Ismael Aldaz et al v. City of Los Angeles et al

Filing 25

MINUTES (IN CHAMBERS) by Judge Christina A. Snyder RE: Defendant's Motion to strike, or in the Alternative, to Dismiss All Individually named Plaintiffs Except Ismael Aldaz, Sr. 10 . The Court GRANTS the City of Los Angeles's motion to dismiss without prejudice the claims of all plaintiffs except for Ismael Aldaz, Sr. The City's motion to strike is GRANTED IN PART as to paragraph 5 and otherwise DENIED. Court Reporter: Not Present. (gk)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No.

2:14-CV-05642-CAS(SSx)

Title

ISMAEL ALDAZ, SR., ET AL. v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES, ET AL.

Present: The Honorable

Date

‘O’

November 18, 2014

CHRISTINA A. SNYDER

Catherine Jeang
Deputy Clerk

Not Present
Court Reporter / Recorder

N/A
Tape No.

Attorneys Present for Plaintiffs:

Attorneys Present for Defendants:

Not Present

Not Present

Proceedings:

(IN CHAMBERS): DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO STRIKE, OR
IN THE ALTERNATIVE, TO DISMISS ALL INDIVIDUALLY
NAMED PLAINTIFFS EXCEPT ISMAEL ALDAZ, SR. (ECF
No. 10, filed September 9, 2014)

The Court finds this motion appropriate for decision without oral argument. Fed.
R. Civ. P. 78; Local Rule 7-15. Accordingly, the hearing date of November 24, 2014, is
vacated, and the matter is hereby taken under submission.
I.

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs, fifty police officers employed by the Los Angeles Police Department
(“LAPD”), filed the instant action on July 21, 2014, against the City of Los Angeles (“the
City”) and Does 1 through 10. ECF. No. 1. The complaint alleges that defendants failed
to compensate plaintiffs for overtime hours worked, including before and after shifts and
during their “Code 7" meal breaks. See Compl. ¶¶ 22–29.
Plaintiffs were previously parties in two opt-in FLSA collective actions that were
decertified because the plaintiffs were not “similarly situated” with respect to off-theclock claims. See Alaniz v. City of Los Angeles, No. 04-CV-8592 GAF (AJWx); Mata
v. City of Los Angeles, No. 07-CV-6782 GAF (AJWx). The decertifying orders
dismissed the opt-in plaintiffs’ claims without prejudice.1 See Compl. ¶ 11.
1

Essentially identical decertification orders were issued in each case; the Court
refers herein to the Alaniz order of May 21, 2014 as “Decertification Order.” The
Decertification Order was based, in part, on findings that: (1) “the officers worked in
disparate locations for a variety of supervisors in different divisions and bureaus with
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Date

‘O’

Case No.

2:14-CV-05642-CAS(SSx)

November 18, 2014

Title

ISMAEL ALDAZ, SR., ET AL. v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES, ET AL.

Subsequently, the dismissed opt-in plaintiffs refiled their actions as twenty-eight lawsuits,
with plaintiffs grouped by work divisions or bureaus. Plaintiffs in the case before this
Court were, “[d]uring a significant period of time throughout their employment . . .
assigned to divisions of the Detective Bureau: Gangs and Narcotics, Commercial Crimes,
Detective Support and Vice, and Robbery Homicide Divisions.” Compl. ¶ 12.
On September 9, 2014, the City filed a motion to (1) dismiss or strike all named
plaintiffs except for Ismael Aldaz, Sr. (“Aldaz”), the first-named plaintiff, and (2) strike
certain allegations in the complaint relating to collective adjudication.2 Following
plaintiffs’ failure to file a timely opposition, and the Court’s grant of an ex parte
application to extend the opposition deadline, plaintiffs filed an opposition on November
3, 2014. ECF No. 22. The City replied on November 10, 2014. ECF No. 23. After
considering the parties’ arguments, the Court concludes that the motion to dismiss all
plaintiffs but Aldaz should be GRANTED and that the motion to strike should be
GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

assignments of varying nature”; (2) the “only department-wide policy is the unambiguous
written directive that bars officers from working off-the-clock for any period of 6 minutes
or more”; (3) no expert report or survey data indicated that declarations submitted in
opposition to the motion to decertify were statistically representative of the claimants; (4)
the City was entitled to raise individualized defenses; and (5) collective adjudication
would be unmanageable . See Decertification Order at 5, 8, 11, 12, 13.
2

The City also requests that the Court take judicial notice of numerous orders and
party submissions in related cases. A district court may take judicial notice of records in
another case. See United States v. Wilson, 631 F.2d 118, 119 (9th Cir. 1980).
Accordingly, the Court takes judicial notice of the existence of these documents, although
the Court does not accept the truth of the facts found or alleged therein. See Peel v.
BrooksAmerica Mortg. Corp., 788 F. Supp. 2d 1149, 1158 (C.D. Cal. 2011).
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No.

2:14-CV-05642-CAS(SSx)

Title

ISMAEL ALDAZ, SR., ET AL. v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES, ET AL.

II.

Date

‘O’

November 18, 2014

LEGAL STANDARD
A.

Joinder

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20 governs permissive joinder and provides:
Persons . . . may be joined in one action as plaintiffs if:
(A) they assert any right to relief jointly, severally, or in the
alternative with respect to or arising out of the same transaction,
occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences; and
(B) any question of law or fact common to all plaintiffs will
arise in the action.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(1). “The first prong, the ‘same transaction’ requirement, refers to
similarity in the factual background of a claim.” Coughlin v. Rogers, 130 F.3d 1348,
1350 (9th Cir. 1997). “Both of these requirements must be satisfied in order to sustain
party joinder under Rule 20(a).” 7 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal
Practice & Procedure § 1653 (2d ed. 1995).
Misjoinder of parties “is not a ground for dismissing an action.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
21. But on “motion or on its own, the court may at any time, on just terms, add or drop a
party,” or “sever any claim against a party.” Id. Rule 20 provides the relevant standard
for determining whether a party should be dropped under Rule 21. Pan Am. World
Airways, Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Court for the Central Dist. Of Cal., 523 F.2d 1073, 1079 (9th
Cir. 1975). When parties are misjoined, the “court can generally dismiss all but the first
named plaintiff without prejudice to the institution of new, separate lawsuits by the
dropped plaintiffs . . . based on the claim or claims attempted to be set forth in the present
complaint.” Coughlin, 130 F.3d at 1350 (internal quotation marks omitted). A district
court exercises considerable discretion under Rule 21. See Sams v. Beech Aircraft Corp.,
625 F.2d 273, 277 (9th Cir. 1980).

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No.

2:14-CV-05642-CAS(SSx)

Title

ISMAEL ALDAZ, SR., ET AL. v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES, ET AL.
B.

Date

‘O’

November 18, 2014

Motion to Strike

A motion to strike material from a pleading is made pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(f). Under this Rule, the Court may strike from a pleading any
material that is “redundant, immaterial, impertinent or scandalous.” A motion to strike is
not a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, and,
where not involving a purportedly insufficient defense, simply tests whether a pleading
contains inappropriate material. The essential function of a motion to strike is to “avoid
the expenditure of time and money that must arise from litigating spurious issues by
dispensing with those issues prior to trial.” Fantasy, Inc. v. Fogerty, 984 F.2d 1524, 1527
(9th Cir. 1993), rev’d on other grounds, 510 U.S. 517 (1994). Because of “the limited
importance of pleadings in federal practice,” motions to strike pursuant to Rule 12(f) are
disfavored. Bureerong v. Uvawas, 922 F. Supp. 1450, 1478 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
III.

ANALYSIS
A.

Motion to Dismiss or Strike Improperly Joined Plaintiffs

Plaintiffs argue that joinder is proper because all named plaintiffs “share common
questions regarding (1) whether the LAPD’s official Code 7 policy violates the FLSA, (2)
whether an unwritten policy discouraging the reporting of missed/interrupted Code 7s
exists, and (3) whether an unwritten policy discouraging the reporting of off-the-clock
work exists.” ECF No. 22 at 16. The Court disagrees, finding that adjudication of
plaintiffs’ FLSA claims will require individualized inquiries that make joinder
impracticable. In so finding, the Court joins a growing number of decisions in this
judicial district dismissing or striking all but the first named plaintiff in the cases filed
after decertification of the collective actions in Alaniz and Mata.3

3

See, e.g., Acevedo v. City of Los Angeles, No. 14-CV-5661-GHK (PJWx), ECF
No. 23 at 4–7 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 13, 2014) (finding that joinder of a similar group of
plaintiffs was improper under Rule 20 and principles of fundamental fairness); Aragon v.
City of Los Angeles, No.14-CV-5631-R, ECF No. 24 at 3 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 6, 2014)
(“Plaintiffs’ attempt to join themselves into mini collective actions by division does not
solve the problem because each Plaintiff has worked in multiple divisions, with varying
assignments and supervisors during the relevant statutory period”); Agard v. City of Los
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Date

‘O’

Case No.

2:14-CV-05642-CAS(SSx)

November 18, 2014

Title

ISMAEL ALDAZ, SR., ET AL. v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES, ET AL.

Plaintiffs spend much of their opposition criticizing the Decertification Order’s
finding that an unofficial policy discouraging the reporting of overtime could not be
shown on a collective basis, and arguing that the Ninth Circuit’s subsequent decision in
Jiminez v. Allstate Ins. Co., 765 F.3d 1161 (9th Cir. 2014), invalidates that finding and
shows the propriety of adjudicating all plaintiffs’ claims together. In Jiminez, the Ninth
Circuit found that a district court did not abuse its discretion in certifying a Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 23 class of automobile insurance claims adjusters who claimed that
Allstate had an unofficial policy of requiring them to work unpaid off-the-clock overtime
in violation of California law. Id. at 1163, 1169. Plaintiffs argue that Jiminez shows that
rather than focusing on “whether the plaintiffs could actually prove the existence of an
unwritten/unofficial policy that contradicted the written policies and directives of the
LAPD,” the Alaniz and Mata court should have “focused on whether the plaintiffs and
opt-in members, as a whole, shared the common question over the existence of such a
policy regardless of whether it was ultimately proven at the liability phase of trial.” ECF
No. 22 at 5. Plaintiffs suggest that, based on Jiminez, the Court should deny the present
motion because all plaintiffs’ claims are united by the common question of whether an
unofficial practice or policy of discouraging the reporting of overtime claims existed.
As an initial matter, this motion presents an issue of joinder under Rule 20, not an
appeal of the Decertification Order. Moreover, Jiminez involved Rule 23 and California
employment law, neither of which is before the Court. But to the extent that Jiminez is
relevant, the Court disagrees with plaintiffs’ reading of that case and the case law on
which the Ninth Circuit relied. In Jiminez, the Court of Appeals held that the district

Angeles, No. 14-CV-5668 PSG (JCx), ECF No. 23 at 5 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2014)
(dismissing all but the first named plaintiff because the plaintiffs, although alleged to
work in one division, were “of varying ranks, were supervised by different individuals,
and are claiming differing violations”); Abner v. City of Los Angeles, No. 14-CV-5655
PA (MRWx), ECF No. 20 at 2 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 22, 2014) (“Plaintiffs’ attempt to subgroup into divisions does not mean that their claims arise out of the same transaction or
occurrence. Plaintiffs’ claims remain individualized due to variances in assignments,
duties, supervisors, and location.”); Alonzo v. City of Los Angeles, No. 14-CV-5636
RGK (JPRx), ECF No. 30 at 1 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 21, 2014) (severing and dismissing the
claims of all but one plaintiff because “[r]esolution of the claims will require
individualized and separate factual inquiries to determine the merits of the claims”).
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Date

‘O’

Case No.

2:14-CV-05642-CAS(SSx)

November 18, 2014

Title

ISMAEL ALDAZ, SR., ET AL. v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES, ET AL.

court had permissibly found that specific evidence supported the existence of classwide
proof that would “drive the answer to the plaintiffs’ claims.” 765 F.3d at 1165–66.
Indeed, as the Supreme Court has made clear, “What matters to class certification . . . is
not the raising of common ‘questions’—even in droves—but rather the capacity of a
classwide proceeding to generate common answers apt to drive the resolution of the
litigation. Dissimilarities within the proposed class are what have the potential to impede
the generation of common answers.” Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541,
2551 (2011) (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). In harmony with
Jiminez and Dukes, the Decertification Order framed the “issue . . . [as] whether trying
the suit as a collective action will generate common answers to the questions
presented—most notably whether there is a department-wide unwritten policy mandating
that all officers work off-the-clock unless and until they reach one hour of overtime.”
Decertification Order at 4. The court then found that, based on the specific claims and
evidence presented, a collective action was not appropriate because individualized
inquiries would drive resolution of the key issues. The Court finds no support in Jiminez
for the proposition that the question of the existence of an unofficial LAPD policy
discouraging overtime reporting supports joinder under Rule 20, and finds the Alaniz and
Mata court’s reasoning instructive on the propriety of trying plaintiffs’ claims together.
Plaintiffs also argue that the collective actions were decertified because of
individualized damages issues, and that limiting this action to officers who worked in the
Detective Bureau eliminates any individualized inquiries that could make joinder
improper. Not so. The Decertification Order squarely addressed plaintiffs’ argument that
individualized issues could be addressed by “bifurcating the trial into liability and
damages phases,” explaining that individualized inquiries “directly impact whether or not
the City can be held liable for certain alleged violations.” Decertification Order at 12
(emphasis added). See, e.g., id. at 9 (“The fact that several hundred thousand overtime
reports were submitted is consistent with the LAPD’s written policy of prohibiting offthe-clock work . . . and suggests that any alleged FLSA violations were not the product of
an LAPD unwritten rule, but rather stemmed from the decisions of individualized
supervisors.”).
Similarly, the Court finds in this case that individualized factual issues impacting
liability make joinder impracticable. For the reasons stated above, the Court is not
persuaded that all plaintiffs’ claims will be driven by a non-individualized inquiry into
the existence of an unofficial policy of discouraging overtime reporting. Moreover,
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Date

‘O’

Case No.

2:14-CV-05642-CAS(SSx)

November 18, 2014

Title

ISMAEL ALDAZ, SR., ET AL. v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES, ET AL.

plaintiffs must demonstrate that LAPD management had “constructive or actual
knowledge that [plaintiffs] were working off-the-clock.” Reed v. County of Orange, 266
F.R.D. 446, 462 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (citing Pforr v. Food Lion, Inc., 851 F.2d 106, 109 (4th
Cir. 1988), and Forrester v. Roth’s I.G.A. Foodliner, Inc., 646 F.2d 413, 414 (9th Cir.
1981)). This determination will require individualized inquiries into varying factual
scenarios. A declaration that plaintiffs submitted in opposition to this motion indicates
that “employees must work different shifts to provide full coverage within each station,”
and that “[s]upervisors and officers often work different or overlapping shifts.” ECF No.
22 Ex. B (“Perez Decl.”) ¶ 12. Additionally, “employees holding the rank of Lieutenant
or below can and frequently do transfer from shift to shift, from assignment to
assignment, and/or from station to station (or to another division or bureau).”4 Id. And
although the plaintiffs in this case allegedly all worked at the Detective Bureau at some
point, the Detective Bureau is divided into seven divisions—at least four of which are
implicated by plaintiffs’ allegations—and includes “21 geographic detective commands
throughout the City.” Id. ¶ 13. Furthermore, the City has pointed to pleadings in the
collective action cases suggesting that even within a single station, the plaintiffs’ titles,
supervisors, and duties varied throughout the time periods at issue in this lawsuit. See,
e.g., DRJN 2 Ex. 7 (declaration of a plaintiff who worked as both a sergeant and watch
commander). Thus, “[t]o rebut [plaintiffs’] allegations of knowledge, [the City] will have
to introduce evidence that is inherently individualized.” Reed, 266 F.R.D. at 460.
Additionally, the City is entitled to introduce defenses that would require
individualized proof, including that individual supervisors acted in good faith, that offthe-clock activities did not constitute compensable “work,” and that off-the-clock work
fell within the FLSA’s de minimis exception. See Reed, 266 F.R.D. at 461; Smith v. TMobile USA, Inc., No. CV-05-5274 ABC (SSx), 2007 WL 2385131, at *8 (C.D. Cal.
Aug. 15, 2007) (finding that these FLSA defenses “must, by their nature, be
individualized”).

4

For example, David Harris, one of the plaintiffs, declared in the collective action
proceedings that he was assigned to ten different divisions during his twenty-three years
with the LAPD. See DRJN 1 Ex. 18 ¶¶ 3, 4. Eddie Badillo, another plaintiff, listed
several assignments, not all of which are in the Detective Bureau. See Def. Req. Judicial
Notice Supp. Reply (“DRJN 2") Ex. 4.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Date

‘O’

Case No.

2:14-CV-05642-CAS(SSx)

November 18, 2014

Title

ISMAEL ALDAZ, SR., ET AL. v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES, ET AL.

Finally, plaintiffs’ own allegations show variations in the factual circumstances
giving rise to their claims. The complaint alleges that sergeants were not compensated
for preparation for roll call. Compl. ¶ 16. But the complaint does not allege that all
plaintiffs held the rank of sergeant in the Detective Bureau, and in fact it appears that
several plaintiffs did not. See DRJN 2 Exs. 4–6 (declarations from plaintiffs that did not
hold either rank). The complaint also alleges that “[p]laintiffs who, in addition to their
normal assignments and obligation, worked speciality details such as SWAT, canine,
motorcycle traffic officers and other duties which require donning and doffing at the
worksite, are entitled to be compensated.” Compl. ¶ 21. But it is not clear from the
complaint that all named plaintiffs worked such speciality details.
In short, plaintiffs have not established that they assert “any right to relief . . . with
respect to or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or
occurrences.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(1)(A).5 The Court therefore GRANTS the motion to
dismiss all plaintiffs except for Aldaz.6

5

Because plaintiffs have not satisfied the requirements of Rule 20(a), the Court
need not consider the City’s additional argument that joinder is inappropriate for the
independent reason that it does not “comport with the principles of fundamental
fairness.” Desert Empire Bank v. Ins. Co. Of N. Am., 623 F.2d 1371, 1375 (9th Cir.
1980).
6

Plaintiffs have requested judicial notice of an order by Judge Feess—who issued
the Decertification Orders in Alaniz and Mata—clarifying that two individually named
plaintiffs were erroneously dismissed from Alaniz. See ECF No. 17-2. Plaintiffs vastly
overstate meaning of this order, describing it as deciding that the two named plaintiffs
“may maintain their claims alongside Roberto Alaniz (i.e. joinder of claims)” and ruling
“that it is proper for these named plaintiffs to continue pursuing their individual claims in
a single lawsuit.” See ECF No. 17 at 2. In fact, Judge Feess only determined that
because the two named plaintiffs were named plaintiffs, as opposed to opt-in plaintiffs,
they should not have been automatically dismissed as a result of the decertification
ruling. The order expressly states: “Does this mean that the three plaintiffs will be
permitted to proceed to trial together? Not necessarily. That will depend on a variety of
factors that are not in issue on this motion.” ECF No. 17-2. Therefore, the order does not
support plaintiffs’ arguments.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No.

2:14-CV-05642-CAS(SSx)

Title

ISMAEL ALDAZ, SR., ET AL. v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES, ET AL.

B.

Date

‘O’

November 18, 2014

Motion to Strike

Insofar as the City requests that the Court strike all named plaintiffs except for
Aldaz, that request is MOOT because the Court is dismissing all of these plaintiffs from
the action. The City also moves to strike paragraphs 5, 16, 18, and 21 of the complaint.
1.

Paragraph 5

Paragraph 5 alleges that all plaintiffs “have the same or substantially similar
claims” and that joinder is proper because all allegations involve the “same wrongful
and/or illegal employment policy, practice and/or scheme.” Compl. ¶ 5. Because the
Court is dismissing all plaintiffs except Aldaz, this allegation is immaterial to Aldaz’s
suit and has “no possible bearing on the subject matter of this litigation.” Colaprico v.
Sun Microsystems, Inc., 758 F. Supp. 1335, 1339 (N.D. Cal. 1991). Therefore, the Court
GRANTS the City’s motion to strike paragraph 5 from the complaint.
2.

Paragraphs 16 and 18

Paragraphs 16 and 18 relate to the specific tasks and claims of sergeants and
lieutenants. Id. ¶¶ 16, 18. Because it is not clear from the complaint what Aldaz’s rank
was at the relevant time, and because motions to strike are disfavored in federal practice,
the Court DENIES the City’s motion to strike these paragraphs.
3.

Paragraph 21

Paragraph 21 concerns plaintiffs who worked speciality details “in addition to their
normal assignments.” Id. ¶ 21. Because it is not clear from the complaint whether Aldaz
worked any of these specialty details, and because motions to strike are disfavored in
federal practice, the Court DENIES the City’s motion to strike these paragraphs.

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No.

2:14-CV-05642-CAS(SSx)

Title

ISMAEL ALDAZ, SR., ET AL. v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES, ET AL.

V.

Date

‘O’

November 18, 2014

CONCLUSION

In accordance with the foregoing, the Court GRANTS the City’s motion to dismiss
without prejudice the claims of all plaintiffs except for Ismael Aldaz, Sr. The City’s
motion to strike is GRANTED IN PART as to paragraph 5 and otherwise DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
00
Initials of Preparer

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CMJ

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