Courtney Barnes v. Sony Music Entertainment et al
Filing
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ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 18 by Judge Dean D. Pregerson. (lc) Modified on 4/6/2016 (lc).
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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COURTNEY BARNES,
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Plaintiff,
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v.
SONY MUSIC ENTERTAINMENT
INC.; RCA MUSIC GROUP; SARAH
DENNISON,
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Case No. CV 14-00965 DDP (JCGx)
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
[Dkt 18]
Defendants.
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Presently before the court is Defendants Sony Music
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Entertainment (“Sony”) and Sarah Weinstein Dennison (“Weinstein
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Dennison”)’s Motion for Summary Judgment.
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submissions of the parties and heard oral argument, the court
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grants the motion and adopts the following Order.
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I.
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Having considered the
Background
Plaintiff Courtney Barnes works as a publicist for high-
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profile music industry clients.
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39.)
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becoming an independent publicist for Fantasia Barrino
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(“Fantasia”), separate from or in addition to Fantasia’s record
(Opposition Ex. A at 18, Ex. B at
In January 2013, Barnes learned of and expressed interest in
company publicist.
(Declaration of Peter J. Anderson in Support of
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Motion, Ex. 1 at 29-30, 37, 39.)
In February, Barnes was engaged
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to serve as Fantasia’s publicist at a rate of $1,500 per month.
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(Opp., Ex. C at 16-17.)
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terminated relationship with Fanstasia.
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Barnes ¶ 3.)
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the termination to the fact that “a Jewish woman” at Sony’s
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publicity department did not want to work with him.
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further contends that, about a year prior to this incident, another
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artist’s manager informed Barnes that Defendant Weinstein Dennison,
Within weeks, however, Fantasia’s manager
(Declaration of Courtney
Barnes contends that Fantasia’s manager attributed
(Id.)
Barnes
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a Vice-President of Publicity at Sony, refused to work with him.
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(Id. ¶ 4; Complaint ¶ 9.)
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Weinstein-Dennison and Sony for intentional interference with
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contractual relations and with prospective economic relations.1
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Defendants now move for summary judgment.
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II.
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Barnes brings causes of action against
Legal Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate where the pleadings,
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depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
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together with the affidavits, if any, show “that there is no
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genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled
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to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A party
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seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing the
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court of the basis for its motion and of identifying those portions
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of the pleadings and discovery responses that demonstrate the
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absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v.
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Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). All reasonable inferences from
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Plaintiff appears to agree that his claims against Sony are
dependent upon and derivative of his claims against Defendant
Weinstein Dennison.
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the evidence must be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party. See
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Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 242 (1986).
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moving party does not bear the burden of proof at trial, it is
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entitled to summary judgment if it can demonstrate that “there is
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an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.”
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Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.
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If the
Once the moving party meets its burden, the burden shifts to
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the nonmoving party opposing the motion, who must “set forth
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specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.”
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Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256.
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party “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the
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existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on
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which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex,
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477 U.S. at 322. A genuine issue exists if “the evidence is such
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that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving
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party,” and material facts are those “that might affect the outcome
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of the suit under the governing law.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.
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There is no genuine issue of fact “[w]here the record taken as a
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whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the
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nonmoving party.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
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Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
Summary judgment is warranted if a
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It is not the court’s task “to scour the record in search of a
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genuine issue of triable fact.” Keenan v. Allan, 91 F.3d 1275, 1278
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(9th Cir.1996). Counsel has an obligation to lay out their support
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clearly. Carmen v. San Francisco Sch. Dist., 237 F.3d 1026, 1031
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(9th Cir.2001). The court “need not examine the entire file for
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evidence establishing a genuine issue of fact, where the evidence
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is not set forth in the opposition papers with adequate references
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so that it could conveniently be found.” Id.
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III. Discussion
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A.
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As an initial matter, Plaintiff contends that he needs
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additional time to gather evidence to oppose Defendants’ motion.
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court may defer consideration of, or deny, a motion for summary
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judgment, or extend discovery, if an opposing party demonstrates,
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by affidavit or declaration, specific reasons why it cannot present
Plaintiff’s Rule 56(d) Request
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facts essential to its opposition.
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counsel states that if he were permitted time to take the
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deposition of Ryan Ramsey, the resulting testimony would establish
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that Sony’s publicity department did not want to work with
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Plaintiff, and would therefore support the contention that
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Defendant Weinstein Dennison knew about and interfered with
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Plaintiff’s contract.
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Fed. R. Civ. P.
Plaintiff’s
(Declaration of James Orland ¶ 8.)
Counsel’s declaration does not, however, establish why Mr.
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Ramsey has not yet been deposed.
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Ramsey in a response to Defendants’ interrogatories as early as
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September 2014.
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At no point prior to the close of discovery on October 31, 2015
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does Plaintiff appear to have noticed Ramsey’s deposition or sought
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an extension of time to do so prior to the instant request.
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Because Plaintiff was not diligent in his pursuit of Mr. Ramsey’s
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deposition, the Rule 56(d) request is denied.
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Jeong, 73 F.3d 909, 914 (9th Cir. 1995).
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B.
Plaintiff himself identified Mr.
(Reply Declaration of Peter J. Anderson, Ex. 10.)
Intentional Interference Claims
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See, e.g., Conkle v.
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A claim for intentional interference with contractual
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relations requires “(1) a valid contract between plaintiff and a
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third party; (2) defendant’s knowledge of this contract; (3)
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defendant’s intentional acts designed to induce a breach or
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disruption of the contractual relationship; (4) actual breach or
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disruption . . ., and (5) resulting damage.”
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v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co., 19 Cal.4th 26, 55 (1998).2
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Quelimane Co., Inc.
Defendants contend that there is no triable issue with respect
to the second and third elements because Defendant Weinstein
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Dennison did not know Plaintiff and was not aware of any contract
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he had with Fantasia, and therefore could not have intentionally
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interfered with any such agreement.
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claims that she has never spoken with Plaintiff.
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Dennison Declaration ¶ 4.)
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know or work with any of Fantasia’s representatives.
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Other evidence is consistent with that representation.
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Dickens, who worked as Fantasia’s personal business manager and
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terminated Plaintiff’s representation of Fantasia, testified that
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he “[n]ever heard of [Weinstein Dennison] nor would I know her if
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she was standing beside me.”
Defendant Weinstein Dennison
(Weinstein
Nor did Defendant Weinstein Dennison
(Id. ¶ 6.)
Brian
(Anderson Decl., Ex.2 at 10:19-20.)
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Plaintiff alleges claims for intentional interference with
both contractual relations and prospective economic advantage.
Plaintiff’s opposition does not, however, discuss the claims
separately, and all of the arguments raised by Defendants with
respect to the contractual relations claim are equally applicable
to the prospective advantage claims. A prospective advantage claim
requires (1) an economic relationship between the plaintiff and
some third party, with the probability of future economic benefit
to the plaintiff; (2) the defendant’s knowledge of the
relationship; (3) intentional acts on the part of the defendant
designed to disrupt the relationship; (4) actual disruption of the
relationship; and (5) economic harm to the plaintiff proximately
caused by the acts of the defendant. Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed
Martin Corp., 29 Cal.4th 1134, 1153.
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Plaintiff provides no evidence to the contrary.
Instead,
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Plaintiff merely contends that “Plaintiff’s employment with
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Fantasia would have largely consisted of him working alongside of
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Fantasia’s publicist at Defendant SONY.
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of Defendants to suggest that Defendant Weinstein Dennison was not
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aware of Plaintiff working alongside one of her personnel when she
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had only recently blackballed Plaintiff.”
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circular argument is unsupported by any evidence, and ignores
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Defendant Weinstein Dennison’s statement that she is not and never
It would be disingenuous
(Opp. at 6.)
This
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has been Fantasia’s publicist at the record label.
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Dennison Decl. ¶ 6.)
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whether Defendant Weinstein Dennison knew of any contract between
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Fantasia and Plaintiff.
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(Weinstein
There is, therefore, no genuine dispute as to
Nor is there any admissible evidence that, even if Defendant
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Weinstein Dennison knew of the purported contract, she did anything
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to interfere with it.
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representatives testified that the record label, and therefore
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Defendant Weinstein Dennison, did not, and could not, have anything
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to do with their decision not to retain Plaintiff.
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one of Fantasia’s business managers, told Brian Dickens that
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Fantasia could not afford the services of an independent publicist
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such as Plaintiff.3
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then made the decision not to retain Plaintiff, and relayed to
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Plaintiff that Fantasia’s financial circumstances necessitated the
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decision.
To the contrary, Fantasia’s own
Sean Larkin,
(Declaration of Sean Larkin ¶ 3.)
(Dickens Decl. ¶ 5.)
Dickens
Dickens affirmatively, directly,
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Although Fantasia did later retain an independent publicist
other than Plaintiff, she did so only after being engaged to
perform in a Broadway show that brought her additional income.
(Larkin Decl. ¶ 5.)
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and repeatedly refuted Plaintiff’s suggestions that the record
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label was at all involved in the decision.
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Dickens testified that nobody at the record label had any power to
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compel him to hire or fire any independently-funded publicist.
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(Anderson Decl., Ex. 2 at 19:22-25.)
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(Id. ¶¶ 5-6).
Indeed,
Although Plaintiff does refer to some evidence that might tend
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to establish Defendant Weinstein Dennison’s interference, it
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consists entirely of hearsay.
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that Dickens told Plaintiff he was being terminated because there
Plaintiff’s own declaration states
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was “a Jewish woman” at the record label’s publicity department who
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did not want to work with Plaintiff.
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evidence is not only hearsay, and flatly contradicted by Dickens
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himself, but also fails to identify Defendant Weinstein Dennison as
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the “Jewish woman” in question.
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hearsay statement made by Ryan Ramsey, the manager of a former
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client, Brandy, about “a problem” between Plaintiff Weinstein
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Dennison and Plaintiff that led the former to refuse to work with
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the latter.
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not deposed Ramsey and did not diligently attempt to do so.
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Lastly, Plaintiff refers to the hearsay testimony of Brandy’s
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mother, Sonja Norwood, who testified about statements made to her
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by Ryan Ramsey, not by Defendant Weinstein Dennison or anyone at
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Sony.
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record establishes that Fantasia’s business managers made a
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financial decision not to retain Plaintiff, and that neither
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Defendant Weinstein Dennison nor anyone else at the record label
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had anything to do with Plaintiff’s termination.
(Id. ¶ 4.)
(Barnes Decl. ¶ 3.)
That
Plaintiff also references a
As discussed above, however, Plaintiff has
(Opp. Ex. C at 19.)
The only admissible evidence in the
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Lastly, Defendants argue that Plaintiff has also failed to
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demonstrate the damages element of his intentional interference
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claims.
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Plaintiff never met his obligation under Federal Rule of Civil
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Procedure 26(a)(1)(iii) to provide a computation of each category
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of damages claimed and the evidentiary basis for those
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computations.
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regarding his usual rate, the rate common in the field, and the
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rate Fantasia’s later-hired independent publicist received after
Defendants contend, and Plaintiff does not dispute, that
Although Plaintiff now appears to point to testimony
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Fantasia was engaged to perform on Broadway, under Rule 37,
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Plaintiff may not now make use of any information that should have
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been provided as part of his initial Rule 26 disclosures.
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Civ. P. 37(c)(1).
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Fed. R.
Rather than address his failure to comply with Rule 26
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directly, Plaintiff argues that due to the culture of the recording
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industry, he cannot reveal the identities of his clients without
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breaching his duties to those clients and inviting retaliation and
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further damages.
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damages claims is not entirely clear to the court, it does not
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excuse Plaintiff’s failure to comply with Rule 26 nor create a
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triable issue of material fact regarding Plaintiff’s damages.
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court further notes that it does not appear that Plaintiff has ever
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sought a protective order or leave
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seal.
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claims for intentional interference must fail.
While the import of this assertion to Plaintiff’s
to file any document under
Absent any admissible evidence of damages, Plaintiff’s
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The
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IV.
Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, Defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment is GRANTED.
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
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Dated: April 6, 2016
DEAN D. PREGERSON
United States District Judge
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