Gibson Brands Inc v. John Hornby Skewes & Co. Ltd et al

Filing 72

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND COUNTERCLAIMS 68 by Judge Dean D. Pregerson. (lc). Modified on 1/6/2015 (lc).

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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GIBSON BRANDS, INC., a
Delaware corporation,

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Plaintiff,
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v.
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JOHN HORNBY SKEWES & CO.
LTD.,

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Defendant.
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Case No. CV 14-00609 DDP (SSx)
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR LEAVE TO
AMEND COUNTERCLAIMS
[Dkt. No. 68]

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Presently before the Court is Defendant’s Motion for Leave to

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Amend Counterclaims.

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to amend its First Amended Counterclaim in response to the Court’s

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orders dismissing claims based on fraud on the Patent Office and a

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third-party complaint alleging that Bank of America was the true

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owner of the trademarks at issue in this case.

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67.)

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(Dkt. No. 68.)

Defendant asks to be allowed

(See Dkt. Nos. 57,

“[A] party may amend its pleading only with the opposing

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party's written consent or the court's leave. The court should

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freely give leave when justice so requires.”

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15(a)(2).

Fed. R. Civ. P.

Leave to amend should be given in the absence of some

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reason not to, including, but not limited to, “undue delay, bad

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faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated

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failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed,

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undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the

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amendment, futility of amendment, etc.”

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178, 182 (1962).

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Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S.

In this case, there are several reasons not to grant leave to

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amend.

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propose to add any new allegations or information to its

The most important is simple economy: Defendant does not

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counterclaims; it simply wishes to conform the pleading to the

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Court’s previous orders.

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is some appeal to the idea of working from a clean copy of a

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pleading, free from extraneous matters already decided by the

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court.

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of America’s ownership of the marks – are so neatly separable from

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the remaining counterclaims – based on genericness – that there is

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little risk of confusion.

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all well aware of the remaining issues to be litigated.

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while the amendments would not be “futile,” precisely, they would

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also not add anything to the Court’s or the parties’ understanding

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of the issues.

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(Df.’s Memo. P. & A. at 1:5-10.)

There

But in this case the other claims – based on fraud and Bank

The Court, Plaintiff, and Defendant are
Thus,

Given that the amendments are unnecessary, another round of

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amendment at this point would also seem to run against the general

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policy favoring speedy resolution of cases on the merits and the

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Court’s own interest in docket management.

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Meanwhile, Plaintiff alleges, plausibly, irreparable harm to

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the distinctiveness of its putative mark if the litigation is

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dilated unnecessarily.

Assuming Plaintiff actually does hold marks
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in the designs at issue, the longer the litigation goes on, and the

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longer Defendant and others can infringe the marks, the greater the

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potential damage to the distinctiveness of the marks in the mind of

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the buying public.

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judicial economy and speedy resolution on the merits, there is

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ample reason to move things to the merits stage in a timely manner.

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Thus, apart from general concerns about

Therefore, the Court DENIES the motion to amend.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Dated: January 6, 2015
DEAN D. PREGERSON
United States District Judge

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