Francis Guevara v. County of Los Angeles et al

Filing 30

ORDER DENYING COUNTY DEFENDANTS MOTION TO DISMISS 24 by Judge Dean D. Pregerson. (lc). Modified on 1/15/2015 (lc).

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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FRANCIS GUEVARA,

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Plaintiff,

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v.
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES,
ELIZABETH GROVER, TONY-PAYAM
KADE, CITY OF LOS ANGELES,
IVAN McMILLAN, IGNACIO
ARGUELLES,
Defendants.
___________________________

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Case No. CV 14-08120 DDP (MANx)
ORDER DENYING COUNTY DEFENDANT’S
MOTION TO DISMISS
[Dkt. No. 24]

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Presently before the Court is Defendant County of Los Angeles’

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Motion to Dismiss as to Plaintiff’s Fourth Cause of Action, based

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on a “Monell” theory of liability.

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oral arguments and considered the parties’ submissions, the Court

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adopts the following order denying the motion.

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I.

(Dkt. No. 24.)

Having heard

BACKGROUND

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On October 22, 2012, two LAPD police officers investigated

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allegations of child abuse.

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31.)

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(Id.)

(First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), ¶

The allegations involved one of Plaintiff’s two daughters.
She had disclosed to a school official that her father’s

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friend had “inappropriately touched her.”

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interviewing the child at her school, the officers decided to take

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the child and her sister to the police station.

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Plaintiff was out of town at the time.

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(Id.)

After

(Id. at ¶¶ 32-35.)

(Id. at ¶ 30.)

After interviews with the children’s grandmother, the girls,

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Plaintiff, and the suspect, case workers for the County decided to

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take the children into protective custody.

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were held by the County for three days, until a juvenile court

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released them back into Plaintiff’s custody.

(Id. at ¶ 50.)

They

(Id. at ¶ 55.)

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Plaintiff filed a Complaint (and later the FAC) alleging civil

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rights violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, including a Monell claim1

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of liability on the part of the County for a policy or practice of

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removing children from their family homes without exigent

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circumstances.

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Plaintiff’s Fourth Cause of Action – for failure to state a claim.

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II.

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The County moves to dismiss the Monell claim –

LEGAL STANDARD
In order to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a

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claim, a complaint need only include "a short and plain statement

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of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief."

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Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 55 (2007) (quoting Conley v.

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Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)).

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"sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to

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relief that is plausible on its face."

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662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).

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considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court must "accept as true

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all allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in

Bell

A complaint must include

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
When

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See Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S.
658 (1978).
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the light most favorable to the plaintiff."

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F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000).

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III. DISCUSSION

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Resnick v. Hayes, 213

A plaintiff alleging civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. §

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1983 may not state a claim against a government entity for the

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actions of the entity’s employees; only the actions of the entity

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itself give rise to liability.

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City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978) (“[W]e conclude that a

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municipality cannot be held liable solely because it employs a

Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of

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tortfeasor—or, in other words, a municipality cannot be held liable

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under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.”).

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government entity can be held liable for “constitutional

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deprivations visited pursuant to governmental ‘custom’ even though

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such a custom has not received formal approval through the body's

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official decisionmaking channels.”

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However, a

Id. at 690-91.

Plaintiff alleges just such an informal government custom in

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its Fourth Cause of Action, captioned “Monell Liability – Removal

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[Plaintiff v. County].”

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is that “Defendant COUNTY . . . established and/or followed

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policies, procedures, customs, and/or practices . . . which

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policies were the cause of violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional

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rights.”

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the County has a policy of “detaining and/or removing children from

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their parents without exigent circumstances (imminent danger of

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serious bodily injury), warrant, court order and/or consent of

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their parents.”

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developed a long standing practice of removing children without a

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warrant . . . when the risk of harm to a child is not so imminent

(Id. at ¶ 75.)

(Id.)

(FAC at 27.)

The cause of action stated

More specifically, the FAC alleges that

It further alleges that “COUNTY has

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as to have insufficient time within which to obtain a warrant.”

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(Id. at ¶ 12.)

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adequate training for its employees in parents’ constitutional

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rights, the use of protective custody warrants, or federal case law

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regarding “warrantless removals, exigency, least intrusive means,

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and . . . proper investigation.”

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It further alleges that the County did not provide

(Id. at ¶ 78.)

These allegations are enough to state a claim.

They are not

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merely “a formulaic recitation of a cause of action's elements.”

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Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545 (2007).

They allege

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specific policies on the part of the County.

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is no proof of the existence of such policies, but that is a

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question for the merits phase of the litigation; as allegations,

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they do state a claim for relief.

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It may be that there

Defendants would like the Court to follow the example of

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another recent Central District decision in Alberici v. Cnty. of

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Los Angeles, No. CV12-10511-JFW-VBK (April 15, 2013) (order

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granting in part defendant’s motion to dismiss).

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dismissed a Monell claim against the County because:

There the court

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[A]fter numerous amendments to their Complaint, Plaintiffs

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have still failed to identify any specific, formal policy,

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practice, or custom of either the County of Orange or the

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County of Los Angeles that may have resulted in a violation of

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Plaintiffs’ civil rights . . . .

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list various, non-specific, generic, and conclusory “policies”

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purportedly followed by the County of Orange and the County of

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Los Angeles, such as “the policy of detaining and/or removing

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children from their family and homes without exigent

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circumstances” . . . that allegedly led to the violation of
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Instead, Plaintiffs simply

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Plaintiffs’ civil rights . . . .

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include any names of or policy numbers for these alleged

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policies . . . .

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Plaintiffs . . . fail to

Id. at 5.

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The Court respectfully disagrees with the rationale applied in

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Alberici.

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to identify with particularity the “who, what, where, when, and

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how” of a claim.

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heightened particularity not required by Rule 8).

It is not necessary, at the pleadings stage, to be able

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 569 & n.14 (pleading with
What is

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necessary is simply enough to put the defendant on notice as to the

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theory of liability and to state a plausible claim for relief.

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Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011).

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County is on notice as to plaintiff’s theory: that the County has

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“established” a policy, custom, or practice of removing children

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from homes without a warrant even when the circumstances would

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allow officials to obtain a warrant.

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not.

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constitutional violation.

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Here, the

That is either true or it is

If it is true, it would plausibly give rise to a

Moreover, the practice need not have an official name, number,

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or designation.

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of § 1983 allows for a claim based on practices that are not

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explicitly adopted or named:

As the Monell Court explained, the very language

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[A]lthough the touchstone of the § 1983 action against a

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government body is an allegation that official policy is

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responsible for a deprivation of rights protected by the

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Constitution, local governments, like every other § 1983

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“person,” by the very terms of the statute, may be sued for

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constitutional deprivations visited pursuant to governmental
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“custom” even though such a custom has not received formal

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approval through the body's official decisionmaking channels.

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As Mr. Justice Harlan, writing for the Court, said in Adickes

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v. S. H. Kress & Co.: “Congress included customs and usages

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[in § 1983] because of the persistent and widespread

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discriminatory practices of state officials . . . . Although

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not authorized by written law, such practices of state

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officials could well be so permanent and well settled as to

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constitute a ‘custom or usage’ with the force of law.”

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Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-91 (citation omitted).

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eviscerate § 1983 protections as against local governments if

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liability could be avoided by not giving a policy an official name

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or number.

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Indeed, it would

The order in Alberici also cites to City of Oklahoma City v.

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Tuttle for the proposition that an allegation of a “nebulous

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‘policy’ of ‘inadequate training’ on the part of the municipal

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corporation” cannot support a Monell claim.

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(1985).

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question was actually whether the trial court could issue jury

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instructions that allowed the jury to infer inadequate training

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from a single officer’s behavior.

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about pleading standards.2

471 U.S. 808, 823

The Court finds the citation inapposite.

Id.

In Tuttle, the

Thus, it tells us little

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A better analysis of the pleading standard for municipal

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policies and customs is provided by the court in Thomas v. City of

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Galveston, Texas, 800 F. Supp. 2d 826 (S.D. Tex. 2011).

The Thomas

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Tuttle was, in any event, a plurality opinion that was
drastically limited by another decision a year later. See Collins
v. City of San Diego, 841 F.2d 337, 341 (9th Cir. 1988) (noting the
Supreme Court’s change in direction).
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court noted that district courts had split on the level of

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specificity required in Monell claim pleading after Twombly and

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Iqbal.

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approach to Monell pleading that took account of both Twombly/Iqbal

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and the evidentiary disadvantage plaintiffs usually find themselves

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at:

Id. at 841-42.

However, the court identified a reasonable

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Iqbal instructed that “[d]etermining whether a complaint

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states a plausible claim for relief” is “a context-specific

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task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial

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experience and common sense.”

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liability, as opposed to individual officer liability, it is

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exceedingly rare that a plaintiff will have access to (or

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personal knowledge of) specific details regarding the

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existence or absence of internal policies or training

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procedures prior to discovery.

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factual allegations should be required at the motion to

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dismiss stage. Moreover, those allegations need not

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specifically state what the policy is, as the plaintiff will

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generally not have access to it, but may be more general . . .

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.

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Allegations that provide [adequate] notice could include, but

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are not limited to, past incidents of misconduct to others,

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multiple harms that occurred to the plaintiff himself,

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misconduct that occurred in the open, the involvement of

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multiple officials in the misconduct, or the specific topic of

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the challenged policy or training inadequacy.

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details . . . help to satisfy the requirement of providing not

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In the context of municipal

Accordingly, only minimal

Those types of

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only fair notice of the nature of the claim, but also grounds

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on which the claim rests.

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Id. at 842-44 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citations

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omitted) (emphases added).

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In this case, Plaintiff has alleged facts in at least two

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categories identified by the Thomas court.

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inadequate training, not just generally, but as to specific topics

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– in this case, the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights of

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parents, the use of protective custody warrants, and federal case

First, he has alleged

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law regarding “warrantless removals, exigency, least intrusive

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means, and . . . proper investigation.”

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allegation of inadequate training as to specific topics is enough

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to state a claim.

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13-895 ABC (PJWx), 2013 WL 3119178, at *3 (C.D. Cal. May 16, 2013)

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(holding pleading inadequate because “the Court is left in the dark

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as to whom Plaintiff alleges was inadequately trained and as to

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what training she believes they should have received”), with Miller

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v. City of Plymouth, No. 2:09-CV-205 JVB, 2010 WL 1474205, at *6

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(N.D. Ind. Apr. 9, 2010) (holding pleading adequate where plaintiff

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alleged “failure to train [police officers] regarding a proper

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search of a vehicle”).

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(FAC at ¶ 78.)

An

Compare Zamudio v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, No. CV

Second, the Thomas court suggested, Plaintiff’s allegation of

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a policy, custom, or practice may be bolstered by allegations of

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past incidents of similar “misconduct to others.”

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F.Supp.2d at 843.

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holding that “a custom or practice can be inferred from widespread

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practices or evidence of repeated constitutional violations for

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which the errant municipal officers were not discharged or

Thomas, 800

This accords with the Ninth Circuit’s repeated

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reprimanded.”

Hunter v. Cnty. of Sacramento, 652 F.3d 1225, 1233

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(9th Cir. 2011).

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as to whether a Monell violation has occurred in this case.”

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(Reply at 2.)

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district has stated with regard to a similar motion to dismiss,

Defendants argue that “other cases are irrelevant

The Court disagrees.

As another judge in this

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Plaintiffs have, by virtue of identifying the cases cited in

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paragraph 65, made an allegation . . . that those cases

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support the conclusion that the County has a policy, practice,

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or custom of removing children from their parents without a

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warrant or other judicial authorization.

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This is a factual,

non-conclusory allegation . . . .

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Edwards v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, No. CV 14-01705 GW (MANx), slip

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op. at 3 (Nov. 13, 2014) (order granting in part and denying in

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part motion to dismiss); see also id. at n.3 (suggesting that

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Plaintiff’s collection of cases was on a spectrum of acceptable

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means of alleging practice or custom, along with academic studies

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and newspaper reports).

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Plaintiff’s reference to other cases is in the nature of an

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allegation that those cases show a policy, custom, or practice of

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removing children from the home without warrants or exigent

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circumstances, and that allegation, coupled with reasonably

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specific language in the general allegations, is enough to state a

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claim.

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Similarly, the Court here finds that

Defendants’ final argument is that Plaintiff’s Monell claim is

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just a respondeat superior claim dressed up, because “no facts are

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pled supporting [a claim that] the County has a ‘policy’ or

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‘practice’ of unlawful warrantless removals.”

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10.)

(Mot. Dismiss at

For all the reasons stated above, the Court disagrees.
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Plaintiff has made sufficient allegations that the County has such

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a policy.

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IV.

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CONCLUSION
The Motion to Dismiss is hereby DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Dated: January 15, 2015
DEAN D. PREGERSON
United States District Judge

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