Benjamin Anderson v. Marion E. Spearman

Filing 6

ORDER SUMMARILY DISMISSING CASE by Judge John A. Kronstadt. (See document for details). Case Terminated. Made JS-6. (ib)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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BENJAMIN ANDERSON,
Petitioner,

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vs.
MARION E. SPEARMAN, Warden,
Respondent.

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CASE NO. CV 14-9835 JAK (RZ)
ORDER SUMMARILY DISMISSING
HABEAS ACTION

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Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States

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District Courts provides in part that “[i]f it plainly appears from the face of the petition and

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any exhibits annexed to it that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court, the

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judge shall make an order for its summary dismissal and cause the petitioner to be

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notified.” Because Petitioner seeks a state-law-based resentencing for which he was and

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is plainly ineligible, the Court will dismiss this habeas petition summarily.

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In 2004, having just been convicted of a “Third Strike” felony, namely a

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second degree (unarmed) robbery, Petitioner was sentenced to 30 years to life in prison.

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See Pet. ¶ 2. In 2012, California voters enacted Proposition 36, the Three Strikes Reform

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Act of 2012 (the Act or Prop 36). See generally People v. Yearwood, 213 Cal.App.4th 161,

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167, 151 Cal.Rptr.3d 901 (2013). The Act permits some “Third Strike” prisoners to

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receive a “Second Strike” resentencing if they meet certain criteria. One such requirement

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is that the most recent offense must not be a “serious” or “violent” felony as defined by

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CAL. PENAL CODE section 667.5(c) or section 1192.7(c).

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§ 1170.126(e)(1). Petitioner unsuccessfully petitioned for resentencing in the state courts

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and now seeks habeas relief in this Court. In his two enumerated claims, Petitioner asserts

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(1) that the trial court wrongfully excluded evidence, among other assertions, and (2)

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denied him equal protection of the laws because one named other person, allegedly

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similarly situated to Petitioner, was granted relief under the Act.

CAL. PENAL CODE

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Petitioner’s claims are plainly infirm because “any robbery” is included in the

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state’s statutory listings of both “serious” and “violent” felonies. CAL. PENAL CODE

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§§ 667.5(c)(9) (“any robbery” is a “violent felony”), 1192.7(c)(19) (“robbery or bank

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robbery” is a “serious felony”). The trial court expressly relied upon this exclusion in

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rejecting Petitioner’s bid for resentencing. See Ex. A to Mem. The state courts’ rejection

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of resentencing relief, for which Petitioner was ineligible under the plain text of the Act,

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neither violated nor unreasonably applied any United States Supreme Court precedent.

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More specifically, Claim 1 is infirm because no wrongfully-excluded evidence, had it been

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admitted, could have changed the fact that Petitioner’s third-strike robbery makes him

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ineligible for relief as a matter of law. Claim 2 is infirm because James Simon, the other

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person to whom Petitioner points as being “similarly situated” (and who did obtain Prop

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36 resentencing), most recently was convicted of possessing a controlled substance, CAL.

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PENAL CODE § 11350(a), not robbery. See unpaginated exhibit to Request of Judicial

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Notice. Although Simon’s crime is a felony, it is not among those listed as “violent” or

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“serious.” He is not “similarly situated” to Petitioner. Habeas relief is unavailable.

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For the foregoing reasons, the Court DISMISSES the action with prejudice.

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DATED: 1/13/15

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JOHN A. KRONSTADT
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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