Saeedah Harwood v. Carolyn W. Colvin

Filing 21

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER AFFIRMING COMMISSIONER by Magistrate Judge Jean P. Rosenbluth. IT IS ORDERED that judgment be entered AFFIRMING the decision of the Commissioner, DENYING Plaintiff's request for remand, and DISMISSING this action with prejudice. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk serve copies of this Order and the Judgment on counsel for both parties. (See Order for details) (bem)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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SAEEDAH HARWOOD,
Plaintiff,

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v.

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CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting
Commissioner of Social
Security,

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Defendant.

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) Case No. CV 14-8119-JPR
)
)
) MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
) AFFIRMING COMMISSIONER
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I.

PROCEEDINGS

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Plaintiff seeks review of the Commissioner’s final decision

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denying her application for Social Security disability insurance

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benefits (“DIB”).

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Joint Stipulation, filed August 7, 2015, which the Court has

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taken under submission without oral argument.

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stated below, the Commissioner’s decision is affirmed.

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II.

The matter is before the Court on the parties’

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff was born in 1960.

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For the reasons

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144.)

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(Administrative Record (“AR”)

She completed college and worked as a physical therapist.

(AR 44, 180.)
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On October 13, 2010, Plaintiff submitted an application for

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DIB, alleging that she had been unable to work since May 11,

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2008, because of “[n]eck injury,” “[p]roblems with right arm,”

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depression, and “[b]ack problems.”

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application was denied initially and on reconsideration, she

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requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge.

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107.)

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who was represented by counsel, appeared, as did a vocational

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expert.

(AR 144, 179.)

After her

(AR

A hearing was held on March 20, 2013, at which Plaintiff,

(AR 52-86.)

In a written decision issued May 3, 2013,

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the ALJ found Plaintiff not disabled.

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2014, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review.

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(AR 7.)

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III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

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(AR 34-45.)

On August 13,

This action followed.

Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), a district court may review the

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Commissioner’s decision to deny benefits.

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decision should be upheld if they are free of legal error and

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supported by substantial evidence based on the record as a whole.

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See id.; Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Parra

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v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 746 (9th Cir. 2007).

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evidence means such evidence as a reasonable person might accept

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as adequate to support a conclusion.

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401; Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1035 (9th Cir. 2007).

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It is more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance.

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Lingenfelter, 504 F.3d at 1035 (citing Robbins v. Soc. Sec.

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Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 882 (9th Cir. 2006)).

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substantial evidence supports a finding, the reviewing court

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“must review the administrative record as a whole, weighing both

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the evidence that supports and the evidence that detracts from
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The ALJ’s findings and

Substantial

Richardson, 402 U.S. at

To determine whether

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the Commissioner’s conclusion.”

Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715,

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720 (9th Cir. 1996).

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either affirming or reversing,” the reviewing court “may not

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substitute its judgment” for the Commissioner’s.

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IV.

“If the evidence can reasonably support

Id. at 720-21.

THE EVALUATION OF DISABILITY

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People are “disabled” for purposes of receiving Social

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Security benefits if they are unable to engage in any substantial

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gainful activity owing to a physical or mental impairment that is

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expected to result in death or has lasted, or is expected to

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last, for a continuous period of at least 12 months.

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§ 423(d)(1)(A); Drouin v. Sullivan, 966 F.2d 1255, 1257 (9th Cir.

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1992).

42 U.S.C.

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A.

The Five-Step Evaluation Process

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The ALJ follows a five-step sequential evaluation process to

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assess whether a claimant is disabled.

20 C.F.R.

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§ 404.1520(a)(4); Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 828 n.5 (9th

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Cir. 1995) (as amended Apr. 9, 1996).

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Commissioner must determine whether the claimant is currently

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engaged in substantial gainful activity; if so, the claimant is

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not disabled and the claim must be denied.

In the first step, the

§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i).

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If the claimant is not engaged in substantial gainful

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activity, the second step requires the Commissioner to determine

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whether the claimant has a “severe” impairment or combination of

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impairments significantly limiting her ability to do basic work

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activities; if not, the claimant is not disabled and the claim

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must be denied.

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§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii).

If the claimant has a “severe” impairment or combination of
impairments, the third step requires the Commissioner to
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determine whether the impairment or combination of impairments

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meets or equals an impairment in the Listing of Impairments

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(“Listing”) set forth at 20 C.F.R. part 404, subpart P, appendix

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1; if so, disability is conclusively presumed.

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§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii).

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If the claimant’s impairment or combination of impairments

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does not meet or equal an impairment in the Listing, the fourth

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step requires the Commissioner to determine whether the claimant

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has sufficient residual functional capacity (“RFC”)1 to perform

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her past work; if so, she is not disabled and the claim must be

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denied.

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proving she is unable to perform past relevant work.

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F.2d at 1257.

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case of disability is established.

§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv).

The claimant has the burden of
Drouin, 966

If the claimant meets that burden, a prima facie
Id.

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If that happens or if the claimant has no past relevant

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work, the Commissioner then bears the burden of establishing that

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the claimant is not disabled because she can perform other

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substantial gainful work available in the national economy.

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§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v); Drouin, 966 F.2d at 1257.

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determination comprises the fifth and final step in the

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sequential analysis.

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n.5; Drouin, 966 F.2d at 1257.

That

§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v); Lester, 81 F.3d at 828

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B.

The ALJ’s Application of the Five-Step Process

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At step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in

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substantial gainful activity from May 11, 2008, the alleged onset

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RFC is what a claimant can do despite existing exertional
and nonexertional limitations. § 404.1545; see Cooper v.
Sullivan, 880 F.2d 1152, 1155 n.5 (9th Cir. 1989).
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date, to September 30, 2012, Plaintiff’s date last insured.

(AR

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36.)

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impairment of degenerative disc disease of the cervical spine.

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(Id.)

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alone or in combination with her prior alcohol abuse, was not

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severe (AR 36-37), a finding Plaintiff does not challenge here.

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At step three, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff’s impairments

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did not meet or equal a listing.

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found that Plaintiff had the RFC to perform light work except

At step two, he concluded that Plaintiff had the severe

He found that Plaintiff’s depression, whether considered

(AR 37.)

At step four, he

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that she could do “no more than occasional bilateral reaching”

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and “no more than occasional handling and fingering with the left

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upper extremity.”

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ALJ concluded that Plaintiff could not perform her past relevant

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work as a physical therapist.

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found that Plaintiff could perform jobs existing in significant

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numbers in the national economy.

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her not disabled.

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V.

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The ALJ Properly Assessed the Treating Physicians’ Opinions

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(AR 37-38.)

Based on the VE’s testimony, the

(AR 44.)

At step five, the ALJ

(Id.)

Accordingly, he found

(AR 45.)

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred in assessing the opinions

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of treating physician Daniel Capen and treating psychiatrist

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Kwang Park.

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remand is not warranted.

(J. Stip. at 4.)

For the reasons discussed below,

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A.

Applicable law

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Three types of physicians may offer opinions in Social

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Security cases: (1) those who directly treated the plaintiff, (2)

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those who examined but did not treat the plaintiff, and (3) those

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who did neither.

Lester, 81 F.3d at 830.
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A treating physician’s

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opinion is generally entitled to more weight than an examining

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physician’s, and an examining physician’s opinion is generally

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entitled to more weight than a nonexamining physician’s.

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Id.

This is true because treating physicians are employed to

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cure and have a greater opportunity to know and observe the

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claimant.

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If a treating physician’s opinion is well supported by medically

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acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is

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not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in the

Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1285 (9th Cir. 1996).

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record, it should be given controlling weight.

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If a treating physician’s opinion is not given controlling

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weight, its weight is determined by length of the treatment

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relationship, frequency of examination, nature and extent of the

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treatment relationship, amount of evidence supporting the

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opinion, consistency with the record as a whole, the doctor’s

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area of specialization, and other factors.

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§ 404.1527(c)(2).

§ 404.1527(c)(2)-(6).

When a treating or examining physician’s opinion is not

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contradicted by other evidence in the record, it may be rejected

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only for “clear and convincing” reasons.

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Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1164 (9th Cir. 2008)

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(citing Lester, 81 F.3d at 830-31).

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ALJ must provide only “specific and legitimate reasons” for

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discounting it.

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Furthermore, “[t]he ALJ need not accept the opinion of any

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physician, including a treating physician, if that opinion is

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brief, conclusory, and inadequately supported by clinical

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findings.”

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2002); accord Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d

See Carmickle v.

When it is contradicted, the

Id. (citing Lester, 81 F.3d at 830-31).

Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 957 (9th Cir.

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1190, 1195 (9th Cir. 2004).

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B.

Relevant background

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Dr. Capen, an orthopedic surgeon, treated Plaintiff from

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June 2005 to March 2008.

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completed a Medical Source Statement form and Musculoskeletal

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form.

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opined that Plaintiff could stand or walk at least two hours and

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sit six hours in an eight-hour workday.

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options indicating that Plaintiff could lift only less than 10

(AR 339-43.)

(See AR 425-99.)

On April 21, 2011, he

In the Medical Source Statement, Dr. Capen

(AR 339.)

He marked

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pounds, whether frequently or occasionally, and in the

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Occasionally section, he wrote that the maximum number of pounds

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she could lift was “5 lbs.”

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could never climb, crouch, or crawl but could balance and

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occasionally stoop or kneel.

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frequently reach, handle, finger, and feel with both her right

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and left upper extremities.

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prognosis, Dr. Capen wrote, “No change expected.”

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Although the form provided space after each question for citing

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supporting medical findings, Dr. Capen noted only “disc injury

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cerv-s” and “spinal discopathy.”

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medical finding referred to Plaintiff’s “back” but was otherwise

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illegible.

(Id.)

He opined that Plaintiff

(AR 340.)

(Id.)

Plaintiff could

Regarding Plaintiff’s

(AR 339-40.)

(Id.)

Another cited

(AR 339.)

In the Musculoskeletal form, Dr. Capen indicated a diagnosis

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of spinal discopathy.

(AR 341.)

He noted tenderness in

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Plaintiff’s joints but did not specify which ones.

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separate question regarding Plaintiff’s paravertebral muscles,

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however, he noted that Plaintiff had tenderness and spasms.

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(Id.)

(Id.)

In a

He opined that Plaintiff did not have any “disorganization
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of motor function.”

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whether Plaintiff’s upper-extremity limitations affected her

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ability to lift or carry with a “free hand,” Dr. Capen wrote,

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“N/A.”

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decreased sensation, and she had positive straight-leg raises in

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both sitting and supine positions.

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that Plaintiff had “weakness in the lower extremities,” he did

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not rate her strength on a scale of five as requested on the

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form.

(Id.)

(Id.)

(AR 342.)

In response to a question asking

He noted that Plaintiff had intact reflexes but

(AR 341.)

Although he noted

In response to three questions asking him to

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describe Plaintiff’s response to treatment, her prognosis, and

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the anticipated duration of her symptoms, Dr. Capen wrote, “[n]o

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change expected.”

(AR 342-43.)

The ALJ gave “no weight” to Dr. Capen’s opinion in part

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because it was “vague and unsupported.”

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he noted Dr. Capen’s “denials of symptoms” and “the lack of

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specificity with alleged findings.”

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Capen’s “supporting medical findings” consisted largely of “the

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subjective claim of back pain.”

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Capen’s statement on the Musculoskeletal form that manipulative

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limitations were “not available” was a “direct contradiction” to

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his statement on the Medical Source Statement form that Plaintiff

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could frequently, but not constantly, do manipulative activity.

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(Id.)

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(AR 40.)

(Id.)

(Id.)

In particular,

He observed that Dr.

He also noted that Dr.

Plaintiff received mental-health treatment from the Los

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Angeles County Department of Mental Health at various clinics

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from December 2011 to May 2013.

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38, 541-68.)

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Hollywood Mental Health Center from June 2012 to May 2013.

(See generally AR 390-424, 501-

Dr. Park was Plaintiff’s treating psychiatrist at

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(AR

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401; see generally AR 390-424, 559-68.)
On October 24, 2012, Dr. Park completed a Psychiatric Review

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Technique form.

(AR 375-88.)

He opined that Plaintiff’s

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depression with marked functional limitations met Listing 12.04.2

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(AR 375.)

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indicating that Plaintiff had a depressive syndrome characterized

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by “[a]nhedonia or pervasive loss of interest in almost all

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activities,” “[a]ppetite disturbance with change in weight,”

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“[s]leep disturbances,” “[p]sychomotor agitation or retardation,”

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“[d]ecreased energy,” “[f]eelings of guilt or worthlessness,” and

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“[d]ifficulty concentrating or thinking.”

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Listing’s Paragraph B criteria, Dr. Park opined that Plaintiff

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was markedly limited in performing activities of daily living,

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maintaining social functioning, and maintaining concentration,

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persistence, or pace.

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app. 1 § 12.00 (“The criteria in paragraphs B and C describe

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impairment-related functional limitations that are incompatible

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with the ability to do any gainful activity.”).

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indicated that Plaintiff had suffered two episodes of

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decompensation, each of extended duration.

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indicating “One or Two” episodes and circling “Two”).)

In support of his opinion, Dr. Park checked boxes

(AR 378.)

As to the

(AR 385); see 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P,

He also

(AR 385 (checking box
As to the

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For a claimant’s depression to meet Listing 12.04, she
must establish both “[m]edically documented persistence, either
continuous or intermittent,” of “[d]epressive syndrome,”
characterized by at least four of a specified list of symptoms
and resulting limitations that meet at least two of the criteria
in paragraph B. 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1 § 12.04.
Alternatively, the claimant can meet Listing 12.04 under
paragraph C by establishing a “[m]edically documented history of
a chronic affective disorder of at least 2 years’ duration,”
characterized by one of a specified list of symptoms. Id.
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Listing’s Paragraph C criteria, Dr. Park checked a box indicating

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that Plaintiff had a “[m]edically documented history” of a mental

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disorder “of at least 2 years’ duration that has caused more than

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a minimal limitation of ability to do any basic work activity,”

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along with “[r]epeated episodes of decompensation, each of

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extended duration.”

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comments in the Consultant’s Notes section of the form.

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387.)

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(AR 386.)

Dr. Park did not write any
(AR

The ALJ gave “no weight” to Dr. Park’s “unsupported opinion

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of extreme limitations.”

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opinion conflicted “with his own progress notes of [Plaintiff’s]

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stability and [her] statements about her high functioning level.”

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(Id.)

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experienced one or two episodes of decompensation was “not found

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in the record” and “actually contradict[ed] [Plaintiff’s] own

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denial of ever being hospitalized for psychiatric reasons.”

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(Id.)

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any clinical findings other than to checkmark symptoms on the

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preprinted form.”

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He noted that Dr. Park’s

In particular, Dr. Park’s statement that Plaintiff had

Moreover, the ALJ found, Dr. Park “neglected to provide

C.

(Id.)

Analysis
1.

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(AR 43.)

Dr. Capen

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The ALJ gave “no weight” to Dr. Capen’s opinion that

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Plaintiff could lift a maximum of five pounds and lift or carry

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less than 10 pounds occasionally or frequently.

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opinion was contradicted by Dr. H. Harlan Bleecker, the

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consultative orthopedic physician, who assessed that Plaintiff

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could lift 10 pounds frequently and 20 pounds occasionally.

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358.)

(AR 40.)

This

Thus, the ALJ was required to give only specific and
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(AR

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legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence for

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discounting Dr. Capen’s opinion, see Carmickle, 533 F.3d at 1164,

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which he did.3

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The ALJ rejected Dr. Capen’s opinion in part because it was

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“vague.”

(AR 40.)

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of symptoms” and “the lack of specificity with alleged

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findings.”4

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Plaintiff’s joints but did not specify which joints had

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tenderness.

(Id.)

Specifically, he noted Dr. Capen’s “denials

For example, Dr. Capen noted tenderness in

(AR 341.)

And although he stated that Plaintiff had

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weakness in her lower extremities, he did not rate her muscle

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strength on a scale of five as requested on the form.5

(Id.)

He

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Plaintiff claims that the opinions of Drs. Bleecker and
Richard Masserman, to which the ALJ gave “great weight” (AR 44),
do not constitute substantial evidence because they were not
based on “independent clinical findings.” (J. Stip. at 13-14.)
But they were. (See, e.g., AR 265-66 (Dr. Masserman recounting
his clinical findings), 356-57 (Dr. Bleecker recounting his
clinical findings).)
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Plaintiff claims, citing Regennitter v. Commissioner of
the Social Security Administration, 166 F.3d 1294, 1299 (9th Cir.
1999), that lack of specificity is “not a valid reason as a
matter of law.” (J. Stip. at 7.) But Regennitter does not
actually say that, and in any event it concerned whether two
doctors’ opinions conflicted and concluded that they did not
because one was simply more detailed than the other. 166 F.3d at
1299. Here, Dr. Capen’s opinion finding, for instance, that
Plaintiff was capable of lifting a maximum of five pounds clearly
conflicted with Dr. Bleecker’s, who assessed that Plaintiff could
lift up to 20 pounds.
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Plaintiff contends that the ALJ “failed to apply the
correct legal standard” in “criticizing” Dr. Capen for not rating
Plaintiff’s muscle weaknesses. (J. Stip. at 5-6.) But the ALJ
noted Dr. Capen’s failure to complete the form, in part by not
rating Plaintiff’s muscle weaknesses, as part of his observation
that the doctor’s opinion was vague and lacked specificity. He
did not err in doing so, as certainly muscle strength of, say, 0
(continued...)
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also wrote the same “[n]o change expected” answer three times to

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questions regarding Plaintiff’s response to treatment, her

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prognosis, and the anticipated duration of her symptoms.

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342-43.)

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Capen’s assessed limitations.

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1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2012) (ALJ may “permissibly reject check-off

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reports that do not contain any explanation of the bases of their

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conclusions” (alterations and citation omitted)).

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(AR

Such vague findings were inadequate to support Dr.
See Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d

The ALJ also found that Dr. Capen’s response on the

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Musculoskeletal form of “N/A” regarding manipulative limitations

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(AR 342) contradicted his statement on the Medical Source

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Statement form that Plaintiff could frequently do manipulative

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activity (AR 340).

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and legitimate reason for rejecting Dr. Capen’s opinion.

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Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1216 (9th Cir. 2005) (finding

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that ALJ may cite internal inconsistencies in evaluating

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physician’s opinion); Houghton v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 493 F.

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App’x 843, 845 (9th Cir. 2012) (ALJ’s finding that physicians’

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opinions were “internally inconsistent” constituted specific and

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legitimate basis for discounting them).

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“the two opinions are not that different at all.”

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7.)

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claimant can perform is often the difference between affirmance

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and remand in these sorts of cases, and there exists a clearly

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defined distinction between “frequently” and “constantly.”

This internal inconsistency was a specific

Plaintiff claims that
(J. Stip. at

But an ALJ’s selection of where on the activity scale a

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5

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See

(...continued)
would be more significant than 4 or 5.
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The ALJ also rejected Dr. Capen’s opinion because it was

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“unsupported.”

(AR 40.)

Indeed, although the Medical Source

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Statement form provided space after each functional assessment

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for citing supporting medical findings, Dr. Capen left most of

5

them blank.

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he simply cited diagnoses of spinal discopathy and disc injury.

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(AR 339-40.)

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from before the alleged onset date.

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treatment from June 2005 to Mar. 2008).)

In the few he did complete, as the ALJ noted (id.),

Moreover, all of Dr. Capen’s progress notes are
(See AR 425-99 (documenting
Although Dr. Capen

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indicated in the Medical Source Statement that he had last seen

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Plaintiff on March 8, 2011 (AR 340), the record does not contain

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any treatment notes from that date or even that year.

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opinion was unsupported by objective medical findings, and the

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ALJ properly rejected it on that basis.

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(more weight given “[t]he more a medical source presents relevant

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evidence” and “[t]he better an explanation” he provides to

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support opinion); Connett v. Barnhart, 340 F.3d 871, 875 (9th

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Cir. 2003) (treating physician’s opinion properly rejected when

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treatment notes “provide[d] no basis for the functional

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restrictions he opined should be imposed on [claimant]”); Batson,

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359 F.3d at 1195 (“an ALJ may discredit treating physicians’

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opinions that are conclusory, brief, and unsupported by . . .

23

objective medical findings”).

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Thus, his

See § 404.1527(c)(3)

The ALJ found Dr. Capen’s opinion unsupported also because
it was based in part on Plaintiff’s “subjective claim of back

26
27
28
13

(AR 40.)6

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pain.”

Given Dr. Capen’s vague, partly illegible

2

responses on the form regarding supporting medical findings as

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well as the lack of any treatment notes after the alleged onset

4

date, as discussed above, it appears that his functional

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assessments were indeed premised on Plaintiff’s self-reports of

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symptoms.

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describe mostly Plaintiff’s self-reported symptoms and medical

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history, with few clinical findings.

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noting only tenderness to palpation, spasm, and painful,

Even Dr. Capen’s most recent notes, from early 2008,

(AR 494 (in Mar. 2008,

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restricted range of motion), 497-98 (on Jan. 22, 2008, noting

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only spasm, tightness, tenderness, and “cervical disc

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deterioration” in x-ray).)

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(AR 42-43), and Plaintiff does not challenge that determination

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on appeal; indeed, the record supports it.

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opinion was based on Plaintiff’s discredited complaints was a

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specific and legitimate reason for rejecting it.

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v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2008) (ALJ may reject

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treating physician’s opinion if it is based “on a claimant’s

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self-reports that have been properly discounted as incredible”);

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Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1149 (9th Cir. 2001)

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(because record supported ALJ’s discounting of claimant’s

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credibility, ALJ “was free to disregard [examining physician’s]

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opinion, which was premised on [claimant’s] subjective

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complaints”).

The ALJ found Plaintiff not credible

That Dr. Capen’s

See Tommasetti

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26
27
28

6

Plaintiff is simply wrong in claiming that the ALJ did not
give this as a reason for rejecting Dr. Capen’s opinion. (See J.
Stip. at 17.)
14

1
2

2.

Dr. Park

The ALJ gave “no weight” to Dr. Park’s opinion that

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Plaintiff’s depression with marked functional limitations

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satisfied Listing 12.04 and that Plaintiff had experienced two

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episodes of decompensation.

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contradicted by the nonexamining state-agency psychiatrist, who

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opined that Plaintiff’s alleged depression was not severe, she

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had mild to no limitations on mental functioning, and there was

9

insufficient evidence to assess whether she had experienced

(AR 43.)

The opinion was

10

episodes of decompensation.7

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required to give only specific and legitimate reasons supported

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by substantial evidence for discounting Dr. Park’s opinion, see

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Carmickle, 533 F.3d at 1164, which he did.

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(AR 328, 336.)

Thus, the ALJ was

The ALJ rejected Dr. Park’s opinion in part because its

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“extreme limitations” were “unsupported.”

(AR 43.)

Indeed, as

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the ALJ noted, Dr. Park simply checked boxes on the preprinted

17

form (see AR 375-86), and he did not write any notes or comments

18

in the space provided for that purpose (AR 387).

19

notes recorded very few clinical findings; instead, they mostly

20

summarized Plaintiff’s subjective complaints or response to

21

medication.

22

writing nothing under Mental Status and Assessment sections), 565

23

(in June 2012, noting only medications prescribed), 564 (in July

24

2012, noting Plaintiff’s complaints regarding sleep, mood, and

His treatment

(See AR 567 (at initial assessment in June 2012,

25
26
27
28

7

The electronic signature of the state-agency physician
includes a medical-specialty code of 37, indicating psychiatry.
(AR 328); see Program Operations Manual System (POMS) DI
24501.004, U.S. Soc. Sec. Admin. (May 5, 2015), http://
policy.ssa.gov/poms.nsf/lnx/0424501004.
15

1

anxiety), 563 (in Sept. 2012, same), 562 (in Jan. 2013, noting

2

only refill of medication over telephone), 561 (in Mar. 2013,

3

noting Plaintiff’s subjective complaints under Mental Status

4

section).)

5

was less depressed and anxious.

6

ALJ was entitled to reject Dr. Park’s opinion as unsupported by

7

his own treatment notes.

8

at 875; Thomas, 278 F.3d at 957 (“The ALJ need not accept the

9

opinion of any physician, including a treating physician, if that

10
11

Moreover, they showed that with medication Plaintiff
(See AR 561, 563-64.)

Thus, the

See § 404.1527(c)(3); Connett, 340 F.3d

opinion is . . . inadequately supported by clinical findings.”).
The ALJ also rejected Dr. Park’s opinion because it was

12

inconsistent with the record.

(See AR 43.)

As the ALJ noted,

13

contrary to Dr. Park’s statement that Plaintiff had experienced

14

two episodes of decompensation, the record contained no evidence

15

of such episodes.

16

June 2012 that Plaintiff had had “no hospitalization[s]” (AR

17

422), and Plaintiff denied being hospitalized for psychiatric

18

issues (AR 396, 402, 536).

19

itself in ways other than hospitalization, as Plaintiff notes (J.

20

Stip. at 19), she points to no such manifestations in the record.

21

Moreover, Plaintiff has not challenged the ALJ’s step-two finding

22

that her depression was not severe.

23

that Plaintiff was markedly limited in mental functioning was

24

inconsistent with Plaintiff’s statements in her function report.

25

For example, she stated that she could take care of herself (AR

26

206), go grocery shopping once a week (AR 208), socialize with

27

friends (AR 209), and follow written and spoken instructions

28

“well” (AR 210).

Dr. Park noted at the initial evaluation in

Although decompensation can manifest

Indeed, Dr. Park’s opinion

She also stated that her impairments did not
16

1

affect her memory, concentration, or ability to complete tasks

2

and get along with others.

3

assessments were also inconsistent with Plaintiff’s statements to

4

other mental-health practitioners.

5

Plaintiff exhibiting euthymic mood and telling social worker she

6

would “like to return to school and earn her MBA”), 556 (on Aug.

7

15, 2012, Plaintiff reporting that “current meds help [with]

8

depression”), 555 (on Aug. 23, 2012, Plaintiff exhibiting

9

euthymic mood and telling social worker she would “like to return

(Id.)

Dr. Park’s functional

(See AR 557 (in July 2012,

10

to school and get marketing degree if SSI goes through”).)

11

Moreover, the other practitioners, like Dr. Park, documented

12

sparse medical findings and mostly summarized Plaintiff’s

13

complaints and feelings.

14

ALJ’s determination that Dr. Park’s opinion was inconsistent with

15

the record was specific, legitimate, and supported by substantial

16

evidence.

17

consistent an opinion is with the record as a whole”); Batson,

18

359 F.3d at 1195 (ALJ may discredit treating physicians’ opinions

19

that are “unsupported by the record as a whole”).

20

(See AR 551-58.)

Accordingly, the

See § 404.1527(c)(4) (more weight given “the more

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ misrepresented evidence

21

regarding “[her] statements about her high functioning level.”

22

(J. Stip. at 20 (citing AR 407).)

23

Plaintiff claims was misrepresented, she reported difficulty

24

getting along with others at the sober-living home “due to past

25

level of high functioning job (physical therapist)”; she was

26

struggling with “ego and sense of entitlement.”

27

the ALJ just as likely intended to refer to evidence in the same

28

progress note of Plaintiff’s own admission that she was having
17

In the progress note that

(AR 407.)

But

1

difficulty obtaining disability benefits “due to her current

2

functioning.”

3

in noting that inconsistency.

4

evidence contradicting Dr. Park’s opinion could be found not only

5

in Plaintiff’s statements to mental-health practitioners but also

6

her statements in her function report.

9

The ALJ did not err

Moreover, as discussed above,

Plaintiff is not entitled to remand on this ground.

7
8

(See AR 43 (citing AR 407).)

VI.

CONCLUSION
Consistent with the foregoing, and under sentence four of 42

10

U.S.C. § 405(g),8 IT IS ORDERED that judgment be entered

11

AFFIRMING the decision of the Commissioner, DENYING Plaintiff’s

12

request for remand, and DISMISSING this action with prejudice.

13

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk serve copies of this Order

14

and the Judgment on counsel for both parties.

15
16

DATED: January 5, 2016

17

______________________________
JEAN ROSENBLUTH
U.S. Magistrate Judge

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19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

8

That sentence provides: “The [district] court shall have
power to enter, upon the pleadings and transcript of the record,
a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the
Commissioner of Social Security, with or without remanding the
cause for a rehearing.”
18