Richard J. Volis v. Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles HACLA et al

Filing 42

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS WITHOUT PREJUDICE 10 by Judge Dean D. Pregerson. (lc). Modified on 9/3/2015 (lc).

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1 2 O 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 RICHARD J. VOLIS, 12 Plaintiff, 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 v. HOUSING AUTHORITY OF THE CITY OF LOS ANGELES (HACLA); DOUGLAS GUTHRIE, Executive Director; PETER LYNN, Section 8 Director; ANGELA ADAMS, Section 8 Assistant Director; JOSEPH NGUYEN, Section 8 Manager; JOHN KING, 504 Coordinator; BLANCA MACRIS, Risk Manager; SANDRA CHAVEZ, Section 8 Adviser, 20 Defendants. 21 ___________________________ ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Case No. CV 14-08747 DDP (VBKx) ORDER DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS WITHOUT PREJUDICE [Dkt. 10] 22 23 Presently before the court is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. 24 Having considered the submissions of the parties and heard oral 25 argument, the court denies the motion, without prejudice, and 26 adopts the following Order. 27 /// 28 /// 1 I. Background 2 Pro se Plaintiff Richard Volis (“Volis”) is a disabled person 3 as defined under the Americans with Disabilities Act. (Complaint ¶ 4 3.) 1 5 Much of the parties’ discussion of the facts of this case is 6 drawn from sources outside the pleadings. At this stage, the court 7 focuses on Plaintiff’s Complaint. Plaintiff alleges that on June 8 1, 2013, he made a request for a Reasonable Accommodation for an 9 Exception Payment Standard (“higher rent subsidy”) to Defendant 10 Sandra Chavez. (Complaint ¶ 18.) Housing Authority of the City 11 of Los Angeles (“HACLA”) employees later claimed, however, that 12 they misplaced Plaintiff’s request. (Compl. ¶ 35.) 13 Plaintiff alleges he received a call from Defendant Nguyen on June 14 10 asking Plaintiff to visit a HACLA office to file another Request 15 for Reasonable Accommodation of an Exceptional Payment Standard. 16 On September 25, 2013, Defendant Nguyen denied Plaintiff’s (Id.) 17 request for Reasonable Accommodation for an Exception Payment 18 Standard. (Complaint ¶ 36.) 19 On June 16, Plaintiff requested an extension of the term of 20 his Section 8 housing voucher. (Compl. ¶ 25.) Plaintiff received 21 a “final 30-day extension for the Section 8 voucher.” (Id. ¶ 26.) 22 23 24 1 25 26 27 28 This is the second federal lawsuit filed by Mr. Volis against HACLA and its employees. The crux of the first lawsuit was an allegation that HACLA falsified an inspection report that found Volis’ rental unit to be habitable and, as a consequence, allowed the landlord of the unit to increase the Plaintiff’s rent. See CV 13-01397-MMM (Dkt. 3.) Another judge of this court granted HACLA’s Motion to Dismiss. (Dkt. 115.) Plaintiff’s appeal of that order remains pending. 2 1 HACLA allegedly “terminated” Plaintiff’s voucher on July 19, 2014. 2 (Id. ¶ 28.) 3 Plaintiff’s Complaint appears to allege that Defendants’ 4 denial of his request for a higher rent subsidy and refusal to 5 extend his Section 8 housing voucher to allow him sufficient time 6 to find a suitable dwelling that would accommodate his disabilities 7 and accept his emotional support animals violates the Americans 8 with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act, although the 9 Complaint also alleges causes of action for retaliation, 10 conspiracy, and obstruction of justice. 11 dismiss. 12 II. 13 Defendants now move to Legal Standard A complaint will survive a motion to dismiss when it contains 14 “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to 15 relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 16 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 17 570 (2007)). 18 “accept as true all allegations of material fact and must construe 19 those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Resnick 20 v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000). 21 need not include “detailed factual allegations,” it must offer 22 “more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me 23 accusation.” 24 allegations that are no more than a statement of a legal conclusion 25 “are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id. at 679. 26 other words, a pleading that merely offers “labels and 27 conclusions,” a “formulaic recitation of the elements,” or “naked 28 assertions” will not be sufficient to state a claim upon which When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court must Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 3 Although a complaint Conclusory allegations or In 1 relief can be granted. 2 quotation marks omitted). 3 Id. at 678 (citations and internal “When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should 4 assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly 5 give rise to an entitlement of relief.” Id. at 679. 6 must allege “plausible grounds to infer” that their claims rise 7 “above the speculative level.” 8 “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for 9 relief” is a “context-specific task that requires the reviewing Plaintiffs Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. 10 court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” 11 556 U.S. at 679. 12 III. Discussion 13 14 A. Iqbal, Plaintiff’s Request for a Higher Subsidy The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development’s 15 housing choice voucher program uses a Housing Assistance Payments 16 Contract (“HAP”) to provide housing assistance to Section 8 17 tenants. 18 Housing Assistance Payments Contract, 19 https://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/documents/huddoc?id=DOC_11737.pdf 20 The local voucher program is administered by a Public Housing 21 Agency (“PHA”), such as Defendant HACLA. 22 an agreement between the housing agency and the owner of a unit 23 occupied by an assisted family. 24 the housing agency will pay housing assistance payments to the 25 owner in accordance with the HAP contract. 26 not maintain the contract unit in accordance with housing quality 27 standards, the housing authority may exercise any available 28 remedies, including suspension of housing assistance payments, See U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Id. 4 Id. The HAP contract is During the HAP contract term, If the landlord does 1 abatement or other reduction of housing assistance payments, and 2 termination of the HAP contract. 3 Id. at 4. Defendants’ main contention with respect to Plaintiff’s higher 4 subsidy claim is that no such request could possibly have been 5 granted because at the time Plaintiff made his request, Plaintiff’s 6 unit was under abatement due to numerous habitability violations, 7 and was therefore ineligible for subsidies of any kind. 8 8 to 9.) 9 disputed issue of fact. (Motion at This argument, however, appears to be premised on a Plaintiff asserts that his unit was not 10 under abatement until August, when he received notice of the 11 abatement. 12 taken an inconsistent position in other cases, and that abatement 13 status is not determined by notice to a tenant, Defendants’ general 14 request that this court take judicial notice of “the court’s files” 15 in Plaintiff’s other case against HACLA is not a sufficient basis 16 to overcome the presumptions in Plaintiff’s favor at this stage of 17 the proceedings.2 Although Defendants suggest that Plaintiff may have 18 B. 19 The housing choice voucher program is designed to allow Housing Voucher Extension 20 families to move without the loss of housing assistance. 21 initial term of a voucher must be at least 60 calendar days. 22 CFR 982.303(a). 23 housing agency may grant one or more extensions of the initial 24 voucher term in accordance with agency policy as described in the The 24 A housing agency may, at its discretion, the 25 26 27 28 2 Although Defendants also argue that, putting aside the habitability issues, only HUD, and not HACLA, had the discretion to approve Plaintiff’s request under 24 CFR § 982.503(c)(2)(1), Defendants do not address Plaintiff’s contention that HACLA never submitted his request to HUD. See 24 CFR § 982.503(b)(2). 5 1 housing agency administrative plan. 24 CFR 982.303(b)(1). HACLA’s 2 general extension policies provide for extensions of no more than 3 120 days. 4 docs.hacla.org/library/files/S8_AP_2015_October_2014.pdf at 8.6; 5 8.10.1.2. 6 If a family needs and requests an extension of the initial voucher 7 term as a reasonable accommodation, however, the agency must extend 8 the voucher term “up to the term reasonably required for that 9 purpose.” HACLA, Section 8 Administrative Plan, 24 CFR 982.303(b)(2). The thrust of Defendants’ 10 contentions regarding Plaintiff’s housing voucher claim is that 11 HACLA’s refusal to extend Plaintiff’s voucher beyond July 2014 12 could not have been improper because Plaintiff received numerous 13 earlier extensions. 14 This argument, too, appears to be based on facts beyond those 15 alleged. Although the Complaint’s sole reference to a voucher 16 extension does refer to a “final” extension in June 2014, 17 suggesting that prior extensions had been granted, it is unclear 18 from the face of the Complaint when Plaintiff first received his 19 voucher or earlier extensions.3 20 potential factual issues regarding Plaintiff’s need for a 21 reasonable accommodation and the potential span of any reasonable 22 time period for purposes of 24 CFR 982.303(b)(2), the court denies 23 Defendants’ motion at this juncture. 24 /// 25 /// 26 /// Given that uncertainty, and 27 3 28 Defendants assert that Plaintiff received his voucher in December 2013. 6 1 2 3 IV. Conclusion For the reasons stated above, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is denied, without prejudice.4 4 5 IT IS SO ORDERED. 6 7 8 Dated: September 3, 2015 DEAN D. PREGERSON United States District Judge 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 4 Many of Defendants’ arguments here might be more appropriately raised in the context of a motion for summary judgment, which Defendants may file if they so choose. Nothing in this Order shall be read to suggest that any such motion, or that Plaintiff’s claims, will or will not prove successful. The court encourages both parties to continue to consider a mutually acceptable resolution of this matter. 7

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