Christopher Anderson et al v. John Scott et al

Filing 57

ORDER #53 DENYING PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT #8 AND GRANTING DEFENDANTS MOTION TO DISMISS #13 . Plaintiffs' Complaint is DISMISSED by Judge Dean D. Pregerson. ( MD JS-6. Case Terminated ) . (lc). Modified on 1/9/2017 (lc).

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1 2 O 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 12 CHRISTOPHER ANDERSON, MICHAEL DOZIER, DAVID MARCINKUS, ARI FRIEDMAN AND ARI MILLER, 13 Plaintiff, 14 v. 15 JOHN SCOTT; CHARLIE BECK, 16 Defendants. 17 ___________________________ ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Case No. CV 14-05241 DDP (PLAx) ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [8] AND GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS[13] 18 19 Presently before the court are Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary 20 Judgment and Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. 21 submissions of the parties, the court denies Plaintiffs’ Motion, 22 grants Defendants’ motion, and adopts the following Order. 23 I. 24 Having considered the Background California prohibits the carrying of concealed firearms, with 25 certain exceptions. 26 exceptions allows concealed carry by a person who holds a concealed 27 carry license. 28 concealed carry permits to applicants who show (1) good moral Cal. Penal Code § 25400. Cal. Penal Code § 25655. One of those County sheriffs may issue 1 character, (2) that “good cause exists for issuance of the 2 license[,]” (3) that they reside within the county, or have a 3 principal place of business or employment in the county and spend a 4 “substantial period of time” in that place, and (4) that they have 5 completed a training course. 6 Cal. Penal Code § 26150. Plaintiffs allege that they are residents of Los Angeles 7 County and “seek concealed weapon permits,” although only some of 8 them have actually applied for such a permit. 9 12.) (Complaint ¶¶ 2, 10- Plaintiffs further allege that Defendants refuse to issue a 10 permit “absent evidence of an imminent threat.” 11 Plaintiffs allege that they cannot exercise their rights under the 12 Second Amendment without a concealed carry permit, and that 13 Defendants’ discretionary decisions to deny Plaintiffs permits 14 therefore violates Plaintiffs’ fundamental rights. 15 (Id. ¶ 7.) (Id. ¶¶ 6, 13.) Soon after filing this case, Plaintiffs moved for summary 16 judgment. 17 summary judgment, to dismiss the case, and to stay this matter 18 until the conclusion of appellate proceedings related to Peruta v. 19 County of San Diego, 742 F.3d 1144 (9th Cir. 2014). 20 granted a stay pending issuance of the mandate in Peruta. 21 Ninth Circuit ultimately reheard Peruta en banc and issued an 22 opinion addressing the question raised here by Plaintiffs. 23 II. 24 Defendants responded by moving to strike the motion for This Court The Legal Standard Summary judgment is appropriate where the pleadings, 25 depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 26 together with the affidavits, if any, show “that there is no 27 genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled 28 to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 2 A party 1 seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing the 2 court of the basis for its motion and of identifying those portions 3 of the pleadings and discovery responses that demonstrate the 4 absence of a genuine issue of material fact. 5 Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). 6 the evidence must be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party. See 7 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 242 (1986). 8 moving party does not bear the burden of proof at trial, it is 9 entitled to summary judgment if it can demonstrate that “there is See Celotex Corp. v. All reasonable inferences from If the 10 an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.” 11 Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. 12 Once the moving party meets its burden, the burden shifts to 13 the nonmoving party opposing the motion, who must “set forth 14 specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” 15 Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256. 16 party “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the 17 existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on 18 which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” 19 477 U.S. at 322. 20 that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving 21 party,” and material facts are those “that might affect the outcome 22 of the suit under the governing law.” 23 There is no genuine issue of fact “[w]here the record taken as a 24 whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the 25 nonmoving party.” 26 Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). 27 28 Summary judgment is warranted if a Celotex, A genuine issue exists if “the evidence is such Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio It is not the court’s task “to scour the record in search of a genuine issue of triable fact.” Keenan v. Allan, 91 F.3d 1275, 3 1 1278 (9th Cir.1996). Counsel has an obligation to lay out their 2 support clearly. 3 1026, 1031 (9th Cir.2001). 4 file for evidence establishing a genuine issue of fact, where the 5 evidence is not set forth in the opposition papers with adequate 6 references so that it could conveniently be found.” 7 the material facts are undisputed and resolution of a motion for 8 summary judgment turns on a question of law, the court may 9 determine as a matter of law which party’s position is correct as a Carmen v. San Francisco Sch. Dist., 237 F.3d The court “need not examine the entire Id. “[W]hen 10 matter of law.” 11 LKK/JFM, 2009 WL 1953444 at *2 (E.D. Cal. July 7, 2009) (citing 12 Asuncion v. Dist. Dir. of U. S. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 13 427 F.2d 523, 524 (9th Cir. 1970). 14 Gulf Ins. Co. v. First Bank, No. CIV-S-08-209 A complaint will survive a motion to dismiss when it contains 15 “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to 16 relief that is plausible on its face.” 17 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 18 570 (2007)). 19 “accept as true all allegations of material fact and must construe 20 those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” 21 v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000). 22 need not include “detailed factual allegations,” it must offer 23 “more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me 24 accusation.” 25 allegations that are no more than a statement of a legal conclusion 26 “are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id. at 679. 27 other words, a pleading that merely offers “labels and 28 conclusions,” a “formulaic recitation of the elements,” or “naked Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court must Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 4 Resnick Although a complaint Conclusory allegations or In 1 assertions” will not be sufficient to state a claim upon which 2 relief can be granted. 3 quotation marks omitted). 4 Id. at 678 (citations and internal “When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court 5 should assume their veracity and then determine whether they 6 plausibly give rise to an entitlement of relief.” Id. at 679. 7 Plaintiffs must allege “plausible grounds to infer” that their 8 claims rise “above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 9 555. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for 10 relief” is a “context-specific task that requires the reviewing 11 court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” 12 556 U.S. at 679. 13 III. Discussion 14 Iqbal, Under the Second Amendment, “[a] well regulated Militia, being 15 necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people 16 to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” 17 II. 18 in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) and McDonald 19 v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010), contend that the Second 20 Amendment requires that they be issued concealed carry permits. 21 The Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, squarely addressed, and 22 rejected, this argument in Peruta.1 23 824 F.3d 919 (2016). U.S. Const. amend. Plaintiffs, relying largely upon the Supreme Court’s decisions Peruta v. County of San Diego, 24 As the Peruta court explained, the Supreme Court held in 25 Heller that the Second Amendment "preserves the right of members of 26 27 28 1 Hereinafter, all references to Peruta refer to the Ninth Circuit's en banc decision. Peruta v. County of San Diego, 824 F.3d 919 (2016). 5 1 the general public to keep and bear arms in their homes for the 2 purpose of self-defense." 3 554 U.S. at 635.) 4 Supreme Court was careful to observe that the scope of the Second 5 Amendment is not unlimited, and that, "for example, the majority of 6 the 19th-century courts to consider the question held that 7 prohibitions on carrying concealed weapons were lawful under the 8 Second Amendment or state analogues." 9 U.S. at 626-27) (emphasis omitted). Peruta, 824 F.3d at 928 (citing Heller, As the en banc court further explained, the Id. (quoting Heller, 554 The Supreme Court later 10 clarified in McDonald that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 11 Amendment "incorporates the Second Amendment right recognized in 12 Heller," which therefore applies to the states. 13 at 791. 14 McDonald, 561 U.S. Plaintiffs assert that, under Heller and McDonald, Defendants' 15 discretionary concealed carry policies do not pass intermediate 16 scrutiny. 17 Ninth Circuit utilize a two-step inquiry that looks first to 18 whether a challenged law burdens conduct protected by the Second 19 Amendment and, if so, then directs the reviewing court to apply the 20 appropriate level of scrutiny. 21 Francisco, 746 F.3d 953, 963 (2014); United States v. Chovan, 735 22 F.3d 1127, 1136 (2013). 23 analyze Defendants' policies under intermediate scrutiny without 24 first determining whether the carrying of a concealed weapon in 25 public is conduct protected by the Second Amendment. 26 court, however, has already answered that question in the negative. 27 28 (MSJ at 3-4.) In Second Amendment cases, courts in the Jackson v. City and County of San This court cannot, therefore, proceed to The Peruta In Peruta, as here, plaintiffs contended that sheriffs' policies requiring "good cause" for the issuance of concealed carry 6 1 permits violated the Second Amendment under Heller and McDonald. 2 Peruta, 824 F.3d at 924. 3 analysis, the Peruta court determined that the carrying of 4 concealed weapons was often proscribed and rarely, and even then 5 only temporarily, considered to be a right, either by state courts 6 or the Supreme Court. 7 concluded that "the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms 8 does not include, in any degree, the right of a member of the 9 general public to carry concealed firearms in public." 10 After conducting an exhaustive historical Id. at 929-939. The Peruta court therefore Id. at 939. The policies challenged here undisputedly impair Plaintiffs' 11 ability to carry concealed weapons in public. 12 however, dictates that such conduct does not enjoy any Second 13 Amendment protection. 14 further. 15 and their claim dismissed as a matter of law. 16 IV. 17 Binding authority, This court's analysis therefore need go no Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment must be denied, Conclusion For the reasons stated above, Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary 18 Judgment is DENIED. 19 Plaintiffs' Complaint is DISMISSED. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. 20 21 22 IT IS SO ORDERED. 23 24 Dated: January 9, 2016 DEAN D. PREGERSON United States District Judge 25 26 27 28 7

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