Munchkin, Inc. v. Luv N'Care, Ltd. et al

Filing 42

CLAIM CONSTRUCTION ORDER by Judge Otis D. Wright, II. (lc). Modified on 9/12/2014 (lc).

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United States District Court
Central District of California

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MUNCHKIN, INC.,
Plaintiff,

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Case No. 2:13-cv-07228-ODW(AGRx)

v.

CLAIM-CONSTRUCTION ORDER

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LUV N’ CARE, LTD.; ADMAR

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INTERNATIONAL, INC.,
Defendants.

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I.

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INTRODUCTION

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In this patent-infringement suit, the Court concerns itself with the “technology”

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of baby blankets—specifically, baby blankets designed to aid an infant in teething.

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The patent-in-suit is U.S. Patent No. 6,292,962 (the ’962 Patent), which Plaintiff

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Munchkin, Inc. asserts against Defendants Luv N’ Care, Ltd. and Admar International,

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Inc. (collectively, “LNC”). As a first step in determining infringement, the Court

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must construe the essential terms of the patent. After considering the parties’ claim-

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construction briefs, the Court finds oral argument unnecessary and construes the

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disputed claim terms as set forth below. Fed. R. Civ. P. 78; L.R. 7-15.
II.

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Munchkin

initiated

BACKGROUND

this

patent-infringement

action

against

LNC

on

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September 30, 2013. (ECF No.1.) In responding to the Complaint, LNC has asserted

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several defenses, including invalidity and non-infringement. (ECF No. 16.)

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Munchkin is the assignee of the ’962 Patent titled “Infant Blanket with

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Teether/Pacifier.” Claims 1, 4, 5, and 8 of the ’962 Patent are at issue in this action.

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(Munchkin Br. 2:25–27.) Claims 1 and 4 are apparatus claims, while claims 5 and 8

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are method claims. The asserted claims are directed to the design and function of a

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small blanket or towel with an attached oral element for an infant to use when

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teething. (See ’962 Patent 1:42–45.)

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The parties dispute the construction of three terms: (1) “corner”;

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(2) “permanently secured”; and (3) “teething element.” Claim 1 is illustrative of the

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disputed terms and reads as follows:

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1. An infant product, comprising:

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a substantially two-dimensional flexible fabric material having a surface

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area that is greater than about 25 square inches, said flexible fabric

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material having a front side, a back side and a plurality of side edges

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that intersect so as to define at least two corners;

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a first teething element that is permanently secured to a first of said at

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least corners, said first teething element being fabricated from a

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material selected from the group consisting of plastic and rubber, said

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first teething element having at least one non-smooth textured

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surface thereon and being fabricated from a non-toxic material and

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being sized and dimensioned to be comfortably inserted and partially

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retained within an infant’s mouth for teething purposes; and

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a second teething element that is permanently secured to a second of

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said at least corners and that is separate from said first teething

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element, said second teething element also being fabricated from a

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material selected from the group consisting of plastic and rubber, said

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second teething element also having at least one non-smooth textured

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surface thereon and also being fabricated from a non-toxic material and

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being sized and dimensioned to be comfortably inserted and partially

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retained within an infant’s mouth for teething purposes.

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(’962 Patent 4:50–5:8 (emphasis added).)
III.

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LEGAL STANDARD

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The purpose of claim construction is to determine the meaning and scope of the

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patent claims alleged to be infringed. O2 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech.

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Co., Ltd., 521 F.3d 1351, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Claim construction is a question of

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law to be decided by the court. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967,

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979 (Fed. Cir. 1995).

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In general, claim terms are “given their ordinary and customary meaning as

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understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art when read in the context of the

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specification and prosecution history.” Thorner v. Sony Computer Entm’t Am. LLC,

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669 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (citing Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303,

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1313 (Fed Cir. 2005) (en banc)).

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“[T]he claims themselves provide substantial guidance as to the meaning of

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particular claim terms.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314. But claims “must be construed in

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light of the appropriate context in which the claim term is used.” Aventis Pharm. Inc.

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v. Amino Chems. Ltd., 715 F.3d 1363, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2013). This is why the

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specification is “highly relevant” in claim construction and the “single best guide” for

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construing ambiguous claim terms. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1315. Nevertheless, a court

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must be wary of “improperly importing a limitation from the specification into the

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claims.” Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton, 653 F.3d 1296, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2011).

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Also relevant to claim construction is a patent’s prosecution history, although it “often

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lacks the clarity of the specification and thus is less useful for claim construction

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purposes.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317.

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In addition, courts may consider extrinsic evidence in claim construction. Id.

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For example, dictionaries may aid the court “in determining the meaning of particular

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terminology to those of skill in the art.” Id. at 1318. But while extrinsic evidence can

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shed light on claim meaning, it is “less significant than the intrinsic record in

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determining the legally operative meaning of claim language.” Id. (internal quotation

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marks omitted).

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There are two circumstances under which a court will not give a term its plain

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and ordinary meaning. First, a patentee can depart from the plain and ordinary

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meaning by acting as his own lexicographer. Thorner, 669 F.3d at 1365. To act as his

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own lexicographer, the patentee “must clearly set forth a definition of the disputed

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claim term other than its plain and ordinary meaning.” Id. “It is not enough for a

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patentee to simply disclose a single embodiment or use a word in the same manner in

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all embodiments, the patentee must clearly express an intent to redefine the term.” Id.

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(internal quotation marks omitted). An “‘implied’ redefinition must be so clear that it

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equates to an explicit one.” Id. at 1368. Second, a patentee can depart from the plain

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and ordinary meaning by clearly “disavow[ing] the full scope of a claim term either in

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the specification or during prosecution.” Id. at 1365. “The patentee may demonstrate

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intent to deviate from the ordinary and accustomed meaning of a claim term by

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including in the specification expressions of manifest exclusion or restriction,

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representing a clear disavowal of claim scope.” Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa N. Am. Corp.,

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299 F.3d 1313, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
IV.

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DISCUSSION

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Munchkin puts forth proposed constructions for the three disputed claim terms,

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relying solely on the language of the claims and the patent’s specification. LNC, on

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the other hand, argues that “no construction is necessary” and the disputed terms

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should be given their plain and ordinary meaning. LNC offers dictionary definitions

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of the words in each disputed claim term to support adoption of the terms’ plain and

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ordinary meanings.

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A.

“corner”

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Munchkin argues that the proper construction of “corner” is “a portion of the

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flexible fabric material containing the intersection of two or more of the material’s

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side edges.” (Munchkin Br. 5:11–12.) According to Munchkin, the term “corner” is

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used throughout the asserted claims to not only denote where the edges of the blanket

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come to a point, but to also describe where the invention’s teething element attaches

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to the blanket. (Id. at 5:26–6:9.) Munchkin then turns to the specification to argue

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that the teething element attaches to more than a single point where the side edges

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meet; it can instead be attached along the side edges extending out from that point as

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well as inward from that point. (Id. at 6:10–7:10; ’962 Patent, Figs. 1–6.) Given that

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the teething element does not need to be attached to the single point where the side

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edges actually meet, Munchkin contends that “corner” is used in the claims “to

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reference a broader portion of the flexible fabric material.” (Id. at 7:1–22.)

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On the other hand, LNC opposes Munchkin’s proposed construction of “corner”

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because the ’962 Patent states that claim terms are to be understood according to their

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“broad general meaning” and at least one embodiment in the specification contradicts

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Munchkin’s rationale for its proposed construction.

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Patent 4:41–49, Fig. 7.) In Figure 7 of the ’962 Patent, the teething element appears

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to attach in the center of the blanket and nowhere near where the side edges of the

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blanket meet at a rounded edge. (’962 Patent, Fig. 7.) Instead, LNC asks the Court to

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adopt the plain and ordinary meaning of “corner,” which the Merriam-Webster

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Dictionary defines as “the point or area where two lines, edges, or sides of something

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meet.” (LNC Br. 3:1–11.)

(LNC Br. 1–2:21; ’962

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After reviewing the parties’ arguments, the Court finds no reason to deviate

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from the plain and ordinary meaning of “corner.” The Court further finds no reason to

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rely on a dictionary, as the term is a common word familiar to all English speakers.

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Munchkin relies on a selective reading of the patent specification for its

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proposed construction that is based on “corner” serving two purposes—as the location

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where the edges meet and as the location where the teething element attaches. But

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Figure 7 of the ’962 Patent clearly contradicts Munchkin’s reading of the

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specification:

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Moreover, Munchkin cannot point to anywhere in the specification that shows a

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clear disavowal or redefinition of “corner” to persuade the Court to overcomplicate

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the simple term “corner” and adopt a construction other than its plain and ordinary

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meaning. See Thorner, 669 F.3d at 1365. In addition, Munchkin’s main concern with

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construction of the term “corner” is that it should encompass more than a single point

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where the edges meet. Yet the parties agree that the meaning of “corner” includes the

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point or area where the edges meet as evidenced by LNC’s citation to the term’s lay

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dictionary definition.
For the reasons discussed above, the Court finds that the term “corner” shall

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have its plain and ordinary meaning.

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B.

“permanently secured”

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Munchkin proposes that the Court construe the term “permanently secured” to

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mean “directly affixed so as to overlap at least a portion of that to which it is affixed

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and not be easily de-attachable without the use of tools.” (Munchkin Br. 5:12–14.)

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According to Munchkin, the specification informs the meaning of the term and all of

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the descriptions of the embodiments reveal that the teething element must necessarily

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overlap the material. (Id. at 7:24–9:19.) Munchkin also relies on descriptions of

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embodiments where the teething element is detachable from the blanket.

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at 9:19–28; ’962 Patent 3:40–45 (“The pacifier . . . can be easily attached to the

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flexible material and easily de-attached from the flexible material (without the use of

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tools) by snapping the snap into the snap retainer opening.”).) Munchkin’s contention

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is that a teething element that is easily detachable is the opposite of one that is

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“permanently secured”; thus, the Court should adopt the language of the specification

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describing an easily detachable teething element in the negative—i.e., “not be easily

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de-attachable without the use of tools.”

(Id.

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The Court finds that Munchkin’s proposed construction of “permanently

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secured” is problematic. With respect to the necessity that the teething element

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“overlap” the material, Munchkin impermissibly seeks to read the embodiments into

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the claim term. See Hill-Rom Servs., Inc. v. Stryker Corp., 755 F.3d 1367, 1371 (Fed.

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Cir. 2014) (“[W]e do not read limitations from the embodiments in the specification

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into the claims.”); Thorner, 669 F.3d at 1368 (“[D]isclosing embodiments that all use

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the term the same way is not sufficient to redefine a claim term.”). The ’962 Patent

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contains “no words of manifest exclusion or restriction” as it relates to the disputed

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term “permanently secured” or the embodiments described in the specification. Hill-

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Rom Servs., 755 F.3d at 1372. Moreover, Munchkin attempts to define the modifier

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“permanently” by pointing to what it contends is the opposite of “permanent” in the

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specification, but this is far from sufficient to demonstrate that the patentee was acting

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as his own lexicographer. See CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 288 F.3d 1359,

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1366 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (stating that a patentee “must clearly set forth a definition of the

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disputed claim term”).

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The Court cannot find the word “permanent” or the disputed term “permanently

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secured” anywhere in the specification. As LNC argues in opposition to Munchkin’s

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proposed construction, this is strong evidence that the term “permanently secured” has

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no specialized or alternative meaning. See Thorner, 669 F.3d at 1365–66 (holding

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that a patentee must clearly express an intent to redefine a term or clearly disavow the

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ordinary meaning of a term and the claim scope). The Court thus adopts the plain and

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ordinary meaning of the term “permanently secured.”

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C.

“teething element”

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Unlike the previous two disputed claim terms, Munchkin’s arguments in favor

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of its proposed construction of “teething element” are more persuasive. Munchkin

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proposes that the term be construed as “an element that is: separate from the flexible

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fabric material; made from a non-toxic material; and sized and dimensioned to be

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comfortably inserted and partially retained within an infant’s mouth for teething

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purposes.” (Munchkin Br. 5:14–16.)

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Munchkin contends that the patentee chose to be a lexicographer, and the ’962

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Patent specification acts as a dictionary. (Id. at 10:7–16); see also Vitronics Corp. v.

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Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996). The specification reads,

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“[t]he term ‘teething element’ is meant to be broadly interpreted to include all

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elements made from a non-toxic material, sized and dimensioned to be comfortably

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inserted and partially retained within an infant’s mouth for teething purposes.” (’962

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Patent 3:2–6.) According to Munchkin, it is also clear that the “teething element” is

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separate and apart from the flexible fabric of the blanket itself.

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Br. 10:17–11:8.) The claims themselves describe the teething element as apart from

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the fabric, requiring it to be attached or “permanently secured” to the fabric. (See,

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e.g., ’962 Patent 4:50–5:9.)

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abstract and summary refer to two separate parts—“a small blanket or towel having

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the oral element attached directly thereto.” (Id. at 1:42–45.) Four of the patent figures

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(Munchkin

Moreover, in describing the invention, the patent’s

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also depict the “teething element” alone, entirely separate from the flexible fabric.

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(Id. at Figs. 2–5.)

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In opposing Munchkin’s proposed construction, LNC once again asks the Court

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to simply adopt the plain and ordinary meaning of “teething element.” LNC argues

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that the patentee was not engaging in lexicography in the specification, but merely

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indicating that the term should be interpreted broadly. (LNC Br. 4:18–5:3.) LNC

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then turns to the Merriam-Webster Dictionary definitions of the words “teething” and

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“element” to argue that the proper definition of “teething element” is “a chewable

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device to assist in the eruption of a baby’s teeth.” (Id. at 5:5–15.)

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The Court finds that Munchkin’s proposed construction of “teething element” is

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supported by the claims themselves and the specification. Unlike the previous two

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disputed terms, the specification includes clear and explicit language that the patentee

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intended the term “teething element” to be construed as Munchkin proposes. In

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addition, Munchkin’s proposed construction does not require the Court to make any

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inferences from the language of the specification. The words used in Munchkin’s

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proposed construction are lifted directly from the specification and clearly describe

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the “teething element.” It is true, as LNC argues, that the term “teething element” is

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meant to be construed broadly.

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construction is broad and does not impermissibly narrow the claim term.

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Accordingly, the Court adopts Munchkin’s proposed construction of the term

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“teething element.”

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But the Court finds that Munchkin’s proposed

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V.

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CONCLUSION

The Court adopts the following constructions of the disputed terms:

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Claim Term

Claim Construction

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1. “corner”

Plain meaning as discussed in Part IV-A

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2. “permanently secured”

Plain meaning as discussed in Part IV-B

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3. “teething element”

“an element that is: separate from the

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flexible fabric material; made from a non-

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toxic material; and sized and dimensioned

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to be comfortably inserted and partially

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retained within an infant’s mouth for

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teething purposes”

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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September 12, 2014

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____________________________________
OTIS D. WRIGHT, II
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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