Dino Angelo et al v. City of Los Angeles et al

Filing 66

MINUTES (IN CHAMBERS) by Judge R. Gary Klausner: granting 61 MOTION to Dismiss Case pursuant to 19 U.S.C. §§ 1526(e) and 1595a(c)(2)(C). ( MD JS-6. Case Terminated ) (shb)

JS-6

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No.

CV 14-05696-RGK (JCx)

Title

DINO ANGELO, et al v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES, et al

Present: The
Honorable

Date

July 24, 2015

R. GARY KLAUSNER, U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE

Sharon L. Williams (Not Present)

Not Reported

N/A

Deputy Clerk

Court Reporter / Recorder

Tape No.

Attorneys Present for Warner Bros.s:

Attorneys Present for Defendants:

Not Present

Not Present

Proceedings:
I.

(IN CHAMBERS) Order re: Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (DE 61)

INTRODUCTION

On July 21, 2014, Dino Angelo (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against the City of Los Angeles
(“Defendant”), alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act in connection with Plaintiff’s
employment with Defendant.
Presently before the Court is Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (the “Motion”) pursuant to Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure (“Rules”) 37(b) and 41(b) on the ground that Plaintiff failed to comply with the
Court’s discovery order. For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS the Motion.
II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On July 21, 2014, Plaintiff filed a Complaint against Defendant. On December 23, 2014,
Defendant served Plaintiff with interrogatories, document requests, and requests for admission. Plaintiff
never served responses to Defendant’s interrogatories and document requests, and served evasive and
inadequate responses to Defendant’s requests for admission. In addition, Plaintiff failed to appear for a
deposition noticed for March 31, 2015.
On April 7, 2015, Defendant filed a Motion to Compel Plaintiff’s deposition and responses to
discovery requests, stating that Plaintiff’s counsel had indicated that he could not say whether Plaintiff
would ever comply with his discovery obligations. On May 5, 2015, the magistrate judge in this action
granted Defendant’s Motion to Compel, ordering Plaintiff to provide written responses to discovery
requests and appear for a deposition on or before the discovery cut-off, May 27, 2015 (the “Discovery
CV-90 (06/04)

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL

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Order”). (Order Granting Def.’s Mot. to Compel Interrogs., ECF No. 57.)
On May 21, 2015, Defendant filed a Joint Stipulation for Dismissal and Request for Court
Approval. On May 27, 2015, the Court denied the stipulation and proposed order, stating that “[c]ounsel
may file a dismissal pursuant to [Rule] 41(a), or file a properly noticed motion to dismiss.” (Order Den.
Joint Stipulation to Dismiss, ECF No. 59.)
As of June 29, 2015, Plaintiff has neither provided written responses to discovery requests nor
appeared for a deposition. A jury trial is scheduled to begin on August 25, 2015.
III.

JUDICIAL STANDARD

Rule 37(b)(2)(A) provides that a court may sanction a plaintiff by dismissing the action if that
plaintiff “fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery.” Furthermore, under Rule 41(b), a court
may dismiss an action based on a plaintiff’s failure to comply with a court order. “Dismissal, however,
is authorized only in extreme circumstances and only where the violation is due to willfulness, bad faith,
or fault of the party.” In re Exxon Valdez, 102 F.3d 429, 432 (9th Cir. 1996) (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted). Once the court finds that the plaintiff’s failure is due to willfulness, bad faith,
or fault, it must weigh the following factors (the “Malone factors”) to determine whether dismissal is an
appropriate sanction: “(1) the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the court’s need
to manage its dockets; (3) the risk of prejudice to [the party seeking sanctions]; (4) the public policy
favoring disposition of cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic sanctions.” Wanderer
v. Johnston, 910 F.2d 652, 656 (9th Cir. 1990) (alteration in original) (citing Malone v. U.S. Postal
Serv., 833 F.2d 128, 130 (9th Cir. 1987)).
IV.

DISCUSSION

Defendant argues that the Court should dismiss this action because Plaintiff failed to comply
with the Discovery Order. For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion.
When a court imposes a sanction of dismissal for a plaintiff’s failure to comply with a discovery
order, the plaintiff’s noncompliance must be due to willfulness, bad faith, or fault. Fjelstad v. Am.
Honda Motor Co., 762 F.2d 1334, 1337 (9th Cir. 1985). “Disobedient conduct not shown to be outside
the control of the litigant is sufficient to demonstrate willfulness, bad faith, or fault.” Jorgensen v.
Cassiday, 320 F.3d 906, 912 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted).
Here, Plaintiff did not oppose the Motion and has not shown that his disobedient conduct was
outside his control. Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s failure to comply with the Discovery Order
was due to fault. See Hyde & Drath v. Baker, 24 F.3d 1162, 1168 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that district
court did not abuse its discretion in finding party at fault and in imposing sanctions, where party did not
submit affidavits supporting its excuse for failing to appear at depositions).
Accordingly, the Court now considers the Malone factors to determine whether dismissal is
appropriate. Where a court order is violated, the first two factors – the public’s interest in expeditious
resolution and the court’s need to manage its docket – support dismissal, and the fourth factor – the
policy favoring disposing of cases on their merits – weighs against dismissal. Adriana Int’l Corp. v.
Thoeren, 913 F.2d 1406, 1412 (9th Cir. 1990). But the fourth factor “lends little support to a party
whose responsibility it is to move a case toward disposition on the merits but whose conduct impedes
progress in that direction.” In re Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) Prods. Liab. Litig., 460 F.3d 1217, 1228
(9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the decisive factors are the third – prejudice to the party seeking sanctions –
and the fifth – the availability of less drastic sanctions. Adriana Int’l Corp., 913 F.2d at 1412.
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“A defendant suffers prejudice if the plaintiff’s actions impair the defendant’s ability to go to
trial or threaten to interfere with the rightful decision of the case.” Id. A party’s failure to produce
documents in discovery is sufficient prejudice. Id.
Here, Plaintiff has failed to produce documents which are necessary for Defendant to adequately
litigate this case. Therefore, Plaintiff’s failure to comply with the Discovery Order has prejudiced
Defendant, and the third factor weighs in favor of dismissal.
In weighing the fifth factor, a district court need not explicitly discuss the availability of
alternative sanctions. Malone, 833 F.2d at 132. “[A] judge’s warning to a party that a future failure to
obey a court order will result in default judgment can itself suffice to meet the ‘consideration of
alternatives’ requirement.” Estrada v. Speno & Cohen, 244 F.3d 1050, 1057 (9th Cir. 2001).
Here, the Discovery Order warned Plaintiff that “if fulsome and timely discovery is not
provided, or the case is not dismissed, this Court recommends that the District Judge issue terminating
sanctions if requested by Defendant through a Motion.” (Order Granting Def.’s Mot. to Compel
Interrogs., at 3.) Accordingly, the fifth factor weighs in favor of dismissal.
Because the first, second, third, and fifth Malone factors weigh in favor of dismissal, and the
fourth factor does not weigh heavily against dismissal, the Court finds that dismissal is an appropriate
sanction for Plaintiff’s failure to comply with the Discovery Order.
V.

CONCLUSION

In light of the foregoing, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. of Defendant
pursuant to 19 U.S.C. §§ 1526(e) and 1595a(c)(2)(C).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
:
Initials of Preparer

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