Richard J. Volis v. Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles HACLA et al

Filing 95

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 74 AND DENYING PLAINTIFFS REQUEST TO FILE SURREPLY 84 by Judge Dean D. Pregerson (Made JS-6. Case Terminated.) . (lc). Modified on 9/30/2016 (lc).

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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RICHARD J. VOLIS,

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Plaintiff,

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v.
HOUSING AUTHORITY OF THE
CITY OF LOS ANGELES (HACLA),
et al,

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Defendants.

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___________________________

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Case No. CV 14-08747 DDP (PLAx)

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
[Dkt. 74]

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Presently before the court is Defendants’ Motion for Summary

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Judgment.

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court grants the motion and adopts the following Order.

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I.

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Having considered the submissions of the parties, the

Background1
Pro se Plaintiff Richard Volis, who is disabled, first

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received a Section 8 housing subsidy voucher from Defendant Housing

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Authority of the City of Los Angeles (“HACLA”) in 1993.

(SUF 3.)

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The facts as stated herein are drawn from Defendants’
Separate Statement of Uncontroverted Facts (“SUF”) and, to the
extent possible, Plaintiff’s Separate Statement of Uncontroverted
Facts (“PSUF”).

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Under federal guidelines, Plaintiff, a single man residing alone,

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was eligible for a one bedroom voucher.

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Davis at 17.)2

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two bedroom condominium in Sylmar, California (“the condo”).

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5; PSUF 2.)

(Declaration of Angela

Beginning in September 2010, Plaintiff resided in a
(SUF

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HACLA must conduct inspections of subsidized housing to ensure

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that the properties comply with the Department of Housing and Urban

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Development (“HUD”)’s Housing Quality Standards (“HQS”).

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In or about March 2013, Plaintiff alleged that the condo did not

(SUF 7.)

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meet HQS standards.

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2013, the condo failed an inspection due to several HQS violations.

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(Ex. 501.)

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of the failed inspection and notified them that if the owner failed

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to remedy the problems and the unit failed re-inspection, HACLA’s

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Housing Assistant Payment (“HAP”) would be “abated.”

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503).

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further payment will be made on the unit until it has passed

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inspection.”

(SUF 8l; See also note 4, below.)

On May 10,

On May 15, HACLA notified Plaintiff and the condo owner

(Exs. 502,

The notification letter explained, “Abatement means that no

(Id.)

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Plaintiff asserts that he made a request for an exception

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payment standard, or higher rent subsidy, to HACLA on June 4, 2013.

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(SUF 21; PSUF 7.)

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to 120% of the standard subsidy.3

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of Plaintiff’s request before June 10, 2013.

Plaintiff requested an exception payment of 110%
(SUF 23.)

HACLA has no record

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2

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Ms. Davis’ declaration is not filed as a separate exhibit,
but rather attached to Defendants’ motion and paginated
sequentially.
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As discussed in further detail below, a public housing
agency such as HACLA may establish a higher payment standard than
usual as a reasonable accommodation of a housing program
participant’s disability. 24 C.F.R. § 982.505(d).
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On June 6, the condo failed a follow-up inspection.

(SUF 13-

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14.)

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subsidy payments, effective June 7.

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additional inspections between July 1 and August 14, 2013.

(SUF

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16-17.)

(SUF

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16.)

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HACLA therefore placed the condo in “abatement” and suspended
The condo failed repeated

The condo remained in abatement during that time.

HACLA made no subsidy payments to the condo’s owner after June

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1. (SUF 19.)

On September 25, 2013, HACLA informed Plaintiff that

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it could not grant his request for an exception payment standard

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because the condo was not in compliance with HQS standards and was

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in abatement.

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with the condo owner in October or November after the owner failed

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to remedy the HQS violations.

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(SUF 24; PSUF 15.)

HACLA terminated its contract

(Suf 18; PSUF 17.)

On October 22, 2013, HACLA gave Plaintiff a new voucher to use

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on another rental housing unit.

(SUF 27; PSUF 18.)

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voucher was valid for up to 120 days.

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HACLA’s counsel informed Plaintiff that HACLA could not consider

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any request for an exception payment standard until and unless he

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used his new voucher on a new, qualifying rental unit.

(SUF 28.)

The new

On October 30,

(SUF 26.)

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Plaintiff alleges that he had difficulty locating a Section 8-

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eligible unit that would accommodate his emotional support animals.

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(PSUF 20; SUF 29.)

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applications within the new voucher’s 120 day validity period.

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(SUF 30.)

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day extension on his new voucher.

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rental applications during the additional 60 days.

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Plaintiff did not submit any rental

In February 2014, Plaintiff requested, and received a 60
(SUF 31.)

He did not submit any
(SUF 32).

On April 26, Plaintiff requested and received a second 60 day
extension of the new voucher.

(SUF 33.)
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He again did not apply

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for any new housing.

(SUF 34.)

In June 2014, Plaintiff requested

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a third extension.

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final, thirty day extension, and notified Plaintiff that HACLA

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could not grant any further extensions.

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did not submit any rental applications during the thirty day final

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extension period, and was terminated from the Section 8 program on

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July 23, 2014.

(SUF 35; PSUF 19.)

HACLA granted Plaintiff a

(SUF 36-37.)

Plaintiff

(SUF 41, PSUF 21.)

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Plaintiff’s complaint alleges that HACLA’s denial of his

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request for a higher rent subsidy and refusal to extend his Section

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8 housing voucher violate the Americans with Disabilities Act and

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the Rehabilitation Act.

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discriminatory acts are retaliation against Plaintiff for bringing

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a prior federal lawsuit against Defendant.4

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for summary judgment.5

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II. Legal Standard

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Plaintiff also claims that the allegedly

Defendant now moves

Summary judgment is appropriate where the pleadings,

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depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,

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together with the affidavits, if any, show “that there is no

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genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled

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to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

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seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing the

A party

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This is the second federal lawsuit filed by Mr. Volis
against HACLA and its employees. The crux of the first lawsuit was
an allegation that HACLA falsified an inspection report in order to
find Volis’ rental unit to be habitable and, as a consequence,
allowed the landlord of the unit to increase the Plaintiff’s rent.
See CV 13-01397-MMM, Dkt. 3. Another judge of this court granted
HACLA’s Motion to Dismiss. (CV 13-01397-MMM, Dkt. 115.)
Plaintiff’s appeal of that order remains pending.
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Plaintiff’s complaint also alleges a cause of action for
obstruction of justice, a crime, for which there is no private
right of action.
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court of the basis for its motion and of identifying those portions

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of the pleadings and discovery responses that demonstrate the

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absence of a genuine issue of material fact.

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Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).

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the evidence must be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party. See

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Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 242 (1986).

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moving party does not bear the burden of proof at trial, it is

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entitled to summary judgment if it can demonstrate that “there is

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an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.”

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See Celotex Corp. v.

All reasonable inferences from

If the

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.
Once the moving party meets its burden, the burden shifts to

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the nonmoving party opposing the motion, who must “set forth

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specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.”

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Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256.

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party “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the

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existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on

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which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.”

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477 U.S. at 322.

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that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving

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party,” and material facts are those “that might affect the outcome

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of the suit under the governing law.”

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There is no genuine issue of fact “[w]here the record taken as a

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whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the

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nonmoving party.”

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Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).

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Summary judgment is warranted if a

Celotex,

A genuine issue exists if “the evidence is such

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio

It is not the court’s task “to scour the record in search of a

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genuine issue of triable fact.”

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1278 (9th Cir.1996).

Keenan v. Allan, 91 F.3d 1275,

Counsel have an obligation to lay out their
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support clearly.

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1026, 1031 (9th Cir.2001).

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file for evidence establishing a genuine issue of fact, where the

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evidence is not set forth in the opposition papers with adequate

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references so that it could conveniently be found.”

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III. Discussion

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Carmen v. San Francisco Sch. Dist., 237 F.3d
The court “need not examine the entire

Id.

Plaintiffs complaint appears to allege discrimination claims

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under Title II of the ADA.

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must show that he is disabled, that he was denied a public benefit,

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and that the discrimination, denial of benefit, or exclusion from a

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service was by reason of his disability.

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Culver City, 754 F.3d 690, 695 (9th Cir. 2014); 42 U.S.C. § 12132.

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Title II’s anti-retaliation provisions prohibit retaliation or

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discrimination against anyone, disabled or not, on the basis of

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that person’s efforts to oppose unlawful discriminatory practices.

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Barker v. Riverside County Office of Educ., 584 F.3d 821, 827-28

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(9th Cir. 2009).

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fact could conclude that HACLA denied Plaintiff’s requests by

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reason of his disability, and that all of his claims therefore

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fail.

To prevail on such a claim, plaintiff

See Cohen v. City of

Defendants allege that no reasonable trier of

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A.

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HUD’s housing choice voucher program provides housing

Payment Exception Standard

See U.S.

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assistance to Section 8 tenants through a HAP contract.

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Department of Housing and Urban Development, Housing Assistance

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Payments Contract,

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https://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/documents/huddoc?id=DOC_11737.pdf

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The local voucher program is administered by a Public Housing

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Agency (“PHA”), such as Defendant HACLA.
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Id.

The HAP contract is

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an agreement between the housing agency and the owner of a unit

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occupied by an assisted family.

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the housing agency will pay housing assistance payments to the

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owner in accordance with the HAP contract.

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not maintain the contract unit in accordance with housing quality

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standards, the housing authority may exercise any available

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remedies, including suspension of housing assistance payments,

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abatement or other reduction of housing assistance payments, and

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termination of the HAP contract.

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Id.

During the HAP contract term,

If the landlord does

Id. at 4; 24 C.F.R. §

983.208(b)(2).
HACLA argues that it could not, as a matter of law, have

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granted Plaintiff the payment exception standard, or higher

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subsidy, he requested.

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payment amounts based on HUD’s published fair market rents.

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C.F.R. § 982.503(a).

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at any level between 90 percent and 110 percent of HUD’s published

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fair market rate without HUD approval.

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982.503(b)(1)(i).

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to establish a higher payment standard as a reasonable

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accommodation of a person with a disability.

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982.505(d).

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basic range.6

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110% of HUD’s fair market rate, the higher payment standard could

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also not have exceeded 110%.

PHAs must establish standard voucher
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A PHA may establish a “basic range” standard

24 C.F.R. §

The regulations in effect in 2013 allowed a PHA

24 C.F.R. §

That higher standard, however, had to fall within the
Id.

Thus, because the basic range could not exceed

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Under the current regulations, a PHA may establish an
exception payment standard of up to 120% of the published fair
market rent as a reasonable accommodation of a person with a
disability. 24 C.F.R. § 982.503(b)(1)(iii); 24 C.F.R. §
982.505(d).
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HACLA has submitted evidence that Plaintiff requested an

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exception payment standard of 110% to 120%.

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regulations, HACLA could not have granted Plaintiff the exception

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standard he sought.

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HACLA denied him the exception on the basis of his disability.

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Under the applicable

Plaintiff cannot establish, therefore, that

HACLA could not have provided Plaintiff with the higher

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subsidy payment he sought for a second, independent reason.

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may not make subsidy payments on a dwelling unit that fails to meet

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HUD’s HQS standards as a result of the owner’s failure to maintain
24 C.F.R. § 982.404(a).

A PHA

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the dwelling.

Here, the owner of the

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condo did not remedy the HQS violations at any point between March

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2013 and the termination of the HAP contract.

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was denied because the condo “did not pass the Housing Quality

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Standard of safe and sanitary housing.

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unit in which you are requesting the exception payment standard.”

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(Ex. 516.)

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authority to make any subsidy payment on the condo, it necessarily

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could not have granted Plaintiff’s request to make a higher than

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standard payment.

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therefore, could not have been discriminatory.

As HACLA’s September

You cannot remain in the

In other words, because HACLA did not have the

HACLA’s denial of Plaintiff’s request,

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Plaintiff argues that the condo suffered from HQS deficiencies

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well before the May and June 2013 inspections that triggered the

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final abatement period and, ultimately, termination of the HAP

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contract.7

(Opposition at 11-13.)

Indeed, allegations regarding

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Although Plaintiff attaches various notices of failures as
(continued...)
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the habitability issues at the condo formed the basis of

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Plaintiff’s first federal lawsuit.

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Plaintiff is correct, however, those facts do not help him.

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HACLA was authorized to exercise any of its remedies in response to

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HQS deficiencies.

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forbidden from making payments for a dwelling that failed to meet

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HQS standards.

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the condo failed HQS minimums even prior to May 2013, those

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failures would not have provided HACLA with any basis or authority

(See note 4, above.)

24 C.F.R. § 983.208(b)(2).

24 C.F.R. § 982.404(a).

Even if
First,

Second, HACLA was

If, as Plaintiff asserts,

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to make any payments to the condo owner, let alone to grant

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Plaintiff the exception standard he sought of 110 to 120 percent.8

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24 C.F.R. § 982.505(d).

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Because the evidence shows that HACLA did not have the

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authority to grant Plaintiff the extension payment standard he

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requested, HACLA’s denial of that request was not based on

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Plaintiff’s disability.

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B.

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Plaintiff brings a second discrimination claim based upon

New Voucher Extension

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HACLA’s denial of his June 2014 request for a fourth extension of

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his new voucher.

Under HUD regulations, the initial term of a

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(...continued)
exhibits to the Motion, Defendants object that those exhibits are
not properly authenticated.
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Plaintiff’s argument that he completed an exception payment
standard request on June 1 and delivered it to HACLA on June 4
fails for similar reasons. Even if Plaintiff is correct that he
applied on that earlier date, rather than on June 10, there is no
dispute that HACLA made no payments to the condo owner after June
1, and did not have authority to do so unless and until the condo
owner remedied the HQS deficiencies. There is no dispute that the
owner never did so.
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housing subsidy voucher must be at least sixty days.

24 C.F.R. §

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982.303(a).

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accommodation of a disability, the PHA “must extend the voucher

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term up to the term reasonably required for that purpose.”

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C.F.R. § 982.303(b)(1).

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generous in establishing reasonable initial search terms and

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subsequent extensions for families with a member who is a person

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with a disability.”

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While there is no maximum extension period, PHAs must approve

If a voucher extension is needed as a reasonable

HUD policies encourage PHAs “to be

(HUD Notice PIH 2013-19, Ex. 529 at 7.).

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extensions in accordance with their administrative plan.

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PHAs may not extend voucher terms indefinitely.

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(Id.)

(Id.)

HACLA’s administrative plan provides for the requisite 60 day

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minimum voucher term.

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including a person with a disability, HACLA’s administrative plan

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allows the voucher to be “extended in increments of 60 days up to a

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term reasonably required . . . but not to exceed 240 cumulative

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days unless the Section 8 Director approves an additional 30-day

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extension in writing.”

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administrative plan provides for a maximum extension period of 270

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days.

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(Ex. 527 at 10.1.)

(Id. at 10.2.2.)

In the case of a family

Thus, HACLA’s

Here, there is no dispute that Plaintiff received the maximum

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possible 270-day extension of his new voucher.

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that he should have been allowed “sufficient time to locate a

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suitable housing that would accommodate his disabilities and accept

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Plaintiff’s emotional support animals in a manner consistent with

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his disability.”9

(Opp. at 17.)

Plaintiff argues

There is no dispute here that

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Plaintiff also argues, however, that he “declined the new
(continued...)
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Plaintiff is disabled, or that he was entitled to a reasonable

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accommodation.

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the bounds for those accommodations, consistent with HUD guidance.

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That guidance forbids HACLA from granting the type of indefinite

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extension to which Plaintiff appears to argue he was entitled.

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reasonable trier of fact could conclude that, by giving Plaintiff

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the maximum term reasonable accommodation provided for in its

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administrative plan, HACLA discriminated against Plaintiff on the

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basis of his disability, particularly in light of the evidence that

HACLA’s administrative plan, however, establishes

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Plaintiff did not submit a single rental application during the

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entirety of the 270-day extended term.

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Because HACLA is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s

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disability discrimination claims, which are the basis for

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Plaintiff’s retaliation claim, summary judgment on that claim is

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warranted as well.

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IV. Conclusion

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For the reasons stated above, Defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgement is GRANTED.10

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Dated: September 30, 2016
DEAN D. PREGERSON
United States District Judge

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(...continued)
voucher to relocate.”

(Opp. at 15.)

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Plaintiff’s Request to file Surreply (Dkt. 84) is denied.
In any event, the contents of Plaintiff’s proposed surreply would
not affect the court’s reasoning.
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