability “applies to any person engaged in the
25 business of selling products for use or consumption”
26 and is not limited to sellers “engaged solely in the
27 business of selling such products,” but, rather, the
28 defendant must simply be “engaged in [selling the
1 product] as a part of his business,” giving the example
2 of a movie theater that regularly sells candy.
3 Restatement (Second) Torts § 402-A, cmt. f; Pan-Alaska
4 Fisheries, 565 F.2d at 1135.
Defendant argues that as a matter of law, Defendant
6 is not liable for strict product liability because
7 Defendant did not and does not “sell” the allegedly
8 defective ramp. Defendant also argues that because the
9 transaction between Plaintiff and Defendant was
10 primarily for a service, not a product, Defendant is
11 excluded from liability for Plaintiff’s claim.
12 Plaintiff rebuts by arguing that because Defendant
13 designed the ramp, Defendant should be liable.
Upon review of Plaintiff’s admissible evidence, and
15 specifically the Tuck Declaration, the Court finds that
16 Plaintiff does not supply any evidence showing that
17 Defendant designed the ramp itself, including any
18 aspect of the ramp that is alleged to have been
19 dangerous. The Tuck Declaration does support a finding
20 that Princess directed the shipbuilder as to certain
21 aspects of the ship design, including characteristics
22 of the portable ramps, such as the slope of the ramps,
23 but there is no evidence that Princess designed the
Additionally, Plaintiff does not
24 actual ramp itself.
25 allege that Defendant sold the ramp to her but admits
See Tuck Dep. 49:19-70:17.
For instance, there is no evidence Princess chose to use
28 two unconnected wedge pieces as the ramp.
1 that Defendant merely provided the ramp to her for her
2 use while a passenger on the cruise ship.
Because Defendant is not a “person engaged in the
4 business of selling [the ramp at issue] for use or
5 consumption,” Defendant is not subject to Plaintiff’s
6 strict product liability claim as a matter of law.
7 Pan-Alaska Fisheries, 565 F.2d at 1135. The Court
8 therefore GRANTS Defendant’s Motion for Summary
9 Judgment as to Plaintiff’s strict liability claim.
Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS in part
12 and DENIES in part Defendant’s Motion for Summary
13 Judgment .
19 Plaintiff was forwhether the atransaction between Defendant and
service, a reasonable jury could
only conclude from the facts that the transaction between
Defendant and Plaintiff was for a service, and not for the ramp
21 as a product, as Plaintiff did not purchase the ramp from
Defendant but, rather, Defendant supplied the ramp to Plaintiff
See In re Dow Corning
Corp., 220 F. App’x 457, 2007 WL 186303 at *1 (9th Cir. 2007)
(stating that strict liability is not extended to “transactions
whose primary objective is obtaining services” and “where the
transaction’s service aspect predominates and any product sale is
merely incidental to the provision of the service” (internal
quotation marks omitted)); Haynes v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp.,
423 F. Supp. 2d 1073, 1085 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (“The defendant did
not just provide the decedent with a seat to use, rather, it
provided the decedent with transportation services from Chicago
to Los Angeles, and the use of the seats was incidental to those
22 as incidental to the cruise ship services.
The Court DENIES Defendant’s Motion for Summary
2 Judgment with regard to Plaintiff’s negligence claim.
The Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion for Summary
4 Judgment with regard to Plaintiff’s strict liability
7 IT IS SO ORDERED.
9 DATED: August 25, 2015
HONORABLE RONALD S.W. LEW
Senior U.S. District Judge
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