Dolores Martinez v. Navy League of the United States

Filing 42

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, STRIKE 38 by Judge Otis D. Wright, II: Defendant Navy League's Motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. (ECF. No.38.) The Court hereby STRIKES the portions of the Second Amended Complaint discussed in Part IV-C above, and DENIES the remainder of Navy League's Motion. 38 (bp)

O

1
2
3
4
5
6
7

United States District Court
Central District of California

8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16

Case No. 2:13-cv-5533-ODW(FFMx)

DOLORES MARTINEZ,
Plaintiff,
v.
NAVY LEAGUE OF THE UNITED
STATES,
Defendant.
I.

17

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND
DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S
MOTION TO DISMISS, OR IN THE
ALTERNATIVE, STRIKE [38]

INTRODUCTION

18

Plaintiff Dolores Martinez alleges in her Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”)

19

that she had a “trip and fall” accident while attending an event sponsored by

20

Defendant Navy League of the United States (“Navy League”). (SAC ¶ 3.) Martinez

21

is a pro se plaintiff. This Court has subject-matter jurisdiction based on diversity

22

under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). On December 20, 2013, Navy League filed the present

23

Motion to Dismiss, or in the alternative, Strike Martinez’s SAC. (ECF No. 38.) This

24

is Navy League’s third motion to dismiss in this matter. For the reasons discussed

25

below, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Defendant’s Motion.1

26

///

27

1

28

Having carefully considering the papers filed in support of and in opposition to the instant Motion,
the Court deems the matter appropriate for decision without oral argument. Fed. R. Civ. P. 78;
L.R. 7-15.

II.

1
2

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The SAC lists one claim for personal injury against Navy League.

Martinez

3

alleges that she was injured while attending a Navy Week event at the Los Angeles

4

Harbor on July 31, 2011. The Navy League was a sponsor of the event. According to

5

Martinez, she tripped and fell over a fence bracket on her way to tour the USS

6

Abraham Lincoln. Martinez alleges that she sustained serious injuries as a result of

7

the fall.

8

The original Complaint in this action was filed on July 31, 2013. (ECF No. 1.)

9

On September 19, 2013, the Court granted Navy League’s Motion to Dismiss the

10

original Complaint for non-opposition. (ECF No. 11.) Martinez subsequently filed a

11

First Amended Complaint, and Navy League again moved to dismiss. (ECF Nos. 16,

12

24.) On November 25, 2013, the Court granted Navy League’s Motion to Dismiss the

13

FAC on the merits. (ECF No. 35.)

14

The instant Motion was filed by Navy League on December 20, 2013. (ECF

15

No. 38.) Martinez filed an opposition on January 15, 2014. (ECF No. 39.) Navy

16

League filed a Reply on January 17, 2014. (ECF No. 40.) The Court took the matter

17

under submission on January 28, 2014.

18

III.

LEGAL STANDARD

19

A court may dismiss a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) for lack of a cognizable

20

legal theory or insufficient facts pleaded to support an otherwise cognizable legal

21

theory. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). To

22

survive a dismissal motion, a complaint need only satisfy the minimal notice pleading

23

requirements of Rule 8(a)(2)—a short and plain statement of the claim. Porter v.

24

Jones, 319 F.3d 483, 494 (9th Cir. 2003). The factual “allegations must be enough to

25

raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550

26

U.S. 544, 555 (2007). That is, the complaint must “contain sufficient factual matter,

27

accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v.

28

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

2

1

The determination whether a complaint satisfies the plausibility standard is a

2

“context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial

3

experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. A court is generally limited to the

4

pleadings and must construe all “factual allegations set forth in the complaint . . . as

5

true and . . . in the light most favorable” to the plaintiff. Lee v. City of L.A., 250 F.3d

6

668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001). But a court need not blindly accept conclusory allegations,

7

unwarranted deductions of fact, and unreasonable inferences. Sprewell v. Golden

8

State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001).

9

An entire pleading or portions of the pleading may also be stricken under

10

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f). Fed. Sav. & Loan v. Gemini Mgmt., 921 F.2d

11

241, 243 (9th Cir. 1990). A court “may strike from a pleading an insufficient defense

12

or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.”

13

P. 12(f).
IV.

14

Fed. R. Civ.

DISCUSSION

15

Navy League asks the Court to grant four alternative forms of relief. First,

16

Navy League contends that the SAC should be dismissed for failure to comply with a

17

court order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). Navy League also seeks

18

dismissal of the entire SAC for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). In the

19

alternative, Navy League moves to strike portions of the SAC pursuant to Rule 12(f),

20

and for a more definite statement under Rule 12(e).

21

argument in turn.

22

A.

The Court addresses each

Rule 41(b): Failure to Comply With Court Order

23

Navy League first argues that the Court should dismiss the SAC for failure to

24

comply with this Court’s November 25, 2013 Order. (Mot. 9–11.) In that Order, this

25

Court dismissed Martinez’s FAC for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6).

26

(ECF No. 35.) According to Navy League, Martinez’s SAC does not correct the

27

deficiencies that resulted in the dismissal of her last complaint.

28

///

3

1

A defendant may move to dismiss an action or any claim against it, if a plaintiff

2

fails to comply with a court order. Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b). However, dismissal on these

3

grounds rests in the court’s sound discretion. Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 US 626,

4

633 (1962). Moreover, courts are strongly inclined to reach decisions on the merits.

5

Yourish v. Cal. Amplifier, 191 F.3d 983, 990 (9th Cir. 1999).

6

The Court finds that, while the SAC is hardly a model of perfection, Martinez

7

has attempted to address a number of the deficiencies that resulted in the prior

8

dismissal of her complaint. Therefore, the Court declines to dismiss the SAC under

9

Rule 41(b).

10

B.

Rule 12(b)(6): Failure to State a Claim

11

Navy League also contends that SAC should be dismissed for failure to state a

12

claim under Rule 12(b)(6). (Mot. 11–13.) Navy League argues that the SAC relies on

13

a single theory of negligence per se, which cannot be sustained, because the statute

14

that Martinez relies on, California Government Code section 39933, is inapplicable.

15

Navy League is correct that section 39933 cannot serve as a basis for

16

Martinez’s personal-injury claim. The Court refers all parties to its November 25,

17

2013 Order for a detailed explanation. (ECF No. 35.) Nevertheless, the Court finds

18

that the SAC does contain sufficient allegations to put Navy League on notice of

19

Martinez’s personal-injury claim under a regular theory of negligence. Unlike the

20

First Amended Complaint that the Court dismissed, the SAC contains additional

21

factual allegations regarding Navy League and its role at the Navy Week event. These

22

factual allegations—such as Navy League being a sponsor of the event and failing to

23

cure safety hazards—go directly to the elements of duty and breach, which the Court

24

found lacking in Martinez’s FAC. While the Court recognizes that Martinez remains

25

misinformed regarding the applicability of section 39933 to her claim, the Court can

26

easily ascertain that Martinez is suing Navy League on a negligence theory.

27

Pleadings of pro se litigants are held to less rigid standards than those drafted

28

by attorneys. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). But pro se pleadings must

4

1

also “meet some minimum threshold in providing a defendant with notice of what it is

2

that it allegedly did wrong.” Brazil v. U.S. Dep’t. of the Navy, 66 F.3d 193, 199 (9th

3

Cir. 1995). In this case, the Court finds that Martinez has met the minimum threshold

4

in the SAC.

5

C.

The Court finds merit with Navy League’s assertion that portions of the SAC

6
7

Rule 12(f): Motion to Strike

should be stricken.

8

First, the Court STRIKES paragraph 5A in the SAC. The paragraph alleges

9

loss of consortium, which is not available to Martinez as a matter of law. Rodriguez v.

10

Bethlehem Steel Corp., 12 Cal. 3d 382, 408 (1974) (“[I]n California each spouse has a

11

cause of action for loss of consortium . . . caused by a negligent or intentional injury to

12

the other spouse by a third party.”) Martinez is the only plaintiff in this action and she

13

is alleging a direct injury from the slip and fall. Loss of consortium is only available

14

to the spouse of the directly injured party.

15

Next, the SAC makes reference to settlement negotiations that have allegedly

16

occurred between Martinez and Navy League’s insurance carrier. Under Federal Rule

17

of Evidence 408, settlement negotiations are inadmissible as evidence of liability.

18

They are also not the proper purview of pleading. Therefore, the Court STRIKES

19

paragraphs 5D–E in the SAC.

20

Moreover, as discussed above and in the Court’s November 25, 2013 Order,

21

California Government Code section 39933 is inapplicable to this case. Accordingly,

22

the Court STRIKES all references to section 39933 from the SAC. Martinez is

23

warned that the Court will not entertain anymore filings or arguments that make

24

reference to section 39933.

25

paragraph or sentence as a reference to section 39933 remain. The Court reads the

26

SAC as asserting a general negligence claim only.

27

///

28

///

However, factual allegations contained in the same

5

1

D.

Rule 12(e): Motion for More Definite Statement

2

Lastly, the Court finds Navy League’s arguments in support of a more definite

3

statement under Rule 12(e) unpersuasive. “A party may move for a more definite

4

statement of a pleading to which a responsive pleading is allowed but which is also

5

vague or ambiguous that the party cannot reasonably prepare a response.” Fed. R.

6

Civ. P. 12 (e). Motions under Rule 12(e) are disfavored. Here, the Court finds that

7

the SAC is coherent and, as stated above, it is readily understood that Martinez is

8

asserting a claim based on negligence. The SAC includes allegations of the who,

9

what, when, where, why, and how of Martinez’s claim. A more definite statement

10

would only prolong this case further. There is enough information in the SAC to

11

allow Navy League to prepare an adequate response.
V.

12

CONCLUSION

13

For the reasons discussed above, Defendant Navy League’s Motion is

14

GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. (ECF No. 38.) The Court hereby

15

STRIKES the portions of the Second Amended Complaint discussed in Part IV-C

16

above, and DENIES the remainder of Navy League’s Motion.

17
18

IT IS SO ORDERED.

19
20

February 12, 2014

21
22
23

____________________________________
OTIS D. WRIGHT, II
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

24
25
26
27
28

6