Daniel Lopez v. James J. Chung et al
Filing
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ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 27 by Judge Dean D. Pregerson. For the reasons stated above, on the record before the Court, no rational trier of fact could find for Defendant. Accordingly, Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. MD JS-6. Case Terminated. (lom)
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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DANIEL LOPEZ,
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Plaintiff,
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v.
JAMES J. CHUNG; IL HOON
CHUNG,
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Defendants.
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___________________________
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Case No. CV 14-06853 DDP (FFMx)
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
[Dkt. 27]
Presently before the Court is Plaintiff Daniel Lopez’s Motion
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for Summary Judgment.
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parties and heard oral argument, the Court grants the motion and
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adopts the following Order.
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I.
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Having considered the submissions of the
Background
Plaintiff is a paraplegic, and uses a wheelchair for mobility.
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(Declaration of Daniel Lopez in Support of Motion (Dkt. 27-5), ¶
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2.) In October 2013, Plaintiff went to Defendant’s store, “Frank’s
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Market” (“the market”), to buy drinks, but found there was no
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accessible entrance. (Decl. Lopez, ¶ 4-5.)
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market had two steps, which were too high for Plaintiff to navigate
The entrance to the
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in his wheelchair. (Decl. Lopez, ¶ 4-5.; Declaration of Victor
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Garcia in Support of Motion (Dkt. 27-6) ¶ 4; Exhibit 4 in Support
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of Motion (Dkt. 27-7).)
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the owner to assist him to get the drinks. (Decl. Lopez, ¶ 5-7.)
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The owner selected drinks in sizes larger than Plaintiff wanted and
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charged Plaintiff for unwanted items. (Id. at ¶ 7.) Plaintiff
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alleges that he has been deterred from visiting the market because
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it is not accessible to him. (Id., at ¶ 11.)
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Plaintiff asked a person he believed to be
Plaintiff’s complaint alleges causes of action under the
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Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and California’s Unruh Civil
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Rights Act. 42 U.S.C. § 12182 (b)(2)(A)(iv); Cal. Civ. Code § 51
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(f).
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Order from the Court requiring Defendant to provide an accessible
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entrance to the market; and 2) judgment in favor of Plaintiff for
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statutory damages of $4,000, plus attorneys’ fees.
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II. Legal Standard
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Plaintiff now moves for summary judgment and seeks (1) an
Summary judgment is appropriate where the pleadings,
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depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
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together with the affidavits, if any, show “that there is no
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genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled
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to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A party
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seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing the
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court of the basis for its motion and of identifying those portions
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of the pleadings and discovery responses that demonstrate the
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absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v.
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Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). All reasonable inferences from
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the evidence must be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party. See
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Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 242 (1986).
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If the
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moving party does not bear the burden of proof at trial, it is
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entitled to summary judgment if it can demonstrate that “there is
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an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.”
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Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.
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Once the moving party meets its burden, the burden shifts to
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the nonmoving party opposing the motion, who must “set forth
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specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.”
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Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256.
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party “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the
Summary judgment is warranted if a
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existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on
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which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex,
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477 U.S. at 322. A genuine issue exists if “the evidence is such
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that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving
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party,” and material facts are those “that might affect the outcome
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of the suit under the governing law.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.
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There is no genuine issue of fact “[w]here the record taken as a
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whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the
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nonmoving party.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
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Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
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It is not the court’s task “to scour the record in search of a
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genuine issue of triable fact.” Keenan v. Allan, 91 F.3d 1275, 1278
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(9th Cir.1996). Counsel has an obligation to lay out their support
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clearly. Carmen v. San Francisco Sch. Dist., 237 F.3d 1026, 1031
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(9th Cir.2001).
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evidence establishing a genuine issue of fact, where the evidence
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is not set forth in the opposition papers with adequate references
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so that it could conveniently be found.” Id.
The court “need not examine the entire file for
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III. Discussion
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Plaintiff argues that the lack of a wheelchair ramp at
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Defendant’s market constitutes a barrier, and that Defendant’s
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failure to remove that barrier violates Plaintiff’s rights to full
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and equal access under the ADA and California’s Unruh Civil Rights
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Act.
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A failure to remove architectural barriers in existing public
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accommodation facilities is discriminatory if such removal is
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readily achievable.
42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv).
Barrier
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removal is readily achievable when it is “easily accomplishable and
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able to be carried out without much difficulty or expense.” 42
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U.S.C. § 12181(9). If barrier removal is not readily achievable,
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the ADA specifies that the public accommodation must “make such
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goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or
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accommodations available through alternative methods, if such
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methods are readily achievable.” Id. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(v).
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Plaintiff has submitted photographs of the market showing the
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two steps up from the sidewalk to the entrance to the market.
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(Mot., Ex. 4 (Dkt. 27-7).)
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market had inaccessible steps on the date of Plaintiff’s visit, nor
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that removal of that barrier was readily achievable.
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Defendant’s Response to Interrogatory #10, which Defendant attaches
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to his Opposition, but does not discuss, admits that the steps have
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since been replaced by a ramp.1
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Defendant does not dispute that the
Indeed,
Defendant, proceeding pro se, instead argues that he has not
received any notice from Plaintiff of the need to provide disabled
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Having heard oral argument, it is unclear to the court
whether this is, in fact, the case.
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access.
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pre-suit notice to defendants.” Skaff v. Meridien North America
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Beverly Hills, 506 F.3d 832, 845 (9th Cir. 2007).
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Plaintiff never informed Defendant of the alleged ADA violation,
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therefore, is not a defense to Plaintiff’s claim.
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However, “ADA plaintiffs are not required to provide
The fact that
Defendant also argues that the market was built in the mid
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19th century, and thus falls within the ADA’s “Grandfather Clause.”
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Defendant has submitted a copy of a property report indicating that
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the subject property was built in 1924.
(Opposition to Summary
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Judgment, Ex. 1.)
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distinct systems for regulating building accessibility: one to
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apply to existing facilities (those designed and constructed for
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occupancy before January 26, 1993) and another to apply to
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later-constructed facilities. The grandfathered facilities must
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remove barriers to accessibility only to the extent that such
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removal is readily achievable.”
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F.3d 918, 923 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12183(a)(1) and
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12182(b)(2)(A)(iv)) (internal citations omitted).
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though Defendant has provided evidence that the market falls
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withing the definition of “grandfathered facilities” under the ADA,
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that fact alone has no bearing on whether the removal of the
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entrance steps was readily achievable.
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in the record indicates that the steps were removable without much
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difficulty or expense, there is no triable issue regarding a safe
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harbor under the ADA’s grandfather clause.
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“In enacting the ADA, Congress adopted two
Long v. Coast Resorts, Inc., 267
However, even
Because the only evidence
Lastly, Defendant argues that Plaintiff is intentionally and
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willfully filing a large amount of ADA claims for the purpose of
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enrichment.
Even if true, Plaintiff’s motivations are not relevant
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to this matter.
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F.3d 1047, 1062 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[M]ost ADA suits are brought by a
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small number of private plaintiffs who view themselves as champions
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of the disabled.
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litigation as vexatious as a matter of course.”).
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IV. Conclusion
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See, e.g. Molski v. Evergreen Dynasty Corp., 500
District courts should not condemn such serial
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For the reasons stated above, on the record before the Court,
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no rational trier of fact could find for Defendant.
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Accordingly,
Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
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Dated: August 1, 2016
DEAN D. PREGERSON
United States District Judge
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