Menelaos Saridakis v. JPMorgan Chase Bank NA et al.

Filing 19

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT JP MORGAN CHASE BANKS MOTION TO DISMISS 7 by Judge Dean D. Pregerson: Chases Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. Plaintiffs First and Second Causes of Action are dismissed with prejudice. Plaintiffs Third through Sixth Causes of Action are dismissed with leave to amend. Any amended complaint shall be filed within ten days of the date of this Order. (lc). Modified on 2/11/2015 (lc).

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1 2 O 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 MENELAOS SARIDAKIS, an individual, 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. 14 15 16 17 JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, a New York corporation; ALBERTELLI LAW PARTNERS CALIFORNIA, PA, a California corporation, Defendants. ___________________________ ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Case No. CV 14-06279 DDP (Ex) ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT JP MORGAN CHASE BANK’S MOTION TO DISMISS [Dkt. 7] 18 19 Presently before the court is Defendant JPMorgan Chase Bank, 20 N.A. (“Chase” or “Defendant”)’s Motion to Dismiss. 21 considered the submissions of the parties, the court grants the 22 motion and adopts the following order. 23 I. 24 Having Background In July 2016, Plaintiff executed a Deed of Trust to real 25 property located at 607 S. Gertruda Avenue in the city of Redondo 26 Beach as security for a $1,172,500.00 mortgage against the 27 /// 28 /// 1 property. 2 Notice (“RJN”), Ex. 1 at 3.) 3 (Compl. ¶¶ 2, 10.) 4 (Complaint ¶¶ 7-8; Defendant’s Request for Judicial Chase is the mortgage servicer. On March 12, 2010, Chase recorded a Notice of Default. 5 (Compl. ¶ 15.) The Complaint alleges that “[d]uring the year 2013, 6 Plaintiff submitted a completed, legible and satisfactory loan 7 modification application” to Chase. 8 2014, Chase recorded a Substitution of Trustee listing itself as 9 beneficiary and naming Defendant Albertelli Law Partners (Id. ¶ 28.) On January 8, 10 California, PA (“ALAW”) as trustee. 11 2014, ALAW recorded a Notice of Trustee’s Sale with a sale date of 12 April 10, 2014. 13 postponed. 14 of action related to foreclosure proceedings. 15 dismiss the Complaint. 16 II. 17 (Compl. ¶¶ 20-21.) (Id. ¶ 24.) (RJN Ex. 5). On March 20, The sale date was later Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges eight causes Chase now moves to Legal Standard A complaint will survive a motion to dismiss when it contains 18 “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to 19 relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 20 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 21 570 (2007)). 22 “accept as true all allegations of material fact and must construe 23 those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Resnick 24 v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000). 25 need not include “detailed factual allegations,” it must offer 26 “more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me 27 accusation.” 28 allegations that are no more than a statement of a legal conclusion When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court must Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 2 Although a complaint Conclusory allegations or 1 “are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id. at 679. 2 other words, a pleading that merely offers “labels and 3 conclusions,” a “formulaic recitation of the elements,” or “naked 4 assertions” will not be sufficient to state a claim upon which 5 relief can be granted. 6 quotation marks omitted). 7 In Id. at 678 (citations and internal “When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should 8 assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly 9 give rise to an entitlement of relief.” Id. at 679. Plaintiffs 10 must allege “plausible grounds to infer” that their claims rise 11 “above the speculative level.” 12 “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for 13 relief” is a “context-specific task that requires the reviewing 14 court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” 15 556 U.S. at 679. 16 III. Discussion 17 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Iqbal, As an initial matter, the court notes that all of Plaintiff’s 18 authorities regarding the legal standard predate Iqbal and Twombly. 19 Plaintiffs’ arguments in opposition to Chase’s motion appear to be 20 based upon the resulting misapprehension of the relevant standard. 21 In any event, Plaintiff does not oppose dismissal of his Second 22 Cause of Action. 23 causes of action in turn. (Opposition at 7.) The court addresses the other 24 A. 25 Plaintiff’s brings a cause of action for injunctive relief to Injunctive Relief 26 enjoin violations of California Civil Code § 2924.12. 27 33.) 28 action. (Compl. ¶ Injunctive relief, however, is a remedy, not a cause of Rosenfeld v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 732 F.Supp.2d 952, 3 1 975 (N.D. Cal. 2010). Moreover, as Plaintiff’s Complaint appears 2 to recognize, § 2924.12(a)(1) states that “a borrower may bring an 3 action for injunctive relief to enjoin a material violation of 4 Section 2923.55, 2923., 2923.7, 2923.9, 2923.11, or 2923.17.” 5 Civil Code § 2924.12(a)(1). 6 cause of action for an injunction, but rather provides for 7 injunctive relief as a remedy for violations of other foreclosure- 8 related statutes. 9 Action is therefore dismissed with prejudice. Cal. Section 2924.12 does not create a (Compl. ¶ 33.) Plaintiff’s First Cause of 10 B. 11 California Civil Code § 2923.6(c) states: “If a borrower 12 submits a complete application for a first lien loan modification . 13 . . a mortgage servicer, mortgagee, trustee, beneficiary, or 14 authorized agent shall not record a notice of default or notice of 15 sale . . .” unless certain other conditions are met. 16 Code § 2923.6(c). 17 application is “‘complete’ when a borrower has supplied the 18 mortgage servicer with all documents required by the mortgage 19 servicer within the reasonable timeframes specified by the mortgage 20 servicer.” 21 Dual Tracking Cal. Civil Section 2923.6 also sets forth that an California Civil Code § 2923.6(h). Here, Plaintiff alleges only that “[d]uring the year 2013, 22 Plaintiff submitted a completed, legible and satisfactory loan 23 modification application” to Chase. 24 conclusory allegation is insufficient to plead a claim under § 25 2923.6(c). 26 2014 WL 4359193 at *7 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2014); Woodring v. Ocwen 27 Loan Servicing, LLC, No. CV 14-3416 BRO, 2014 WL 3558716 at *7 (Compl. ¶ 28.) Alone, that See Stokes v. CitiMortgage, Inc., No. CV 14-278 BRO, 28 4 1 (C.D. Cal. July 18, 2014). 2 The Third Cause of Action is dismissed, with leave to amend. 3 C. Failure to Re-Notice Foreclosure Sale 4 Under California Civil Code § 2924(a)(5), “whenever a 5 [trustee’s] sale is postponed for a period of at least 10 business 6 days . . ., a mortgagee, beneficiary, or authorized agent shall 7 provide written notice to a borrower regarding the new sale date 8 and time . . . .” 9 allege that the original sale date of April 10, 2014 was postponed Cal. Civil Code § 2924(a)(5). Here, Plaintiffs 10 more than ten days, but Plaintiffs never received notice of the new 11 sale date. 12 however, that a trustee’s sale ever occurred or that a trustee’s 13 sale was ever actually rescheduled. 14 Defendants could have violated § 2924(a)(5) or how Plaintiff 15 suffered any injury. 16 Inc., No. CV 14-2571-AB, 2014 WL 6910334 at *4 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 8, 17 2014). 18 amend. (Compl. ¶¶ 64-65.) The Complaint does not allege, It is unclear, therefore, how See Penaloza v. Select Portfolio Servicing, The Fourth Cause of Action is dismissed, with leave to 19 D. 20 Some courts have held “that an accounting is merely an Accounting 21 equitable remedy, and therefore cannot be maintained as an 22 independent cause of action.” 23 7275 GAF, 2011 WL 7637785 at *8 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2011). 24 courts, however, citing Tesselle v. Mcloughlin, 173 Cal.App.4th 156 25 (2009), have concluded that an accounting can exist as an 26 independent equitable cause of action. 27 Inc. v. Hon, No. 11-cv-5835 ODW, 2012 WL 1413681 at * 11 (C.D. Cal. 28 Apr. 24, 2012); see also Baidoobonso-Iam v. Bank of Am., No. CV 10- Fradis v. Savebig.com, No. CV 11- 5 Other See, e.g., Dahon North Am., 1 9171 CAS, 2011 WL 3103165 at *6 (C.D. Cal. Jul. 25, 2011) (“An 2 accounting may take the form of either a legal remedy or an 3 equitable claim.”). 4 for an accounting requires that “a relationship exist[] between the 5 plaintiff and defendant that requires an accounting, and that some 6 balance is due the plaintiff that can only be ascertained by an 7 accounting.” 8 relationship giving rise to an accounting claim need not 9 necessarily be a fiduciary one, courts typically require that it Where independently viable, a cause of action Tesselle, 173 Cal. App. 4th at 179. Though the 10 reflect some degree of confidentiality or closeness. 11 Cal.App.4th at 179.; Dahon, 2012 WL 1413681 at *13; Fradis, 2011 WL 12 7637785 at *9; Canales v. Fed. Home Loan Mortgage Corp., No. CV 11- 13 2819 PSG, 2011 WL 3320478 at * 8 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2011). 14 Tesselle, 173 Though the Complaint alleges that Plaintiff and Chase “share 15 the relationship of mortgagor and mortgagee,” neither the Complaint 16 nor Plaintiff’s opposition explain why this relationship is 17 sufficiently special, confidential, or close to sustain a cause of 18 action for an accounting. 19 contrary, that a mortgagor-lender relationship does not suffice. 20 See, e.g., Williams v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. EDCV 13-2075 21 JVS, 2014 WL 1568857 at *9 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 2014). 22 Sixth Cause of Action is dismissed, with leave to amend. Indeed, courts often find, to the Plaintiff’s 23 E. 24 Plaintiff’s claim for unlawful and fraudulent business 25 practices under California Business & Professions Code § 17200 is 26 premised upon the causes of action discussed above. 27 70, 71). Unlawful and Fraudulent Business Practices (Compl. ¶¶ 68, Those causes of action having been dismissed, Plaintiff’s 28 6 1 Fifth Cause of Action under California Business & Professions Code 2 § 17200 is therefore also dismissed, with leave to amend.1 3 IV. 4 Conclusion For the reasons stated above, Chase’s Motion to Dismiss is 5 GRANTED. 6 dismissed with prejudice. 7 of Action are dismissed with leave to amend. 8 shall be filed within ten days of the date of this Order. Plaintiff’s First and Second Causes of Action are Plaintiff’s Third through Sixth Causes Any amended complaint 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 IT IS SO ORDERED. 16 17 18 Dated: February 11, 2015 DEAN D. PREGERSON United States District Judge 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 1 Because Plaintiff does not bring the Seventh and Eight Causes of Action against Chase, the instant motion does not encompass those claims. 7

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