Prudent Trust Company Limited et al v. Niania Dabo Touray et al

Filing 26

ORDER DISMISSING ACTION WITHOUT PREJUDICE by Judge Ronald S.W. Lew. SEE ORDER FOR COMPLETE DETAILS. (Made JS-6. Case Terminated.) (jre)

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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 PRUDENT TRUST COMPANY LIMITED; EDI M. O. FAAl, 12 13 14 15 16 17 ) ) ) ) Plaintiffs, ) ) v. ) ) NIANIA DABO TOURAY; ) PRISTINE CONSULTING ) COMPANY, ) ) Defendants. ) ___________________________ ) 2:14-cv-08965-RSWL-MAN ORDER DISMISSING ACTION WITHOUT PREJUDICE 18 19 On March 31, 2015, the Court ordered [19] 20 Plaintiffs Prudent Trust Company Limited and Edi M. O. 21 Faal (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) to show cause by 22 April 10, 2015, as to why this Action should not be 23 dismissed for lack of prosecution. Plaintiffs 24 initiated this Action on November 19, 2014, and as of 25 March 31, 2015, Plaintiffs had not filed proofs of 26 service for remaining Defendants Niania Dabo Touray and 27 Pristine Consulting Company (collectively, 28 “Defendants). See Dckt. # 1; Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). 1 1 On April 10, 2015, Plaintiffs filed a response [23] 2 to the Court’s Order [19]. In Plaintiffs’ response, 3 Plaintiffs’ attorney, Mr. Ronald G. Kim (“Mr. Kim”), 4 declares that Plaintiffs served Niania Dabo Touray and 5 Pristine Consulting Company on April 3, 2015. 6 Decl. ¶¶ 3, 4, ECF No. 23. Kim Mr. Kim explains that 7 Defendant Niania Dabo Touray was served by email on 8 April 3, 2015, due to her unknown location and cites 9 Rio Properties, Inc. v. Rio Int’l Interlink, 284 F.2d 10 1007, 1018 (9th Cir. 2002) for the contention that 11 electronic service is proper “where service cannot be 12 made by other means and the e-mail does not bounce 13 back.” Kim Decl. ¶ 3. Mr. Kim declares that Defendant 14 Pristine Consulting Company (“Pristine”) was served on 15 April 3, 2015, by certified mail with return receipt 16 requested, as well as by email on April 8, 2015, at an 17 address in Virginia, and that the late service of 18 process on Defendant Pristine was due to Plaintiffs’ 19 diligence in “attempting to effectuate service . . . by 20 Hague Convention on Defendant [Pristine] at its office 21 in Gambia.” 22 23 Id. ¶ 4. I. LEGAL STANDARD Rule 4(m) states that “[i]f a defendant is not 24 served within 120 days after the complaint is filed, 25 the court–-on motion or on its own after notice to the 26 plaintiff–-must dismiss the action without prejudice 27 against the defendant or order that service be made 28 within a specified time.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). 2 Rule 1 4(m) requires the court to extend the time for service 2 to be made “if the plaintiff shows good cause for the 3 failure” to timely serve the defendant. 4 P. 4(m). Fed. R. Civ. Rule 4(m) “does not apply to service in a 5 foreign country under Rule 4(f) or 4(j)(1).” 6 Additionally, courts have the “inherent power to 7 achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of 8 cases by dismissing actions for failure to prosecute.” 9 Chase v. Gen. Growth Prop. Corp., No. CV 10 07-3405-JVS(E), 2008 WL 622036, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 11 28, 2008); see Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 63012 32 (1962) (noting that courts have the inherent 13 authority “to clear their calendars of cases that have 14 remained dormant because of the inaction or 15 dilatoriness of the parties seeking relief”). 16 II. DISCUSSION 17 A. Defendant Touray 18 Here, Plaintiffs served Defendant Niania Dabo 19 Touray on April 3, 2015, by email because Defendant 20 Touray’s residence is unknown, as she allegedly “‘fled 21 from The Gambia in July 2014.’” Kim Decl. ¶ 4. 22 Plaintiffs assert that service by email was proper here 23 under Rule 4 and Ninth Circuit precedent. See id. 24 However, the case Plaintiffs cite in support of their 25 e-service on Defendant Touray holds, contrary to 26 Plaintiffs’ contention, that “email service is not 27 available absent a Rule 4(f)(3) court decree,” which, 28 in this case was never requested by Plaintiffs. 3 Rio 1 Properties, 284 F.3d at 1018; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 2 4(f)(3). As such, Plaintiffs’ service by email on 3 Defendant Touray is improper. 4 While Rule 4(m)’s 120-day deadline does not apply 5 to foreign service on an individual under Rule 4(f), 6 Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m), Plaintiffs have not shown any 7 attempt at proper service on Defendant Touray under 8 Rule 4(f). Though the Ninth Circuit in Lucas v. 9 Natoli, 936 F.2d 432, 432-33 (9th Cir. 1991) held that 10 the 120-day service deadline in Rule 4(m) was 11 inapplicable to successful service in a foreign country 12 under Rule 4(j), Lucas is distinguishable. 13 In Lucas, the Plaintiffs had successfully served 14 the defendants under Rule 4(j) eleven months after the 15 complaint was filed. 936 F.2d at 432. The only 16 question on appeal was “whether the requirement of Fed. 17 R. Civ. P. 4(j) that the complaint be served within 120 18 days after filing applies to service in a foreign 19 country.” Id. Lucas should not be extended beyond its 20 holding--that successful service of process under Rule 21 4(j) is proper because the Federal Rules do not impose 22 a specific deadline on service of process under Rule 23 4(j)(1) or 4(f). 24 432-33. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m); 936 F.2d at Lucas does not speak to the court’s inherent 25 discretion to move a case along when a plaintiff fails 26 to serve a defendant, even a foreign defendant, with 27 reasonable diligence. See, e.g., O’Rourke Bros. Inc. 28 v. Nesbitt Burns, Inc., 201 F.3d 948, 952 (7th Cir. 4 1 2000) (“It may well be that the provision for dismissal 2 without prejudice under Rule 4(m) does not apply when 3 service is attempted in a foreign country, but it does 4 not follow that a court is left helpless when it wants 5 to move a case along.”). 6 Here, unlike in Lucas, Plaintiffs have not 7 successfully served Defendant Touray under any 8 subsection of Rule 4. Plaintiffs have also failed to 9 even attempt proper service on Defendant Touray, as 10 email is not an appropriate method of service of 11 process absent a requested court order. Plaintiffs 12 have no excuse for failing to abide by Rule 4’s 13 requirements; both Rule 4 and Ninth Circuit precedent, 14 including the Ninth Circuit case cited by Plaintiffs in 15 their Response [23] to the Order to Show Cause, clearly 16 state that a court order must be sought prior to 17 serving a defendant by email. 18 Because Plaintiffs failed to even attempt proper 19 service on Defendant Touray under Rule 4 after the 20 Court’s Order to Show Cause, the Court finds that cause 21 has not been shown as to why this case should not be 22 dismissed for failure to prosecute and finds 23 Plaintiffs’ actions dilatory. As such, the Court, by 24 its inherent power to manage its cases, HEREBY 25 DISMISSES without prejudice Defendant Niania Touray 26 from this Action. 27 B. See Link, 370 U.S. at 630-32. Defendant Pristine Consulting Company 28 5 1 Plaintiffs untimely1 served Defendant Pristine 2 Consulting Company (“Pristine”), which the Court 3 understands to be a foreign corporation with a Virginia 4 location,2 on April 3, 2015, by certified mail with 5 return receipt requested, at Pristine’s Virginia office 6 address; and by email, on April 8, 2015. Kim Decl. ¶ 4. 7 Plaintiffs’ excuse for their late service of 8 process on Pristine is Plaintiffs’ “diligence” in 9 “attempting to effectuate service . . . by Hague 10 Convention on Defendant [Pristine Consulting Company] 11 at its office in Gambia.” 12 untenable. Id. ¶ 4. Such an excuse is First, Gambia is not a signatory to the 13 1965 Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial 14 and Extrajudicial Documents (“Hague Convention”). If 15 Plaintiffs were, in fact, being diligent, that fact 16 would have become evident via a quick internet search. 17 However, because Plaintiffs claim they “recently 18 discovered that Defendant PRISTINE has an office 19 located in the State of Virginia,” Kim Decl. ¶ 4, 20 Plaintiffs have provided a sufficient excuse to survive 21 dismissal if Plaintiffs’ service of process is proper 22 under Rule 4(h). 23 Rule 4(h), which governs service on a domestic or 24 foreign corporation states in relevant part that a 25 1 Rule 4(m)’s 120-day deadline applies to service of process Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(h); Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). 26 under Rule 4(h). 27 2 28 See https://sccefile.scc.virginia.gov/Find/Business; http://pristineconsulting.com. 6 1 corporation served in the United States must be served 2 “in the manner prescribed by Rule 4(e)(1) for serving 3 an individual.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(h)(1). Rule 4(e)(1) 4 states in relevant part that service must be made 5 “following state law for serving a summons in an action 6 brought in courts of general jurisdiction in the state 7 where the district court is located or where service is 8 made.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(1). As such, Plaintiffs’ 9 service of process on Defendant Pristine is proper if 10 it complies with either Virginia or California law. 11 1. California Law 12 For mailed service of process on a corporate party, 13 California law requires the mailing to be addressed to 14 an individual and not merely to the corporate party. 15 Cal. Code Civ. P. §§ 415.30, 415.40, 416.10. Section 16 416.10 of the California Code of Civil Procedure states 17 that service on a corporate party must be addressed 18 “[t]o the president or other head of the corporation, a 19 vice president, a secretary or assistant secretary, a 20 treasurer or assistant treasurer, a general manager, or 21 a person authorized by the corporation to receive 22 service of process.” Cal. Code Civ. P. § 416.10; see 23 Cruz v. Fagor Am., Inc., 52 Cal. Rptr. 3d 862, 867-68 24 (Ct. App. 2007); see also Cal. Code Civ. P. § 417.20 25 (requiring that, when service is made by mail pursuant 26 to Section 415.40, “proof of service shall include 27 evidence satisfactory to the court establishing actual 28 7 1 delivery to the person to be served, by a signed return 2 receipt or other evidence”). 3 Here, Plaintiffs’ Proofs of Service for Pristine 4 [20, 24] fail to identify an individual to which the 5 summons and complaint were mailed, but, instead, 6 mention only the corporate entity. Proof of Serv. ¶ 3, 7 ECF No. 20; Proof of Serv. ¶ 3, ECF No. 24. Plaintiffs 8 have also failed to supply the Court with any “evidence 9 satisfactory to the court establishing actual delivery 10 to the person to be served.” Cal. Code Civ. P. § 11 417.20; see Cruz, 52 Cal. Rptr. at 868-69; see Ramos v. 12 Homeward Residential, Inc., 168 Cal. Rptr. 3d 114, 12013 21 (Ct. App. 2014) (holding that failure to identity 14 the person to be served, which means an individual and 15 not a corporate entity, and failure to provide evidence 16 that an individual actually received the summons, 17 resulted in insufficient service of process on a 18 corporation under California’s Code of Civil 19 Procedure). As Plaintiffs’ Proofs of Service were 20 filed April 10, 2015, the Court has given Pristine 21 sufficient time to return a signed receipt, but, to 22 date, no signed receipt has been provided by 23 Plaintiffs. 24 See Cruz, 52 Cal. Rptr. at 868-70. As such, Plaintiffs’ service on Defendant Pristine 25 is insufficient under California law. See Ramos, 168 26 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 120-21. 27 2. Virginia Law 28 8 1 Virginia law allows substituted service on a 2 corporation, domestic or foreign, by service on one of 3 various permissible persons, but not merely on the 4 corporate entity itself. Va. Code § 8.01-3013; Va. Code 5 § 13.1-766 (allowing substituted service on a 6 corporation’s authorized agent or the clerk of the 7 Commission); Va. Code § 13.1-928 (same); Va. Code § 8 8.01-329 (allowing service “on any agent of such person 9 . . . or on the Secretary of the Commonwealth of 10 Virginia”); see Junk v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 24 11 F. Supp. 716 (W.D. Va. 1938) (“Corporations can act 12 only through agents and service upon a corporation can 13 be only upon some individual who is the agent of the 14 3 “[S]ervice of process on a 15 effected in the following manner: foreign corporation may be 1. By personal service on any officer, director or on the 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 registered agent of a foreign corporation which is authorized to do business in the Commonwealth, and by personal service on any agent of a foreign corporation transacting business in the Commonwealth without such authorization, wherever any such officer, director, or agents be found within the Commonwealth; 2. By substituted service on a foreign corporation in accordance with §§ 13.1-766 and 13.1-928, if such corporation is authorized to transact business or affairs within the Commonwealth; 3. By substituted service on a foreign corporation in accordance with § 8.01-329 or by service in accordance with § 8.01-320, where jurisdiction is authorized under § 8.01-328.1, regardless of whether such foreign corporation is authorized to transact business within the Commonwealth; or 4. By order of publication in accordance with §§ 8.01-316 and 8.01-317 where jurisdiction in rem or quasi in rem is authorized, regardless of whether the foreign corporation so served is authorized to transact business within the Commonwealth. Va. Code § 8.01-301. 9 1 corporation.”). Thus, under the same analysis set out 2 above, Plaintiffs failed to properly serve Defendant 3 Pristine under Virginia law, as Plaintiffs do not 4 provide any evidence that one of the various 5 permissible persons under Virginia law was served with 6 Pristine’s service of process. 7 Plaintiffs’ service on Defendant Pristine is not 8 only untimely but also improper under Rule 4. Though 9 Plaintiffs may have an excuse for untimely service on 10 Pristine, Plaintiffs have no excuse for improperly 11 serving Pristine. As such, the Court finds that 12 Plaintiff has failed to show cause as to why this 13 Action should not be dismissed as against Defendant 14 Pristine, and, thus, Defendant Pristine Consulting 15 Company is HEREBY DISMISSED without prejudice. 16 17 III. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, this Action is HEREBY 18 DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for failure to prosecute. 19 20 IT IS SO ORDERED. 21 22 DATED: May 13, 2015 23 HONORABLE RONALD S.W. LEW Senior U.S. District Judge 24 25 26 27 28 10

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