ITN Flix, LLC et al v. Gloria Hinojosa et al

Filing 89

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES 76 81 by Judge Otis D. Wright, II. Therefore, the Court finds that the rationale articulated in its May 13, 2015 Order for dismissing Plaintiff's seventh claim for violation of the Lanham Act does not provide a proper basis to conclude that the instant action is "exceptional" for purposes of awarding attorneys' fees. For the reasons discussed above, the Court DENIES Defendants' Motions for Attorneys' Fees. (ECF Nos. 76 , 81 .) IT IS SO ORDERED. (lom)

O

1
2
3
4
5

United States District Court
Central District of California

6
7
8
9

Plaintiff,

10
11

Case № 2:14-cv-8797-ODW(RZx)

ITN FLIX, LLC; GIL MEDINA,
v.

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’

12

GLORIA HINOJOSA; AMSTEL,

MOTIONS FOR ATTORNEYS’

13

EISENSTADT, FRAZIER & HINOJOSA

FEES [76] [81]

14

TALENT AGENCY; ROBERT

15

RODRIGUEZ; MACHETE KILLS, LLC;

16

CHINGON, INC.; TROUBLEMAKER

17

STUDIOS, L.P.; QUICK DRAW

18

PRODUCTIONS, LLC; MACHETE’S

19

CHOP SHOP, INC.,

20
21

Defendants.
I.

INTRODUCTION

22

The instant action arises from a business dispute involving independent film

23

producer Gil Medina and tough-guy character actor Danny Trejo. Medina wrote,

24

developed, and promoted the film “Vengeance” starring Trejo. However, Medina and

25

ITN Flix, LLC alleged that the film failed because “Machete” and “Machete Kills”

26

director Robert Rodriguez and talent agent Gloria Hinojosa conspired to prevent its

27

release. Medina and the company filed suit against Rodriguez, Hinojosa, Amstel

28

Eisenstadt, Frazier, & Hinojosa Talent Agency (“AEFH”), Machete Kills, LLC,

1

Chingon, Inc., Troublemaker Studios, L.P., Quick Draw Productions, LLC, and

2

Machete’s Chop Shop, Inc. (“related entity Defendants”).

3

Defendants moved to strike and dismiss the Complaint. The Court granted

4

Defendants’ Motions. As a result, Defendants now seek attorneys’ fees incurred to

5

obtain dismissal. For the reasons discussed below, the Court DENIES Defendants’

6

Motions for Attorneys’ Fees.1 (ECF Nos. 76, 81)

7

II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

8

On November 13, 2014, Plaintiffs filed suit against Defendants, alleging: (1)

9

intentional interference with contract; (2) intentional interference with economic

10

relations; (3) intentional interference with prospective economic advantage; (4)

11
12
13
14
15

intentional interference with economic relations; (5) intentional interference with
prospective economic advantage; (6) unjust enrichment; (7) violation of Lanham Act;
(8) violation of California Business and Professional Code Section 17200, et seq.; and
(9) negligence.2 (Compl. ¶¶ 68–116.)
Defendants Rodriguez and related entity Defendants filed a Motion to Strike

16
17

Pursuant to California’s Anti-SLAPP Statute and a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’

18

Seventh Claim for Violation of Lanham Act Section 43(a), and Defendants Hinojosa

19

and AEFH filed a Motion to Dismiss. (ECF Nos. 32, 34, 36.)

20

On May 13, 2015, the Court granted all three Motions and dismissed the

21

Complaint. (ECF No. 75.) On May 27, 2015, Plaintiffs appealed the Court’s decision

22

to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. (ECF No. 77.) That same day, Defendants

23

Rodriguez and related entity Defendants filed a Motion for Attorneys’ Fees as the

24

Prevailing Party on Plaintiffs’ Seventh Claim for Violation of Lanham Act Section

25
26
27
28

1

After carefully considering the papers filed in support of and in opposition to the Motion, the Court
deems the matter appropriate for decision without oral argument. Fed. R. Civ. P. 78; L.R. 7-15.
2
Plaintiffs’ third and fifth causes of action are the same, but the third is asserted “against Rodriguez
and the Rodriguez entity defendants” and the fifth is asserted against “Hinojosa and AEFH.” (Id.
¶¶ 83, 96.)

2

1

43(a). (ECF No. 76.) Defendants seek attorneys’ fees in the amount of $28,066. (A

2

Mot. 2.) On June 15, 2015, Defendants AEFH and Hinojosa filed a Motion for

3

Attorneys’ Fees on the same grounds. (ECF No. 81.) Defendants seek attorneys’ fees

4

in the amount of $17, 452.13. (B Mot. 2.3)

5

III.

LEGAL STANDARD

6

The Lanham Act permits an award of reasonable attorney’s fees to the

7

prevailing party in “exceptional cases.” 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a). However, the Lanham

8

Act does not define what makes a case “exceptional.” Stephen W. Boney v. Boney

9

Services, Inc., 127 F.3d 821, 825 (9th Cir. 1997). “Under the Lanham Act, an award

10

of attorney's fees is within the district court's discretion . . . [and] should be reviewed

11
12
13
14
15
16
17

for an abuse of discretion.” Stephen W. Boney, Inc. v. Boney Servs., Inc., 127 F.3d
821, 825 (9th Cir.1997). The “determination that a trademark case is exceptional is a
question of law for the district court, not the jury.” Watec Co., Ltd. v. Liu, 403 F.3d
645, 656 (9th Cir.2005). According to the Ninth Circuit, [w]hen a plaintiff’s case is
groundless, unreasonable, vexatious, or pursued in bad faith, it is exceptional, and the
district court may award attorney’s fees to the defendant.” Boney, 127 F.3d at 827;

18

Love v. Associated Newspapers, Ltd., 611 F.3d 601, 615–616 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing

19

Boney factors)).
IV.

20

DISCUSSION

Although Defendants Rodriguez and related entity Defendants and Defendants

21
22

Hinojosa and AEFH filed separate Motions to Dismiss, the Motions are brought and

23

opposed on the same grounds. Thus, the Court will analyze the Motions together,

24

noting any relevant distinctions when necessary.

25

Defendants argue that they are entitled to attorneys’ fees under the Lanham Act

26
27
28

3

Defendants Rodriguez and related entity Defendants and Defendants Hinojosa and AEFH filed
separate Motions for attorneys’ fees. The Court distinguishes the two filings by identifying the
former’s as A and the latter’s as B.

3

1

because Plaintiff’s allegations “bore no cognizable resemblance to a viable Lanham

2

Act claim” and “had nothing to do with consumer confusion, trademarks, trade dress,

3

or any other issues that were remotely implicated by the Lanham Act.” (A Mot. 7; B

4

Mot. 1.) Defendants reason that, because the Court dismissed Plaintiffs’ Complaint,

5

“[t]he Court recognized that there were simply no allegations at all that could have

6

stated a valid claim under the Lanham Act,” and thus “this is one of those exceptional

7

circumstances justifying the award of attorney’s fees and costs to the prevailing

8

defendants.” (A Mot. 8; B Mot. 1.)

9

Plaintiffs contend that “although they lost, the case is nonetheless not

10

‘exceptional’ for purposes of fee shifting.” (Opp’n 1.) Plaintiffs defend their decision

11
12
13
14
15
16
17

to bring the claim as objectively reasonable and note that they did not litigate
vexatiously, act in bad faith, or refuse to engage opposing counsel prior to motion
practice. (Id. at 1–2.) Even if the Court finds that the case is “exceptional” for
purposes of a possible fee award, Plaintiffs contend that “the Court should still
exercise its discretion not to award any fees or to award a reduced amount.” (Id. at 3.)
In its May 13, 2015 Order, the Court determined that the two contracts between

18

Plaintiffs and Trejo were unenforceable because they constituted unlawful restraints

19

on trade pursuant to California and Utah law. (Order 13.) From this, the Court

20

concluded that Plaintiffs’ seventh claim for violation of the Lanham Act could not

21

survive dismissal because Defendants’ alleged liability was premised on a failure to

22

disclose Plaintiffs’ unenforceable contractual rights.

23

Court’s basis for dismissing Plaintiffs’ seventh claim for violation of the Lanham Act.

This was the extent of the

24

Contrary to Defendants’ assertions, the Court did not conclude that Plaintiffs’

25

allegations “bore no cognizable resemblance to a viable Lanham Act claim” and “had

26

nothing to do with consumer confusion, trademarks, trade dress, or any other issues

27

that were remotely implicated by the Lanham Act.” The Court did not even conclude

28

that Plaintiffs’ position as to the enforceability of the contracts was groundless,

4

1

unreasonable, vexatious, or pursued in bad faith. Boney, 127 F.3d at 827; Love, 611

2

F.3d at 615–616 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Boney factors)).
V.

3

CONCLUSION

4

Therefore, the Court finds that the rationale articulated in its May 13, 2015

5

Order for dismissing Plaintiff’s seventh claim for violation of the Lanham Act does

6

not provide a proper basis to conclude that the instant action is “exceptional” for

7

purposes of awarding attorneys’ fees. For the reasons discussed above, the Court

8

DENIES Defendants’ Motions for Attorneys’ Fees. (ECF Nos. 76, 81.)

9
10
11
12
13
14

IT IS SO ORDERED.
July 29, 2015
____________________________________
OTIS D. WRIGHT, II
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

5