Victoria Urenia et al v. Public Storage et al
Filing
109
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., PUBLIC STORAGE, AND MICHAEL ANZS MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT 63 . 64 .(SEE FOOTNOTE 3: The motion to dismiss filed against Ms. Corona (Docket No. 64) is moot.) by Judge Dean D. Pregerson . (lc) Modified on 11/6/2014. (lc).
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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VICTORIA URENIA, an
individual; SOLEDAD CORONA,
an individual,
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Plaintiffs,
v.
PUBLIC STORAGE, a real
estate investment trust;
CITY OF LOS ANGELES, a
governmental entity; BANK OF
AMERICA, N.A.; MICHAEL ANZ,
Defendants.
___________________________
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Case No. CV 13-01934 DDP (AJWx)
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND
DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS BANK
OF AMERICA, N.A., PUBLIC STORAGE,
AND MICHAEL ANZ’S MOTION TO
DISMISS PLAINTIFFS’ FIRST AMENDED
COMPLAINT
[DKT. NO. 63, 64]
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Presently before the Court is Defendants Bank of America,
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N.A., Public Storage, and Michael Anz’s motion to dismiss
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Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint (the “Motion”). (Docket Nos.
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63, 64.) For the reasons stated in this Order, the Motion is
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GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
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I. Background
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A. Procedural Background
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This action was originally filed by Victoria Urenia and
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Soledad Corona against Bank of America, N.A., Public Storage,
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Michael Anz, and the City of Los Angeles (collectively,
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“Defendants”) regarding the foreclosure of Ms. Corona’s home and
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the storage of her personal belongings from that home at a Public
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Storage facility. (See Docket No. 1.) The action purported to be a
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class action. (Id.) The Court granted in part and denied in part
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the motion to dismiss the original complaint, with leave to amend.
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(Docket No. 59.) Upon amendment, three new plaintiffs were added to
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this action: Cathelene Hughes, Javier Hernandez, and Brenda
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Hernandez.1 (See First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), Docket No. 60.)
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The City of Los Angeles answered. (Docket No. 61.) Bank of America,
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Public Storage, and Anz (collectively, “Private Defendants”) then
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filed the Motion. (Docket No. 63, 64.)2 After the Motion was filed,
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Victoria Urenia, Soledad Corona, and Cathelene Hughes were
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dismissed from the action without prejudice after the Court held a
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hearing on Plaintiffs’ counsel’s motion to withdraw as attorney for
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those three plaintiffs. (See Docket Nos. 100, 105.) Therefore, the
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only remaining plaintiffs are Javier Hernandez and Brenda Hernandez
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(collectively, “Plaintiffs”). Accordingly, the Court will address
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the sufficiency of the FAC with respect to these Plaintiffs only.3
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B. Factual Background
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In the Court's prior order ruling on the motion to dismiss
the original complaint in this action, the Court expressed some
skepticism as to whether the action would be able to proceed as a
class action, though the Court did not rule on the issue of class
certification at that time. Perhaps in an attempt to demonstrate
the potential for class claims, these three new plaintiffs were
added.
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Private Defendants actually filed two motions: one as to Ms.
Corona’s claims (Docket No. 64) and one as to the claims of Ms.
Urenia, Ms. Hughes, and the Hernandezes (Docket No. 63).
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The motion to dismiss filed against Ms. Corona (Docket No.
64) is moot.
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Plaintiffs Javier Hernandez and his sister Brenda Hernandez
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were the owners of real property located at 14620 Leadwell Street,
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Van Nuys, California 91405 (the “Property”) and secured by a deed
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of trust from Countrywide Bank, N.A. (FAC ¶¶ 5-6, 130.) Countrywide
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recorded a notice of default against the Hernandezes in 2008. (Id.
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¶ 131.) Bank of America later asserted ownership of the loan as
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Countrywide’s successor. (Id. ¶ 132.) A trustee’s sale was recorded
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in 2011. (Id. ¶ 133.) Plaintiffs allege that after the sale,
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Plaintiffs were threatened with the deportation of their father if
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they refused to vacate the Property. (Id. ¶ 134.) Plaintiffs
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refused to vacate, and their father was deported. (Id. ¶ 135.)
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Javier Hernandez then joined the Occupy Fights Foreclosures
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(“OFF”) group and began to participate in their meetings and
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demonstrations, including events at Ms. Corona’s home and at the
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Property. (Id. ¶¶ 136-40, 168.) Plaintiffs allege that Los Angeles
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Police Department (“LAPD”) officers would monitor OFF and its
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members by finding out about events and protests through social
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media, then showing up at the events, demanding identification of
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those present, and sharing the identities of the protestors with
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Bank of America. (Id. ¶ 170.) Plaintiffs allege that Bank of
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America would then plan immediate lockouts of those individuals
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involved in the protests. (Id.) Further, Plaintiffs allege that
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LAPD commanded that no one was allowed to photograph or videotape
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what was happening at the protests and that LAPD would remove signs
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placed on the Property as part of the protests. (Id. ¶ 173, 182.)
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As the holiday season in 2012 approached, Plaintiffs allege
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that Bank of America represented through media outlets that it
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would put a halt to foreclosure evictions during the holidays. (Id.
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¶ 141.) Nevertheless, Plaintiffs allege that they were locked out
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of the Property on December 27, 2012 by Bank of America, LAPD, and
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the Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department (“LASD”) after LAPD and LASD
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“stormed” the Property with 50 to 200 armed officers at
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approximately 4:00 or 5:00 AM. (Id. ¶¶ 142-43.) All persons at the
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Property, including Javier and at least 8 other individuals, were
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forcibly removed from the Property. (Id. ¶ 146.) A “clean up crew”
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then came and removed all of their personal belongings from the
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Property without letting Plaintiffs or others retrieve any
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belongings. (Id. ¶ 147.) Plaintiffs allege that there was no valid
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search or seizure warrant for the Property. (Id. ¶ 145.) Plaintiffs
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allege that later, Javier Hernandez was forced to sign a storage
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rental agreement with Public Storage and pay $250.00 in order to
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see his personal property again and that upon gaining access to his
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belongings, he discovered that much of the property was damaged or
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missing. (Id. ¶ 152.)
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Plaintiffs bring a variety of claims arising out of these
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events. Plaintiffs allege violations of the First Amendment, Fourth
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Amendment, RICO, the Sherman Act, and Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §
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17200. Plaintiffs purportedly bring all of their claims on behalf
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of a class of similarly situated individuals who have been
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subjected to the same alleged acts that Plaintiffs experienced.
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II. Legal Standard
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A complaint will survive a motion to dismiss when it contains
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“sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to
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relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
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662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
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570 (2007)). When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court must
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“accept as true all allegations of material fact and must construe
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those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Resnick
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v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000). Although a complaint
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need not include “detailed factual allegations,” it must offer
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“more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me
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accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Conclusory allegations or
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allegations that are no more than a statement of a legal conclusion
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“are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id. at 679. In other
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words, a pleading that merely offers “labels and conclusions,” a
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“formulaic recitation of the elements,” or “naked assertions” will
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not be sufficient to state a claim upon which relief can be
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granted. Id. at 678 (citations and internal quotation marks
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omitted).
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“When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court
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should assume their veracity and then determine whether they
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plausibly give rise to an entitlement of relief.” Id. at 679.
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Plaintiffs must allege “plausible grounds to infer” that their
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claims rise “above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at
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555. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for
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relief” is a “context-specific task that requires the reviewing
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court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal,
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556 U.S. at 679.
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III. Discussion
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As a preliminary matter, it appears that Defendant Michael Anz
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is only personally implicated in the factual allegations regarding
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Ms. Corona and Ms. Urenia. As those plaintiffs are no longer
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involved in this action, there are no remaining allegations that
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involve Mr. Anz. As a result, the Court DISMISSES all claims
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against Defendant Anz. The Court’s remaining analysis, therefore,
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addresses the sufficiency of the FAC as to Bank of America and
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Public Storage only.
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A. Section 1983 Claims
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Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims are based on purported violations of
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Plaintiffs’ First Amendment and Fourth Amendment rights. Private
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Defendants argue first that Plaintiffs’ Section 1983 claims should
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be dismissed as to them because they are not state actors and did
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not act under color of law. “To state a claim under § 1983, a
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plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right
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secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was
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violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a
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person acting under the color of State law.” Long v. County of Los
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Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006).
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Generally, private actors do not act under color of state law.
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Price v. State of Hawaii, 939 F.2d 702, 707-08 (9th Cir. 1991).
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Further, “it is generally not a constitutional violation for a
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police officer to enforce a private entity’s rights.” Villegas v.
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Gilroy Garlic Festival Ass’n, 541 F.3d 950, 957 (9th Cir. 2008).
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Nor does a private party’s invocation of remedies provided by state
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law constitute state action. See Harper v. Federal Land Bank of
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Spokane, 878 F.2d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[T]he fact that a
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state permits the use of foreclosure procedures and subsequent
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sheriff sales as the execution of a judgment is not sufficient to
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constitute state action.”).
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However, there are situations where a private individual or
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entity can be held liable under § 1983 under a joint action theory.
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See Kirtley v. Rainey, 326 F.3d 1088, 1093-95 (9th Cir. 2003); Tsao
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v. Desert Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1128, 1140 (9th Cir. 2012). Joint
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action exists where the state has “so far insinuated itself into a
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position of interdependence with [the private entity] that it must
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be recognized as a joint participant in the challenged activity.”
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Gorenc v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist., 869
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F.2d 503, 507 (9th Cir. 1989) (quoting Burton v. Wilmington Parking
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Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961)).
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The Court previously found that Plaintiffs had sufficiently
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pleaded joint action as to Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment claim. (See
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Docket No. 59.) However, that determination was made with reference
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to the alleged facts regarding Ms. Urenia and Ms. Corona. Since
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those plaintiffs are no longer a part of this action, the Court’s
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prior determination is irrelevant, and the Court must now determine
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whether the allegations regarding the current plaintiffs, Javier
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and Brenda Hernandez, support a plausible claim that Private
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Defendants acted jointly with LAPD such that they may be held
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liable for § 1983 violations.
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1. First Amendment Claim
To state a First Amendment retaliation claim, a plaintiff must
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show: “(1) that the plaintiff was engaged in a constitutionally
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protected activity; (2) that the defendant[’]s actions cause the
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plaintiff to suffer an injury that would chill a person of ordinary
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firmness from continuing to engage in that activity; and (3) that
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the defendant’s adverse action was substantially motivated as a
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response to the plaintiff's exercise of constitutionally protected
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conduct.” Forte v. Jones, 2014 WL 2465606, at *3 (E.D. Cal. 2014);
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see also Worrell v. Henry, 219 F.3d 1197, 1212 (10th Cir. 2000).
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Private Defendants do not challenge that Plaintiffs’ activity at
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OFF protests was protected activity. However, Private Defendants
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argue that no acts by Private Defendants would chill speech and
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that those acts were not motivated by a desire to chill speech.
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The Court finds that Plaintiffs have alleged sufficient facts
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to support their allegation that their First Amendment rights were
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violated. Plaintiffs allege that LAPD and Bank of America
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essentially worked together to effect foreclosures on those
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individuals who were active participants in the OFF movement. LAPD,
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at the request of Bank of America, was present at various protests
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and demanded identification of those present. Then, Bank of America
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allegedly used that information to selectively evict those
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homeowners who participated in the protests. This alleged scheme,
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jointly performed by LAPD and Bank of America, would certainly
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chill a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to protest. If
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presence at an OFF protest meant that individuals would be required
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to show identification to LAPD and that, if they did so, they would
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later be singled out for immediate lock-out by Bank of America, it
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is reasonable to assume that most people would be chilled from
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protesting for fear of losing their homes. The fact that multiple
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individuals were locked out within a short period of time after
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such protests further supports the conclusion that the lock-outs
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were intended to quell further protests against Bank of America and
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the foreclosure process. Further, by using LAPD both to collect
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identifying information and to assist in the lock-out of
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Plaintiffs, Bank of America relied on the authority of state actors
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to accomplish the lock-out. Where police officers do more than
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merely “stand by” in case of trouble, but instead affirmatively
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participate in assisting private actors in effectuating an eviction
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or repossession of property, the private actors may be said to be
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acting under color of law. See Howerton v. Gabica, 708 F.2d 380,
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383-84 (9th Cir. 1983)
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Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ First Amendment
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claim survives the Motion as to Bank of America, and the Motion is
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therefore DENIED as to Bank of America. However, Plaintiffs have
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not alleged sufficient involvement of Public Storage in their First
8
Amendment claim, the Court GRANTS the Motion as to any First
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Amendment claim against Public Storage.
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2. Fourth Amendment Claim
Private Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment
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claim fails because their entry onto the Property and seizure of
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personal property therein was entirely lawful, as they assert that
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Plaintiffs no longer had an interest in the Property. Further,
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Private Defendants argue that there was no joint action.
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As to the first argument, the allegations establish a
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plausible claim that Plaintiffs’ lock-out was not lawful. While
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discovery may prove that Private Defendants had performed all of
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the necessary acts to properly evict Plaintiffs from the Property,
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it is not clear to the Court at this time that Private Defendants
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acted lawfully. The code sections cited by Private Defendants in
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support of this argument pertain only to the storage of personal
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property, and Private Defendants do not address the other aspects
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of Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment claim, including entry into the
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occupied Property and removal of individuals present there.
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Therefore, Private Defendants’ argument in this respect is
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unavailing.
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As to the second argument, the Court previously determined
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that substantial officer involvement in the lock-out process was
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sufficient to support a finding of joint action between LAPD and
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Bank of America. Although the underlying facts pertaining to the
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current Plaintiffs are slightly different, this conclusion remains
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the same. Where police officers do more than merely “stand by” in
7
case of trouble, but instead affirmatively participate in assisting
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private actors in effectuating an eviction or repossession of
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property, the private actors may be said to be acting under color
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of law. Howerton v. Gabica, 708 F.2d 380, 383-84 (9th Cir. 1983)
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(“This case involves more than a single incident of police consent
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to ‘stand by’ in case of trouble. Police were on the scene at each
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step of the eviction... The actions of [the officer] created an
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appearance that the police sanctioned the eviction.” ); see also
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Harris v. City of Roseburg, 664 F.2d 1121, 1127 (9th Cir. 1981)
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(“[T]here may be a deprivation within the meaning of § 1983 ...
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when the officer assists in effectuating a repossession over the
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objection of the debtor.”).
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Here, Plaintiffs’ alleged facts indicate that the LAPD
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officers did more than merely “stand by” when Bank of America
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locked Plaintiffs out of the Property, evicted Plaintiffs from the
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Property, and took possession of Plaintiffs’ personal belongings.
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However, the alleged facts do not demonstrate that Public Storage
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or Michael Anz performed any acts jointly with LAPD officers, such
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that any acts performed by Public Storage were not performed “under
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color of law.” Therefore, the Court DENIES the Motion as to
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Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment claim against Bank of America and
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GRANTS the Motion with leave to amend as to Plaintiffs’ claim
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against Public Storage.
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B. RICO Claims
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The elements of a civil RICO claim are “(1) conduct (2) of an
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enterprise (3) through a pattern (4) of racketeering activity.”
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Rezner v. Bayerische Hypo-Und Vereinsbank AG, 630 F.3d 866, 873
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(9th Cir. 2010). “To have standing under civil RICO, [a plaintiff]
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is required to show that the racketeering activity was both a but-
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for cause and a proximate cause of his injury.” Id. (citing Holmes
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v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268 (1992)). Private
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Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ RICO claim should be dismissed
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because (a) Plaintiffs fail to plead the predicate acts of mail
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fraud and wire fraud with sufficient specificity, and (b) there is
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an insufficient nexus between mail and/or wire fraud and
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Plaintiffs’ alleged injuries in this case to satisfy the standing
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requirement. Further, Private Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’
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RICO conspiracy claim fails because the underlying RICO claim
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fails. Finally, Private Defendants argue that there is no
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cognizable claim for aiding and abetting a civil RICO claim.
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The predicate acts upon which Plaintiffs base their RICO claim
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appear to be mail and/or wire fraud. The purportedly false
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representations at issue here are a bit ambiguous. The alleged
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fraud occurred when Bank of America, after taking Plaintiffs’
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property to Public Storage, sent Plaintiffs a one page “Release via
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Email, Fax and/or US mail ... representing that if the plaintiff
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signs the release they will be able to obtain their property from
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storage.” (FAC ¶ 273.) Plaintiffs allege that this representation
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was false, as Plaintiffs were forced to sign a seven-page lease
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agreement with Public Storage in order to even see their
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belongings. (Id. ¶¶ 273-74.) Further, Plaintiffs include
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generalized allegations regarding other purportedly false
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statements contained in “leases, promotional materials,
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applications, agreements, manuals and correspondence.” (Id. ¶¶ 287-
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88.)
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As to all predicate acts other than the sending of the
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“release” document, Plaintiffs have not alleged mail and/or wire
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fraud with sufficient specificity to satisfy the Rule 9(b) pleading
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standard. Plaintiffs do not allege what documents were sent to
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them, when they were sent, or the specific misrepresentations made
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in those documents.
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As to Plaintiffs’ claim based on the “release” document, the
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Court need not address whether these allegations are sufficiently
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specific to comport with the Rule 9(b) pleading requirements
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because the Court finds that the RICO claim may be dismissed on the
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basis of Private Defendants’ second argument. It is not clear how
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the mail and/or wire fraud at issue here was either the actual or
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the proximate cause of any harm to Plaintiffs. The harm at issue
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here stems from the seizure of Plaintiffs’ items from their home
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and placement in a Public Storage facility. Harm may possibly have
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also resulted from Plaintiffs being forced to sign a purportedly
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adhesive and unconscionable lease agreement. (See id. ¶ 307.) Those
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acts, while potentially unlawful under other claims Plaintiffs may
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have, do not constitute mail fraud or wire fraud. In order to
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establish a fraud claim, Plaintiffs would have to show that they
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suffered harm as a result of relying on the misrepresentations made
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in the “release” documents sent to them. Here, Plaintiffs do not
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allege that any particular harm occurred as a result of the alleged
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misrepresentations; Plaintiffs’ property was already at a Public
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Storage facility by the time any such misrepresentations were made,
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and it is unclear what further harm did or could have occurred by
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reason of a representation. As a result, the Court GRANTS the
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Motion as to Plaintiffs’ RICO claims.
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Plaintiffs also bring a RICO conspiracy claim. (Id. ¶¶ 310-
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17.) As their underlying RICO claim is insufficiently pled, the
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conspiracy claim fails as well. See Howard v. America Online, Inc.,
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208 F.3d 741, 751 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Plaintiffs cannot claim that a
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conspiracy to violate RICO existed if they do not adequately plead
12
a substantive violation of RICO.”). Further, as noted in the
13
Court’s prior order, there is no private right of action for
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“aiding and abetting” RICO violations. Therefore, to the extent
15
that Plaintiffs still attempt to assert such a claim, it must be
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dismissed.
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Therefore, the Court GRANTS the Motion as to all of
Plaintiffs’ RICO claims.
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C. Sherman Act Claims
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A claim under Section 2 of the Sherman Act requires “(1) the
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defendant possessed monopoly power in the relevant market; (2) the
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defendant willfully acquired or maintained that power through
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exclusionary conduct; and (3) the defendant’s conduct caused
24
antitrust injury.” InfoStream Group, Inc. v. PayPal, Inc., 2012 WL
25
3731517, at *4 (N.D. Cal. 2012). Plaintiffs’ Sherman Act claim
26
appears to be based on Public Storage’s alleged monopolization of
27
the self-storage industry through an alleged agreement between
28
Public Storage and Bank of America that all personal property
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1
recovered from homes upon which Bank of America has foreclosed will
2
be taken to a Public Storage facility. Private Defendants argue
3
that Plaintiffs have not stated a claim under Section 2 of the
4
Sherman Act because they have not suffered an antitrust injury.4
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An antitrust injury “means harm to the process of competition
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and consumer welfare.” LiveUniverse, Inc. v. MySpace, Inc., 304 F.
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App’x. 554, 557 (9th Cir. 2008). Plaintiffs allege that they
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sustained an antitrust injury in the following manner: Public
9
Storage, because of its size, was able to offer a very low rental
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rate for the first month ($1 or even $0.01) to Bank of America;
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this induced Bank of America to store personal belongings from
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foreclosed home exclusively at Public Storage. (FAC ¶ 336.) For
13
months subsequent to the introductory rate month, Plaintiffs
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allege, Public Storage is then able to charge a rental rate higher
15
than the market rate because owners of the personal property now
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have no choice but to pay to store their belongings at the Public
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Storage facility. (Id. ¶¶ 341, 344.) It is somewhat unclear whether
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Plaintiffs claim that the antitrust violation was an explicit
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agreement between Public Storage and Bank of America to collude
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regarding storage of foreclosed homeowners’ belongings or whether
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Plaintiffs instead intend to allege that the antitrust violation is
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Public Storage charging a very low introductory rate to induce Bank
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of America to use its storage facilities.
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The Court finds that Plaintiffs have alleged sufficient facts
to support a plausible claim that they suffered an antitrust
26
27
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4
Private Defendants offer a couple of additional arguments in
their reply, but the Court does not consider those arguments, as
they were not raised in the Motion.
14
1
injury. Because of the alleged collusion, which resulted in Public
2
Storage being able to offer very low introductory prices and then
3
locking foreclosed homeowners into higher prices for subsequent
4
months, harms the welfare of these “forced” consumers of self
5
storage services, Plaintiffs may be successful in pursuing their
6
antitrust claims. Therefore, the Court DENIES the Motion as to
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Plaintiffs’ Sherman Act claims.
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D. UCL Claims
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Plaintiffs premise their unfair competition law claim on Bank
10
of America’s alleged practice of “evict[ing] homeowners and
11
search[ing] and seiz[ing] their personal property, when there is no
12
valid search warrant and no arrest ... made.” (FAC ¶ 354.) Further,
13
Plaintiffs allege that Bank of America threatens “to arrest and
14
tak[e] property without due process as a bargaining tool in order
15
to coerce those to stop associating with the OFF movement to chill
16
free speech.” (Id. ¶ 356.) Finally, Plaintiffs appear to allege
17
that even in the absence of underlying violations of law, the
18
scheme at issue here of removing Plaintiffs’ personal property and
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then making it difficult and costly to retrieve is unfair within
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the meaning of § 17200.
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To the extent that Plaintiffs’ underlying claims survive, or
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are amended to state a claim, the Court finds that the UCL claim
23
survives under the “unlawful” prong of Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §
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17200. Further, Plaintiffs have added sufficient facts and
25
allegations to support a plausible claim that the conduct at issue
26
here was unfair. Unfair conduct is actionable under the UCL where
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the business practice at issue “offends an established public
28
policy or when the practice is immoral, unethical, oppressive,
15
1
unscrupulous or substantially injurious to consumers.” S. Bay
2
Chevrolet v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 72 Cal.App.4th 861, 886-
3
87 (1999) (citing People v. Casa Blanca Convalescent Homes, Inc.,
4
159 Cal.App.3d 509, 530 (1984)). Accepting Plaintiffs’ allegations
5
as true, Plaintiffs’ belongings were removed from their home and
6
essentially held captive by Public Storage for what Plaintiffs dub
7
a “ransom.” Even if Bank of America had a right to possession of
8
the Property and a right to remove personal property from the
9
Property, the arrangement by which Plaintiffs allege that they were
10
required to either pay a high rental fee or potentially lose their
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belongings forever can be characterized as oppressive and
12
substantially injurious to the owners of such property. Therefore,
13
the Court DENIES the Motion as to Plaintiffs’ UCL claim.
14
IV. Conclusion
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For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS the Motion IN PART
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and DENIES the Motion IN PART. Because of the dismissal of certain
17
plaintiffs subsequent to the filing of the FAC and the Motion,
18
allowing clarification of Plaintiffs’ claims by way of one more
19
amendment is warranted, should Plaintiffs wish to amend to attempt
20
to state claims dismissed in this order. Any amended complaint must
21
be filed on or before November 21, 2014.
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
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Dated: November 6, 2014
DEAN D. PREGERSON
United States District Judge
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