Richard J. Volis v. Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles HACLA et al
Filing
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ORDER DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS WITHOUT PREJUDICE 10 by Judge Dean D. Pregerson. (lc). Modified on 9/3/2015 (lc).
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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RICHARD J. VOLIS,
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Plaintiff,
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v.
HOUSING AUTHORITY OF THE
CITY OF LOS ANGELES (HACLA);
DOUGLAS GUTHRIE, Executive
Director; PETER LYNN,
Section 8 Director; ANGELA
ADAMS, Section 8 Assistant
Director; JOSEPH NGUYEN,
Section 8 Manager; JOHN
KING, 504 Coordinator;
BLANCA MACRIS, Risk Manager;
SANDRA CHAVEZ, Section 8
Adviser,
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Defendants.
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Case No. CV 14-08747 DDP (VBKx)
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS
WITHOUT PREJUDICE
[Dkt. 10]
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Presently before the court is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss.
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Having considered the submissions of the parties and heard oral
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argument, the court denies the motion, without prejudice, and
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adopts the following Order.
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I.
Background
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Pro se Plaintiff Richard Volis (“Volis”) is a disabled person
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as defined under the Americans with Disabilities Act.
(Complaint ¶
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3.)
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Much of the parties’ discussion of the facts of this case is
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drawn from sources outside the pleadings.
At this stage, the court
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focuses on Plaintiff’s Complaint.
Plaintiff alleges that on June
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1, 2013, he made a request for a Reasonable Accommodation for an
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Exception Payment Standard (“higher rent subsidy”) to Defendant
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Sandra Chavez.
(Complaint ¶ 18.)
Housing Authority of the City
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of Los Angeles (“HACLA”) employees later claimed, however, that
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they misplaced Plaintiff’s request.
(Compl. ¶ 35.)
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Plaintiff alleges he received a call from Defendant Nguyen on June
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10 asking Plaintiff to visit a HACLA office to file another Request
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for Reasonable Accommodation of an Exceptional Payment Standard.
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On September 25, 2013, Defendant Nguyen denied Plaintiff’s
(Id.)
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request for Reasonable Accommodation for an Exception Payment
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Standard. (Complaint ¶ 36.)
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On June 16, Plaintiff requested an extension of the term of
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his Section 8 housing voucher.
(Compl. ¶ 25.)
Plaintiff received
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a “final 30-day extension for the Section 8 voucher.”
(Id. ¶ 26.)
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This is the second federal lawsuit filed by Mr. Volis
against HACLA and its employees. The crux of the first lawsuit was
an allegation that HACLA falsified an inspection report that found
Volis’ rental unit to be habitable and, as a consequence, allowed
the landlord of the unit to increase the Plaintiff’s rent. See CV
13-01397-MMM (Dkt. 3.) Another judge of this court granted HACLA’s
Motion to Dismiss. (Dkt. 115.) Plaintiff’s appeal of that order
remains pending.
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HACLA allegedly “terminated” Plaintiff’s voucher on July 19, 2014.
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(Id. ¶ 28.)
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Plaintiff’s Complaint appears to allege that Defendants’
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denial of his request for a higher rent subsidy and refusal to
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extend his Section 8 housing voucher to allow him sufficient time
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to find a suitable dwelling that would accommodate his disabilities
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and accept his emotional support animals violates the Americans
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with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act, although the
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Complaint also alleges causes of action for retaliation,
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conspiracy, and obstruction of justice.
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dismiss.
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II.
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Defendants now move to
Legal Standard
A complaint will survive a motion to dismiss when it contains
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“sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to
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relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
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662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
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570 (2007)).
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“accept as true all allegations of material fact and must construe
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those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Resnick
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v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000).
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need not include “detailed factual allegations,” it must offer
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“more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me
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accusation.”
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allegations that are no more than a statement of a legal conclusion
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“are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id. at 679.
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other words, a pleading that merely offers “labels and
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conclusions,” a “formulaic recitation of the elements,” or “naked
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assertions” will not be sufficient to state a claim upon which
When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court must
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
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Although a complaint
Conclusory allegations or
In
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relief can be granted.
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quotation marks omitted).
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Id. at 678 (citations and internal
“When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should
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assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly
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give rise to an entitlement of relief.” Id. at 679.
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must allege “plausible grounds to infer” that their claims rise
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“above the speculative level.”
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“Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for
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relief” is a “context-specific task that requires the reviewing
Plaintiffs
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
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court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.”
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556 U.S. at 679.
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III. Discussion
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A.
Iqbal,
Plaintiff’s Request for a Higher Subsidy
The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development’s
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housing choice voucher program uses a Housing Assistance Payments
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Contract (“HAP”) to provide housing assistance to Section 8
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tenants.
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Housing Assistance Payments Contract,
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https://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/documents/huddoc?id=DOC_11737.pdf
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The local voucher program is administered by a Public Housing
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Agency (“PHA”), such as Defendant HACLA.
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an agreement between the housing agency and the owner of a unit
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occupied by an assisted family.
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the housing agency will pay housing assistance payments to the
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owner in accordance with the HAP contract.
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not maintain the contract unit in accordance with housing quality
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standards, the housing authority may exercise any available
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remedies, including suspension of housing assistance payments,
See U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development,
Id.
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Id.
The HAP contract is
During the HAP contract term,
If the landlord does
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abatement or other reduction of housing assistance payments, and
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termination of the HAP contract.
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Id. at 4.
Defendants’ main contention with respect to Plaintiff’s higher
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subsidy claim is that no such request could possibly have been
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granted because at the time Plaintiff made his request, Plaintiff’s
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unit was under abatement due to numerous habitability violations,
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and was therefore ineligible for subsidies of any kind.
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8 to 9.)
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disputed issue of fact.
(Motion at
This argument, however, appears to be premised on a
Plaintiff asserts that his unit was not
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under abatement until August, when he received notice of the
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abatement.
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taken an inconsistent position in other cases, and that abatement
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status is not determined by notice to a tenant, Defendants’ general
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request that this court take judicial notice of “the court’s files”
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in Plaintiff’s other case against HACLA is not a sufficient basis
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to overcome the presumptions in Plaintiff’s favor at this stage of
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the proceedings.2
Although Defendants suggest that Plaintiff may have
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B.
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The housing choice voucher program is designed to allow
Housing Voucher Extension
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families to move without the loss of housing assistance.
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initial term of a voucher must be at least 60 calendar days.
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CFR 982.303(a).
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housing agency may grant one or more extensions of the initial
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voucher term in accordance with agency policy as described in the
The
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A housing agency may, at its discretion, the
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Although Defendants also argue that, putting aside the
habitability issues, only HUD, and not HACLA, had the discretion to
approve Plaintiff’s request under 24 CFR § 982.503(c)(2)(1),
Defendants do not address Plaintiff’s contention that HACLA never
submitted his request to HUD. See 24 CFR § 982.503(b)(2).
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housing agency administrative plan.
24 CFR 982.303(b)(1).
HACLA’s
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general extension policies provide for extensions of no more than
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120 days.
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docs.hacla.org/library/files/S8_AP_2015_October_2014.pdf at 8.6;
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8.10.1.2.
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If a family needs and requests an extension of the initial voucher
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term as a reasonable accommodation, however, the agency must extend
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the voucher term “up to the term reasonably required for that
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purpose.”
HACLA, Section 8 Administrative Plan,
24 CFR 982.303(b)(2).
The thrust of Defendants’
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contentions regarding Plaintiff’s housing voucher claim is that
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HACLA’s refusal to extend Plaintiff’s voucher beyond July 2014
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could not have been improper because Plaintiff received numerous
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earlier extensions.
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This argument, too, appears to be based on facts beyond those
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alleged.
Although the Complaint’s sole reference to a voucher
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extension does refer to a “final” extension in June 2014,
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suggesting that prior extensions had been granted, it is unclear
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from the face of the Complaint when Plaintiff first received his
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voucher or earlier extensions.3
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potential factual issues regarding Plaintiff’s need for a
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reasonable accommodation and the potential span of any reasonable
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time period for purposes of 24 CFR 982.303(b)(2), the court denies
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Defendants’ motion at this juncture.
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Given that uncertainty, and
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Defendants assert that Plaintiff received his voucher in
December 2013.
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IV.
Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is
denied, without prejudice.4
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
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Dated: September 3, 2015
DEAN D. PREGERSON
United States District Judge
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Many of Defendants’ arguments here might be more
appropriately raised in the context of a motion for summary
judgment, which Defendants may file if they so choose. Nothing in
this Order shall be read to suggest that any such motion, or that
Plaintiff’s claims, will or will not prove successful. The court
encourages both parties to continue to consider a mutually
acceptable resolution of this matter.
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