Juan Jose Avila v. Haley et al
Filing
12
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER DISMISSING FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO AMEND by Magistrate Judge Suzanne H. Segal. The FAC is dismissed with leave to amend. If Plaintiff still wishes to pursue this action, he is granted thirty (30) days from the date of this Memorandum and Order within which to file a Second Amended Complaint. Plaintiff shall not include new defendants or new allegations that are not reasonably related to the claims asserted in the original complaint. Plaintiff is strong ly encouraged to utilize the standard civil rights complaint form when filing any amended complaint, a copy of which is attached. Plaintiff is further advised that if he no longer wishes to pursue this action, he may voluntarily dismiss it by filing a Notice of Dismissal in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1). A form Notice of Dismissal is attached for Plaintiff's convenience. (See document for further details). (Attachments: # 1 Civil Rights Complaint Form, # 2 Notice of Dismissal Form) (mr)
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
10
11
JUAN JOSE AVILA,
Plaintiff,
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13
14
Case No. CV 14-7999 MMM (SS)
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER
v.
DISMISSING FIRST AMENDED
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, et al.,
COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO AMEND
Defendants.
15
16
17
18
I.
19
INTRODUCTION
20
21
Juan Jose Avila (“Plaintiff”), a California state prisoner
22
proceeding
23
“FAC”) alleging violations of his civil rights pursuant to 42
24
U.S.C. § 1983.
(Dkt. No. 8).
25
courts
an
26
actions where a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity
27
or employee.
28
pro
perform
se,
has
filed
initial
a
First
Amended
Complaint
(the
Congress mandates that district
screening
28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a).
of
complaints
in
civil
This Court may dismiss such
1
a complaint, or any portion, before service of process if it
2
concludes that the complaint (1) is frivolous or malicious, (2)
3
fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or (3)
4
seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such
5
relief.
6
F.3d 1122, 1126-27 & n.7 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).
7
reasons stated below, the FAC is DISMISSED with leave to amend.
28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1-2); see also Lopez v. Smith, 203
For the
8
9
II.
10
ALLEGATIONS OF THE FAC
11
12
Plaintiff sues the following individuals and entities in
13
their individual and official capacities: (1) the County of Los
14
Angeles
15
Department (the “LASD”); (3) the Los Angeles County Sheriff (the
16
“Sheriff”); (4) “O.S.J. Officer Haley” (“Haley”), a sheriff’s
17
deputy at Peter J. Pitchess Detention Center (“Pitchess”), where
18
Plaintiff
was
19
deputies
assigned
20
(collectively “Defendants”).
(“County”);
(2)
formerly
to
the
Los
incarcerated;
Pitchess
Angeles
and
(the
County
(5)
“Doe
Sheriff’s
twenty
unknown
Defendants”)
(FAC at 3-4). 1
21
Plaintiff complains of his treatment following his detention
22
23
at Pitchess. 2
24
1
25
26
27
28
Plaintiff claims that Haley assigned him to the
The FAC contained identically numbered pages. For ease of
reference, the Court has renumbered the pages consecutively.
2
Plaintiff does not state whether he was convicted prior to his
arrival at Pitchess.
“Eighth Amendment scrutiny is appropriate
only after the State has complied with the constitutional
guarantees traditionally associated with criminal prosecutions.”
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 537 (1979).
However, although
pretrial detainees’ claims "arise under the due process clause,
2
1
general
2
“drop-out,” placing him at risk from other inmates.
3
Plaintiff further alleges that, following a jail riot in June
4
2014, Doe Defendants beat Plaintiff, causing severe injuries.
5
(Id.).
6
hours and ultimately required transport to a hospital for further
7
treatment.
jail
population
despite
Plaintiff’s
status
as
a
gang
(FAC at 5).
Plaintiff did not receive medical treatment for several
(Id. at 7).
8
9
Plaintiff
asserts
that:
(1)
Haley’s
refusal
to
place
10
Plaintiff in protective custody violated the Eighth Amendment and
11
the Equal Protection Clause; (2) the Doe Defendants “brutally”
12
beat
13
Defendants threatened violence if Plaintiff complained of jail
14
conditions, violating Plaintiff’s First Amendment rights; (4) the
15
Sheriff’s
16
conducive to . . . misconduct”; (5) the County failed to provide
17
a safe jail environment, violating the Eighth Amendment; and (6)
18
the
19
prisoners
20
environment,
21
Plaintiff
seeks
22
$3,000,000
and
23
relief, and a jury trial.
Plaintiff,
LASD
violating
failure
failed
in
to
to
the
Eighth
supervise
provide
protective
violating
“joint
punitive
deputies
“clear
custody
the
Eighth
and
or
of
(3)
created
guidelines”
creating
Amendment.
several”
damages
Amendment;
a
for
the
Doe
“culture
placing
a
safe
jail
(Id.
at
5-6).
compensatory
$1,500,000,
damages
of
declaratory
(Id. at 8).
24
25
26
27
28
the eighth amendment guarantees provide a minimum standard of
care for determining [a person’s] rights as a pretrial detainee."
Jones v. Johnson, 781 F.2d 769, 771 (9th Cir. 1986), overruled on
other grounds by Peralta v. Dillard, 744 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir.
2014).
3
1
III.
2
DISCUSSION
3
4
Under 28 U.S.C. section 1915A(b), the court must dismiss
5
Plaintiff’s FAC due to multiple pleading defects.
6
court must grant a pro se litigant leave to amend his defective
7
complaint unless “it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of
8
the complaint could not be cured by amendment.”
9
698
F.3d
1202,
1212
(9th
Cir.
2012)
However, the
Akhtar v. Mesa,
(citation
10
quotation marks omitted).
11
and
internal
below, the FAC is DISMISSED with leave to amend. 3
Accordingly, for the reasons stated
12
13 A.
Plaintiff’s Claims Against The Sheriff, Haley And The Doe
14
Defendants In Their Official Capacity Must Be Dismissed
15
16
Plaintiff
sues
all
Defendants
in
their
individual
and
17
official capacities, for monetary damages and declaratory relief.
18
(FAC
19
Sheriff, Haley and the Doe Defendants are defective and must be
20
dismissed.
at
3-4,6).
The
official
capacity
claims
against
the
21
22
Official capacity claims are “another way of pleading an
23
action
against
an
entity
of
which
an
officer
is
an
agent.”
24
Hafter v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991) (quoting Monell v. Dep’t
25
of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978)).
26
27
28
3
A magistrate judge may dismiss a complaint with leave to amend
without the approval of a district judge. See McKeever v. Block,
932 F.2d 795, 798 (9th Cir. 1991).
4
1
If a government entity is named as a defendant, it is not only
2
unnecessary and redundant to name individual officers in their
3
official capacity, but also improper.
4
Reform, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cnty. Sheriff Dep’t, 533 F.3d 780,
5
799 (9th Cir. 2008).
6
the
7
employees.
8
individual defendants in their official capacity are defective
9
and must be dismissed.
Sheriff,
See Ctr. for Bio-Ethical
Here, the County is a named defendant and
Haley
and
the
Accordingly,
Doe
Defendants
Plaintiff’s
are
claims
all
County
against
the
Under section 1983, Plaintiff may sue the
10
Sheriff, Haley, and the Doe Defendants only in their “individual”
11
capacities, if he seeks monetary damages against them.
12
13 B.
Plaintiff
Fails
To
14
State
Claims
Against
Haley
In
His
Individual Capacity
15
16
The Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition of cruel and
17
unusual punishment.
18
However,
19
prisons.”
20
a
21
Plaintiff must show that the alleged constitutional deprivation
22
posed a “substantial risk of serious harm” and that the official
23
showed “deliberate indifference” to Plaintiff’s health or safety.
24
See id. at 834 (citations omitted).
valid
“[t]he
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976).
Constitution
does
not
mandate
comfortable
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994).
Eighth
Amendment
claim
against
a
prison
To state
official,
25
26
A prisoner does not have a constitutional right to receive a
27
particular
security
28
segregated
from
classification
other
prisoners
5
or
on
to
the
be
basis
automatically
of
a
gang
1
affiliation.
2
1997) (no right to particular security classification); Labatad
3
v. Corrections Corp. of Am., 714 F.3d 1155, 1161 (9th Cir. 2013)
4
(cohousing rival gang members, without more, is insufficient to
5
show prison officials’ deliberate indifference).
See Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818, 828 (9th Cir.
6
7
Plaintiff does not assert that he was ultimately harmed by
8
his
placement
in
the
general
population.
To
the
contrary,
9
Plaintiff states that he was subjected to excessive force by the
10
Doe
11
attacked
12
Plaintiff does not show that his assignment placed him at risk,
13
as nothing happened to him as a result of this assignment, and
14
his
15
Leave to amend is granted, however.
Defendants
by
Eighth
following
fellow
a
riot
inmates.
Amendment
claim
over
(FAC
against
jail
at
conditions,
5-6).
Haley
not
Accordingly,
must
be
dismissed.
16
17
Plaintiff also fails to state an equal protection claim.
such
18
state
19
ordinarily show that “the defendants acted with an intent or
20
purpose
21
membership in a protected class.”
22
668, 686 (9th Cir. 2001).
23
refusal to place him in protective custody violated his right to
24
equal protection.
25
considered his request for protective custody less urgent because
26
Plaintiff was “classified as a Southern Hispanic” rather than
27
white.
28
protective custody not on the basis of his race but because of
to
a
claim
under
discriminate
(Id.).
section
against
the
a
plaintiff
plaintiff
based
must
upon
Lee v. Los Angeles, 250 F.3d
Here, Plaintiff asserts that Haley’s
(FAC at 5).
However,
1983,
To
Plaintiff asserts that Haley
Plaintiff
6
alleges
that
he
sought
1
his alleged former gang membership.
2
equal protection claim must be dismissed.
3
granted, however.
(Id.).
Accordingly, his
Leave to amend is
4
5
C. Plaintiff Fails To Allege A Valid First Amendment Claim
6
7
Plaintiff also fails to state a valid First Amendment claim.
8
Prisoners
“have
9
grievances.”
a
First
Amendment
right
to
file
prison
Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1269 (9th Cir.
10
2009).
“Retaliation against prisoners for their exercise of this
11
right is itself a constitutional violation, and prohibited as a
12
matter of clearly established law.”
13
quotation
14
retaliation against a prisoner must include “(1) [a]n assertion
15
that a state actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2)
16
because of (3) that prisoner’s protected conduct, and that such
17
action (4) chilled the inmate’s exercise of his First Amendment
18
rights,
19
legitimate correctional goal.”
marks
and
(5)
omitted).
the
A
action
did
Id. (citation and internal
First
not
Amendment
reasonably
claim
for
advance
a
Id.
20
21
Plaintiff alleges that the Doe Defendants violated his First
22
Amendment rights by threatening that Plaintiff would “disappear”
23
if he filed a prison grievance based on the use of force.
24
at 7).
25
grievance “later that day.”
26
his grievance in the exhibits accompanying his FAC.
27
It is therefore clear that the alleged threats did not chill
28
Plaintiff’s
(FAC
However, Plaintiff alleges that he nevertheless filed a
exercise
of
(Id.).
his
Plaintiff includes a copy of
First
7
Amendment
(Id. at 9).
rights.
As
1
Plaintiff’s pleading directly contradicts the fourth element of a
2
First
3
dismissed.
Amendment
claim,
this
claim
is
defective
and
must
be
4
5
The Court notes that Local Rule 19-1 provides that “[n]o
6
complaint or petition shall be filed that includes more than ten
7
(10) Doe or fictitiously named parties.”
8
Plaintiff
9
Accordingly, the excessive “Doe” allegations are in violation of
10
names
twenty
such
DOE
C.D. Cal. R. 19-1.
defendants.
(FAC
at
4).
the Local Rules.
11
12 D.
Plaintiff Fails To State A Claim Against The Sheriff In His
13
Individual Capacity
14
15
Plaintiff asserts that the Sheriff’s failure to supervise
16
Haley and the Doe Defendants created a “culture” conducive to
17
constitutional
18
liability
is
19
plaintiff
must
20
through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the
21
Constitution.”
22
plaintiff
23
participation or “a sufficient causal connection” between the
24
official’s
25
Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2011).
violations.
inapplicable
must
plead
(FAC
to
that
at
section
each
5).
1983
Because
suits,
vicarious
however,
Government-official
defendant,
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009).
establish
conduct
and
the
either
alleged
26
27
28
8
the
official’s
constitutional
“a
The
personal
violation.
1
Plaintiff is suing the Sheriff in his individual capacity
2
(FAC at 3-4) but does not assert that the Sheriff personally
3
participated
4
Moreover, Plaintiff does not identify any specific failures by
5
the Sheriff, identify specific employees whom the Sheriff failed
6
to
7
sufficient to explain the basis for his claim.
8
to show a causal connection between the Sheriff’s alleged action
9
or
in
supervise,
inaction
violating
or
and
describe
any
Plaintiff’s
the
resulting
constitutional
rights. 4
constitutional
“culture”
in
detail
As such, he fails
violations.
Accordingly,
10
Plaintiff’s claims against the Sheriff in his individual capacity
11
must be dismissed.
Leave to amend is granted, however.
12
13 E.
Plaintiff Fails To State A Claim Against The County
14
15
Although there is “no constitutional impediment to municipal
16
liability,” Monell, 436 U.S. at 690 n.54, a local government unit
17
may not be held responsible for the acts of its employees under a
18
respondeat superior theory of liability.
19
691.
20
Plaintiff must show both a deprivation of constitutional rights
21
and
22
“moving force” behind the constitutional violation.
23
Gilroy Garlic Festival Ass'n, 541 F.3d 950, 957 (9th Cir. 2008).
24
There must be “a direct causal link between a [County] policy or
25
4
26
27
28
Monell, 436 U.S. at
To assert a valid section 1983 claim against the County,
a
departmental
policy,
custom
or
practice
that
was
the
Villegas v.
John L. Scott was Interim Sheriff when Plaintiff’s claims arose
in June 2014 and when Plaintiff filed his FAC on November 24,
2014.
(See FAC at 3, 8).
See Biography at LASD website,
http://sheriff.lacounty.gov/wps/portal/lasd (last visited Feb.
20, 2015). In any amended complaint, Plaintiff should identify,
to the extent possible, any party sued in an individual capacity.
9
1
custom
2
(quoting City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989)).
3
Proof of a single incident of unconstitutional activity, or even
4
a series of “isolated or sporadic incidents,” is insufficient to
5
impose
6
Angeles, 772 F.3d 608, 618 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Okla. City v.
7
Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823-24 (1985)).
8
“founded upon practices of sufficient duration, frequency and
9
consistency that the conduct has become a traditional method of
and
the
alleged
liability
constitutional
under
10
carrying out policy.”
11
section
deprivation.”
1983.
Gant
v.
Cnty.
See
id.
of
Los
Rather, liability must be
Cir. 1996).
Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 918 (9th
12
13
Plaintiff
asserts
failing
County
provide
a
his
Eighth
15
environment for [P]laintiff’s detention.”
16
Plaintiff does not identify a policy, custom or practice that led
17
the unsafe jail conditions.
18
Plaintiff’s alleged injuries is insufficient to establish that
19
such
20
County may not be held liable for the acts of its employees under
21
a respondeat superior theory of liability.
22
at 691.
23
claim against the County.
existed.
to
violated
Amendment
policy
“by
the
14
a
rights
that
reasonably
(FAC at 6).
safe
However,
The single incident giving rise to
Moreover,
as
already
discussed,
the
See Monell, 436 U.S.
Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state a valid Monell
Leave to amend is granted, however.
24
25 F.
The LASD Is An Improper Defendant
26
27
28
Plaintiff
alleges
that
the
LASD
failed
to
provide
clear
guidelines for placing prisoners in protective custody and to
10
1
provide a reasonably safe jail environment.
2
relief
3
violation of rights protected by the Constitution or created by
4
federal
5
‘person’ (4) acting under color of state law.”
6
Gates, 947 F.2d 1418, 1420 (9th Cir. 1991).
7
department is not a “person” for the purposes of a section 1983
8
action.
9
(police narcotics task force not a “person” or entity subject to
10
suit under section 1983); United States v. Kama, 394 F.3d 1236,
11
1239 (9th Cir. 2005) (Ferguson, J., concurring) (local government
12
departments and bureaus are generally not considered “persons”
13
within the meaning of section 1983).
14
not a proper defendant in this action, and Plaintiff’s claims
15
against LASD must be dismissed.
under
section
statute,
(2)
1983,
a
plaintiff
proximately
caused
(FAC at 6).
must
(3)
plead:
by
To gain
“(1)
conduct
of
a
a
Crumpton v.
However, a police
See Hervey v. Estes, 65 F.3d 784, 791 (9th Cir. 1995)
Accordingly, the LASD is
16
17
IV.
18
CONCLUSION
19
20
For the reasons stated above, the FAC is dismissed with
21
leave to amend.
22
he is granted thirty (30) days from the date of this Memorandum
23
and Order within which to file a Second Amended Complaint.
24
any
25
described above.
26
new allegations that are not reasonably related to the claims
27
asserted
28
Complaint, if any, shall be complete in itself and shall bear
amended
in
If Plaintiff still wishes to pursue this action,
complaint,
the
the
Plaintiff
shall
cure
the
In
defects
Plaintiff shall not include new defendants or
original
complaint.
11
The
Second
Amended
1
both
2
number assigned to this action.
3
to any previously filed complaint in this matter.
the
designation
“Second
Amended
Complaint”
and
the
case
It shall not refer in any manner
4
5
In
any
amended
to
complaint,
those
Plaintiff
operative
facts
should
supporting
confine
each
of
his
6
allegations
his
7
claims.
8
Civil Procedure 8(a), all that is required is a “short and plain
9
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
Plaintiff is advised that pursuant to Federal Rule of
10
relief.”
11
standard
12
complaint,
13
complaint, Plaintiff should identify the nature of each separate
14
legal
15
support
16
encouraged to keep his statements concise and to omit irrelevant
17
details.
18
include legal argument.
Plaintiff is also advised to omit any
19
claims
lacks
Plaintiff
civil
a
claim
each
is
rights
copy
and
complaint
of
make
of
his
strongly
which
clear
form
is
what
separate
encouraged
when
filing
attached.
specific
claims.
to
In
factual
Plaintiff
utilize
the
any
amended
any
amended
allegations
is
strongly
It is not necessary for Plaintiff to cite case law or
for
which
he
a
sufficient
factual
basis.
20
21
Plaintiff is explicitly cautioned that failure to timely
22
file
a
Second
23
deficiencies described above, will result in a recommendation
24
that
25
prosecute and obey Court orders pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
26
Procedure 41(b).
27
longer wishes to pursue this action, he may voluntarily dismiss
28
it by filing a Notice of Dismissal in accordance with Federal
this
Amended
action
be
Complaint,
dismissed
or
with
failure
prejudice
to
for
correct
failure
the
to
Plaintiff is further advised that if he no
12
1
Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1).
2
attached for Plaintiff’s convenience.
A form Notice of Dismissal is
3
4
DATED:
February 26, 2015
5
/S/
__________
SUZANNE H. SEGAL
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
6
7
8
NOTICE
9
10
Reports and Recommendations are not appealable to the Court
11
of Appeals, but may be subject to the right of any party to file
12
objections as provided in the Local Rules Governing the Duties of
13
Magistrate Judges and review by the District Judge whose initials
14
appear in the docket number.
No notice of appeal pursuant to the
15
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure should be filed until entry
16
of the judgment of the District Court.
17
18
THIS ORDER IS NOT INTENDED FOR PUBLICATION IN WESTLAW, LEXIS
19
OR ANY OTHER LEGAL DATABASE.
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
13
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