Juan Jose Avila v. Haley et al

Filing 12

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER DISMISSING FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO AMEND by Magistrate Judge Suzanne H. Segal. The FAC is dismissed with leave to amend. If Plaintiff still wishes to pursue this action, he is granted thirty (30) days from the date of this Memorandum and Order within which to file a Second Amended Complaint. Plaintiff shall not include new defendants or new allegations that are not reasonably related to the claims asserted in the original complaint. Plaintiff is strong ly encouraged to utilize the standard civil rights complaint form when filing any amended complaint, a copy of which is attached. Plaintiff is further advised that if he no longer wishes to pursue this action, he may voluntarily dismiss it by filing a Notice of Dismissal in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1). A form Notice of Dismissal is attached for Plaintiff's convenience. (See document for further details). (Attachments: # 1 Civil Rights Complaint Form, # 2 Notice of Dismissal Form) (mr)

Download PDF
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JUAN JOSE AVILA, Plaintiff, 12 13 14 Case No. CV 14-7999 MMM (SS) MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER v. DISMISSING FIRST AMENDED COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, et al., COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO AMEND Defendants. 15 16 17 18 I. 19 INTRODUCTION 20 21 Juan Jose Avila (“Plaintiff”), a California state prisoner 22 proceeding 23 “FAC”) alleging violations of his civil rights pursuant to 42 24 U.S.C. § 1983. (Dkt. No. 8). 25 courts an 26 actions where a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity 27 or employee. 28 pro perform se, has filed initial a First Amended Complaint (the Congress mandates that district screening 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). of complaints in civil This Court may dismiss such 1 a complaint, or any portion, before service of process if it 2 concludes that the complaint (1) is frivolous or malicious, (2) 3 fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or (3) 4 seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such 5 relief. 6 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 & n.7 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). 7 reasons stated below, the FAC is DISMISSED with leave to amend. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1-2); see also Lopez v. Smith, 203 For the 8 9 II. 10 ALLEGATIONS OF THE FAC 11 12 Plaintiff sues the following individuals and entities in 13 their individual and official capacities: (1) the County of Los 14 Angeles 15 Department (the “LASD”); (3) the Los Angeles County Sheriff (the 16 “Sheriff”); (4) “O.S.J. Officer Haley” (“Haley”), a sheriff’s 17 deputy at Peter J. Pitchess Detention Center (“Pitchess”), where 18 Plaintiff was 19 deputies assigned 20 (collectively “Defendants”). (“County”); (2) formerly to the Los incarcerated; Pitchess Angeles and (the County (5) “Doe Sheriff’s twenty unknown Defendants”) (FAC at 3-4). 1 21 Plaintiff complains of his treatment following his detention 22 23 at Pitchess. 2 24 1 25 26 27 28 Plaintiff claims that Haley assigned him to the The FAC contained identically numbered pages. For ease of reference, the Court has renumbered the pages consecutively. 2 Plaintiff does not state whether he was convicted prior to his arrival at Pitchess. “Eighth Amendment scrutiny is appropriate only after the State has complied with the constitutional guarantees traditionally associated with criminal prosecutions.” Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 537 (1979). However, although pretrial detainees’ claims "arise under the due process clause, 2 1 general 2 “drop-out,” placing him at risk from other inmates. 3 Plaintiff further alleges that, following a jail riot in June 4 2014, Doe Defendants beat Plaintiff, causing severe injuries. 5 (Id.). 6 hours and ultimately required transport to a hospital for further 7 treatment. jail population despite Plaintiff’s status as a gang (FAC at 5). Plaintiff did not receive medical treatment for several (Id. at 7). 8 9 Plaintiff asserts that: (1) Haley’s refusal to place 10 Plaintiff in protective custody violated the Eighth Amendment and 11 the Equal Protection Clause; (2) the Doe Defendants “brutally” 12 beat 13 Defendants threatened violence if Plaintiff complained of jail 14 conditions, violating Plaintiff’s First Amendment rights; (4) the 15 Sheriff’s 16 conducive to . . . misconduct”; (5) the County failed to provide 17 a safe jail environment, violating the Eighth Amendment; and (6) 18 the 19 prisoners 20 environment, 21 Plaintiff seeks 22 $3,000,000 and 23 relief, and a jury trial. Plaintiff, LASD violating failure failed in to to the Eighth supervise provide protective violating “joint punitive deputies “clear custody the Eighth and or of (3) created guidelines” creating Amendment. several” damages Amendment; a for the Doe “culture placing a safe jail (Id. at 5-6). compensatory $1,500,000, damages of declaratory (Id. at 8). 24 25 26 27 28 the eighth amendment guarantees provide a minimum standard of care for determining [a person’s] rights as a pretrial detainee." Jones v. Johnson, 781 F.2d 769, 771 (9th Cir. 1986), overruled on other grounds by Peralta v. Dillard, 744 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 2014). 3 1 III. 2 DISCUSSION 3 4 Under 28 U.S.C. section 1915A(b), the court must dismiss 5 Plaintiff’s FAC due to multiple pleading defects. 6 court must grant a pro se litigant leave to amend his defective 7 complaint unless “it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of 8 the complaint could not be cured by amendment.” 9 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012) However, the Akhtar v. Mesa, (citation 10 quotation marks omitted). 11 and internal below, the FAC is DISMISSED with leave to amend. 3 Accordingly, for the reasons stated 12 13 A. Plaintiff’s Claims Against The Sheriff, Haley And The Doe 14 Defendants In Their Official Capacity Must Be Dismissed 15 16 Plaintiff sues all Defendants in their individual and 17 official capacities, for monetary damages and declaratory relief. 18 (FAC 19 Sheriff, Haley and the Doe Defendants are defective and must be 20 dismissed. at 3-4,6). The official capacity claims against the 21 22 Official capacity claims are “another way of pleading an 23 action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.” 24 Hafter v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991) (quoting Monell v. Dep’t 25 of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978)). 26 27 28 3 A magistrate judge may dismiss a complaint with leave to amend without the approval of a district judge. See McKeever v. Block, 932 F.2d 795, 798 (9th Cir. 1991). 4 1 If a government entity is named as a defendant, it is not only 2 unnecessary and redundant to name individual officers in their 3 official capacity, but also improper. 4 Reform, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cnty. Sheriff Dep’t, 533 F.3d 780, 5 799 (9th Cir. 2008). 6 the 7 employees. 8 individual defendants in their official capacity are defective 9 and must be dismissed. Sheriff, See Ctr. for Bio-Ethical Here, the County is a named defendant and Haley and the Accordingly, Doe Defendants Plaintiff’s are claims all County against the Under section 1983, Plaintiff may sue the 10 Sheriff, Haley, and the Doe Defendants only in their “individual” 11 capacities, if he seeks monetary damages against them. 12 13 B. Plaintiff Fails To 14 State Claims Against Haley In His Individual Capacity 15 16 The Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition of cruel and 17 unusual punishment. 18 However, 19 prisons.” 20 a 21 Plaintiff must show that the alleged constitutional deprivation 22 posed a “substantial risk of serious harm” and that the official 23 showed “deliberate indifference” to Plaintiff’s health or safety. 24 See id. at 834 (citations omitted). valid “[t]he Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976). Constitution does not mandate comfortable Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). Eighth Amendment claim against a prison To state official, 25 26 A prisoner does not have a constitutional right to receive a 27 particular security 28 segregated from classification other prisoners 5 or on to the be basis automatically of a gang 1 affiliation. 2 1997) (no right to particular security classification); Labatad 3 v. Corrections Corp. of Am., 714 F.3d 1155, 1161 (9th Cir. 2013) 4 (cohousing rival gang members, without more, is insufficient to 5 show prison officials’ deliberate indifference). See Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818, 828 (9th Cir. 6 7 Plaintiff does not assert that he was ultimately harmed by 8 his placement in the general population. To the contrary, 9 Plaintiff states that he was subjected to excessive force by the 10 Doe 11 attacked 12 Plaintiff does not show that his assignment placed him at risk, 13 as nothing happened to him as a result of this assignment, and 14 his 15 Leave to amend is granted, however. Defendants by Eighth following fellow a riot inmates. Amendment claim over (FAC against jail at conditions, 5-6). Haley not Accordingly, must be dismissed. 16 17 Plaintiff also fails to state an equal protection claim. such 18 state 19 ordinarily show that “the defendants acted with an intent or 20 purpose 21 membership in a protected class.” 22 668, 686 (9th Cir. 2001). 23 refusal to place him in protective custody violated his right to 24 equal protection. 25 considered his request for protective custody less urgent because 26 Plaintiff was “classified as a Southern Hispanic” rather than 27 white. 28 protective custody not on the basis of his race but because of to a claim under discriminate (Id.). section against the a plaintiff plaintiff based must upon Lee v. Los Angeles, 250 F.3d Here, Plaintiff asserts that Haley’s (FAC at 5). However, 1983, To Plaintiff asserts that Haley Plaintiff 6 alleges that he sought 1 his alleged former gang membership. 2 equal protection claim must be dismissed. 3 granted, however. (Id.). Accordingly, his Leave to amend is 4 5 C. Plaintiff Fails To Allege A Valid First Amendment Claim 6 7 Plaintiff also fails to state a valid First Amendment claim. 8 Prisoners “have 9 grievances.” a First Amendment right to file prison Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1269 (9th Cir. 10 2009). “Retaliation against prisoners for their exercise of this 11 right is itself a constitutional violation, and prohibited as a 12 matter of clearly established law.” 13 quotation 14 retaliation against a prisoner must include “(1) [a]n assertion 15 that a state actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2) 16 because of (3) that prisoner’s protected conduct, and that such 17 action (4) chilled the inmate’s exercise of his First Amendment 18 rights, 19 legitimate correctional goal.” marks and (5) omitted). the A action did Id. (citation and internal First not Amendment reasonably claim for advance a Id. 20 21 Plaintiff alleges that the Doe Defendants violated his First 22 Amendment rights by threatening that Plaintiff would “disappear” 23 if he filed a prison grievance based on the use of force. 24 at 7). 25 grievance “later that day.” 26 his grievance in the exhibits accompanying his FAC. 27 It is therefore clear that the alleged threats did not chill 28 Plaintiff’s (FAC However, Plaintiff alleges that he nevertheless filed a exercise of (Id.). his Plaintiff includes a copy of First 7 Amendment (Id. at 9). rights. As 1 Plaintiff’s pleading directly contradicts the fourth element of a 2 First 3 dismissed. Amendment claim, this claim is defective and must be 4 5 The Court notes that Local Rule 19-1 provides that “[n]o 6 complaint or petition shall be filed that includes more than ten 7 (10) Doe or fictitiously named parties.” 8 Plaintiff 9 Accordingly, the excessive “Doe” allegations are in violation of 10 names twenty such DOE C.D. Cal. R. 19-1. defendants. (FAC at 4). the Local Rules. 11 12 D. Plaintiff Fails To State A Claim Against The Sheriff In His 13 Individual Capacity 14 15 Plaintiff asserts that the Sheriff’s failure to supervise 16 Haley and the Doe Defendants created a “culture” conducive to 17 constitutional 18 liability is 19 plaintiff must 20 through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the 21 Constitution.” 22 plaintiff 23 participation or “a sufficient causal connection” between the 24 official’s 25 Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2011). violations. inapplicable must plead (FAC to that at section each 5). 1983 Because suits, vicarious however, Government-official defendant, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009). establish conduct and the either alleged 26 27 28 8 the official’s constitutional “a The personal violation. 1 Plaintiff is suing the Sheriff in his individual capacity 2 (FAC at 3-4) but does not assert that the Sheriff personally 3 participated 4 Moreover, Plaintiff does not identify any specific failures by 5 the Sheriff, identify specific employees whom the Sheriff failed 6 to 7 sufficient to explain the basis for his claim. 8 to show a causal connection between the Sheriff’s alleged action 9 or in supervise, inaction violating or and describe any Plaintiff’s the resulting constitutional rights. 4 constitutional “culture” in detail As such, he fails violations. Accordingly, 10 Plaintiff’s claims against the Sheriff in his individual capacity 11 must be dismissed. Leave to amend is granted, however. 12 13 E. Plaintiff Fails To State A Claim Against The County 14 15 Although there is “no constitutional impediment to municipal 16 liability,” Monell, 436 U.S. at 690 n.54, a local government unit 17 may not be held responsible for the acts of its employees under a 18 respondeat superior theory of liability. 19 691. 20 Plaintiff must show both a deprivation of constitutional rights 21 and 22 “moving force” behind the constitutional violation. 23 Gilroy Garlic Festival Ass'n, 541 F.3d 950, 957 (9th Cir. 2008). 24 There must be “a direct causal link between a [County] policy or 25 4 26 27 28 Monell, 436 U.S. at To assert a valid section 1983 claim against the County, a departmental policy, custom or practice that was the Villegas v. John L. Scott was Interim Sheriff when Plaintiff’s claims arose in June 2014 and when Plaintiff filed his FAC on November 24, 2014. (See FAC at 3, 8). See Biography at LASD website, http://sheriff.lacounty.gov/wps/portal/lasd (last visited Feb. 20, 2015). In any amended complaint, Plaintiff should identify, to the extent possible, any party sued in an individual capacity. 9 1 custom 2 (quoting City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989)). 3 Proof of a single incident of unconstitutional activity, or even 4 a series of “isolated or sporadic incidents,” is insufficient to 5 impose 6 Angeles, 772 F.3d 608, 618 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Okla. City v. 7 Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823-24 (1985)). 8 “founded upon practices of sufficient duration, frequency and 9 consistency that the conduct has become a traditional method of and the alleged liability constitutional under 10 carrying out policy.” 11 section deprivation.” 1983. Gant v. Cnty. See id. of Los Rather, liability must be Cir. 1996). Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 918 (9th 12 13 Plaintiff asserts failing County provide a his Eighth 15 environment for [P]laintiff’s detention.” 16 Plaintiff does not identify a policy, custom or practice that led 17 the unsafe jail conditions. 18 Plaintiff’s alleged injuries is insufficient to establish that 19 such 20 County may not be held liable for the acts of its employees under 21 a respondeat superior theory of liability. 22 at 691. 23 claim against the County. existed. to violated Amendment policy “by the 14 a rights that reasonably (FAC at 6). safe However, The single incident giving rise to Moreover, as already discussed, the See Monell, 436 U.S. Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state a valid Monell Leave to amend is granted, however. 24 25 F. The LASD Is An Improper Defendant 26 27 28 Plaintiff alleges that the LASD failed to provide clear guidelines for placing prisoners in protective custody and to 10 1 provide a reasonably safe jail environment. 2 relief 3 violation of rights protected by the Constitution or created by 4 federal 5 ‘person’ (4) acting under color of state law.” 6 Gates, 947 F.2d 1418, 1420 (9th Cir. 1991). 7 department is not a “person” for the purposes of a section 1983 8 action. 9 (police narcotics task force not a “person” or entity subject to 10 suit under section 1983); United States v. Kama, 394 F.3d 1236, 11 1239 (9th Cir. 2005) (Ferguson, J., concurring) (local government 12 departments and bureaus are generally not considered “persons” 13 within the meaning of section 1983). 14 not a proper defendant in this action, and Plaintiff’s claims 15 against LASD must be dismissed. under section statute, (2) 1983, a plaintiff proximately caused (FAC at 6). must (3) plead: by To gain “(1) conduct of a a Crumpton v. However, a police See Hervey v. Estes, 65 F.3d 784, 791 (9th Cir. 1995) Accordingly, the LASD is 16 17 IV. 18 CONCLUSION 19 20 For the reasons stated above, the FAC is dismissed with 21 leave to amend. 22 he is granted thirty (30) days from the date of this Memorandum 23 and Order within which to file a Second Amended Complaint. 24 any 25 described above. 26 new allegations that are not reasonably related to the claims 27 asserted 28 Complaint, if any, shall be complete in itself and shall bear amended in If Plaintiff still wishes to pursue this action, complaint, the the Plaintiff shall cure the In defects Plaintiff shall not include new defendants or original complaint. 11 The Second Amended 1 both 2 number assigned to this action. 3 to any previously filed complaint in this matter. the designation “Second Amended Complaint” and the case It shall not refer in any manner 4 5 In any amended to complaint, those Plaintiff operative facts should supporting confine each of his 6 allegations his 7 claims. 8 Civil Procedure 8(a), all that is required is a “short and plain 9 statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to Plaintiff is advised that pursuant to Federal Rule of 10 relief.” 11 standard 12 complaint, 13 complaint, Plaintiff should identify the nature of each separate 14 legal 15 support 16 encouraged to keep his statements concise and to omit irrelevant 17 details. 18 include legal argument. Plaintiff is also advised to omit any 19 claims lacks Plaintiff civil a claim each is rights copy and complaint of make of his strongly which clear form is what separate encouraged when filing attached. specific claims. to In factual Plaintiff utilize the any amended any amended allegations is strongly It is not necessary for Plaintiff to cite case law or for which he a sufficient factual basis. 20 21 Plaintiff is explicitly cautioned that failure to timely 22 file a Second 23 deficiencies described above, will result in a recommendation 24 that 25 prosecute and obey Court orders pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 26 Procedure 41(b). 27 longer wishes to pursue this action, he may voluntarily dismiss 28 it by filing a Notice of Dismissal in accordance with Federal this Amended action be Complaint, dismissed or with failure prejudice to for correct failure the to Plaintiff is further advised that if he no 12 1 Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1). 2 attached for Plaintiff’s convenience. A form Notice of Dismissal is 3 4 DATED: February 26, 2015 5 /S/ __________ SUZANNE H. SEGAL UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 6 7 8 NOTICE 9 10 Reports and Recommendations are not appealable to the Court 11 of Appeals, but may be subject to the right of any party to file 12 objections as provided in the Local Rules Governing the Duties of 13 Magistrate Judges and review by the District Judge whose initials 14 appear in the docket number. No notice of appeal pursuant to the 15 Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure should be filed until entry 16 of the judgment of the District Court. 17 18 THIS ORDER IS NOT INTENDED FOR PUBLICATION IN WESTLAW, LEXIS 19 OR ANY OTHER LEGAL DATABASE. 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 13

Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.


Why Is My Information Online?