Sundiata Besheari Taylor v. United States of America

Filing 5

ORDER DISMISSING PETITION by Judge Otis D. Wright, II: Taylors Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is time-barred under 28 U.S.C. 2255(f). The governments Motion to Dismiss 4 is GRANTED; Taylors petition is hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. (MD JS-6. Case Terminated). (lc) Modified on 5/17/2013. (lc).

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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SUNDIATA BESHEARI TAYLOR,

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v.

Petitioner,

Case No. 2:13-cv-3063-ODW
(Case No. 2:11-cr-520-ODW)
ORDER DISMISSING PETITION [4]

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.

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Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f), Petitioner Sundiata Besheari Taylor had one year

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from the “date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final.” On January 30,

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2012, the Court sentenced Taylor to a term of 101 months. On the same day, the

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Court issued its judgment-and-commitment order.

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Taylor did not seek an appeal. (Pet. 3.) Thus, his conviction became final 14

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days later on February 13, 2012, when Taylor’s “availability of appeal [was]

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exhausted.” United States v. Schwartz, 274 F.3d 1220, 1223 (9th Cir. 2001).

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Unfortunately, Taylor filed this petition on May 1, 2013—well after the one-

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year statute of limitations. Thus, despite any merit Taylor’s petition may have, his

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petition is time-barred.

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Equitable tolling may apply in certain circumstances. But a petitioner must

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demonstrate that he diligently pursued his rights and was unable to timely file his

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petition because of extraordinary circumstances. United States v. Aguirre-Ganceda,

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592 F.3d 1043, 1045 (9th Cir. 2010).

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Here, Taylor states no facts to support equitable tolling except for his belief that

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he had until April 30, 2013, to file this petition. (Pet. 3.) Yet this is not enough—his

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inability to calculate time is “not an extraordinary circumstance warranting equitable

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tolling.” Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006). And even if this

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inability was attributed to a lack of legal knowledge of the applicable time periods,

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that is also insufficient to invoke equitable tolling. Id. Indeed, equitable tolling is an

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extraordinary remedy, “the threshold . . . is very high.” Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d

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1063, 1065 (9th Cir. 2002). Equitable tolling does not apply in this case.

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Taylor’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is time-barred under 28 U.S.C.

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§ 2255(f).

The government’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 4) is GRANTED;

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Taylor’s petition is hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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May 16, 2013

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____________________________________
OTIS D. WRIGHT, II
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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