j2 Global Inc et al v. Fax87.com et al

Filing 32

ORDER by Judge Dean D. Pregerson: granting 21 defendant Farjad Fani's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction. Fani is dismissed as adefendant in this action, without prejudice. (lc). Modified on 2/5/2014 .(lc).

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1 2 O 3 4 NO JS-6 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 12 j2 GLOBAL, INC. and ADVANCED MESSAGING TECHNOLOGIES, INC., 13 Plaintiffs, 14 15 v. FAX87.COM, FARJAD FANI, MATT JOHNSON FINANCE INC., 16 Defendants. 17 ___________________________ ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Case No. CV 13-05353 DDP (AJWx) ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS UNDER RULE 12(b)(5) [DKT No. 21] 18 19 Before the Court is Defendant Farjad Fani's Motion to Dismiss 20 for Insufficient Service of Process under Rule 12(b)(5) and Lack of 21 Personal Jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(2). The matter is fully 22 briefed and suitable for adjudication without oral argument. See 23 Fed.R.Civ.P. 78. Having considered the parties' submissions, the 24 Court now issues the following order. 25 26 27 28 II. Background Plaintiffs j2 Global, Inc. and Advanced Messaging Technologies, Inc. (collectively, “j2”) assert claims for breach of 1 contract and patent infringement arising from Defendants' alleged 2 unlicensed use of two patents owned by Plaintiffs. 3 j2 is the owner of U.S. Patents No. 6,208,638 (“'638 patent”) 4 and 6,350,066 (“'066 patent”). (Complaint ¶ 11-17 & Exs. A, B.) 5 a previous action filed on March 29, 2011, j2 sued Matt Johnson 6 Finance, Inc. (“MJF”), Fax87.com (“Fax 87”), and Farjad Fani for 7 infringement of the '638 and '066 patents (“First Action”). (Id. 8 ¶ 18.) On April 12, 2012, the parties settled the First Action and 9 it was dismissed by stipulation. (Id. ¶ 19.) As part of the In 10 settlement, j2 and MJF (doing business as Fax87.com) entered into a 11 Patent License Agreement (“Agreement”). (Id. ¶ 20 & Ex. E.) 12 Under the Agreement, MJF received a non-exclusive license to 13 the '638 and '066 patents in exchange for its payment to j2 of a 14 lump sum of $25,000 and running royalties based on customer use. 15 (Id. ¶ 21 & Ex. E, ¶ 3.1.) The Agreement also requires that MJF 16 mark user materials and manuals associated with the licensed 17 product with the numbers of the licensed patents in the manner 18 required by 35 U.S.C. § 87. (Id. ¶ 22 & Ex. E. § 7.4.) 19 Additionally, the Agreement requires MJF to notify j2 within a 20 specified period if it undergoes one of several specified “change 21 events,” which j2 interprets to include any change in control of 22 the Fax87.com website. (Id. ¶ 23. & Ex. E. § 8.) 23 The Agreement also includes a choice of law provision, 24 providing that the Agreement is to be governed by California law, 25 and a forum selection clause, providing that any claims arising 26 from the Agreement must be brought in the Central District of 27 California. (Id. Ex. E. § 10.1-10.2.) 28 j2 named Fani, along with MFJ and Fax87.com, in its claim for 2 1 breach of contract, alleging that these defendants breached the 2 Agreement by failing to provide a royalty report, failing to remit 3 royalty payments, selling the business without providing timely 4 notice to j2, and failing to provide the required markings on the 5 Fax.87.com website. (Id. ¶ 42.) Though not relevant to this motion, 6 j2 additionally asserts patent infringement claims against the 7 current owners and operators of Fax87.com, who are named as Does 1 8 & 2. (Id. ¶ 37-56.) 9 Importantly, although Fani was a party to the First Action and 10 to an agreement settling that litigation, he is not included in the 11 Agreement as a party or signatory in his individual capacity. (Id. 12 Ex. E.) Instead, Fani signed the Agreement as a signatory for Matt 13 Johnson Finance, Inc. d/b/a Fax87.com, as the company's CEO. (Id.) 14 Fani asserts, and j2 does not contest, that Fani was included in 15 his individual capacity in the first draft of the Agreement 16 provided by j2, but that he was removed as a party at his request 17 during the negotiations that led to the final Agreement. (Id.) 18 (Declaration of Farjad Fani in Support of Motion ¶ 4.) 19 Fani asserts that, apart from being named in and negotiating 20 the resolution to the earlier patent infringement litigation, he 21 has no other personal contacts with California. He asserts that he 22 formerly resided in Washington, but left the United States in or 23 about February 2013. (Fani Decl. ¶ 2.) He asserts that he has never 24 resided in California; does not maintain an office or place of 25 business in California; has no mailing address, telephone number or 26 telephone listing in California; does not own or lease property in 27 California; does not maintain a bank account in California; and has 28 not borrowed money in California or applied for a loan in 3 1 California. (Id.) He further asserts that he has only visited 2 California on vacation in the past. (Id. ¶ 3.) 3 As discussed further below, Fani also contends that he was not 4 served with the Summons and Complaint. Plaintiffs' proof of service 5 on Fani indicates that the Summons and Complaint were executed upon 6 Tom Walker (“Walker”), purportedly as an Agent for Service of 7 Process for Fani, at the Eastham Foster CPAs (“Eastham”) firm in 8 Washington State on or about October 15, 2013. (DKT No. 13.) 9 Service on MJF was also simultaneously executed upon Walker, who 10 was MFJ’s registered agent for service of process. (DKT No. 14.) 11 However, Fani has submitted a declaration stating that he has 12 not authorized any person or entity to accept service of process on 13 his behalf, and particularly, has never authorized Eastham or 14 Walker to accept service of process for him. (DKT No. 24 ¶ 7.) Fani 15 states that when he learned on November 4, 2013 that Walker had 16 mistakenly purported to accept service of process on his behalf, he 17 contacted Eastham, which then advised j2’s counsel that Eastham and 18 Walker were only authorized to accept service of process for MJF. 19 (Id. ¶ 8.) 20 Fani moves to dismiss the claim against him for failure to 21 provide sufficient service of process under Rule 12(b)(5) and for 22 lack of personal jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(2). 23 24 25 II. Motion to Dismiss for Insufficient Service of Process The Court first considers Fani’s contention that service of 26 process was insufficient. “[S]ervice of summons is the procedure by 27 which a court having venue and jurisdiction of the subject matter 28 of the suit asserts jurisdiction over the person of the party 4 1 served.” Mississippi Publishing Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 2 444–445 (1946). “Before a federal court may exercise personal 3 jurisdiction over a defendant, the procedural requirement of 4 service of summons must be satisfied.” Omni Capital Int'l, Ltd. v. 5 Rudolf Wolff & Co., Ltd., 484 U.S. 97, 104 (1987). Accordingly, 6 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(5) provides that insufficient 7 service may be a basis for dismissal of a complaint. Fed.R.Civ.P. 8 12(b)(5). Requirements for the manner of service are established by 9 Rule 4. As relevant here, Rule 4(e)(2)(C) provides that an 10 individual may be served, inter alia, by “delivering a copy of [the 11 summons and complaint] to an agent authorized by appointment or by 12 law to receive service of process.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(e)(2)(C). Once 13 the adequacy of service is challenged, the plaintiff bears the 14 burden of establishing that service was valid. Brockmeyer v. May, 15 383 F.3d 798, 801 (9th Cir. 2004). 16 Fani contends that service was insufficient here because 17 Walker, the purported agent on whom Plaintiffs served process for 18 Fani, was never authorized to accept service on Fani’s behalf. 19 (Mot. at 6.) Fani contends that, although Walker mistakenly failed 20 to recognize that one set of the papers was directed to Fani when 21 accepting service for MJF, this error does not render service on 22 Fani sufficient. (Id.) Walker has submitted an affidavit stating 23 that, although he is the agent for service of process for MJF, he 24 is not the agent for service of process for Fani. (DKT No. 25 ¶ 3.) 25 He states that he accepted papers for Fani in error under the 26 misunderstanding that the papers concerned MJF only, not Fani. 27 (Id.) 28 In response, j2 argues in its Opposition that “Walker did not 5 1 simply accept the papers without noticing that Fani was a 2 Defendant, as Fani Argues. He affirmatively told the process server 3 that he was authorized to accept service for Fani.” (Opp. at 12.) 4 This argument fails for two reasons. First, j2 does not support 5 this assertion with any declaration by the process server or any 6 other witness stating that Walker made the assertions j2 alleges in 7 its Opposition. The Court cannot credit bald factual assertions by 8 counsel made without any citation to supporting evidence. This is 9 particularly so given that, in his declaration, Walker specifically 10 denied having a conversation with the process server concerning to 11 whom the papers were directed or advising the process server that 12 he was authorized to accept service of process for Fani, or words 13 to that effect. (Id.) 14 Second, as Fani notes, “even if a person states that he or she 15 is authorized to accept service, that is not proof that the person 16 actually has the authority to do so.” U.S. Commodity Futures 17 Trading Comm'n v. Paron Capital Mgmt., LLC, 2012 WL 1156396 (N.D. 18 Cal. Apr. 6, 2012). Rule 4 requires that the purported agent have 19 actual authority for service to be adequate. See Fed.R.Civ.P 20 4(e)(2)(C) (allowing for service on an agent who is “authorized by 21 appointment or by law to receive service of process”); Pochiro v. 22 Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 827 F.2d 1246, 1248–49 (9th Cir. 1987) 23 (service on attorney is insufficient unless attorney had actual 24 authority from client to accept service on client's behalf). 25 j2 additionally argues that Fani was properly served because 26 service was executed properly on MJF, which j2 contends is Fani’s 27 alter ego. (Opp. at 13.) Service on a defendant’s alter ego may 28 constitute service on defendant himself. See, e.g., Certified Bldg. 6 1 Prods. Ins. V. N.L.R.B.,528 F.2d 968, 969 (9th Cir. 1976). However, 2 in the instant Complaint, j2 has not made sufficient factual 3 allegations to support an alter ego theory. 4 To invoke the doctrine of alter ego, a plaintiff must assert 5 (1) that there is such a unity of interest and ownership between 6 the corporation and its equitable owner that the separate 7 personalities of the corporation and the shareholder do not in 8 reality exist; and (2) that there would be an inequitable result if 9 the acts in question are treated as those of the corporation alone. 10 Neilson v. Union Bank of California, N.A., 290 F. Supp. 2d 1101, 11 1115 (C.D. Cal. 2003). “Conclusory allegations of ‘alter ego’ 12 status are insufficient to state a claim. Rather, a plaintiff must 13 allege specifically both of the elements of alter ego liability, as 14 well as facts supporting each.” Id., citing In re Currency 15 Conversion Fee Antitrust Litigation, 265 F.Supp.2d 385, 426 16 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). “Factors that courts have found militated towards 17 finding alter ego liability include commingling of assets, 18 treatment of the assets of the corporation as the individual's own, 19 failure to maintain corporate records, employment of the same 20 employees and attorneys, undercapitalization, and use of the 21 corporation as a shell for the individual.” Ontiveros v. Zamora, 22 2009 WL 425962, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Feb 20, 2009). 23 Here, j2 has alleged no relevant facts in support of its alter 24 ego theory. Indeed, although the Complaint asserts that Fani and 25 MJF are alter egos, the only supporting factual allegations are 26 that “Defendant Farjad Fani is the sole officer of Matt Johnson 27 Finance, Inc. and purports to be the founder of Fax87.com.” 28 (Complaint at ¶ 8.) These allegations are insufficient to plausibly 7 1 support a finding that MJF and Fani are alter egos. Nor do they 2 suggest that there is as-yet-undiscovered evidence that would 3 support such a finding.1 4 j2 has requested jurisdictional discovery. (Opp. at 12-13.) 5 However, because there is no reason to believe that discovery may 6 reveal evidence showing that Walker was authorized to accept 7 service and because the Complaint does not sufficiently plead an 8 alter ego theory, the Court finds that jurisdictional discovery–- 9 and its concomitant burden on the defendant and use of judicial 10 resources--is not justified. See Pebble Beach Co. v. Caddy, 453 11 F.3d 1151, 1160 (9th Cir. 2006) (“[W]here a plaintiff's claim of 12 personal jurisdiction appears to be both attenuated and based on 13 bare allegations in the face of specific denials made by the 14 defendants, the Court need not permit even limited discovery.”) 15 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). The Court 16 therefore denies j2's request for jurisdictional discovery. 17 Because the Court finds j2 has not borne its burden to show 18 that service of process upon Fani was sufficient, the Court does 19 not reach Fani’s motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(2). See Omni 20 Capital, 484 U.S. at 104. 21 22 23 24 25 26 1 27 28 The Court notes that the question of whether Fani and MJF are alter egos may be important for personal jurisdiction, as well as the merits, as Fani is not formally a party to the Agreement that forms the basis for j2's breach of contract claim. 8 1 2 3 IV. Conclusion For the reasons set forth above, Defendant Fani’s motion 4 to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(5) is GRANTED. Fani is dismissed as a 5 defendant in this action, without prejudice. 6 7 IT IS SO ORDERED. 8 9 Dated: February 5, 2014 S. JAMES OTERO United States District Judge for DEAN D. PREGERSON United States District Judge 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 9

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