J. N. v. Heather M. Hendrickson et al

Filing 189

ORDER by Judge Dean D. Pregerson: GRANTING 149 Plaintiff's MOTION for Attorney Fees in the amount of $471,820.45. See order for details. (shb)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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J.N.,

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Plaintiff,

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v.
DET. HEATHER M. HENDRICKSON, et
al.,

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Defendants.

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) Case No. 2-14-cv-02428-DDP (PLAx)
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) ORDER RE: ATTORNEY’S FEES
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) [Dkt. 149]
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Presently before the court is Plaintiff J.N.’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees. (Dkt. 149.)

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After reviewing the parties’ submissions and hearing oral argument, the court adopts the

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following Order.

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I. BACKGROUND

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Plaintiff J.N. filed the instant action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging

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violations of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment Rights on the basis of judicial

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deception and malicious prosecution by Defendant Det. Heather Hendrickson. (See Third

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Amended Complaint.) The court assumes the parties’ familiarity with the facts, which

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have been set forth in greater detail in the court’s Order granting Defendant’s Motion for

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Remittitur. (See Dkt. 167.)
In brief, Plaintiff J.N. brought this action following his arrest and detention on

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felony charges from August 2011 to April 2012. The charges pertained to sex crimes

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perpetrated on Facebook by a man with the user name “Pater Noster” against then 12-

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year-old K.W. The victim’s mother reported the incidents to the Sacramento Police

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Department, which assigned the case to Defendant Det. Heather Hendrickson. Det.

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Hendrickson soon identified Plaintiff J.N. as the primary suspect. Plaintiff asserts that

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Defendant’s investigation was characterized by several errors, including a suggestive

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admonition during a photographic lineup with K.W. that led to a tainted identification

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and a failure to follow-up with a requested FBI subpoena that would have revealed Pater

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Noster’s computer IP address originated in Austria. On the basis of this investigation,

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Defendant prepared a search and arrest warrant application, which she submitted to a

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judge. The warrants were approved and Plaintiff was taken into custody in August 2011.

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In February 2012, the charges were ultimately dismissed after K.W. failed to identify

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Plaintiff as Pater Noster at a live lineup. Plaintiff was released from custody in April

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2012.

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The Third Amended Complaint asserts violations of Plaintiff’s Fourth and

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Fourteenth Amendment rights on the basis of judicial deception, malicious prosecution,

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fabrication of evidence, and suppression of exculpatory evidence. Initially, Plaintiff sued

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Det. Hendrickson, her supervisor, and the deputy District Attorney handling the case,

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and alleged Monell claims for municipal liability. The court dismissed the claims against

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the deputy District Attorney and Plaintiff dismissed all remaining Defendants other than

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Det. Hendrickson prior to trial. The case went to trial and a jury found in favor of

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Plaintiff on his claims for judicial deception and malicious prosecution. The jury awarded

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Plaintiff $5 million in compensatory damages and $5,000 in punitive damages. After the

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verdict, Defendant moved for a new trial or, in the alternative, remittitur of the damages

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verdict. The court denied Defendant’s motion for new trial on liability. However, the
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court found that the jury verdict was excessive and granted a remittitur to reduce the

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verdict to $3,000,000. Plaintiff accepted the remittitur. Plaintiff now moves for reasonable

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attorneys’ fees.

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II. LEGAL STANDARD

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A district court may, in its discretion, award a reasonable attorney’s fee to the

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prevailing party in section 1983 litigation. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). Under section 1988, “a

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prevailing plaintiff should ordinarily recover an attorney’s fee unless special

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circumstances would render such an award unjust.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429

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(1983) (internal citations and quotations omitted). A plaintiff “prevails” when there is a

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material alteration of the legal relationship between the parties that modifies the

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defendant’s behavior in a way that directly benefits the plaintiff. See Farrar v. Hobby, 506

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U.S. 103, 111-12 (1992).

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The “starting point for determining the amount of a reasonable fee is the number

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of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate.”

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Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433. Courts should exclude hours that were not reasonably expended

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from the initial fee calculation. Id. at 434. There is a strong presumption that the resulting

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“lodestar” figure represents a reasonable fee. Jordan v. Multnomah Cnty., 815 F.2d 1258,

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1262 (9th Cir. 1987). After calculating the lodestar, other considerations “may lead the

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district court to adjust the fee upward or downward.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433. Among

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those other considerations is “the important factor of the ‘results obtained.’” Id.; see also

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id. at n.9 (suggesting that many factors are often subsumed within the initial calculation

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of hours reasonably expended at a reasonable hourly rate).

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III. DISCUSSION

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A. Reasonable Attorneys’ Fees

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The parties agree that Plaintiff prevailed in this section 1983 suit and is entitled to

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recover some measure of attorneys’ fees. The only dispute between the parties is what

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constitutes a reasonable fee award.

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1. Reasonable Rates

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“Fee applicants have the burden of producing evidence that their requested fees

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are ‘in line with those prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers of

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reasonably comparable skill, experience and reputation.’” Chaudhry v. City of Los Angeles,

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751 F.3d 1096, 1110–11 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin., Inc., 523 F.3d

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973, 980 (9th Cir. 2008). “[T]he relevant community is the forum in which the district

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court sits.” Camancho, 523 F.3d at 979. The fee applicant must “produce satisfactory

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evidence—in addition to the attorney’s own affidavits—that the requested rates are in

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line with those prevailing in the community.” Dang v. Cross, 422 F.3d 800, 814 (9th Cir.

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2005).
This case was handled in large part by attorney Jeff Dominic Price. Price, who has

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29 years of experience, requests compensation at the rate of $775/hour. (Price Decl. ¶ 9.)

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Two additional attorneys assisted largely at the trial stage. Corey Carter, who has six

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years of experience, requests $495/hour and Mary McCaffrey, who has 6 months of

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experience, requests $290/hour. (See Carter Decl, Exs. C, D; McCaffrey Decl., Exs. E, F.) In

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support of the fee request, Plaintiff’s counsel relies on the declaration of attorney Carol

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Sobel. Sobel, who states that she has reviewed numerous fee applications by civil rights

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litigators in Southern California, explains that based on her review of comparable cases,

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her personal experience with Mr. Price, and her review of the resumés of all three

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attorneys, she would find the rates requested reasonable. (Sobel Decl. ¶ 26.)

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As recognized by fellow district courts, these declarations are of limited value

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because “the appropriate standard is ‘the prevailing rate in the community’ to attract

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‘qualified counsel to civil rights cases,’ and not necessarily what others in the community

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believed that Plaintiffs’ counsel are entitled to.” See, e.g., Charles Antuna v. County of Los

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Angeles, No. CV 14-5600-MWF (PLAx) (C.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 2016) (quoting Moreno v. City of

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Sacramento, 534 F.3d 1106, 1111 (9th Cir. 2008) (“In making the award, the district court

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must strike a balance between granting sufficient fees to attract qualified counsel to civil

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rights cases, and avoiding a windfall to counsel.”)). Accordingly, the court relies on its
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own experience and recent fee awards in comparable civil rights cases to ascertain a

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reasonably hourly rate. In Antuna, the district court undertook a similar analysis in 2016

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and found that senior partners or solo practitioners with over 30 years of experience

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should reasonably be compensated between $600 and $700 per hour, “with $700 reserved

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for those who have invested substantial energy and time in the case.” Id.; see also

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Rodriguez v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 96 F. Supp. 3d 1012, 1023 (C.D. Cal. 2014) (awarding

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hourly rate of $700 to civil rights litigator with 28 years’ experience). The district court in

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Antuna also concluded that hourly rates of $200 for associates with five years of

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experience and $100 for new attorneys were appropriate. Other courts have awarded

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even less for experienced civil rights litigators. See Zuniga v. W. Apartments, No. CV 13-

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04637-JFW, 2014 WL 6655997, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 24, 2014) (awarding hourly rate of

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$450 to fair housing litigator with 24 years of experience). Having reviewed Mr. Price’s

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supporting declaration and his particular experience, along with comparable cases, the

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court finds that a reasonable hourly rate would be $650.

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As to Mr. Carter’s rate, the court notes that his resume does not indicate any

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particular experience with civil rights work and exceeds the court’s understanding of

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prevailing market rates for someone with his level of experience. See Contreras v. City of

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Los Angeles, No. 2:11-CV-1480-SVW-SH, 2013 WL 1296763, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2013),

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aff'd, 603 F. App'x 530 (9th Cir. 2015) (awarding $320 per hour to civil rights litigator with

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six years of experience); P.C. v. City of Los Angeles, et al., No. 2:07–cv–3413–PLA (C.D. Cal.

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Sept. 14, 2012) (awarding hourly rate of $320 to same attorney). Accounting for the rise in

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billing rates since 2013, the court would award Mr. Carter $380 per hour. Finally, the

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court finds Ms. McCaffrey’s rate, though high for someone with such limited prior

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experience, is within the range of reasonable rates for newly admitted attorneys.

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2. Reasonable Time Expended
Plaintiff’s counsel have submitted detailed billing records indicating the time
expended on various tasks. The total number of hours for which compensation is

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requested is 906.36. Applying the approved rates, this would result in the following

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lodestar

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Attorney

Reasonable Rate

Hours

Lodestar

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Jeff D. Price

$650

671.06

$436,189

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Corey A. Carter

$380

79.1

$30,058

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Mary E. McCaffrey

$290

156.2

$45,298

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Total

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In an exercise of billing judgment, Plaintiff’s counsel has voluntarily requested a 10%

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reduction in the fee award to account for any possibly duplicative or unnecessary work

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$511,545

performed.
“The district court may not uncritically accept the number of hours claimed by the

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prevailing party, even if actually spent on the litigation, but must, in order to award fees

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based on them, find that the time actually spent was reasonably necessary.” Carson v.

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Billings Police Dept., 470 F.3d 889, 893 (9th Cir. 2006) (internal quotations omitted). Having

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conducted a review of Plaintiff’s billing records, the court finds that the hours were

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reasonably expended. Likewise, Defendant does not object to any specific billing entries.

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Defendant does, however, propose reducing Mr. Price’s billing rates for all non-trial

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related because this was work that could have been performed by a lower paid associate.

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In Defendant’s view, the 209.40 hours Mr. Price billed in connection with trial should be

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paid at his lodestar rate while the remaining 461.06 hours should be billed at a rate more

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appropriate for associates. As an initial matter, this adjustment rests on the assumption

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that work done in connection with trial preparation is necessarily more complex than all

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other work. An attorney’s efforts preparing to depose a witness, defend a key deposition,

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craft discovery requests, or brief motions in limine can be as complex as, say, preparing

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demonstratives for use at trial. Moreover, as Plaintiff notes, until shortly before trial there

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was no one to whom to delegate, as Mr. Price is a solo practitioner. Likewise, the Ninth

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Circuit has instructed that courts “should defer to the winning lawyer’s professional

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judgment as to how much time he was required to spend on the case . . . .” Moreno v. City
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of Sacramento, 534 F.3d 1106, 1112 (9th Cir. 2008). Accordingly, the court declines to

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speculate about whether certain tasks could have been delegated to a hypothetical less

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experienced associate. Moreover, to the extent that there was any overstaffing, Mr. Price’s

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proposal for an across-the-board ten percent reduction adequately mitigates those

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concerns. Thus, the court finds that the overall reasonable fees incurred in this action

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amount to $460,390.50.

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B. Reduction under Hensley

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Defendant also contend that, notwithstanding Plaintiff’s overall success, the court

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should reduce the overall fee award for time spent preparing the abandoned Monell

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claim. As noted above, Plaintiff initially asserted individual claims against Det.

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Hendrickson, her supervisor, and the assigned Deputy District Attorney, as well as

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municipal liability claims against the City of Sacramento and the Sacramento Police

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Department. (See Third Amended Complaint.) The court dismissed the Deputy District

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Attorney on Defendant’s Motion. (See Dkt. 51.) Shortly before trial, Plaintiff abandoned

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his Monell claims and presented a case only about Det. Hendrickson’s liability. Defendant

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requests a 10% fee reduction to account for time spent on the unsuccessful and ultimately

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abandoned Monell claim.

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Attorney’s fees are not necessarily limited to work performed on successful

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claims. “A plaintiff who is unsuccessful at a stage of litigation that was a necessary step

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to her ultimate victory is entitled to attorney’s fees even for the unsuccessful stage.”

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Cabrales v. County of Los Angeles, 935 F.2d 1050, 1053 (9th Cir. 1991); see also Hensley, 461

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U.S. at 440 (“A plaintiff who has won substantial relief should not have attorney’s fee

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reduced simply because the district court did not adopt each contention raised.”). The

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Hensley Court established a two part analysis for determining attorney’s fees where

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plaintiff has prevailed on some claims but not others. See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434-35.

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First, the court must decide whether the successful and unsuccessful claims are related.

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Though there is no “precise” test of relatedness, related claims involve “a common core

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of facts” or are “based on related legal theories.” Thorne v. City of El Segundo, 802 F.2d
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1131, 1141 (9th Cir. 1986). If the claims are unrelated, hours spent on unsuccessful,

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unrelated claims should be excluded in considering the amount of a reasonable fee.

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Hensley, 461 U.S. at 440.

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In the instant case, Plaintiff has not established the Monell claims and the claims

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against Det. Hendrickson personally are sufficiently related under the Hensley inquiry.

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As an initial matter, Plaintiff makes no argument on this point other than to reiterate

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Hensley’s teaching that an attorney who has secured a favorable outcome should be

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compensated “even if ‘the plaintiff failed to prevail on every contention.’” (Reply 9

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(quoting Fox v. Vice, 563 U.S. 826, 834 (2011)).) Moreover, a review of the operative

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complaint confirms that while the claims against Det. Hendrickson focused on her

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individual acts of judicial deception and malicious prosecution, the Monell claims allege

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that the city maintained deficient policies when investigating cases that involve

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exploitation of children over the Internet. (See TAC ¶ 132.) Although the two claims have

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some connection, they do not turn on a common core of facts and Plaintiff is not entitled

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to recover for time spent preparing that claim. See Gonzales v. City of San Jose, No. 13-CV-

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00695-BLF, 2016 WL 3011791, at *7 (N.D. Cal. May 26, 2016) (awarding fees in successful

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section 1983 action but declining to award fees for time spent on unsuccessful Monell

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claims). Defendant proposed a 10% reduction from Plaintiff’s reasonably incurred

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expenses to account for the Monell claims. It is difficult to determine from reviewing

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Plaintiff’s billing records the exact amount of time dedicated to preparing the municipal

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liability claim. Nonetheless, Plaintiff does not contest the 10% estimate and it accords

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with the court’s understanding of the relative import of the claim to the overall litigation.

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Thus, the court will apply a 10% reduction to Plaintiff’s reasonably incurred attorney’s

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fees. After applying this adjustment, the court arrives at a fee award of $414,351.45.

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C. Supplemental Request

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Plaintiff seeks an additional $73,548.25 in fees incurred after trial, including fees

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related to Defendant’s Motion for New Trial. From the records and declarations

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presented, the court finds that most, but not all, of the time billed was reasonably
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expended. The court reduces the hours sought by Mr. Price by 3.2, the hours sought by

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Mr. Carter by 2, and the hours sought by Ms. McCaffrey by 13.5. At the reasonable rates

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discussed above, the court awards a further $57,496.00

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IV. CONCLUSION

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For the reasons stated above, the court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorneys’
Fees in the amount of $471,820.45.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Dated: August 15, 2017

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DEAN D. PREGERSON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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