Shaun Chappell v. John Barkley et al

Filing 24

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS MOTION TO DISMISS AND DENYING PLAINTIFFS APPLICATION FOR ENTRY OF JUDGEMENT AGAINST DEFENDANTS 6 , 14 19 . The Court finds that Plaintiffs Application for Default Judgment is dismissed as moot by Judge Dean D. Pregerson. (MD JS-6. Case Terminated). (lc). Modified on 7/15/2014 (lc).

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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SHAUN CHAPPELL,

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Plaintiff,
v.
JOHN BARKLEY, in his
individual capacity as
SERGEANT JOHN BARKLEY Badge
#32428; KENNETH CURTIS, in
his individual capacity as
OFFICER KENNETH CURTIS Badge
#40858; and CHRISTOPHER
PHELAN, in his individual
capacity as OFFICER
CHRISTOPHER PHELAN Badge
#39661,
Defendants.
___________________________

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Case No. CV 14-00130 DDP (RZx)
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION
TO DISMISS AND DENYING
PLAINTIFF’S APPLICATION FOR ENTRY
OF JUDGEMENT AGAINST DEFENDANTS
[Dkt. Nos. 6, 14 & 19]

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Presently before the court is a Motion to Dismiss filed by

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Defendants John Barkley, Kenneth Curtis and Christopher Phelan.

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(Dkt. 6.) Also before the court is an Application for Entry of

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Default Judgement filed by Plaintiff in Pro Per Shaun Chappell.

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(Dkt. 14.) These matters are suitable for decision without oral

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argument. Having considered the parties’ submissions, the court

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adopts the following order.

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I.

Background
As best the court can discern from Plaintiff’s Complaint,

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which includes various digressions and exhibits of unclear

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relevance, Plaintiff’s factual allegations are as follows:

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On January 11, 2013, at approximately 9:20 p.m., Plaintiff was

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engaged in a dispute with employees of a repossession company,

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Active Adjusters, who were attempting to repossess Plaintiff’s

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vehicle. (Complaint ¶ 17-18.) Plaintiff locked himself inside the

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vehicle and refused to vacate. (Id. ¶ 21.) The Los Angeles Police

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Department (“LAPD”) was called and several officers arrived on the

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scene, including Defendants Barkley, Curtis, and Phelan. (Id. ¶ 22-

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23, 31.) Following their arrival, Plaintiff remained locked inside

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the vehicle and communicated to the officers that “he is a

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sovereign man and not bound to the laws and codes of the United

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States” and provided Defendant Phelan with “paperwork ...

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expound[ing] on Plaintiff’s status.” (Id. ¶¶ 24-30.) At some point,

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Defendant Barkely informed Plaintiff that he had two misdemeanor

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warrants for his arrest. (Id. ¶ 33.) Plaintiff eventually vacated

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the vehicle, was placed under arrest, handcuffed, placed in the

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back of a patrol car, and taken to the LAPD Hollywood Division for

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booking. (Id. ¶ 42-42.) Plaintiff was detained for approximately

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sixteen hours. (Id. ¶ 42.)

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On January 7, 2014, Plaintiff filed the instant action in

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which, on the basis of the above allegations, he asserts that

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Defendants violated several of his rights under the constitutions

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of the United States and the State of California. (Id. ¶¶ 50-60.)

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He alleges damages of $110,000,000.000. (Id. ¶ 7.)

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II.

Legal Standard
A complaint will survive a motion to dismiss when it contains

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“sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to

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relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

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662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,

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570 (2007)).

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“accept as true all allegations of material fact and must construe

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those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Resnick

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v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000).

When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court must

Although a complaint

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need not include “detailed factual allegations,” it must offer

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“more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me

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accusation.”

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allegations that are no more than a statement of a legal conclusion

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“are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id. at 679. Even

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under the liberal pleading standard of Federal Rule of Civil

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Procedure 8(a)(2), under which a party is only required to make a

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“short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is

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entitled to relief,” a “pleading that offers ‘labels and

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conclusions’ or a ‘formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause

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of action will not do.’” Id. 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at

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555). The complaint fails to contain short and plain statements of

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the claims.

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Plaintiff’s complaint is, and Defendant has not been put on fair

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notice of the claims against him.

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Defendant would begin to formulate a response to the Complaint,

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other than bring the instant motion.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

Conclusory allegations or

It is unclear what the central allegation of

Indeed, it is unclear how

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III. Discussion

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Defendant moves to dismiss the Complaint on the ground that

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Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be

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granted. The court agrees.

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Plaintiff does not state in his Complaint any discernable

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cause of action. Plaintiff quotes the text of First, Fourth, Fifth,

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Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth and Fourteenth Amendments of the

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United States Constitution, as well as Article 1, Sections 1-3 of

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Constitution of the State of California. (Compl. ¶ 50-60.) However,

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Plaintiff does not explain in his Complaint or in his Opposition to

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the instant Motion to Dismiss how Defendants’ conduct violated his

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rights under any of these constitutional provisions. Nor is any

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theory of relief under these provisions plausible from the court’s

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review of the facts alleged in the Complaint.

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A.

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First Amendment
To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege: (1)

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the violation of a constitutional right and (2) that the violation

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was committed by a person under acting the color of state law. West

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v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). Plaintiff does not set forth any

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facts to show how his First Amendment rights were violated in the

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course of his arrest or at any other time. Accordingly, no claim

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under the First Amendment is plausible.

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B.

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Fourth Amendment
Plaintiff appears to assert that his Fourth Amendment rights

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were violated in the course of his arrest. (See Compl. ¶¶ 31-46,

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51.) However, no such claim is plausible.

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Arresting officers have probable cause to execute an arrest
if, at the moment of the arrest, “the facts and circumstances
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within their knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy

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information were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing

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that the [arrested person] had committed or was committing an

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offense.” Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964).

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Here, Plaintiff acknowledged that at the time of his arrest

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there were two outstanding warrants for his arrest-–indeed,

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Plaintiff attached both warrants to his Complaint-–and that

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Defendants arrested him expressly pursuant to these warrants. (See

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id. ¶ 33, Ex. G.) As the warrants constituted probable cause for

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his arrest, Plaintiff has not pled a plausible Fourth Amendment

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violation with respect to fact of the arrest. Nor has Plaintiff

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alleged any facts to support a claim that Defendants violated his

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Fourth Amendment rights by using excessive force in carrying out

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the arrest.

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C.

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Fifth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendments
Plaintiff has not identified any ways in which his Fifth or

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Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated by Defendants’ conduct.

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To the extent Plaintiff alleges that his rights to due process

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under the Fourteenth Amendment were violated through the

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repossession of his vehicle, this claim fails because, under the

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facts as alleged, the repossession was executed not by police but

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by Active Adjusters. (See Compl. ¶¶ 19-22.) Plaintiff has not

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explained how Defendants were responsible for or played a role in

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the repossession, as their conduct under the facts alleged was

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limited to arresting Plaintiff on the basis of the two extant

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warrants.

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D.

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Seventh Amendment
The Seventh Amendment provides that a defendant is entitled to

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a right jury trial in certain civil cases. Plaintiff has not

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alleged any facts suggesting a Seventh Amendment violation nor

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explained why the Amendment is relevant in this case.

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E.

Eighth Amendment claim

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The Eighth Amendment prohibits “cruel and unusual

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punishments,” as well as excessive bail and fines in certain

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circumstances. The Amendment does not apply where the government

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has not “secured a formal adjudication of guilt.” Bell v. Wolfish,

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441 U.S. 520, 535 n.16 (1979)(internal quotations omitted).

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Plaintiff does not explain, nor can the court discern, any

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plausible manner in which Defendants’ Eighth Amendment rights were

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violated here, where Plaintiff was arrested on two misdemeanor

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warrants and detained for approximately sixteen hours, but has not

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been convicted of any crime.

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F.

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Ninth and Tenth Amendments
The Ninth Amendment provides that “[t]he enumeration in the

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Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or

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disparage others retained by the people.” However, the Amendment

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“has not been interpreted as independently securing any

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constitutional rights.” San Diego County Gun Rights Committee v.

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Reno, 98 F.3d 1121, 1124-25 (9th Cir. 1996). The Tenth Amendment

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provides that “[t]he powers not delegated to the United States by

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the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved

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to the States respectively, or to the people.” Plaintiff quotes

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from both Amendments in his Complaint but does not explain, nor can

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the court discern, how either Amendment is relevant to this action.

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G.

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State Law Claims
Plaintiff quotes from Article I, Sections 1-3 of the

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California Constitution, though he does not explain how his rights

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were violated under these provisions. Because, per the above

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discussion, the court has already “dismissed all claims over which

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it has original jurisdiction,” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), the court

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declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining

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state law claim.

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IV. Conclusion
For the reasons stated herein, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss

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is GRANTED. The Court finds that Plaintiff’s Application for

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Default Judgment is dismissed as moot.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Dated: July 15, 2014

DEAD D. PREGERSON

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United States District Judge

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