Maura Cotter v. City of Long Beach et al

Filing 48

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 27 by Judge Dean D. Pregerson: Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment with respect to her Fourth Amendment claim for false arrest is GRANTED. (lc). Modified on 1/29/2016 (lc).

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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MAURA COTTER,

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Plaintiff,

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v.
CITY OF LONG BEACH; LONG
BEACH POLICE OFFICER ARMAND
CASALLENOS, BADGE NO. 5705;
LONG BEACH POLICE OFFICER
VEGA, BADGE NO. 5791; LONG
BEACH POLICE OFFICER ARZOLA
BADGE NO. 6189,
Defendants.
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Case No. CV 14-05495 DDP (JEMx)

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION
FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

[Dkt. 27]

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I.

Background
Plaintiff is a member of an organization known as “Food, Not

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Bombs.” (Decl. Of Maura Cotter, ¶ 2.)

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Plaintiff and two other members of Food, Not Bombs (collectively,

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“the protesters”) were peacefully protesting against McDonald’s

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while holding a 5 x 3 foot banner and passing out flyers and vegan

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burritos on the sidewalk in front of the McDonald’s entrance at 640

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Long Beach Blvd. (Id. at ¶¶ 4 & 7.)

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called the Long Beach Police Department to complaint that the

On August 14, 2013,

The manager of McDonald’s

protesters were disturbing his business by approaching customers

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and telling them not to eat at McDonald’s and handing out free food

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to get them to go away. (Decl. of Jeffrey Le Beau, Ex. 9, 1.)

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officers arrived, they spoke with the manager and took photos of

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the protesters. (Le Beau Decl., Ex. 24, 4.)

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asked the protesters for identification and checked for warrants.

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(Le Beau Decl., Ex. 27, 3-4.)

When

Then, the officers

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Plaintiff was ostensibly arrested because she failed to

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provide the officers with identification. (Le Beau Decl., Ex. 11,

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3.)

Plaintiff alleges that although she was arrested for failing

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to provide the officer with identification, she gave the officer

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her Illinois Driver’s License at the scene of the incident. (Decl.

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of Ms. Cotter, ¶ 8; Exhibit 30, 2-3.)

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station and booked on charges of obstructing a public passage

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(L.B.M.C. 9.30.050) and violation of operating conditions as a

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peddling merchant (L.B.M.C. 5.66.020). (Le Beau Decl., Ex. 12.)

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August 23, 2013, a criminal complaint was filed in the Los Angeles

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Superior Court against Plaintiff, charging her with a misdemeanor

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for obstructing a public passage. (Id., Ex. 13.)

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2013, the court made a finding of factual innocence and granted an

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order sealing the records of Plaintiff’s arrest. (Le Beau Decl.,

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Ex. 15.)

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Plaintiff was taken to the

On

On December 30,

Plaintiff’s Complaint here states four causes of action:

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violation of her First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment Rights

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under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, unlawful custom and practice under 42

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U.S.C. § 1983, civil rights violations under California Civil Code

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§ 52.1, and false arrest and imprisonment.

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Partial Summary Judgment.

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II.

Legal Standard
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Plaintiff now moves for

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Summary judgment is appropriate where the pleadings,

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depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,

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together with the affidavits, if any, show “that there is no

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genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled

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to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A party

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seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing the

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court of the basis for its motion and of identifying those portions

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of the pleadings and discovery responses that demonstrate the

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absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v.

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Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). All reasonable inferences from

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the evidence must be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party. See

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Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 242 (1986). If the

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moving party does not bear the burden of proof at trial, it is

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entitled to summary judgment if it can demonstrate that “there is

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an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.”

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Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.

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Once the moving party meets its burden, the burden shifts to

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the nonmoving party opposing the motion, who must “set forth

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specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.”

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Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256. Summary judgment is warranted if a party

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“fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of

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an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party

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will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322.

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A genuine issue exists if “the evidence is such that a reasonable

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jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party,” and material

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facts are those “that might affect the outcome of the suit under

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the governing law.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. There is no genuine

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issue of fact “[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a
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rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party.” Matsushita

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Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).

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It is not the court's task “to scour the record in search of a

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genuine issue of triable fact.” Keenan v. Allan, 91 F.3d 1275, 1278

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(9th Cir.1996). Counsel has an obligation to lay out their support

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clearly. Carmen v. San Francisco Sch. Dist., 237 F.3d 1026, 1031

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(9th Cir.2001). The court “need not examine the entire file for

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evidence establishing a genuine issue of fact, where the evidence

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is not set forth in the opposition papers with adequate references

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so that it could conveniently be found.” Id.

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III. Discussion

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As an initial matter, the scope of Plaintiff’s Motion is

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unclear.

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judgment “of the First Cause of Action for Relief . . . because the

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undisputed evidence establishes that defendant CASTELLANOS falsely

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arrested plaintiff to stop her from exercising her First Amendment

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Rights to protest.”

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that Defendants “deprived Plaintiff of her rights secured by the

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First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments . . . in that Defendants .

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. . subjected plaintiff [sic] to excessive and unreasonable force,

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search and seizure and malicious prosecution.”

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however, states that it “is directly [sic] solely to the issue of

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Ms. Cotter’s false arrest,” and refers to false arrest as a

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violation of the Fourth Amendment.1

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bulk of Plaintiff’s Motion appears directed at her Fourth Amendment

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false arrest claim, the court addresses the Motion accordingly.

Plaintiff’s Notice of Motion seeks partial summary

The Complaint’s First Cause of Action alleges

The motion,

(Mot. At 13, 14.)

Because the

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The Complaint also alleges a Fourth Cause of Action for
false arrest and imprisonment.
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A.

42 U.S.C. § 1983
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff may bring a claim for

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deprivation of rights where a government actor deprived him or her

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of his or her constitutional rights.

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1368, 1374 (9th Cir. 1987).

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cognizable under § 1983 as a violation of the Fourth Amendment,

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provided the arrest was without probable cause or other

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justification.”

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1018 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Lacey v. Maricopa County, 691 F.3d

Merritt v. Mackey, 827 F.2d

“A claim for unlawful arrest is

Velazquez v. City of Long Beach, 793 F.3d 1010,

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896, 913 (9th Cir. 2012)).

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the totality of the circumstances known to officers at the time,

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there is a “fair probability or substantial chance of criminal

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activity.”

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Probable cause exists when, based on

Velazquez, 793 F.3d at 1018.

Defendants, without any citation to the record, assert that

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Defendant Castellanos had probable cause to believe that Plaintiff

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was blocking the sidewalk in violation of Long Beach Municipal Code

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§ 9.30.050, which states:

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No person shall block, impede or obstruct any public place
or any entrance, exit or approach to any place of business
in a manner calculated or with intent to prevent, delay,
hinder or interfere with any person in the free passage
along or the entering or leaving of such public place or
place of business.

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According to Defendants, Defendant Castellanos (1) observed
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Plaintiff holding a banner across the sidewalk, (2) “perceived that
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the banner sufficiently blocked the sidewalk to obstruct public
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passage,” (3) learned from the McDonald’s manager and from
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Plaintiff’s group that the group was trying to dissuade passers by
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from eating at McDonald’s, and “[b]ased on those facts . . .
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decided to cite the group” and then arrested Plaintiff. (Motion at

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7.)

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First, the fact that Defendant Castellanos may have known or

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believed that Plaintiff was trying to dissuade people from eating

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at McDonald’s has little bearing on whether she was physically

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obstructing pedestrians’ travel on the sidewalk.

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not dispositive of the probable cause question, Plaintiff was found

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to be factually innocent of a § 9.30.050 violation.

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although Defendants do not cite to any evidence, and it is not the

Second, although

Further,

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court’s burden to scour the record in search of a triable issue,

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the court’s review of the evidence reveals that Plaintiff and her

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group’s banner were not even arguably hindering public passage.

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A photograph taken by Officer Castellano himself, and therefore

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reflective of the circumstances known to him at the time of the

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incident, clearly indicates that the protesters and their sign

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occupied less than half the width of the sidewalk, and that

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pedestrian traffic was minimal.

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establishes that the sidewalk, at 26 feet in width, was

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significantly wider than a typical sidewalk, and that Plaintiff’s

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group’s sign measured approximately five feet in width.

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photographic and video evidence shows that the sidewalk was wide

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enough to accommodate two police cruisers parked side by side,

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while still leaving enough space in between for a tree and for

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pedestrians, including at least one pedestrian with a stroller, to

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proceed without a sliver of obstruction.

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circumstances, no reasonable trier of fact could conclude that

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there was a fair probability that Plaintiff was blocking the

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sidewalk in violation of § 9.30.050.

Other, undisputed evidence

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Indeed,

Under these

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B.

Qualified Immunity

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Defendants also contend, somewhat briefly, that Officer

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Castellanos is entitled to qualified immunity.

“Qualified immunity

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gives government officials breathing room to make reasonable but

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mistaken judgments,” and “‘protects’ all but the plainly

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incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.’” Green v.

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Fresno, 751 F.3d 1039, 1051 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Ashcroft v. al-

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Kidd,131 S. Ct. 2074, 2083 (2011)).

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established a two-part test for determining if a police officer is

The Supreme Court has

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entitled to qualified immunity: (1) whether the allegations, if

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true, establish a constitutional violation, and (2) whether the

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constitutional violation was clearly established. Pearson v.

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Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 235-36 (2009).

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requires two separate determinations: (1) whether the law governing

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the conduct at issue was clearly established and (2) whether the

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facts as alleged could support a reasonable belief that the conduct

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in question conformed to the established law.

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Bagley, 988 F.2d 868, 873 (9th Cir. 1993).

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Fourth Amendment rights were violated, as discussed above.

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only remaining question, therefore, and that to which Defendants

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devote the entirety of their brief qualified immunity argument, is

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whether a reasonable person would have known that the arrest

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violated Plaintiff’s rights.

The second part of the test

Act Up!/Portland v.

Here, Plaintiff’s
The

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It was well established at the time of the incident that

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individuals may not be subjected to seizure or arrest without

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reasonable suspicion or probable cause.

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of San Francisco, 751 F.3d 1039, 1052 (9th Cir. 2014).

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argue, however, that Defendant Castellanos could reasonably have
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Green v. City and County
Defendants

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believed that Plaintiff was violating § 9.30.050 by blocking a

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portion of the sidewalk.

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Qualified immunity may be based upon a reasonable mistake of

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law, fact, or both.

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Cir. 2014).

Here, Defendant Castellano’s mistakes were not

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reasonable.

Factually, as described in detail above, there is no

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question that Plaintiff was not blocking the sidewalk or impeding

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pedestrian traffic.

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finding of factual innocence, the state court noted that the case

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Lal v. California, 746 F.3d 1112, 1116 (9th

Indeed, in granting Plaintiff’s motion for a

was not a close one.
Nor was Defendant Castellano’s interpretation of § 9.30.050 to

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include partial obstructions of the sidewalk a reasonable

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interpretation of the law.

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knowledge element of the ordinance, which requires that a person

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intend to hinder free passage through a public space.

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insert the term “partial” alongside “block, impede, or obstruct”

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would render the ordinance meaningless in the context of a lightly

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traveled sidewalk.

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without, in some sense, “obstructing” at least that portion of the

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sidewalk which she herself occupies.

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however, could argue that a person standing on an empty sidewalk is

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blocking, let alone intending to block, free passage along the

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route.

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1149, 1153 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (suggesting that ordinance banning

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“standing in a stationary position upon any sidewalk, boardwalk or

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other public thoroughfare so as to obstruct free pedestrian

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traffic” would be unconstitutional as applied to an empty

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sidewalk); see also In Re Wallace, 3 Cal.3d 289, 295 (1970) (“[A]ny

First, Defendants completely ignore the

Second, to

No person can travel or stand upon a sidewalk

No reasonable person,

See, e.g. White v. City of Laguna Beach, 679 F.Supp.2d

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visitor to a fair or other public exhibition necessarily occupies a

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certain area of ground or floor space wherever he stands, and

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persons wishing to proceed past him are manifestly required to

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‘avoid’ that area under pain of tort liability. The record is thus

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devoid of evidence that petitioners ‘obstructed’ the business of

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the fair” by handing out leaflets.).

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Because Defendant Castellanos arrested and booked Plaintiff

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without probable cause, and made no reasonable mistake of either

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fact or law, he is not entitled to qualified immunity.

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IV.

Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial

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Summary Judgment with respect to her Fourth Amendment claim for

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false arrest is GRANTED.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Dated:January 29, 2016
DEAN D. PREGERSON
United States District Judge

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